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Abstract. 
Through an engagement with Gilles Deleuze's philosophy of  the cinema, this 
thesis explores how the notion of  labyrinthine time is represented differently in 
movement- and time-images. Part I contrasts the different types of  subject that 
are created in the narratives of  the two types of  image. This begins with an 
exploration of  the philosophical conceptions of  time behind the two images and 
the subjects they create. Chapter two focuses on the role of  memory in the 
creation of  these subjects, drawing on the works of  Henri Bergson, and using 
films by Hitchcock and Fellini. The third chapter delves into the recent re-
emergence of  the debate over spectator positioning, and questions what Deleuze 
can offer this field. Here the thesis most comprehensively negotiates its place 
within the field of  film studies, through its interaction with psychoanalytical 
theories of  the subject, and the debate over what exactly constitutes suture. 
Part II focuses on the movement-image. In particular it explores characters' 
attempts to perform their present identities differently, by falsifying their past 
and taking a new direction through the labyrinth oftime. Chapters four and five 
analyse the way in which this performativity is represented in, Sliding Doors, 
Run Lola Run,  The Talented Mr Ripley and Memento. These recent films are 
seen to draw a broad distinction between female performativity, which is 
sanctioned, but only for a brief  while, and male performativity, which is 
represented as getting away with murder. Movement-images are thus found to 
uphold a very traditional gender binary, by reterritorializing the labyrinth's 
subversive potential into a legitimizing straight line and its marginalized, 
labyrinthine other. This is a conclusion that had already been suggested in 
chapter three. 
The thesis concludes in chapter six, with a return to concerns that arose in the 
first chapter. It examines how the historical and metaphysical context in which 
the movement- and time-image emerge has ensured the continued global 
dominance of  the movement-image. Contents. 
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Preface: On reservations. 
For the Anglo-American film studies scholar, reservations immediately arise 
when reading Gilles Deleuze's cinema texts. Perhaps the most obvious of  these 
are, their veneration of  auteur cinema at the expense of  the popular, and their 
almost complete disregard of  the national and social context into which many of 
the films discussed emerged. Their use of  cinema to form an assemblage with 
philosophy in order to further Deleuze's own conceptual ends will also make 
them inaccessible texts for many readers. These caveats notwithstanding, 
however, the 1990s has seen the emergence of  a growing body of  work on 
Deleuze in Anglo-American film studies. After Steven Shaviro's The Cinematic 
Body (1993) came D.N. Rodowick's Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine (1997), and 
Laura U. Marks' The Skin a/the Film, Barbara Kennedy's Deleuze and Cinema, 
and The Brain Is the Screen (a collection edited by Gregory Flaxman) all 
appeared in 2000. 
The problem that all these works had to negotiate, to a greater or lesser degree, 
was how to discuss Deleuze's ideas on cinema, and the ramifications thereof, 
without first having to explain Deleuze's entire philosophical outlook, and the 
position held by the cinema texts in his oeuvre. With interest in Deleuze 
continuing to grow in film studies, however, Deleuzian terminology is slowly 
beginning to gain a common currency, as the works listed above bare witness. 
Moreover, the influence of  De  leuze on disciplines which have common ground 
with film studies, in particular, theories of  gender and sexuality - such as those 
of  Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, Dorothea Olkowski, Rosi Braidotti et. al. - all 
ensure that his concepts are becoming recognizable (if such a DeleuzianJaux pas 
can be permitted) to film studies. For these reasons, this work will attempt to 
keep the description of  Deleuze's philosophy to a minimum, and concentrate 
instead on the way in which it can help us to understand cinema. 7 
That said, and although this work remains on a somewhat abstract, or 
universalized plane - ensuring that, like Deleuze's work, it has difficulty 
negotiating its conclusions in respect of  national and cultural contexts - it is not 
meant as an all-encompassing theory of  cinema. Indeed, the bias towards 
European art cinema and the Hollywood mainstream which informs the work is 
obvious. The exploration of  the subjectivities that are created in the narratives of 
these films, then, is typically "western" in orientation. The conclusions that this 
work draws would not, for instance, be applicable to most third, or diasporic 
cinemas. Indeed, it could not even be said to represent all the cinemas that are 
produced in Europe, particularly Southern and Eastern Europe, and is certainly 
not nuanced enough to be applied to African or Asian cinemas. The rather 
curious Deleuzian monster 
1 that this work creates, then, is an assemblage of 
Anglo-American film studies, the French philosophies of  De  leuze, Lyotard and 
Foucault, and a range of  predominantly American and western European films. 
The common link between the disparate approaches upon which this thesis 
draws is their obsession with negotiating the construction of  gender, sexuality 
and subjectivity in relation to the law. 
Neither is the discussion of  cinema which this work undertakes, whilst it deals in 
grandiose, universal terms like those of  the time- and the movement-image, 
meant as a replacement for the many different trajectories that already exist in 
film studies. In fact, it is perhaps best seen as a bifurcation of  the direction which 
the works cited above have already taken within film studies. The discussion 
which follows utilizes Deleuze's thoughts on time in order to analyse the way in 
which character subjectivity is constructed in certain types of  film narrative. It 
also attempts to understand the reason why certain constructions of  the subject 
are represented in specific ways by "western" cinema as a whole. It is for this 
reason that whilst it occasionally rubs up against already existing theories within 
film studies, such as those informed by psychoanalysis, it is in order to 
draw parallels and contrasts between the two that this is done. The Deleuzian 
approach does not replace these already existing positions, then, but rather, 
provides a slightly different temporal framework within which to re-examine 
them. It is, partly at least, for this reason that certain areas of  film studies will be approached using the Deleuzian mode~  but not, by any means, all of  them, as 
only certain areas immediately lend themselves to contrast with such a specific 
work. 
8 
Finally, the work's emphasis on narrative over other, typically cinematic 
concerns, such as the use of  sound, cinematography, mise-en-scene, and editing 
is determined by its desire to focus most heavily on character subjectivity within 
the narrative. This is not to suggest that such an analysis of  cinema cannot be 
undertaken from a Deleuzian perspective, just that this one does not. 
1 For Deleuze on the creation of  the monstrous, see Deleuze, Gilles, Negotiations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 6. 9 
Acknowledgements. 
Throughout the writing of  this work I have been helped by a great number of 
people. I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Dimitris Eleftheriotis, who has 
provided comprehensive advice on all matters academic. For all your help and 
advice on my work, your patience, and for showing me the human face of 
academia, I feel that lowe you a great many thanks. I must also extend my 
gratitude to John Caughie for his additional supervision, and to both Julianne 
Pidduck and Ian Garwood for suggesting new theoretical directions. Indeed, to 
all three, for help, advice and encouragement generally, I am very grateful. I am 
also especially grateful for the help of  both David Rodowick and Bill Marshall 
who acted as examiners. Thanks for reading the finished thesis, for the 
meticulous attention to detail which you showed in suggesting corrections, and 
above all, for a particularly stimulating and productive discussion of  my work. 
Then there are the innumerable friends and colleagues who have been around 
throughout the four years, with support, advise, criticism, and friendship. My 
thanks go to: Johnny Murray, Rebecca Robinson, Sarah Smith, Sarah Neely, 
Davie Archibald, Phil Drake, Gary Needham, Belen Vidal, Jennifer Gourlay, 
Dickon Copsey, Simon Jones, Tina Kendall, Gordon Hush, Krin Gabbard, Jane 
Allan, Damian Sutton, Ian Revie, Carmine Mezzacappa, Lynn Buchanan, Sarah 
Nelson, Graham Sutherland, Michael Papapostolou, Patrick Langley, Nathalie 
Aylward Marchant and Annie Ritchie. Finally, thanks to my family for being so 
supportive of  me, especially as I have scantly repaid you with my prolonged 
absences. Thanks mum, and thanks dad. Without the support of  these people the 
work would certainly not have progressed as it did, or been as broad in its 
outlook as it finally became. My thanks also to the staff  and students at Glasgow 
University's Department of  Theatre, Film and TV, and the Glasgow School of 
Art's Department of  Historical and Critical Studies. Trying out my ideas in these 
various environments was instructive in more ways than I can list. Finally, 
thanks to the Arts and Humanities Research Board for the funding which made 
this study possible. Part I. 
Both Time and Movement. 11 
1. Ungrounding Cinema. 
In the preface to Cinema 1, Deleuze clearly states that: 'This study is not a history of 
the cinema'l. Yet, together Deleuze's cinema texts do seem to create a certain kind 
of  history of  cinema. Admittedly this view ofthe texts may be due to the fact that 
film studies shifted its contextual approach to cinema, incidentally around the time 
of  the publication of  De  leuze's texts, from a primarily theoretical, to a 
predominantly historical model. It may be that Deleuze's statement is to be taken at 
face value, and that it is the methodological approach to cinema of  film studies 
which insists in seeing the two texts as tracing a history. Whether or not this is the 
case is not the issue here. Rather, we are concerned with what sort ofa history the 
twin texts can be seen to create. 
What is immediately striking about the two texts is their lack of  reference to 
concrete historical events within which to ground the majority ofthe conclusions. 
Consequently, they lack the rigour normally associated in film studies with, say, an 
historical approach to the study of  a national cinema. Their lack of  a specific context 
ensures that what they establish as history appears to claim universal applicability 
for an ill-defmed notion of  "western" cinema
2
• The reason for this is, at least in part, 
due to their double movement, between the disciplines of  film and philosophy. Their 
discussion of  cinema, seemingly a little out of  place in contemporary film studies, 
needs to be understood as developing in conjunction with a broader discussion of 
the evolution of  the twentieth century's 'image ofthought,3. The cinema texts, then, 
chart the  history of  the changing philosophical understanding of  our relation to 
movement and time, in the last century, as it has been expressed in cinema. 
As a consequence of  this double movement, Deleuze's categories often seem at odds 
with those which already exist in film studies. What Deleuze broadly describes as 12 
the distinction between classical and modem cinema for instance (the movement-
and the time-image respectively) is a classification meant to explain two types of 
cinema which express different conceptions of  time. His choice of  the term classical 
does not indicate solely those films which are marked by the process of  continuity 
editing that can be found in the Classical Hollywood style. Rather, this term is used 
to express a range of  movement-image cinemas, including those of  the French, 
American, Russian and German pre-war montage styles. Deleuze's term, classical, 
refers to the  cinemas which create the image of  thought corresponding to that which 
has characterized the western conception of  time, from antiquity to the present. 
These are the movement-images in which time remains subordinate to movement 
through space. This is a movement usually traced through the actions of  a unified 
subject who evolves within a linear time scheme. In these images the link between 
the subject and the world remains intact. The whole oftime is thought to be 
knowable, and is conceived of  as a spatialized totality. 
The term modem, on the other hand, refers to the time-images which emerged after 
WWII, those which correspond to the change in the image of  thought that occurs 
when the notion of  truth is put into crisis. These are images marked by a 
labyrinthine time and a discontinuous subject, in which time is directly visible in the 
perpetual becoming-actual of  its virtual state. In these images the link between 
subject and world is questionable, due to the way in which time is conceived of  as 
perpetual change, or becoming, an open and expanding, virtual, whole. 
Due to the confusion that Deleuze's works can cause, this study will begin by 
explaining the way in which it conceives of  the cinema texts as functioning 
historically, in order for it to realise its own position in relation to ftlm studies. A 
more in-depth exploration of  the way in which subjectivity is created in the cinemas 
of  the movement- and the time-image will then follow. The two different ways of 
conceiving of  time - as linear evolution, or as labyrinthine falsifying - that characterize the two cinemas being used to explain the two different types of 
subjects which emerge therein. 
13 
Although this approach to the texts will not solve the problem of  their lack of 
contextual specificity per se, it should at least provide some explanation of  how they 
function in relation to the crack, or interval, between the two cinemas. This is the 
crack which Deleuze identifies as having emerged around the time of  WWII. Using 
a model which conceives of  the two cinemas, and indeed, cinema texts, as 
interactive, as opposed to progressive or sequential, this study will build upon the 
already existing meditation on Deleuze and time ofD.N. Rodowick's, Gilles 
Deleuze's Time Machine, with which it shares the most cornmon ground. 
Two Histories. 
Numbered sequentially, Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 suggest a history of  cinema which 
evolves in a linear movement through time. As Andras Balint Kovacs has it, in, 'The 
Film History of  Thought': 'Whether we like it or not, De1euze's model is linear'4. For 
Kovacs: 
The incarnation of  the time-image, then, is also the incarnation of  a goal 
(telos) in the broad cinematographic evolution, the point at which cinema 
arrives at its own consciousness and discovers its "essence".5 
When seen in this way, the cinema texts suggest an evolution of  cinema as an 
expression of  the way in which we think, which reaches its maturity in the modem 
cinema of  the time-image. There seems to be a particularly telling view oftime 
apparent in Kovacs' reasoning, however, in that the teleological aim of  cinema is 
apparently posited by Deleuze in retrospect, and serves as a sort of  originary 14 
'essence' of  cinema. For Kovacs, the time-image was the unstated conclusion to 
which the two texts were leading, which was already inscribed in the fIrst volume, 
in its study ofthe movement-image. In point of fact, this reasoning begs the 
question of  whether Deleuze's history of  cinema is itself linear, or whether Kovacs' 
interpretation imposes linearity upon it in retrospect? Although the self-
consciousness of  cinema certainly did emerge with the reflexivity that characterized 
so many time-images, was this necessarily part of  a linear progression? 
In 'Into the Breach', the piece which immediately follows Kovacs' in The Brain is 
the Screen, Angelo Restivo suggests another way oflooking at the two cinema texts. 
For Restivo the break that occurs between the movement- and the time-image 
should be understood in relation to 'Deleuze's own strongly Foucauldian position,6. 
This reading  suggests that instead of  a linear evolution, the two texts express the 
same type of  shift, or break that occurs between historical epistemes. In this case, 
what emerges in the time-image is the unthought of  the movement-image's thought. 
This unthought emerges as an image oftime which places the truth of  the 
movement-image in crisis, and, by doing so, forces a rethinking of  the linear view of 
time. It also prompts us to question the linear reasoning of  Kovacs' view. 
Restivo also evokes Lyotard's description of  post  modernism, as 'actually something 
which precedes modernism,7, in order to explain the paradoxical emergence ofan 
'incipient postmodernity,8 within certain fIlms which fall in the gap between the 
classical cinema of  the movement-image, and the modem that would later emerge in 
the time-image. Although this may create some confusion over terminology, 
Lyotard's idea that: 
A work can become modem only if  it is fIrst postmodern. Postmodernism 
thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this 
state is constant.
9 15 
is in fact a very useful way of  understanding the interaction between the cinema 
texts
lO
• Although Lyotard's model is meant to express a concrete historical 
development - and one which does not correlate precisely with Deleuze's move from 
the movement- to the time-image - the ungrounding of  the modem that is caused 
when the postmodem emerges can be seen to be an analogous movement to that 
created by the emergence of  the time-image, as the unthought (or becoming-other) 
of  the movement-image. When Lyotard is read in this slightly ahistorical way the 
emergent postmodem exists as the ungrounding of  the modem, much as the 
movement-image is ungrounded, its truth and linear time scheme put into crisis, by 
the falsifying powers of  the time-image's labyrinth. It is in this sense, then, that the 
movement-image can be seen, admittedly in retrospect, as the reterritorialization of 
the time-image, in much the same way as Lyotard contends that the postmodem has 
to: 'be understood according to the paradox of  the future (post) anterior (modo)'ll. 
The time-image's becoming is that which precedes the movement-image's illusory 
form of  being, it is the future which precedes it, its own memory of  the future. Put 
another way, the time-image is the movement-image in its 'nascent state, and this 
state is constant'. 
It  would seem, then, that Kovacs is right to posit a retroactive recovery of  the 
'essence' of  cinema in the time-image, but that this is not an essence in the sense of  a 
ground of  cinema. Rather, it is the ungrounding of  the cinema of  the movement-
image. It  is the discovery of  cinema's emergent unthought, its becoming-other. The 
time-image should thus be seen as the anterior, as that which precedes the 
movement-image, despite its emergence after the movement-image was already well 
established, chronologically speaking. In this way we can see that De1euze's time 
scheme is not a linear one, and the time-image does not herald its, or indeed, 
cinema's, telos, even if  it is 'the point at which cinema arrives at its own 
consciousness'. Instead the "evolution" between the two cinemas is one that is analogous to that of  Foucault's epistemic shift, or Lyotard's postmodern 
ungrounding, into the interval of  which emerges the unthought of  the time-image. 
16 
Already we begin to see that cinema is constantly struggling between the opposing 
pulls of  the active and ungrounding forces which are apparent in the time-image, 
and the reactive forces of  the movement-image. This struggle is, and perhaps always 
will be, won by the conservative forces of  the movement-image, which must always 
posit a reterritorialized form over any suggestion of  a becoming, a straight line over 
every labyrinth. When viewed in this way the cinema texts begin to make a different 
type of  sense than when viewed as progressing in a linear fashion. In fact, they can 
now begin to be read as an expression of  the crisis oflinear thinking that occurs 
when the labyrinthine temporality which is expressed in the time-image emerges in 
the cinema of  the post-war period. Thus, although Deleuze's work does not situate 
itself in relation to a context that is immediately recognizable to film studies (in that 
he does not choose, for instance, to discuss the evolution of  cinemas within specific 
national contexts) his two texts on cinema are thoroughly immersed in the 
philosophical context in which they were written.  12 How to write a history of 
cinema when the very idea of  history has become ungrounded is the question which 
the cinema texts attempt to answer in their two part structure. 
Deleuze chose the end ofWWII as the point at which to situate the break between 
the two texts as it was amongst the rubble of  Europe's major cities that he saw the 
crisis in truth emerge. The creation of'any-space-whatevers,13 in emergent time-
images replaced the determined direction through city spaces that had previously 
distinguished the realist cinema of  the movement-image. Connections between 
spaces became discontinuous, and the ability of  the subject to react to what they 
encountered in these spaces became similarly questionable. 'And thanks to this 
loosening of  the sensory-motor linkage, it is time, 'a little time in the pure state' 
which rises up to the surface of  the screen.'14 It is this emergence ofa new 17 
conception of  time, other than its linear form, which puts the idea that there can be 
one, singular, knowable, "truth" into crisis. With the belief in the realizable 
objective to the subject's movement through space shattered by the war's disregard 
of  space's teleological purpose, how was the subject to conceive of  its own "truth"? 
What happened to a sensory-motor based truth, when the sensory-motor linkage 
came apart? Once the subject of  the movement-image became disconnected from its 
continuous progression through a linear time that was subordinate to movement, its 
contrasting aberrant movement through discontinuous time in the time-image 
caused it to pass through a series of  unconnected spaces (any-space-whatevers). 
This was much as the survivors of  the war appeared to do, in many European films 
of  the immediate post-war period. Truth had suddenly lost its spatial coordinates. 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that once Europe's cities were rebuilt, the 
crisis of  truth ended. The return to dominance of  the movement-image, and the 
dying out of  the time-image in recent years, moreover, should not be read as 
signaling an end to the struggle between the two. With the gradual dissipation of  the 
post-war political crisis in western Europe, the crisis of  truth may have been 
eradicated from our immediate perception of  its spatial expression. This does not, 
however, mean that it is not still an ongoing crisis. Truth is always in crisis 
whenever it encounters its virtual ungrounding, which it does at all times. To 
suggest that Deleuze's texts do not sit within an historical context that we recognize, 
then, perhaps says more about the linear, and paradoxically, "western" view of 
history which film studies employs, than it does about the texts themselves. Truth is 
not just in crisis when the cities of  Europe are in ruins, it is in crisis at all times. The 
fact that, globally, there is always, somewhere, a city that has been reduced to 
rubble can only confirm this fact. Indeed, as Laura Marks
15 points, out, the subject's 
inability to extend its sensory perception into a motor action - that which 
accompanies the creation of  any-space-whatevers in the post-war European, urban 
landscape - is a crisis that perhaps most strongly effects the post-colonial and 
diasporic populations who came to dwell in these cities after the war. The official and indeed, everyday, denial of  the continued existence ofthese smooth spaces 
expresses perfectly the "western" denial of  its culpability in creating them. Truth is 
always in crisis, then, in any number of  ways, and it is the image of  "truth", of 
official history, which obscures this from our view. 
18 
The difficulties that Deleuze causes film studies, then, stresses the difficulty in 
perceiving the universal that film studies now has, due to its tendency towards an 
over-emphasis on the nation as the chosen site from which to explore difference. At 
its worst extreme, this type of  study could be seen to facilitate the return of  a binary 
reasoning which effaces from academic discourse the perpetual crisis that truth 
faces. As this is the crisis which truth must constantly work to efface in order to 
maintain its monolithic identity, this could be seen to make film studies complicit in 
the re-imposition of  the binary reasoning upon which truth is predicated. 
The historical context of  De  leuze's cinema texts is western history itself. In this 
context De1euze's philosophy of  the virtual shows that the creation of  truth, form, 
being, and linear history, is always a process which contains its own immanent 
dissolution. It is always a process of  reactive, and indeed retroactive affirmation that 
ensures linearity and continuity, and this process is always at the point of  its own 
undoing. As we stated previously, the time-image is the movement-image in its 
'nascent state, and this state is constant.' In terms of  cinema narrative, this process of 
ungrounding and reterritorialization is most clearly seen when the temporal 
structures of  the two types of  image are viewed in relation to the subjectivities 
which they create. 
One Cinema. 19 
The cinemas of  the movement- and the time-image are marked by their own, 
specific temporalities. These, in turn, ensure the creation of  two different types of 
subject. At the start of  Cinema 1, Deleuze draws upon and expands his previous 
work on Bergson
16
, in order to trace the development of  Bergson's argument 
concerning time that leads up to the discovery of  the movement-image. In Creative 
Evolution, Bergson argues that the spatializing of  time which we enact in the 
perception of  our everyday lives leads to an illusory conception of  time as 
subordinate to movement. In this illusory model, the virtual and open whole of  time, 
of  duration, is only visible indirectly. The clearest example of  this which Bergson 
gives is his deconstruction ofZeno's paradox of  the arrow17. Using his own 
conception of  time as a duration that endures and which cannot be reduced to spatial 
segments, Bergson was able to show that the false, or illusionary movement which 
Zeno discovers is actually only that which is created when we conceive of  time as 
measurable in space, and as subordinate to movement. 
Zeno's arrow paradox states that, if  an arrow is fired from point A, and traces a 
flight to point B, then to our perception it would appear to have moved from A to B. 
Yet, reasoned Zeno, if  you subdivide the distance traveled in half, it is possible to 
fix a point, halfway between A and B, where, if  you examine the arrow, it will be at 
rest. Because this point is fixed, the arrow will also be fixed, at rest, and immobile. 
Halfway between this point and point A (the point of  departure) there will be a 
similar point where the arrow is, again, at rest. The space travelled by the arrow is, 
in this way, irrfmitely divisible into a series of  points, each one of  which contains 
the arrow at rest. If  the arrow is, then, always at rest (as its position in space will 
always correspond to one of  the points) the paradox is created of  a moving arrow 
that is simultaneously at rest. Despite having covered the ground from A to B, the 
arrow has never moved. 20 
This is only a paradox, however, when considered from what is seen by Bergson as 
a common-sensical view oftime. This is a view which is caused by the necessary 
geometrical division of  space which accompanies everyday life. Indeed this belief, 
that movement, as it appears to us to cross space, is actually divisible, is the notion 
that itself  gave rise to (and is given credence by) the oldest ofphilosophical 
reterritorializations oftime, the Platonic notion of  the originary form. In point of 
fact, Bergson argues, all that Zeno's arrow paradox shows is that you cannot 
construct movement from the immobile. An image of  the moving whole oftime 
cannot be created out of  '  immobile sections'. As Deleuze has it in Cinema 1: 
... you cannot reconstitute movement with positions in space or instants in 
time: that is, with immobile sections. You can only achieve this 
reconstitution by adding to the positions, or to the instants, the abstract idea 
of  a succession, of  a time which is mechanical, homogeneous, universal and 
copied from space, identical for all movements.  18 
All that can be created from this model is an illusion of  movement, in which 
immo  bile sections are given to appear to move, due to the addition of  a time which 
has been 'copied from space'. This model necessitates the subordination oftime to a 
spatialized model that is mechanical, homogeneous, and universal. For Bergson, the 
apparatus of  cinema functions in the way that is apparent in Zeno's reasoning, 
hence, in Creative Evolution,  he described this same false movement as 
cinematographic. Yet, Deleuze points out, the discovery of  the movement-image 
actually emerged in Bergson's work ten years previously, in Matter and  Memory. 
Bergson's condemnation of  the cinema, then, Deleuze reasons, was perhaps based 
upon the infantile state which cinema was in at the time when Bergson wrote 
Creative Evolution. With the development of  montage and the moving camera, 
however, Deleuze argues, cinema: 'immediately gives us a movement-image,19. The 
movement-image is not an illusory image of  time, not a series of  immobile sections 
to which an abstract view of  time is added, but rather, it is an image of  the mobile 
section of  the whole of  time, of  duration, which movement gives us. 21 
Zeno's arrow, as it flies from A to B, can no longer be divided into a succession of 
states, or forms, but can now be seen as expressive of  the mobile section of  time that 
the movement-image captures. As Bergson argues: 
The truth is that if  the arrow leaves the point A to fall down at the point B, 
its movement AB is as simple, as indecomposable, in so far as it is 
movement, as the tension of  the bow that shoots it .... so the arrow which 
goes from A to B displays with a single stroke, although over a certain 
extent of  duration, its indivisible mobility. Suppose an elastic stretched from 
A to B, could you divide its extension?2o 
When viewed temporally the flight of  the arrow is 'indecomposable', a 'single stroke' 
akin to the stretching of  elastic. The movement-image of  the arrow's flight is thus 
one in which an indirect image oftime is created, the whole oftime being expressed 
as the qualitative (as opposed to the quantitative, measurable) 'change in the 
whole,21 that is created by the arrow's movement through space. Time here, 
however, remains subordinate to the movement through space of  the arrow, its 
'indivisible mobility' showing only 'a certain extent of  duration'. The movement-
image is not yet a direct image of  time. This expression of  the virtual movement of 
time itself, which subordinates movement to its labyrinthine bifurcations, still 
awaits, in the time-image. 
Movement-images illustrate blocs of  space-time. They are an indirect expression of 
the virtual whole of  time. They express our desire for a rational continuum, 
provided by a unifying movement through space. The four types of  classical 
cinemas of  the movement-image which Deleuze then classifies, those of  the pre-war 
American, French, German and Soviet cinemas, all have in common their ability to 
express the whole oftime, but in an indirect fashion, through their different uses of 22 
montage. These cinemas all subordinate time to movement, to actions that take 
place in space. As such they are expressions of  already actualized movements, 
rather than of  the virtual movements of  duration itself, through which the actual is 
continually created out of  the virtual. Although these four specific types are distinct 
unto themselves, the classical cinema, if  a general view of  it is taken, seems to 
create one specific type of  subject in its narrative, due to its need to continually 
subordinate time to a movement through space. 
Two Subjects. 
Continuing to follow Bergson, Deleuze theorized the subject as an interval, between 
perception, and the action which they decide to take upon that which is perceived. 
The subject, in this sense, is a 'centre of  indetermination,22 in which affection 
occurs. The subject in cinema is a montage of  perception, affection and action-
images. What marks the representation of  the subject of  the movement-image out as 
distinct from the subject represented in the time-image is the way in which 
perception always leads to action in a continuous, and directly causal, sensory-
motor progression. In short, that which is perceived by the subject represented in the 
movement-image is that which is acted upon, and there is never any question of  this 
sensory-motor continuity being broken. Hence the subject seen in the movement-
image is distinguishable by its organic, continuous form, which evolves in a linear 
fashion, due to its unbroken sensory-motor schema. 
As an example of  this type of  subject, Rodowick discusses the film Sherlock 
Jr.(1924). Of  the dream sequence in which Buster Keaton enters the film which he, 
the projectionist, has fallen asleep watching, Rodowick says: 23 
When Keaton fmds himself on a rock by the ocean, he dives, only to land 
headftrst in a snowbank. Keaton's movements from one shot to the next link 
incommensurable spaces through what modern mathematics calls a 'rational' 
division. The interval dividing any two spatial segments serves 
simultaneously as the end of  the fIrst and the beginning of  the second. In 
Keaton's ftlm, every division, no matter how unlikely and nonsensical, is 
mastered by this ftgure of  rationality where the identiftcation of  movement 
with action assures the continuous unfolding of  adjacent spaces. The 
consequence of this identiftcation is the subordination oftime to 
movement?3 
Time, as an open and changing whole, is expressed indirectly through the 
movements through space of  Keaton, and thus remains subordinate to movement. 
Moreover, it is the subject's actions which enable the ftlm's indirect expression of 
time, witness the protagonist's dive which links the shot ofthe ocean to that of  the 
snowbank. The incommensurable spaces through which he passes (which, in the 
time-image will attain a virtual movement of  their own) are here linked causally by 
the subject's movement from perception to action. The interval which defmes the 
subject is thus 'rational' in that, despite the changing contexts through which it 
appears to move, each action is a direct consequence of  the subject's perception of 
the previous situation. The 'identiftcation of  movement with action' is thus assured 
by the subject's unbroken sensory-motor continuity. 
The subject that we see pass through the different time-spaces is, moreover, always 
the same subject, its linear evolution being enabled by its perpetual reappearance as 
a repetition of  the same. In this way does the subject appear to be a unifted, 
homogeneous, singular, and already actualized form. Sherlock Jr.  illustrates the way 
in which movement in the movement-image proceeds causally, through the actions 
of  the subject, and in so doing produces an indirect image of  time. This subject is 
not yet seen to be caught up in a process of  becoming-other, as a virtual potential that could actualize in any number of  different ways. It is not yet the subject as a 
return of  difference which emerges in the time-image. 
The time-image, by contrast, contains an image of  time which produces a different 
type of  subject. This is a subject whose sensory-motor schema has lost the 
unbroken, causal relation previously seen in the movement-image. The reason for 
this change Deleuze again identifies in the revelations brought about during and 
after WWII. Due to such cataclysmic events as the Stalinist purges, the fmal 
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solution perpetrated by the National Socialists, the nuclear holocausts unleashed 
upon Japan by America, and growing disillusionment with the American Dream, the 
post-war era created a subject who was no longer secure in their ability to react to 
the situations in which they found themselves. This was at once a concrete change, 
as people experienced the awesome powers of  technological destruction which 
made their own actions seem futile in comparison, and also, and equally as 
important, the change in the image of  thought which characterized  the initial years 
of  the cold war era. The second world war saw a shift in the image ofthought, as, if 
we hear from Lyotard once again; 'the Enlightenment narrative, in which the hero of 
knowledge works towards a good ethico-political end - universal peace,24 was 
destroyed by the destructive ends to which knowledge was turned. The teleology of 
the Enlightenment grand narrative was suddenly revealed to be an illusion, with the 
consequence that truth was put into crisis. 
Beyond the ethos exemplified by the belief  encapsulated in the American cinema of 
the action-image (the dominant movement-image of  the pre-war period25) in which 
the individual's ability to alter its situation was beyond doubt, the cinema of  the 
time-image created an image of  thought in which the individual no longer had the 
power to influence its situation. The cinema's previous privileging of  the subject's 
actions through space, its motor reaction to sensory data, were thus replaced by an 
emphasis on its movement through time itself Unable to always react in order to 25 
influence its physical context, the subject became dislocated from the linear 
continuity of  the movement-image's spatializing gesture, and began instead to slip 
through time itself. From a cinema of  the 'agent' to one of'seers,26, the expression of 
time shifted from one in which it was subordinate to action, to the subject's 
movement through space, to one of  'pure optical situations,27 in which time 
appeared in a pure state and the subject could but visually record time's passing. 
Thus it was that amongst the rubble of  Europe's major cities a cinema emerged 
which expressed the crisis of  truth, in which the reason for movement through space 
was no longer derived from action, but from the desire to see, to record. The 
everyday tourism of  films such as Rossellini's Voyage In Italy expressed, for 
Deleuze, the way in which the 'stroll, the voyage and the continual return home,28 
through any-space-whatevers had come to replace the decisive, teleological plot of 
the pre-war action-image. The interval which distinguished this type of  subjectivity, 
in which perception did not-necessarily lead to action, is an irrational, or aberrant 
interval. 
Rodowick uses Chris Marker's Lajetee (1962) as an example of  the direct image of 
duration's perpetual, virtual shifting that is seen in the time-image, and of  the subject 
that exists therein. Suspended in the interval between perception and action, the seer 
of  the time-image, who lacks the ability to act upon what he sees, is figured in the 
film as an immobile, post-holocaust prisoner. He travels through time without 
moving from the  hammock in which he is incarcerated: 
Movement, drained from the image and divorced from the representation of 
action, has relinquished its role as the measure of  time. In La  jetee, the 
image of  time is no longer reduced to the thread of  chronology where 
present, past and future are aligned on a continuum. The painful binding of 
the subject - physically stilled no less than movement is frozen in the image -26 
liberates him briefly in time just as the imaging oftime is released from its 
subordination to movements linked with physical actions. The chronological 
continuum is flayed, shaving past, present, and future into distinct series, 
discontinuous and commensurable. The narrative sections of  the film are 
disconnected spaces, divided into blocks of  time linked in a probabilistic 
manner ... Time no longer derives from movement; 'aberrant' or eccentric 
movement derives from time.  29 
Lacking the ability to extend perception into action, due to his suspended sensory-
motor  condition, the subject begins to travel in time itself, through a series of 
discontinuous images (of  spaces, which are actually times) which are not 
subordinate to his physical movement. Time flows into the interval, suspending 
action, and enabling a direct image of  the virtual whole oftime, of  duration. The 
subject is thus no longer a singular, unified, organic entity, but has become a 
dispersive, discontinuous traveler through time, perpetually in the process of 
becoming-other.
3D 
What dominates on screen is no longer movement across space, but rather the 
movement of  time itself For this reason, the movement of  the subject becomes 
discontinuous, as, with each bifurcation, each labyrinthine fork in time, there 
emerges a different subject, or rather, the subject as a return of  difference. With each 
emergence of  the virtual subject in a new time, the form in which s/he becomes 
actualized is always different. 
Here the need for continuity that characterized the cinema of  the movement-image, 
in line with a retroactive belief  in linear history, is replaced by the need for 
discontinuity, as the irrational cut is employed to express the movement of  time, and 
the shifting nature of  the subject's becoming identity. Movement, and indeed, 
change, is no longer effected in the realm of  the actual, as a motor function, but 27 
rather in the gap opened up during the process of  the becoming-actual ofthe virtual. 
This is the aberrant interval of  the time-image's discontinuous subject. The model of 
time on which this discontinuous, virtual movement is based, is that ofthe labyrinth. 
Two Times. 
In Cinema 2, Deleuze draws on an idea from a short story by Jorge Luis Borges in 
order to explain the functioning of  the labyrinth of  time. This is one of  the models of 
time which he effectively maps onto Bergson's duration (of  which we shall see more 
in chapter two) in order to explain the fact that: 'If  we take the history of  thought, we 
see that time has always put the notion of  truth into crisis,31. Deleuze uses Borges' 
fictional model in order to posit the existence of, what amounts to, multiple 
worlds32. These are parallel worlds which exist (or rather, insist, or subsist) in a 
virtual state, and become actual, in the present, along a series of  infmitely 
bifurcating pathways.33 According to Deleuze, Borges' story, The Garden of 
Forking Paths illustrates the fact that: 
... nothing prevents us from affrrming that incompossibles belong to the 
same world, that incompossible worlds belong to the same universe. 'Fang, 
for example, has a secret; a stranger calls at his door ... Fang can kill the 
intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, they can both escape, they can both die, 
and so forth ... you arrive at this house, but in one of  the possible pasts you 
are my enemy, in another, my friend ...  ' This is Borges' reply to Leibniz: the 
straight line as force oftime, as labyrinth oftime, is also the line which forks 
and keeps on forking, passing through incompossible presents, returning to 
not-necessarily true pasts.  34 
Each bifurcation of  the pathway through the labyrinth leads to two 'incompossible 
presents', two possible, and possibly contradictory, outcomes to anyone situation. In 28 
the labyrinth, this is not, however, a paradox (although it had remained so prior to 
the emergence of  this view of  time) as the potential for both outcomes always exists 
virtually, and are always both played out, albeit in different worlds, in their 
respective becoming-actuals. The past, moreover, becomes 'not-necessarily true' for 
at least one of  the two outcomes. 
If  each present moment is a fork in the path of  time, then not only are there an 
infmite number of  equally plausible presents corresponding to every past, but their 
simultaneous existence ensures that the present-becoming-past from which they 
arose is now not-necessarily true. It  is not-necessarily the specific origin of  the 
particular present in question. Rather than a direct causal chain of  development in 
linear time, the privileging of  one true history, there is the emergence, with each 
fork in the path of  labyrinthine time, of  multiple virtual pasts. These fluctuate in and 
out of  existence depending upon how they are re-aligned by the subject's existence 
in the present. The past is made "true" in the present, looking back, rather than 
through the imposition of  a false origin from which truth originally stemmed. Time, 
labyrinthine time, has thus arrived (as seen in the image of  thought typified by the 
time-image) in the interval which constitutes subjectivity. It is this which allows the 
possibility of  discontinuity, or acausal becoming-other which insists as the 
ungrounding potential of  the linear subjectivity found in the movement-image. This 
is why it is labyrinthine time which puts the singular form of  truth into crisis, and 
suggests a different form of  subject, in the time-image, than that which exists in the 
movement-image. 
The subject of  the time-image is the discontinuous force, the repetition of  the self as 
difference, which ungrounds the unified subject of  the movement-image. The 
movement-image's subject corresponds to the form of  the true, in its perpetual re-
affirmation of  its previous past self, through the retroactive positing of  a series of 
'false', but ultimately legitimizing, origins. This is the process which assures its self-29 
same identity by always returning in the same form. The continual creation of  its 
actual form in this way is, moreover, necessitated by the common-sense view that 
its existence is continuous as it crosses space. The subject of  the time-image, by 
contrast, is defined by its ability to grasp the Nietzschean inspired 'powers of the 
false,35 which the labyrinth makes available. Existing in time as a virtual whole, as 
opposed to in a time that is subordinate to actualized space, this subject is able to 
perform its identity in such a way as to make the past self  that was, that which came 
before, not-necessarily true. This retroactive destruction of  the singular chronology 
of  causality enables their ability to perpetually become-other. 
Two I's. 
Deleuze credits Kant with the discovery of  this schizophrenic subject, and the initial 
movement towards the realization of  the pure form of  time. In his deconstruction of 
Descartes' Cogito, Kant illustrated that the 'I' which Descartes describes is split into 
an I that contemplates (I think) and an I that is (I am). 
For Kant, it is a question of  the form oftime in general, which distinguishes 
between the act ofthe I, and the ego to which the act is attributed ... Thus 
time moves into the subject, in order to distinguish the Ego from the I in it  . 
. .. It is in this sense that time as immutable form, which could no longer be 
defined by simple succession, appeared as the form of  interiority (inner 
sense) whilst space, which could no longer be defmed by coexistence, 
appeared for its part as the form of  interiority. 'Form of  interiority' means not 
only that time is internal to us, but that our interiority constantly divides us 
fr  1  1·,  36  om ourse ves, sp Its us m two ... 
Time, 'no longer defined by simple succession' or subordinate to a movement 
through space as chronological time is, is now, instead, the force which splits the 30 
subject in two. The subject is now both an I that acts, and an Ego that both endures 
and contemplates the I that acts. The implications of  this division of  the subject by 
time was explored more fully by Bergson, who conceived of  the bifurcation in time 
(which corresponds to each fork in the labyrinth of  time) as the point at which time 
splits into a present that passes, and a past that is preserved. The subject, then, is at 
once an actual self  that acts, in the present, and a virtual self  that insists, or subsists, 
as the past. Deleuze quotes Bergson to this effect: 
Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself 
along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image. Every moment of  our life 
presents the two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception on the one side 
and recollection on the other ... Whoever becomes conscious of  the 
continual duplicating of  his present into perception and recollection ... will 
compare himself  to an actor playing his part automatically, listening to 
himself and beholding himselfplaying.
37 
Anyone gaining intuition of  their doubled self  as it splits in time will be aware of 
their becoming-other much as one would who, seeing themselves as other, compares 
themselves to an actor playing a part, or masquerading a role. In this way are the 
binaries which are usually upheld by the subordination oftime to movement, such 
as inside/outside, and self/other, disrupted by the pure form oftime. In the pure 
form of  time the subject is at once both inside and outside, self  and other, virtual and 
actual, recollection and perception, and indeed, past and present. Thus the 
masquerade which the subject is now involved in, the falsifying of  the self, the 
forever making contingent of  the past, is the action of  performativity as a return of 
difference which destroys the linear causality of  the model/copy binary of  chronos. 
As Deleuze theorized in a much earlier work, Difference and Repetition, the 
repetition which belies the subject's existence 'is truly that which disguises itself in 
constituting itself, that which constitutes itself only by disguising itself.  ,38 This new 31 
subjectivity of  the time-image, then, is one which requires a certain amount of 
Nietzschean, liberatory  forgetting, if  it is to succeed. Yet forgetting is only half of 
the process,  for, in order to make the past that was, not-necessarily true, the 
performance of  the subject's identity must allow a double movement to occur, a 
simultaneous 'liberation and capture,39 of  the self  in time. With each split, or fork, in 
the labyrinth of  time the subject is both captured in its virtual memory, in the past, 
and also forgotten (and recreated) for the future, in the actualization of  difference 
that occurs in the present. 
When the masquerading subject returns as difference, its origin, its model, becomes 
disconnected from its present becoming, for: 'masks do not hide anything except 
other masks. There is no first term which is repeated,40. Thus, although the subject 
of  the time-image is continuous in that it insists, or subsists, virtually, it is only as 
this ungrounding force is actualized as the return of  difference that this subject is 
seen to exist in its actualized form. This is the subjectivity of  the aberrant interval 
that we find in the time-image, the discontinuous subject who is becoming-other in 
time. 
The point at which time splits Deleuze terms the 'crystal oftime,41. This is the point 
at which the passing of  the actual present, and the preserving of  the virtual past, 
crystallizes into an image in which the two movements become indiscernible from 
one another. Existing within time's labyrinth, without an objective distance (the 
inside/outside binary no longer holding) from which to view its fundamental 
splitting, it is impossible for us to tell the two movements apart. As Deleuze says: 
'there is no virtual which does not become actual in relation to the actual, the latter 
becoming virtual through the same relation.  ,42 The circuit of  exchange that is set up 
between the two - the virtual-becoming-actual of  the past in its actualization as 
present that passes, and the actual-becoming-virtual ofthe present as it becomes a 
past that is preserved - creating an oscillation in which the double movement of  the subject occurs. It  is perhaps for this reason that certain theories abound which 
theorize subjectivity as a mobius spiral. As seen, in particular, in  Lyotard's 
Libidinal Economy, Grosz's Volatile Bodies and Lingis' Foreign Bodies. In 
Deleuze's crystal it is similarly tempting to theorize the subject as a temporal 
mobius
43
, or perhaps a temporal 'superfolding' of  the virtual whole oftime, or the 
outside. 
32 
Although lacking the double helix shape of  DNA  44 which Deleuze believed would 
possibly characterize this type of  subjectivity, the mob  ius spiral nevertheless seems 
to correspond to the oscillation, or double movement of  the subject in time which is 
to be found in the crystal. This is a subject in which the distinction between outside 
and inside is constantly scrutinized, due to the way in which they both encounter 
each other in their mobius superfolding. With every twist of  the mobius, every fork 
in time which structures Deleuze's peculiarly rhizomatic labyrinth, a new, 
unthought, "face" of  the subject is revealed. In this way does its masquerade cause 
the return of  the subject, ofits-self, in difference. This is the paradoxical 
actualization of  the subject out of  its virtual, subsisting, past, as a memory of  the 
future. Subjectivity in the time-image is definable as the possibility of  an immanent 
ungrounding, and it is this potential which the movement-image has constantly 
worked to reterritorialize, to make subordinate to space and continuity. 
Two Foucaults. 
The idea of  the superfolded outside, and indeed Deleuze's doubling subject, are both 
greatly influenced by his reading of  Foucault's later work, and in particular, 
Foucault's idea that the subject is involved in a process of  self-definition. Deleuze's 
Foucault is a meditation on Foucault's work which contains, amongst other things, 
his own interpretation of  subjectivity as it is found in Foucault's oeuvre. For Deleuze, Foucault's early and later works expressed two slightly different takes on 
the process through which subjectivity was defmed. According to Deleuze, the 
theory of  the subject to be found in his later works, that of'subjectivation,45 was a 
more nuanced development of  Foucault's ideas. Not surprisingly, it is also the one 
which fits in with his own particular notion of  this process. 
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For Foucault, the subject was formed at the site of  interaction between itself and its 
context, as the product of  the relationship between power, the forces of  which 
constructs virtual diagrams, and knowledge, which enabled these virtual diagrams to 
become actualized as forms. For Deleuze, Foucault's subject was the inside that was 
formed when the outside (a term Foucault himself  took from Blanchot) was folded 
in a way that was determined by the forces of  the outside which characterized its 
epistemic conditions. Thus Foucault was able to conceive of  the subject as formed 
in a dynamic relation between self  and context, which eradicated the space of 
representation which normally exists between the two. This was a subject without a 
fixed binary to mark its inside and outside. In line with Foucault's discontinuous, or 
epistemic view of  history, it was also a subject without recourse to a directly causal 
predecessor. 
However, when Foucault initially conceived of  the subject in this way, he believed 
it to be formed in a uni-directional movement, in which knowledge-, or subject-
forms were formed solely due to the workings of  power. In short, they were subject 
to power, which positioned them unconditionally. Foucault conceived of  power as 
capable of  constructing knowledge-forms, without the individual having the power 
to resist this process. In The Order of  Things, for instance, as part of  a much broader 
discussion of  his epistemic view of  history, Foucault classified the different types of 
subjects which were created, in the Classical, and the Modem epistemes, by the 
different forces of  the outside which marked each episteme. In Foucault's later works, by contrast, De1euze saw a slightly different process at 
work. Rather than knowledge-forms being created in this rather passive way, they 
were now conceived of  as coming into existence as part of  a dynamic interaction 
between the forces of  the outside (power as it attempts to enfold the subject-form) 
and the subject-form's resistance to said forces. The inside of  the outside's fold is 
actually shaped by the subject-form's resistance to power. Deleuze identified this 
process as beginning with the writing of  '  The Life ofInfamous Men', in which this 
dawning realization becomes apparent: 
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The most intense point of  lives, the one where their energy is concentrated, 
is precisely there where they clash with power, struggle with it, endeavour to 
utilize its forces or to escape its traps.46 
At this point in his work, rather than power creating passively formed subjects, the 
subject was only made possible by the resistance that it offered to the forces of  the 
outside. The subject was seen to be an 'encounter with power,47, leading Deleuze to 
conclude that, it is not power which is primary in this relationship, but rather that: 
'resistance comes jirst
t48
• Once again this 'resistance' being understood as an 
ungrounding force that precedes, as opposed to a causal, determining, or originary 
'fITst'. 
Deleuze then develops this interpretation of  Foucault's work, following it through 
the final two volumes of  The History of  Sexuality. In his return to Ancient Greek 
civilization in these texts, Foucault discovers a subjectivity that is based upon a 
relationship of  the self to the self, the process ofsubjectivation. This was the 
realization, within the folded inside, that the self  had the power to act upon the self, 
as its own double, in order to affect the possibility of  what it could become in the 
future. This invention of  the 'aesthetic existence,49, or the possibility of  performing one's identity differently was based upon the realization, then, of  the self  as a 
double. 
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But the double is never a projection of  the interior; on the contrary, it is an 
interiorization of  the outside. It is not a doubling of  the One, but a 
redoubling of  the Other. It is not a reproduction of  the Same, but a repetition 
of  the Different. It is not an emanation ofan 'I', but something that places in 
immanence an already other ofa Non-self. It is never the other who is the 
double in the doubling process, it is a self  that lives me as the double of  the 
other: I do not encounter myself  on the outside, I fmd the other in me ('it is 
always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near 
and the Same'). It  resembles exactly the invagination of  a tissue in 
embryology, or the act of  doubling in sewing: twist, fold, stop, and so on
50
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The new self  that the subject-form has the ability to become, its imminent 
becoming-other, is the unthought which awaits the next folding of  the self, the 
perpetual ungrounding of  the self. The ability to perform its identity differently is 
only possible for a subject who conceives of  themselves in this way, as 'a repetition 
of  the Different' as opposed to a 'reproduction of  the Same'. This ability is, in tum, 
dependent upon the labyrinthine conception oftime which is apparent in the time-
image. For this reason the crystalline or mobius self is always becoming, always an 
immanent 'other of  a Non-self. The subjectivity expressed by the time-image, then, 
was one in which style, the perpetual recreation of  the self, or a sort of  personal 
anarchy is advocated if  the powers of  the false are to utilized. In this way does the 
subject create itself  as a 'redoubling of  the other', a superfolding of  the outside. 
Deleuze's use of  Foucault, however, is perhaps not so surprising. Amongst the links 
which can be drawn between their works there is, for instance, the noticeable 
influence of  modernist thought. The modernism inherent in Deleuze's formulation of 
the subject in time is immediately apparent. Not only is the influence of  Bergson 36 
(and also Proust) foregrounded in the cinema texts, he also cites Rimbaud's famous 
statement, 'I is another,S1 in order to soundbite what is at stake in this philosophical 
definition of  the crystalline subject. Yet it would be a mistake to then condemn this 
theory to a specific time, in the sense of  historical period, as solely representative of 
the concerns ofthe first half of  the twentieth century. Indeed, the re-emergence of 
this obsession with time in the post-war European cinemas of  the time-image 
suggests that this is a concern which is ongoing, emerging at different times in 
different aesthetic forms. Although this concern with existence in time now seems 
to have been replaced, in the latter half of  the last century, with a much stronger 
desire to understand our existence in space
52 this 'post'modernism is perhaps only 
actually the return to dominance of  the ancient belief  that time should remain 
subordinate to movement through space. In theoretical terms then, as well as in 
cinema itself: the image of  thought of  the movement-image has triumphed over the 
ungrounding danger posed by the time-image. In fact, the time-image could be seen 
to be nothing more than a passing glitch in the otherwise uncompromised, linear 
continuum, or history, of  the philosophical thought of  time. This seeming triumph, 
however, is perhaps only temporary, and due to the industrial developments that 
have characterized the production of  cinema in the "west" up until now. That this 
concern will re-emerge, however, despite its recent absence from our cinema 
screens, is beyond doubt. The crisis of  truth which time creates is not period 
specific, although its different manifestations seem to be, as it is a consequence of 
the interaction between the two planes upon which the two images of  thought exist. 
Two Planes. 
The interaction between the movement-image and the time-image needs to be 
understood as that which Deleuze and Guattari describe in A Thousand Plateaus as 
the struggle between an ungrounding plane of  consistency and a reterritorializing 
plane of  transcendence. Drawing on Deleuze's argument in Cinema 1, that matter, or 37 
the 'material universe' (when viewed at a molecular level at least) is in actual fact an 
infinite set of  images which constitutes a 'plane of  immanence'  53 made entirely of 
light, Rodowick argues that the cinemas ofthe movement- and the time-image 
actually create 'two distinct planes of  immanence'  54.  These planes, for Rodowick, 
are defined by the different way in which each image expresses time, truth and, 
consequently, we would argue, subjectivity. 
The movement-image's plane of  immanence, or rather the plane consistency which 
it creates through its assembling of  images, is: 'the open totality in movement that 
gives rise to the model of  the True as totalization' in which 'images are linked or 
extended according to principles of  association and contiguity,55. The plane of 
consistency which the time-image creates, by contrast, is one in which: 'Succession 
gives way to series' and images are strung together only as 'disconnected spaces,56 
Indeed, these defmitions are very much as we have described the two images so far. 
Due to the fact, however, that Deleuze's oeuvre contains certain seeming 
inconsistencies57 as his ideas develop in different contexts, Rodowick's conclusions 
can perhaps be viewed in a slightly different light if  we draw upon Deleuze and 
Guattari's definition of  the way in which different planes interact, in, A Thousand 
Plateaus. The two planes can now be seen to exist in an oscillating movement 
between the plane of  consistency of  the time-image, and the plane of  transcendence 
of  the movement-image. Each ofthese planes actualizes the virtual that is the plane 
of  immanence in a different ways, and together they function as follows. 
In its supreme, all-reterritorializing dominance there is the plane of  transcendence, 
or organization, which: 'always concerns the development of  forms and the 
formation of  subjects.  ,58 This is the plane on which the movement-image creates 
itself, complete with a continuous subject that evolves in a linear direction through 
time. This is the plane of  the actua~ the forms that are created out of  the retroactive 
reterritorialization of  virtual becomings. This is the teleological plane that is never 38 
visible in itself, but always at a remove, as an analogy, or as representation. This is 
the plane upon which the actual is made to appear, as though it were already 
formed, by a retroactive placing of  a series of  false causes, as returns of  the same. 
The plane of  consistency, by contrast, is the plane on which time-images emerge, as 
the becoming-actual of  virtual forces of  deterritorialization. This is the plane that 
captures the process of  actualization as it occurs, the plane upon which forms do not 
yet appear, but are seen to be perpetually assembling. The subject that is created on 
this plane is discontinuous, and uses the powers of  the false that are enabled by the 
labyrinth of  time in order to perform their identity differently. This is the plane that 
is forever falsifying, that on which the crisis of  truth becomes evident. 
That the movement-image emerges as a reterritorialization ofthe time-images is 
evident if  we consider Deleuze and Guattari's statement that: 
The plane of  organization is constantly working away at the plane of 
consistency, always trying to plug the lines of  flight, stop or interrupt the 
movements of  deterritorialization, weigh them down, restratify them, 
reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of  depth. Conversely the 
plane of  consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of 
organization ... scrambling forms by dint of  speed or slowness, breaking 
down functions by means of  assemblages ...  59 
The discovery of  the time-image after the second world war was the ungrounding of 
the plane of  transcendence that the movement-image had previously created. It  was 
not the evolution of  cinema to a higher form, but rather, the realization ofthe need 
to dissolve cinema's form. Far from cinema reaching its telos, the time-image 
expressed the deterritorialization of  teleology within cinema. In fact, Godard's 
cinema is discussed by Deleuze and Guattari as an example of  this ungrounding of the totalizing form of  representation that is the plane of  transcendence, as: 'Godard 
'"  effectively carries the fixed plane of  cinema to this state where forms dissolve, 
and all that subsists are tiny variations of  speed between movements in 
composition.  ,60 
39 
The two types of  cinema interact as contrary but simultaneous movements of  de-
and re-territorialization towards differing images of  thought. On the plane of 
transcendence, truth is still created through the contiguous succession of  images of 
the movement-image. The subject that appears on this plane is, a form, a molar 
entity. Both the molar truth, and its corresponding subject are ungrounded, or put 
into crisis, on the plane of  consistency, by the time-image's discontinuous, 
labyrinthine movement through time. The subject which appears within the 
disconnected spaces, or any-space-whatevers of  the post-war milieu, is a 
consistency, as opposed to a form. The subject exists as a coming together of 
speeds, flows and rhythms, in a perpetual feedback loop with its environment. 
Rather then a molar form, this is a subject that is constantly coming into existence, 
an assemblage with its context, a body without organs. The movement-image, 
however, always has the last say, as it constantly struggles to re-impose form upon, 
to 'restratify', the discontinuous flux that the time-image suggests. It must always 
stress the subject over subjectivation. 
That the time-image has all but died out, or that its themes and processes have been 
appropriated by the movement-image, however, does not mean that this process of 
de-and reterritorialization is not continuous. Rather it bears testament to how strong 
the conservative forces of  the movement-image are. For, where there should always 
exist a mutual interaction, or perhaps even a becoming-indiscernible, between the 
two planes, the reterritorialization that the movement-image enacts upon the time-
image ensures that the immanence of  the plane of  consistency is perpetually 
retrenched within the binary reasoning of  molar forms. The movement-image's 40 
plane of  transcendence takes, to use Brian Massumi's tenns, the  'both/and of  the 
time-image, and reterritorializes it into a binary division, an 'either/or,61. To take the 
machinic couplings, the assemblages through which consistency is created, and to 
reduce it to the binary ofrepresentatlon is the becoming-reactive of  the time-image 
which the movement-image constantly seeks to enact. In this way is the subject 
reterritorialized within the binary that ensures the continuation of  such divisions as 
the inside and the outside, the self and the other, male and female, and the line and 
the labyrinth of  time. This retrenchment similarly destroys the possibility of  the self 
as becoming-other. Finally, it is this process which attempts to efface the perpetual 
crisis of  truth by disavowing its own culpability in the maintenance ofa politics of 
exclusion. 
Using this model of  the two types of  images, as they exist on the two planes, we are 
drawn to the conclusion that - working at the level of  the narrative
62 at least, and 
with the "western" movement-images that we have chosen - in its perpetual ability 
to reterritorialize molecular becoming into molar form, the cinema of  the 
movement-image is the epitome of  Nietzsche  an ressentiment. In the continued 
dominance of  the movement-image we witness the triumph of  the becoming-
reactive offorces over the active forces ofthe falsifying time-image, which attempts 
to unground, to liberate cinema from its linear trajectory. 
Two Pasts. 
The way in which the past is aligned on the two different planes is also crucial to an 
understanding ofthe way in which the two planes exist. On the plane of 
transcendence on which we find the movement-image, the past is a linear trajectory, 
that evolves in a causal fashion, and begins with a fIrst cause. This is the 
teleological time of  history. On the plane of  consistency, by contrast, the 41 
labyrinthine time of  Aion (as opposed to that of  chronos) effects a past that begins 
with the present moment and works backwards in order to uncover the previous 
incarnations in which the present situation has become-actual. It is, once again, the 
contrast between the past envisaged as a return of  the same, and a return of 
difference. This second way of  conceiving the past is analogous with that which 
belongs to certain types of  philosophical thought, especially as it is found in the 
work of  Nietzsche  an-inspired philosophers like Deleuze and Foucault
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Hutton describes the two different methodological approaches that exist to uncover 
the past thus: 
... the intellectual historian seeks to account for a theoretical viewpoint by 
fathoming its intellectual sources. His intent is to return to its earliest 
conceptualization and then to reconstruct the continuous narrative of  the 
modifications that lead to its present formulation. The genealogist, in 
contrast, traces patterns of  intellectual descent from the present backwards 
without seeking to ascertain their formal beginnings.  64 
The historical recovery of  the past which begins with a first cause and works up to 
the present is a device frequently used by the movement-image, as we shall see 
further, from chapter three onwards. This is often achieved through the use of  a 
flashback structure which begins with the end of  the story to be told, flashes back to 
the "beginning",  thus establishing a teleological progression and a false origin from 
which the rest of  the narrative then stems. The subject in this temporal scheme fmds 
it impossible to become-other, as their identity is, of  necessity, pre-determined as a 
return of  the same form. This is the subject which must forever re-appear as a copy 
of  the model which is established at its origin. There is no scope for a bifurcation of 
the path which it will take through time, as to do so would threaten to change the 
already established ending. This is the cinema of  continuity editing. This is the 
action-image, the given and knowable whole of  time expressed indirectly as 
subordinate to the singular, unified movement of  the subject through space. 42 
The genealogical recovery of  the past of  the time-image, by contrast, is that which 
begins in the present, and attempts to trace a path backwards through the labyrinth, 
'without seeking to ascertain formal beginnings'. It  looks for the past which, from all 
those which are not-necessarily true, makes the most sense in retrospect. Looking 
back across time in this way falsifies that which may have previously seemed to be 
the directly causal relationship with the predecessor of  its present form. In the time-
travel narratives of  the time-image several histories are often offered without any 
one being specifically given as that which is 'correct'. The virtuality of  these 
possible pasts is emphasized, as we shall see in the cinema of  Fellini for instance, by 
confusing the "real" past with the cinematic past. In this way, the virtual layers of 
the past which it is possible to uncover archaeologically are shown to be multiple, 
rather than singular, due to their very existence as virtual  memories. Moreover, the 
transparent linearity created by the flashback is often replaced in the time-image by 
a confusion over what is present and past as it occurs. Thus the linearity oftime's 
passing is further broken up by the resurgence of  time within the aberrant interval, 
ensuring the subject's discontinuous relation to its own past. This is the subject that 
has no origin, and returns always as simulacra, a copy of  a copy, a mask of  a mask. 
This ungrounding force of  the labyrinth which is expressed in the time-image must 
be forever reterritorialized into a straight line by the movement-image. This is 
achieved through the privileging of  one past, which thus denies difference itself by 
excluding all other possible labyrinthine pasts. The singular past of  history, the law, 
the patriarchal order, all that is based upon a singular lineage - which is itself 
structured upon a binary division which favours the unified, male subject, and which 
must continually legitimize its own existence through the positing of  false origins -
is threatened whenever time forces open the subject's sensory-motor interval and 
separates the self from itself The ressentiment behind the reterritorializations 
enacted by the movement-image is thus perpetuated by the need to maintain the 
binary structure that the ungrounding time-image would dissolve. 43 
Two Cinemas? 
Returning to Kovacs' argument, with which we started this discussion, Deleuze's 
texts can only appear to chart a linear progression when seen in retrospect. This is to 
take one trajectory through the labyrinth of  cinema, that which moves from the 
movement-image to the time-image, and to privilege it, at the expense of  all others, 
as though it were an inevitable evolutionary progression from one to the other. This 
Deleuze does not do. In fact, the only one history which does emerge in this fashion, 
is that of  the movement-image before the war, to the movement-image after the war, 
a history in which there is no break, shift, crack, or aberrant interval in sight. Rather, 
Deleuze's history of  the cinema is discontinuous, and charts one route through the 
labyrinth, which, when seen looking back from the perspective of  the new time-
image, exposes how not-necessarily true its predecessors (the movement-images of 
the pre-war period) were. The progression from pre-war movement-image to post-
war time-image is far from linear, it is the bifurcation of  one line of  the labyrinth. 
As Deleuze says at the very start of  his project: 'This study is not a history of  the 
cinema'. Only the movement-image, infused with its binary logic and linear 
progression can create a singular line of  time, a (one) history of  cinema. The time-
image, by contrast, is that which constantly re-emerges to put this singular history in 
crisis. As Rodowick has it, in Reading the Figural, 'only the movement-image 
"evolves"; the time-image "recurs,,65. 
At the close of  Cinema 1, Deleuze discusses the crisis which faced the action-image 
with the emergence of  the time-image. Yet this crisis, he points out, was not 
something new. Rather, he asks, 'Was this not the constant state of  cinema?,66 As we 
saw earlier, the crisis of  the action-image is an ongoing crisis, for the time-image is 
the movement-image in its 'nascent state, and this state is constant'. In fact, the 44 
possibility of  its arousal had always existed, all that had been necessary for it to 
occur was for cinema to observe itself, as an actor, playing its part automatically, 
listening to itself, and beholding itself  playing. This awareness of  itself as other, 
however, the cinema of  the movement-image (and in particular that of  the American 
action-image) was designed specifically to deny. The maintenance of  the sensory-
motor link between man and world was the most essential element in the 
continuation of  this process, as it helped foster the belief  that there was no situation 
too big for the subject to react to. For this reason alone, the whole oftime could be 
represented, as it was conquered in the subject's sensory-motor movement across 
space. Even with the contrary revelations brought about by the war,  which showed 
that there were indeed 'limit situations', or 'limit-circumstances,67 which were too big 
for the subject, (pure optical and sound situations to which there was no possible 
motor response) this still did not spell the end of  the movement-image, or indeed, 
the global dominance of  the action-image. 
In fact, the post-war milieu, that which had so very recently witnessed the 
culmination of  the movement-image's ethos of  the knowable whole oftime in what 
Deleuze handily dubs, 'Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler,68, was to 
witness only a short lived burst of  time-images. In the mainstream, Hitler and 
Hollywood have never left us. The resistance to its dominance offered by the time-
image, that rather elitist, often overly intellectualized product of  the modernist 
bourgeois, liberal, European art-house, and auteur led cinema of  the 1960s and 70s, 
has, in fact, shifted somewhat to the politics of  representation offered by third, 
diasporic and minor69 cinemas. In this new cinema, it is not the subject which is 
critiqued in its immediate sensory-motor incapacity, as it was in the time-image, but 
rather, the inability to represent "the people" as a given whole. This fascism of  the 
whole is replaced, in the minor, or 'modem political cinema'  70, which Deleuze 
mentions towards the end of  Cinema 2, by the need to create a people yet to come. 
These are a becoming-people who form a community yet to be imagined, rather than 
an already imagined community. 45 
Yet despite the emergence, and indeed, continued re-emergence of  different 
ungrounding forces which utilize the labyrinth oftime in different ways, and with 
emphases which are beyond the scope of  this study of  dominant liberal subjectivity 
in the developed world, the movement-image remains supreme. Attempts to 
unground it are quickly marginalized, often as cult or art cinemas (time-images) or 
through unavailability due to an even worse lack of  distribution than is available on 
the independent cinema circuit (third cinemas). The fascism of  the given whole, 
linear temporality, and the sensory-motor continuum remain the norm. Why is it, 
then, asks Peter Canning, in 'The Imagination ofImmanence', that the crisis of  truth, 
and the emergence of  the time-image which it prompted, appeared after WWII? 
After all, Canning points out, the crimes against humanity which arose during the 
war were no "worse" than those perpetrated during the previous century, with the 
mass extermination of  the native American tribes, and the colonization of  much of 
the rest of  globe by military means.  Why was it that, at the birth of  cinema, it was 
movement-image that emerged, when its historical context was equally as 
murderous? Why was the time-image not the first to be seen? 
The fact is, the dominant form of  cinema, the movement-image, was always 
predicated upon closing the gap between subject and world through action, and on 
ensuring that the whole oftime remained representable. The movement-image was 
designed, in its very inception, as a reterritorialization of  the ungrounding with 
which the time-image (amongst other images) threatened to expose cinema to itself 
The binary principle upon which the reterritorialization oftime into a linear schema 
rests, that which is enacted by the formation of  the plane of  transcendence, is that 
which must constantly work to shore up the temporal division between the subject 
and its actions upon the world. Should this fail, as it did with the emergence of  the 
time-image, the awareness that we gain is that it is - as Canning states with a 
particularly Foucauldian rationale - our own binary morality which 'creates the evil 46 
it prosecutes both within the subject and withouto7l• The awareness of  our actual 
disconnection from the world (as discontinuous entities existing in time, rather than 
in space) the morality which we impose upon it, and our naturalization of  this 
through the exclusion of  difference, was that which the time-image glimpsed. It is 
this glimpse of  ourselves which the movement-image must ensure never emerges. 
The illusion of  the connection between the sensory-motor continuum of  the subject 
and the knowable whole is of  primary importance to the movement-image, as it 
denies the possibility that we could, ourselves, be in any way responsible for a 
reactive willing of  the continuation of  the very morality which led to the 
cataclysmic events of  the second war. Canning is worth quoting at length in this 
matter, simply due to the amazing vitriol which he hurls at the tyranny ofthe image 
of  thought which the movement-image expresses. 
It  is enough to make one sick with shame, this all too humanform of  erotic-
aggressive temporality providing the link between images in a totalizing 
narrative of  good versus evil and light versus darkness, as all the old stories 
and heroic cliches and phantoms continue to be revived from the dead and 
reappear on- screen and in life, to reinforce the signifying fantasy structure 
that is the sorry basis of  human passion; they promptly produce new 
scapegoats as the condition of  harmonious community; and the film industry 
cynically feeds these moving images to the "people" - to channel their 
psychic hunger for "passion", their neural receptors' thirst for erotic-
aggressive transmitters - in exchange for money to feed back into 
reproduction. It  is a convenient arrangement for the very capital that is 
organizing and spreading worldwide the misery of  cynical psychosis 
(egotism, paranoia, and distrust) to be itself the purveyor of  images of 
harmony and unanimity following the apocalyptic cleansing action of  the 
latest Top Gun.72 47 
It  is the sensory-motor regime of  the movement-image which keeps us from 
realizing our own guilt in creating the system of  exclusion which we use to 
perpetrate atrocities in the name of  good and evil, the creation of  scapegoats in order 
to foster the notion ofa universal truth (or law) to which they are other. The time-
image was dangerous in that it showed our capacity for self-creation, that which 
must, if  we follow the reasoning through, have initially led us to this grotesque 
situation of  anti-human ressentiment - masquerading as the transcendent struggle 
between forces of  good and evil - in the ftrst place. It  also suggested our own ability 
to change this situation, through an action of  creative evolution which would re-link 
us to the whole, a whole that is not yet given, but grasped only in its becoming. For, 
on the plane of  consistency, the movement is always towards assemblages that 
would deny the binary between self  and other. 
In this respect, Kovacs was right to assert that the time-image expressed the self-
consciousness of  cinema. The labyrinthine powers of  the false, the ability to care 
for, or perform, the self, and the artillce of  the law was that which the time-image 
saw when it regarded its own self in time. For a brief moment it became the virtual 
double, or ungrounding of  the movement-image. Hardly surprisingly, this was a 
short lived and quickly marginalized uprising against the law. The movement-image 
created on the plane of  transcendence is forever one step ahead of  its predecessor, 
its ungrounding double, and plugs its lines of  flight, restratifies its molecular 
becomings into molar forms, and reterritorializes its labyrinthine becoming into the 
straight line of  history: 'an endless search for justice, vindication, or vengeance, a 
chain of  events or linkage of  deeds and moral reasons,73. 
Just as Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus showed, the struggle against fascism is 
an everyday struggle, it occurs all the time, or perhaps, it occurs as time itself It 
occurs at the level of  the sel£: "the people" and the whole. That the movement-image 
continues to win this battle over the representation of  the subject in time, however, 48 
is perhaps not that surprising. The creation of  form, that which, as Bergson himself 
admits, is that which we use in the perception of  our everyday life, is an invaluable 
tool for survival. To think actively, as opposed to in this reactive fashion, to think 
becoming over being, duration over space-time, is therefore a very difficult 
task to approach. 
Indeed, as Philip Goodchild points out, the struggle between the becoming-active 
and reactive of  forces always appears to perception, to consciousness, to have been 
won by the  becoming-reactive offorces, as it can only perceive the forms of  the 
everyday. 
Deleuze emphasizes that ressentiment, bad conscience and nihilism are not 
psychological traits, but the foundation of  humanity in man. We are only 
able to know nihilism, the "becoming-reactive" offorces in which they are 
separated from what they can do. This is because of  the essential link 
between reactive forces and consciousness as memory and knowledge. 
Consciousness is merely an effect producing nothing; it represents the 
relation between reactive forces and the active forces which always escape 
consciousness. We are only able to know mechanical effects - never 
spontaneous forces which function as causes. Everything coming to 
consciousness is already a force which has been separated from its power of 
action in becoming-reactive.  74 
That which appears in the movement-image, on the plane of  transcendence, will 
always prevail as long as we perceive in a common-sensical fashion, through the 
forms which our consciousness constructs. What is interesting to note, then, as this 
study will attempt to do in various ways, is just exactly how this reterritorialization 
is achieved by the movement-image. How are the active forces which the time-
image expresses  reterritorialized through the movement-image's becoming-reactive 
of  forces? In particular, how are concerns such as those of  gender, sexuality, and indeed, nation, dealt with by the time-image, and how are these concerns then 
reterritorialized by movement-images, through the creation of  different temporal 
structures? 
One Thesis. 
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The Thesis is in two parts. The fIrst, chapters one to three, deals further with the 
contrasts between the representations oftime found in the movement- and the time-
images. The second, chapters four to six, focuses more exclusively on the 
movement-image. Chapter two provides a more in-depth analysis of  the way in 
which Bergson's theories oftime and memory can be used to explain the subject as 
it is found in the time-image. Initially, the past as it re-emerges in the movement-
image is discussed in relation to the recurring livery stables kiss scene in 
Hitchcock's Vertigo. The model oftime derived from Bergson, once modifIed by 
Deleuze using Nietzsche, is then illustrated, using Fellini's 8lh, in order to describe 
the different way in which the past is encountered by the subject in the time-image. 
Chapter Three deals with the way in which spectator subjectivity is different in the 
time-image than it is in the movement-image, using Rivette's Celine et Julie vont en 
bateau. The psychoanalytical model of  the spectatorial subject found in Rodowick's 
The Difficulty of  Difference, is seen to correspond to the spectator which the 
movement-image attempts to posit through its use of  the shot/reverse shot structure. 
This is emphasized through a reading of  the same process at work in the more recent 
movement-image, The Sixth Sense. The subject of  the time-image, by contrast, is 
seen to emerge in a scene which occurs later in Rivette's fIlm to that discussed by 
Rodowick. Spectating in this sequence is shown to be a movement of  mob ius 
doubling, or becoming-other, creating a model of  spectatorship which has elements 
in common with Laura Marks' defmition, in, The Skin of  the Film. 50 
In part two, chapters four and five work together to discuss more recent examples of 
movement-images from the 1990s, which explored different temporal narrative 
structures for male and female characters, and the ramifications thereof Chapter 
four begins with an explanation of  the difference between Einstein and Bergson's 
defmitions of  time, and proceeds to analyse these different conceptions of  time as 
they are to be found in Sliding Doors, Run Lola Run, and Romy and Michele's High 
School Reunion. These movement-images all suggest a labyrinthine time and a 
performative becoming-other for their heroines, but ultimately reterritorialize this 
liberative becoming-active of  forces through a binary structure in which these 
narratives become a passing fancy, or pleasurable matinee daydream. Chapter five 
illuminates the other half of  this binary structure, showing how labyrinthine 
liberation, or becoming-other, is always shown to be an action which is against the 
law when applied to men. Using The Talented Mr Ripley, Memento, Liar, and 
Possible Worlds, this chapter will show how male performativity is always reduced 
to a form of  self-deceit which enables man to get away with murder. This murder is, 
in fact, the murder of  the essential self, the morally reprehensible nature of  which 
the movement-image must always uphold in its conclusion. In this way the plane of 
transcendence of  the movement-image maintains its dominance through a 
privileging of  the continuous organic, Cartesian subject of  the sensory-motor link. 
The use of  flashback in order to create a singular history for these characters is also 
discussed. 
Finally, chapter six concludes by looking at the differing attitudes of  west  em 
European and North American national cinema images to the shifts in power of  the 
post-war era. The films, The Music Box, Saving Private Ryan and Un Heros tres 
discret are examined in order to illustrate the different attitudes to the past which 
different colonial powers have adopted. At this point this study again returns to 
issues raised in this chapter, questioning exactly what is at stake in the different ways in which these colonizing, and once colonizing, powers create their histories 
through cinema images. 
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2. Remembrance of  Film's Past. 
This chapter will explore the way in which memory functions differently in the 
movement-image than it does in the time-image. The subject that each image creates 
will be seen to be defined by the way in which the past, and its return as memory, is 
conceived in the respective images. 
The subject, as we saw previously, is defmed as an interval between perception and 
action. When memory is encountered in this interval, the subject's sensory-motor 
continuity is questioned. In the movement-image the recollection of  the past remains 
subordinate to the continuation of  an unified subject. Memory does not yet assert 
itself with enough force to break apart the sensory-motor continuum. Memory in the 
time-image, by contrast, contains exactly this disruptive ability, and consequently 
ungrounds the linearity of  the subject. This destruction of  the sensory-motor 
continuum frees the subject from its actualized, spatial coordinates, allowing it to 
travel within time itself It is for this reason that the past is encountered in a much 
more complex way in time-images, as a series of  slippages between the virtual 
sheets of  past times. In the movement-image, by contrast, it remains, essentially, a 
flashback, which briefly interrupts the subject's continuum, but which is always 
followed by a return to linearity. 
Deleuze's model of  time is drawn from Bergson. In Cinema 2 however, in order to 
discover the ungrounding of  time in the time-image, due to the resurgence of  the 
past as disruptive force, De1euze creates an assemblage ofBergsonian and 
Nietzschean theories oftime. In fact, it is Nietzsche's eternal return which provides 
the ungrounding impetus to Bergson's conceptualization oftime as a virtual whole, 
upon which the crystal oftime is based. This same assemblage had previously 58 
enabled Deleuze to formulate the three passive syntheses oftime in Difference and 
Repetition, drawing, once again, on his work on the post-Cartesian subject, the 
subject after Kant. 
After an initial discussion of  Bergson's theory of  the past, this chapter will 
concentrate on the subject in the time-image, as it is here that Deleuze's integration 
of  Nietzsche with Bergson is most apparent. Following an analysis of  the way in 
which memory returns in the movement-image, using a scene from Hitchcock's 
Vertigo (1958), the remainder of  the chapter will focus on Fellini's 8Y:?  (1963). This 
chapter will not, however, attempt to offer original interpretations of  the narratives 
of  these already much discussed films. Rather, certain scenes from the films will be 
used to illustrate the ways in which the past returns differently in the movement-
image than it does in the time-image. 
Bergson. 
Deleuze's use of  Bergson in the cinema texts is, primarily, are-working of  ideas 
developed in Matter and Memor/, in which Bergson isolates two different types of 
memory. On the one hand there is habit, an empirical form of  recollection, based 
upon a logical, linear, sensory-motor link between the subject and its surroundings. 
Habit is the instinctual recognition of  the everyday, quotidian reality that surrounds 
the subject. It  is a recognition that extends into action, rather like the reflexive 
closing of  the leaves ofa Venus Fly Trap plant upon feeling the touch of  its prey. 
Habit is formed by a building up of  repetitions of  same actions, the storing up of  the 
past as bodily habit. The example given by Bergson
2 is that of  the student learning a 
text by heart, in which what is remembered is not each separate reading of  the text, 59 
but rather the mechanical operation by which the words gradually come to be linked 
together through each repetition ofthe same material. When such learned habits are 
performed (or, remembered) the interval between perception and action is minimal. 
In fact, there is almost no time, no interval, in which an attentive recollection can 
intervene between what is perceived and the mechanical setting into motion of  the 
action that is performed upon it. Thus the continuity ofthe sensory-motor subject is 
maintained. 
On the other hand, and in contrast to habit, attentive recollection is the return, or 
rather the becoming-actual, of  the past (which exists as a stored, virtual memory 
image) when it encounters a corresponding image in the present. Attentive 
recollection is the emergence of  the past, of  memory, within the interval between 
perception and action. Rather than the automatic setting in action of  a mechanism, 
of  stored bodily actions in response to certain stimuli found in habit, however, 
recollection involves an active effort of  mind. Attentive recollection, moreover, 
ensures that the subject becomes temporarily suspended in the interval, and is 
unable to immediately act upon that which it perceives; although this is not yet 
enough to completely liberate the subject from its sensory-motor continuity. Both 
habit and recollection, then, serve to prolong the subject's continuous movement 
through space. 
Before the operation of  attentive recollection can be described in full we must first 
examine more closely Bergson's conception of  the past. Due to the perpetual 
splitting oftime, into a present that passes, and a past that is preserved, the stored, 
virtual past is envisaged by Bergson as shaped like a cone
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Figure 1: Bergson's Cone Diagram. 
Bergson's cone represents duration, time as a virtual whole. The point of  the cone, S, 
corresponds to the moment that is the present, which is actually only the most 
contracted level of  the past. The subject at this point exists as the condensed 
memory of  repeated previous bodily attitudes. As time splits, the action of  the 
storing up of  pasts creates the cone shape, SAB, each layer of  which is a more or 
less relaxed level of  the past. As the present, at S, is the most contracted level of  the 
past, the layer AB is, conversely, the most relaxed plane of  the past. Here all of  the 
past exists as distinct and separate images, the antithesis of  the condensed memory 
of  habit. The myriad layers in-between, represented here as A'B', and A"B", are 
infmite in number (and will be discussed in more detail below). The virtual weight 
of  the past serves to push the present moment forward into its point of  interaction 
with the area marked P, the universal plane of  images that is our perceived vision of 
reality, or the 'plane' of'representation,4. Thus the cone ensures a linear direction to time. At S the subject becomes a centre of  indetermination, not only an interval 
between perception and action, but also as the point of  time's splitting into passing 
present and preserved past. 
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The question remains of  how exactly this virtual past is recalled by attentive 
recollection? How does memory come to insert itself into the interval? One might 
expect that, if  the subject at Sis defmed by its sensory-motor continuity, its habits, 
or rather, the body's physical position, would play an important part in this process. 
However, our habitual tendency to extend perception into bodily action - which 
usually serves to block the return of  memories by closing off  the interval into which 
time seeks to flow - paradoxically, cannot help but also encourage it. Bergson states 
that: 
... just because the disappearance of  former images is due to their inhibition 
by our present attitude, those whose shape might fit into this attitude 
encounter less resistance than the others: if, then, anyone of  them is indeed 
able to overcome the obstacle, it is the image most similar to the present 
perception that will actually do  SO.5 
The body's physical position, in fact, plays a decisive role in attentive recollection, 
as it allows the recollection-image from the past that is 'most similar' to the image 
perceived in the present, to surge forward into the interval. Attentive recollection, 
we can see, is based upon the same mechanical recognition as those learned, bodily 
repetitions of  habit, but it distinguishes itself  from habit by facilitating a much more 
complex encounter with the past. 
It  would appear that it is not simply the body's physical posture that calls forth the 
recollection-image. Memories also force themselves out to meet the image 
perceived, and with a greater degree of  success when the subject's physical posture 62 
creates a shape which they can match. Bergson is drawn to this conclusion because, 
if  movement simply called forth memories, then memory itself would just be a 
function of  the brain. This is, however, a conclusion contrary to his thesis, in which 
the brain is but one image amongst others upon the plane of  representation. The 
brain, in fact, does not have the agency necessary for such a task. The subject is, we 
are beginning to see, no longer an organic entity, a body ruled by the mind, but 
rather a temporal entity, in which the force of  time begins to wrestle control from 
that of  the body's movement through space. 
An attentive recollection, then, does require an adaptation of  the body, a physical 
positioning that facilitates the entry of  the recollection-image, and this in turn 
requires a certain inhibition of  movement of  the subject. At the very least, a brief 
pause in the sensory-motor continuum is needed, a time for reflection upon the past. 
Accompanying this motor positioning, this stillness in the present, however, there 
must also be a corresponding movement of  the past, pushing forward into the 
present. The organism, therefore, is not specifically in control of  the recall of 
memory. This conclusion is borne out by proust's6 modification of  Bergson's theory, 
in which he describes involuntary memory recall, due to the sensory recollection 
brought about by tastes, sounds, smells, and so on. In these instances, time surges 
forward unsolicited into the interval, bringing forward recollection without an 
attentive effort of  mind on our part. Time, it would seem, has as big a part to play in 
recollection as the physical movement of  the subject's organism does. 
In attentive recollection, images from the past are grafted onto perception-images in 
the present. The return of  the past is, effectively, a form of  recognition of  the past 
when it creates a match with the present: 
... every attentive perception truly involves a reflection, in the etymological 
sense of  the word, that is to say the projection, outside ourselves, ofan actively created image, identical with, or similar to, the object on which it 
comes to mold itself 
7 
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This is the process of  the becoming-actual ofa virtual image that comes to abide 
with the actual image that is perceived. As the virtual image comes forward from 
memory, in its process of  becoming-actual, it enters into a circuit of  indiscernibility 
with the actual image. In this 'circuit' of  'mutual tension,8, the recollection-image 
overlays itself  upon the image of  the object perceived (the perception-image) until it 
is impossible to tell them - the respective past and present images - apart. 
For Bergson, the process through which a recollection-image is recovered from its 
virtual storage in the past, and then brought forward to meet the present, roughly 
breaks down into three inter-linked stages. These are, the leap into the past in 
general, the search through the layers of  the past, and the bringing forth, through 
translation-rotation
9
, of  the appropriate layer, as a recollection-image. Firstly there 
is the leap into the past in general, the purely virtual realm. This ensures that we are 
detached from the present, and that there is a momentary pause in the sensory-motor 
continuum. This initial movement, moreover, is accompanied by the search for the 
particular region of  the past which contains an image corresponding to that which is 
perceived. Ifwe return to Bergson's cone momentarily, this process can be 
explained a little more clearly. Each section of  virtuality, each layer, sheet, or plane 
of  time (A'B', A"B", etc.) contains the entire past, and each exists as a different 
degree of  contraction and/or expansion of  the past. Each distinct layer is uniquely 
divided, with particular starring memories (different for each plane) and a 
supporting cast oflesser memories. It is for this reason that different associations 
take us to, and bring forth, different planes of  the past, or different ways in which 
we remember events as having happened. This explains why Proustian, involuntary 
memories can abruptly return us to planes that we have previously attempted to 
recover in vain when using the Bergsonian process of  attentive recollection. We 
may have previously been attentively searching on the wrong plane, a plane on 64 
which the memory we sought plays but a minor role and is therefore not 
immediately apparent. An involuntary memory trigger (a taste, a sound) on the other 
hand, may leap us directly back to the most appropriate layer, that upon which the 
memory we seek is to be found playing a starring role. 
Finally, once within a particular layer of  the past, it remains for the memory found 
there to be brought forward into the present. This occurs in a two-fold movement of 
translation-rotation, a movement that Bergson refers to as fa work of  adjustment, 
something like the focussing ofa camera'lO. During this process the cone 
simultaneously contracts the region of  the past which contains the recollection-
image that we have chosen, and also rotates the cone in order to bring the entire 
labyrinth pathway of  that particular region of  the past to bear upon the sensory-
motor present. The body, for its part, assumes the posture most likely to receive said 
memory image, to allow it to become actual. There is, then, a part to be played by 
the physical positioning of  the body in the attentive recollection of  memory-images, 
only it is not, as we have seen, without a corresponding forward movement of  the 
past pushing itself forward into the present. 
During the process of  recollection the subject is involved in a double movement, 
always oscillating between AB and S, the virtual and the actual. The subject: 
... consists in the double current which goes from the one to the other -
always ready either to crystallize into uttered words or evaporate into 
memories .... This amounts to saying that the sensori-motor mechanism 
figured by the point S and the totality of  the memories disposed in AB there 
is room ... for a thousand repetitions of  our physical life, figured by as many 
sections A' B', An Bn, etc., of  the same cone.l1 65 
With each leap into the past there is an expansion, a dissipation of  the self into 
multiple past selves, 'a thousand repetitions' amongst all the many layers of  the past, 
and with each contraction of  the past, a becoming-actual of  one particular self. 
These co-existent past selves, myriad layers of  the past, and their relevance for the 
subject in the present will be further examined in relation to Fellini's time-images. In 
the cinema of  the movement-image, however, the return to the singular self  of  the 
present is always retained. The reason why the recollection-image is not quite the 
same as the time-image can thus be seen through an analysis ofa single scene from 
Hitchcock's Vertigo, in which the return of  the past as a process of  expansion and 
contraction (translation-rotation) is apparent. 
Hitchcock. 
The scene under discussion takes place in Judy Barton's (Kim Novak) room at the 
Hotel Empire, in which Scotty (James Stewart), having almost completed his make-
over of  Judy back into Madelaine, awaits her exit from the bathroom. When 
Judy/Madelaine enters the room, with hair now blonde once more, and tied back as 
per Madelaine, Scotty moves towards her, they embrace, and begin to kiss. At this 
point, the camera moves behind Scotty and begins to pan to the right, circling the 
couple. Scotty, sensing a change in his surroundings, opens his eyes, as the scenery 
behind the couple changes. The backdrop moves, as the camera continues to appear 
to circle, from the interior of  the room, to black, and then to the livery stables of  the 
Spanish Mission. This was the original setting for the kiss with which Madelaine 
parted company with Scotty, before beginning her flight to the bell tower. 
Recognizing his surroundings, Scotty closes his eyes again, the kiss resumes, and 
the backdrop rotates back to the room interior. This is a perfect filmic example of 
the action of  translation-rotation whereby the past comes to be overlaid upon the 
present, entering into a circuit of  mutual tension between the actual, perception-
image, and the virtual-becoming-actual, recollection-image. 66 
The process starts with the kiss. The position of  their bodies creates a certain 
stillness of  Scotty's sensory-motor continuum, and enables the memory-image to 
push itself  into the interval. Yet it is not solely their bodily posture which brings 
forward the recollection-image. Until Judy had effectively become the image of 
Madelaine, Scotty remained unable to access the particular layer of  the past that 
would return the memory to him. Indeed, until his transformation of  Judy into 
Madelaine had been completed, he had been unable to adopt this physical position, 
and to kiss her passionately on the lips. Only with Judy's make-over into the image 
of  Madelaine completed, does Scotty find the correct associative image to also 
enable the movement of  past into present to be completed. Whilst this process is 
indeed aided by the physical posture they adopt during the kiss, the recollection-
image also required a perception-image to match before it could surge forward into 
the present. With its match found in the present, in the image of  Judy, the memory 
of  Madelaine pushes itself forward to create an indiscernibility between the images 
of  the past and the present, a Judy/Madelaine circuit. 
When the room begins to circle we see the centrifugal movement of  time as it 
rotates the cone of  the past. This simultaneously contracts the layer of  the past in 
which the kiss in the livery stable is the most akin to the kiss Scotty experiences in 
the hotel, and pushes that particular plane of  the past forward into the present. This 
is the movement of  translation  -rotation akin to the focusing ofa camera of  which 
Bergson talks. The indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual-becoming-
actual that this creates - the setting up of  the circuit of  mutual tension in which the 
past and present 'careen one behind the other,12 - is seen in the way in which the 
backdrop changes from room to stable, to room again. Scotty's facial recognition, 
moreover, when he sees the stable around him confrrms that the correct image has 
been found, and that the perception of  kissing Judy in the present matches that of 
kissing Madelaine in the past. 67 
This overlaying of  identities continues to deepen as immediately after the kiss, Judy, 
forgetting herself (as it were) for a moment, makes the mistake of  putting on 
Madelaine's necklace. This was the necklace previously worn by Judy, playing 
Madelaine, playing Carlotta, when she initially ensnared Scotty. As Scotty is fixing 
the clasp behind her neck before they go out, he catches sight of  the necklace in the 
mirror, which transforms the image seen into the recollection-image of  the necklace 
worn by Carlotta in the portrait seen earlier in the film. As the camera pulls back 
from this image of  the painting, we discover Madelaine in the art gallery, looking, 
with her back to Scotty, at the painting. Here, once again, the situation in the present 
becomes overlaid by the recollection-image of  the past. Madelaine, seen from 
behind by Scotty in the past, is the image brought forward by Scotty's memory to 
match, to deepen, to enter into a circuit with, the image in the present. The image 
which matches that of  Judy, standing in front of  Scotty, looking at the image of 
Madelaine that she is becoming, is that of  Madelaine, looking at the image of 
Carlotta that she was then becoming. 
Clearly Hitchcock's conception oftime has much in common with Bergson's. In 
fact, this similarity suggests that it may not be entirely coincidental that Scotty's 
moments of  vertigo, especially when looking down the stairwell of  the bell tower, 
are actually figured in the shape of  a cone. This elongating effect is achieved 
through Hitchcock's distinctive use of  the simultaneous pan and pull back of  the 
camera. The spiralling vortex which emerges from the eye in Saul Bass's opening 
title sequence, moreover, is again suggestive ofthe cone shape seen from above. 
Scotty's vertigo is thus shown to be as much a fear of  the past as it is a fear of 
heights. His is a dizziness brought on by a confrontation with the past, seen 
whenever he stares into the cone. The fear which haunts him, from the opening 
death of  his colleague, is the fear that the past will repeat itself in the same fashion, 
and that he will be powerless to stop it doing so. The ultimate irony of  the film is 68 
that when he himself artificially recreates the past in order to give himself  the 
opportunity to make it return differently - and at this point he does indeed manage to 
cure his fear of  the past, his vertigo - Madelaine dies, once again, as a result. 
Ultimately, the image in the present is still the same as that in the past, with Scotty 
staring down at a figure lying dead on the ground below him. Tampering with the 
linearity oftime's cone, tampering with the match of  images of  the recollection-
image is clearly not something that can be achieved in the cinema of  the movement-
unage. 
Indeed, following Bergson's theory, when the past returns in both recollection-
images, the stables and the necklace, it creates but a momentary pause to the 
continuity of  Scotty's sensory-motor present. Vertigo illustrates the way in which the 
past returns in the movement-image, whilst always retaining the primacy of  a 
singular, linear present and a self-same, organic subject. At the conclusion of 
Cinema 1, in fact, Deleuze describes Hitchcock's cinema as illustrative of  the crisis 
which the action-image faced when it neared the realization of  its own completion. 
The subject of  Rear Window, for instance, is cited as an example ofthe problematic 
cross-over from movement- to time-image. The wheelchair-bound spectator 
(Stewart once again), exhibiting the same sensor-motor incapacity, and inability to 
extend perception into action, which would soon come to characterize the subject in 
the time-image. 
The return of  the past in the recollection-image, however, is not the same as the 
return of  the past in the time-image. Consequently, Hitchcock can be said to have 
taken the movement-image to its completion, but not to have created time-images. 
Ultimately the  recollection-image enables the cinema of  the movement-image to 
retain both its linear narrative and subject. In fact, the successful completion of  a 
circuit between a corresponding past and present image is precisely that which, 
according to Deleuze, enables the 'sensory-motor flux to take up its temporarily 69 
interrupted course again,13. As we saw in the scene from Vertigo, Scotty pauses 
momentarily to take in the image of  the stable, to witness the overlaying of 
matching recollection- and perception-images (the Judy/Madelaine match) but then, 
once again, resumes kissing. The recollection-image functions, essentially, as a 
flashback, and does not permanently threaten the subject's sensory-motor continuity, 
or its consequent subordination of  time to a movement through space. 
By analysing the use of  flashback as a cinematic device that actually tends towards a 
linear unfolding oftime, Deleuze comes to the conclusion that what is seen in the 
recollection-image is merely the return of  elements of  the past that ultimately 
ensures the continuation of  the unified subject that thus becomes identical to its past 
self. Scotty would be the classic example here, a man forever struggling to be, as he 
says, 'free of  the past' who never manages to do anything other than repeat it, to 
confIrm its sameness. In fact, Vertigo is itself marked by a narrative repetition that 
tends towards the same with a doomed, entropic, and ultimately cliched finality. A 
flashback does not sufficiently break up the linear aspect of  narrative, because it 
always returns the narrative to its point of  departure. It  is a closed loop: 
... we know very well that the flashback is a conventional, extrinsic device: 
it is generally indicated by a dissolve link, and the images that it introduces 
are often superimposed or meshed. It is like a sign with the words: 'watch 
out! recollection'. It  can, therefore, indicate, by convention, a causality 
which is psychological, but still analogous to a sensory-motor determinism, 
and, despite its circuits, only confirms the progression of  a linear narration.  14 
Indeed, the flashback is conventionally employed to give the reason why something 
happened, the first cause that led up to the current situation. It creates a singular 
history to the narrative, and retroactively posits the present as the telos to which the 
past inevitably led. Essentially, it asserts the self-sameness of  the subject. Even in 
the scene chosen from Vertigo, which is an exceptional example of  a flashback, and 70 
which verges on becoming a time-image in its own right, the linear trajectory of  the 
movement-image is ultimately retained. 
What has yet to be seen, even though films like Vertigo come close to creating it -
for the circuit of  mutual tension is indeed a pure optical and sound image - is the 
direct expression oftime that is to be found in the time-image. For this to happen, 
the breaking of  the sensory-motor link must be completed. Only with perception 
unable to continue into action can the subject, instead, travel within a purely virtual 
past. The recollection-image, despite the pause which it gives to action, cannot fully 
sever the sensory-motor connection because, in its return from the past, in order to 
meet the perception-image in the present, the recollection-image always becomes 
actual. 
... the recollection-image is not virtual, it actualises a virtuality ... on its 
own account. This is why the recollection-image does not deliver the past to 
us, but only represents the former present that the past 'was'. 15 
The recollection-image is not quite a direct image oftime, for the emergence of  the 
recollection-image always involves the becoming-actual of  the recollection-image, 
as it comes to overlay itself  upon the present. By returning in such a way as to 
explain the present situation, its function is necessarily truth-confirming, and causal. 
In its becoming-actual it verifies the singularity of  the past that 'was', and eliminates 
the falsifying potential of  the virtual past that endures, the past that "is". In this way 
the recollection-image effects the reterritorialization of  the past that characterizes 
the movement-image. 
The crystal of  time, then, is to be found not in the recollection-image, but rather in 
'disturbances of  memory and ... failures ofrecognition,16 which break up the logical 
progression of  the self  in time, and expose the virtual realm that Bergson 71 
distinguished as 'pure-recollection,17. The crystal is the mutual coexistence of  an 
actual and a virtual image, of  the actual and the purely virtual, of  the present and a 
past that is, rather than the present and a past that was. It is the image oftime at the 
moment of  its labyrinthine splitting into a present that passes and a past that is 
preserved. The crystal is a double sided image, in which neither virtual or actual has 
yet crystallized, but in which both are caught up in the process of  becoming so. It  is 
this lack of  fmality to the time-image which ensures the total suspension ofthe 
subject in the interval. As long as the past remains purely virtual the sensory-motor 
link remains permanently broken. 
Both habit and attentive recollection are ways of  recognizing the past, as it returns 
(as a return of  the same) in the present. At either an instinctive, or an attentive level, 
they make manifest a continuity of  past and present. Thus it is that Scotty's image of 
Judy must match Madelaine before Scotty's flashback can occur. In the crystal of 
time, by contrast, the past is always misrecognized, it is not-necessarily that which 
corresponds to the present which it mismatches. The time-image's labyrinthine 
falsifying of  causality ensures that what returns, the memory of  the past, is that 
which can be used to create the memory of  the future. This is the falsifying of  the 
past, and the creation of  different directions through the labyrinth that is enabled by 
the realization oftime's perpetual forking. This is a cinema in which the possibility 
of  different pasts always ensure the return of  difference in the future. This third 
memory, the memory of  the future, however, does not come from Bergson, but from 
Nietzsche. 
Deleuze. 
Beyond habit and recollection, there exists the memory of  the future which Deleuze 
draws from Nietzsche's eternal return. This is the pure or 'empty form oftime,18 which ungrounds Bergson's, ultimately linear, cone model of  time. It is this that 
makes visible the simultaneous becoming-actual of  the virtual, and corresponding 
becoming-virtual of  the actual, in the crystal oftime. The third form of  memory 
emerges in Deleuze's theorizing of  the three syntheses oftime, which are, as we 
began to see in the previous chapter, ultimately derived from his work on Kant: 
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... Kant explains that the Ego itself is in time, and thus constantly changing: 
it is a passive, or rather receptive, Ego, which experiences changes in time. 
But on the other hand, the I is an act which constantly carries out a synthesis 
of  time, and of  that which happens in time, by dividing up the present, the 
past, and the future at every instant. The I and the Ego are thus separated by 
the line oftime which relates them to each other, but under the condition of  a 
fundamental difference .... I cannot therefore constitute myself as a unique 
and active subject, but as a passive ego which represents to itself only the 
activity of  its own thought; that is to say, the I, as an other which affects it.
19 
The schizophrenic subject, at once a passive Ego, and an active I, is fractured by the 
straight line, or pure form of  time, time which has become unhinged from spatial 
succession. Its passive aspect, the 'Ego', experiences, or 'receives' time, and in this 
sense exists 'in time'. The subject's simultaneous existence as an'!', however, 
provides the action that synthesizes time. The I is the actual aspect of  the subject in 
time, the point at which time is perceived as passing, and is divided into a past, a 
present and a future. The Ego is the passive, or virtual form, which is then changed 
by this interaction of  the I with time. In this way Kant deconstructs Descartes' 
Cogito into its two component selves, the passive Ego who endures in time, 
virtually, and the active, representative, I, who passes in time, and who appears as 
the actualized form of  the self. 73 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze identifies three ways in which time can be 
synthesized, three ways in which time can be experienced by the subject. The first 
and second of  these roughly correspond to Bergson's ideas concerning the two 
different types of  recognition, habit and recollection. Habit is the first passive 
synthesis oftime. It is the present that passes, the contraction of  presents into a 
habitual action, or actions. Habit is the 'foundation,20 of  time. Yet, if  time is a 
labyrinth created by the splitting of  time into both a present that passes and a past 
that is preserved, then it must be this past that allows for the present to pass in the 
first place. Beyond the first synthesis, habit, then, is the second passive synthesis, 
that of  the past that is preserved. This is Bergson's pure past, the cone. The present, 
but the most contracted level ofthe past, only comes to pass because of  the storing 
away of  the virtual past that is effected by the cone. Memory, then, 'grounds,21 time, 
even though habit is the foundation of  time. 
The present can be the most contracted degree of  the past which coexists 
with it only if  the past first coexists with itself in an infinity of  diverse 
degrees of  relaxation and contraction at an infmity oflevels (this is the 
meaning of  the famous Bergsonian metaphor of  the cone ...  )22 
Whilst habit is a passive synthesis of  many different passing presents, recollection is 
a passive synthesis of  many different layers of  the past, 'an infinity of  diverse 
degrees of  relaxation and contractions at an infmity of  levels'. 
The subject can be seen in habit as formed by a contraction, or synthesis, of  passing 
presents, through repetitions of  actions that tend towards the same. The subject in 
recollection, for its part, exists in a more dynamic relation to the past, as a synthesis 
of  several pasts, the action of  relaxation and contraction between points SAB of  the 
cone. The second synthesis of  time, then, when seen in the subject's actions, or at 
the level of  representation at least, appears as an active synthesis23 oftime. For, with 
the successful actualization of  the recollection-image, the subject's spatial continuity 74 
in the present can, once more, be resumed. The active representation of  the second 
synthesis thus maintains the illusion of  both the subject's inevitable extension into 
action (despite its more fundamental existence as a passive synthesis of  time) and its 
existence as the singular I of  Descartes' Cogito. This further ensures that, in the 
movement-image, the positioning of  the body still seems of  greater importance than 
the movement of  time itself Hence this synthesis also ultimately tends towards the 
repetition of  the same, just as the overlaying of  the past image onto the present that 
occurs in attentive recollection is brought about by a recognition, or, the creation of 
a match between, the two images. 
Together these first two syntheses constitute a subject who is linear, the subject of 
the movement-image. Yet the first and second passive syntheses, constitutive of  the 
present and past respectively, are themselves suggestive ofan 'ungrounding,24 of 
time, a third passive synthesis that belongs to the future. This is the third type of 
memory, Deleuze's formulation ofthe eternal return as the pure form of  time, time 
out of  joint, or time released from spatial succession. It  is the synthesis oftime 
peculiar to the doubled subject of  the time-image, who, constantly becoming-other, 
begins to realize its own existence as a mobius-like entity. The third synthesis of 
time is a loop: 
There is eternal return only in the third time: it is here that ... the straight 
line of  time, as though drawn by its own length, re-forms a strange loop 
which in no way resembles the earlier cycle, but leads into the formless and 
operates only for the third time and for that which belongs to it?5 
Unlike the circular, self-identical loop of  the 'earlier cycle' (that which returns in the 
same form) in the eternal return, the virtual, empty form oftime folds itself into a 
self-reflexive superfold, creating the oscillation peculiar to the crystaloftime. 
Rather than a loop that tends towards the same, as in a conventional flashback loop, 75 
or the actualization of  a recollection-image, this is a 'strange loop' which tends 
towards difference. The 'formless' into which it opens is the labyrinthine whole of 
time which is created when the linear drive of  the memory cone is ungrounded, and 
the subject's sensory-motor continuum is suspended. Thus what returns in the crystal 
is always the other face of  the m6bius spiral, always the double, always difference, 
always the memory of  the future. The crystal of  Cinema 2 expresses exactly the 
'hidden ground oftime,26 of  the eternal return, the 'terra incognita'27 which Deleuze 
previously discovered in Difference and Repetition. 
The subject of  the time-image is a unique subject who 'belongs' only to that one 
repetition of  itself-as-other. This is a subject who, unable to extend itself into an 
action through space, instead becomes-other in time. The suspension of  its sensory-
motor continuum defines the subject as a static (as opposed to active) synthesis of 
time, the synthesis oftime enacted by an immobile spectator. The subject now exists 
in a time in which change occurs, but a time which does not itself change. Time is 
now no longer subordinate to movement through space, instead, all movement now 
exists in time. In the time-images ofFellini this synthesis is evident in the subject's 
slippages between the different, virtual1ayers of  the not-necessarily true past. Here 
the time-image creates a somewhat different subject to that which is retained by the 
return of  the matching past, into the present, of  Hitchcock's recollection-image. 
Fellini. 
In the time-image, with the subject's sensory-motor extension suspended, the cinema 
of  the agent (the doer of  the movement-image) gives way to the cinema of  the 
'seer,28. The subject, its perception unable to extend into movement, is instead 
extended by a 'movement ofworld,29 which takes place around the subject. The 
subject's becoming-other involves a slipping into, and between, different layers of 76 
the past, a process through which they come to explore the different past selves that 
exist therein. The subject now exists in time, time in its pure and empty form, and as 
such, is subject to its movements. The subordination of  time to movement through 
space that occurs in the movement-image has been reversed. 
When an image from the past now enters into a circuit with that which is perceived 
in the present it does not become actual as the recollection-image did. Consequently, 
the past is not reterritorialized into a singular continuum in the time-image. Rather, 
the process of  crystallization allows the subject to slip into the past in general (the 
past that is, rather than the past that was) and to explore its myriad, not-necessarily 
true layers. Moreover, what is virtual and actual is now impossible to discern, for: 
... we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the 
situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to 
know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask. It  is as if  the 
real and the imaginary were running after each other, as if  each had become 
reflected in the other, around a point of  indiscernibility.  30 
Fellini's 81f2 provides the perfect example of  this movement of  world which occurs 
in the third synthesis of  time, and the consequent indiscernibility of  virtual and 
actual which is made manifest in the crystal of  time. The film was, after all, made in 
response to Fellini's own experiences when he found his ability to act (to make the 
film) suspended by an artistic block. This block is figured in the film's famous 
opening sequence, as a traffic jam, in which Guido (Marcello Mastroianni) fmds 
himself  trapped in his car. His movement through space has been, we are shown 
literally, stopped. 81f2  is a film about the way in which time invades the interval 
when the subject finds itself  unable to extend perception into action. It  is a film 
about the confusion between past and present which occurs once the linearity 
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world, instead, begins to move around the incapacitated subject. 
The two meetings between Guido and the Cardinal, for instance, provide excellent 
examples ofthe passage of  time in the time-image. Guido, visiting his mistress, 
Carla, in The Railway Hotel- she has a fever from drinking the spa water - and 
exhausted, lies back on the bed and stares at the back of  his hands. With his sensory-
motor ability suspended, we hear Guido reflect wearily, in a voiceover; 'What shall I 
tell the Cardinal tomorrow?' This is immediately followed by an abrupt cut to the 
meeting of  Guido with the Cardinal. Already we cannot be sure that this is actually 
the next day which we are seeing, a dream, or a fantasy on Guido's part. With the 
subject's linear continuum suspended, the distinction between 'imaginary' and 'real' 
becomes increasingly difficult to make with any degree of  surety. 
Guido is walking through the woods where he is to meet the Cardinal to discuss the 
treatment of  religion in the film. He is told by an assistant to the Cardinal that his 
previous idea for a setting for the meeting won't work because: 'the film's hero and a 
prince of  the church can't meet in a mud bath ... a prelate would have a private 
cubicle.' Again, this dialogue leaves us none the wiser as to whether this is a 
genuine meeting, or indeed, Guido's fantasy of  this meeting within the film-within-
the-film, which has to happen in the woods, because it cannot happen in a mud bath. 
As he sits with the Cardinal, listening to the somber, funereal song of  the Diomedes 
bird, Guido - forever the schoolboy, sitting on the edge of  the seat, shoulders 
slumped, hat in hands and knees pointing inwards - is unable to concentrate on the 
mystical message being imparted. As all around listen reverently, on the Cardinal's 
insistence, Guido for his part furtively steals glances off  to all sides. Finally he 
catches sight of  a large woman walking towards him down the hill, carrying an 
equally large bag. As she hoists up her dress in order to take special care with her 78 
footing, Guido looks directly at her exposed legs. In a gesture which epitomizes the 
subject, the seer, of  the time-image, he pointedly moves his glasses down his nose, 
and, staring over the top of  them, signals the movement of  world that is about to 
occur. 
This movement is effected by another abrupt cut, this time shifting us back through 
time into the past, where we emerge behind a priest's head, in a schoolyard. The 
young boy Guido, in black cap and cape (in order to make the point that the boy and 
the man are co-existent in time Guido is shown wearing a hat and cape as an adult) 
is being called away by his young friends (the 'vitelloni' to be) in order to see La 
Saraghina. La Saraghina is a large beach dwelling prostitute who will dance the 
Rumba for them if  they pay her. The young boy makes the choice between church 
and school, and prostitute, in favour of  the prostitute, and runs to join his friends. As 
was previously the case with the recollection-image, the layer of  the past chosen by 
Guido is that in which a match is to be found for the image he perceives in the 
present. In this instance, however, this match does not extend into an actualization 
of  the past, but facilitates instead the utilization of  the virtual past in order to create 
the memory of  the future. 
Initially the match between past and present seems obvious. It is a match between 
the Cardinal, in whose presence Guido behaves as a naughty schoolboy, and the 
playground to which he is transported, in which the priest is calling him in to class. 
However, there is a deeper resonance at work in creating this match. Guido the 
schoolboy is also seen in the memory of  La Saraghina, staring, captivated, at her 
legs as she dances the Rumba. Thus the sight of  the legs of  the woman descending 
the slope, within the context of  his conversation with the Cardinal, has enabled 
Guido to leap back in time to a layer of  the past in which the memory of  La 
Saraghina's legs, and his punishment by the priests are both prominent features. 
Guido finds in this layer of  the past the virtual double ofthe (actual) situation in 79 
which he previously found himself (the meeting with the Cardinal is actual in that 
even if  it is not "actually" happening - i.e. ifit is but Guido's dream or fantasy-
whether it is the actual or the virtual is impossible to discern, so it effectively 
becomes actual once it enters into a circuit with another, virtual image). Indeed, this 
mirroring is compounded by the narrative surrounding La Saraghina, the young 
GuidolFellini's early struggle between religion and women. This struggle is itself 
doubled in the problems religion is causing the director of  the film, hence his 
concerns over what to tell the Cardinal in the first place. 
Just as we cannot tell if  the meeting that we are witnessing is actually happening, or 
a fantasy, so the memory that Guido leaps into through the association with the 
woman's legs mayor may not be a memory that is directly linked to the actual 
present. Unlike the actualization of  the past which accompanies the recovery of  the 
recollection-image, here the past remains purely virtual. With the subject's sensory-
motor continuity suspended, what we are witnessing is the movement of  world in 
which the real and the imaginary (virtual and actual, past and present) are 
impossible to separate. Without an actualization of  the past in the present there is no 
longer a linear continuum from which to judge what is past and what present, and 
instead the subject proceeds through a series of  memory "failures" to travel through 
the past that is, rather than to reterritorialize it into a past that was. The memory 
Guido experiences, then, mayor may not be an actual event from his childhood. 
After watching La Saraghina dance the Rumba, Guido is caught by the priests on 
the beach, a doubling of  the resolution to the opening dream of  flying, in which he is 
pulled to earth on the same beach. This doubling of  the beach scene points once 
again to the way in which the past and present are oscillating within the crystal, 
coexisting as opposing faces of  a two-sided image, between which Guido slips 
imperceptibly. The association of  the beach with his own capture, and being brought 
to earth - tumbling over with the priests as a boy, and being pulled down on a rope 80 
in the dream - is not, however, a causal one. The fact that the dream seemingly 
occurs before the memory allows the possibility that his capture on the beach may 
be a misremembrance ofthe past based upon his present situation. The memory of 
his boyhood capture may in fact be the settling on, or even, the creation of, a not-
necessarily true past that now comes to explain his present situation. The layer of 
the past in which Guido discovers the image that comes to overlay the present is 
not-necessarily that which happened, or even the way in which it happened, but it is 
the image which best fits the situation in the present. Nor is this the positing of  a 
mythological origin, and the subsequent creation ofa linear sense of  self  through the 
actualization of  such an image, but rather, the creation of  a memory of  the future 
which enables the renewed performance ofthe self as other, based upon a past 
which is not- necessarily true. This is a past which, without reterritorializing into an 
actual form, retains the possibility of  future change in its virtuality. 
The end of  this sequence that began with the movement from Carla's bedroom to the 
Cardinal in the woods, abruptly cuts once more to Guido talking with Daumier (the 
fUm critic) with the Cardinal and his assistants seen eating at a table in the 
background. From here we move again, this time to the mud baths in which Guido 
is to meet the Cardinal. As spectators, we must question whether this scene follows 
chronologically from Guido's visit to his mistress? If  this is a return to the present, 
then this would seem to place the narrative of  8Y2 very much within a movement-
image schema. If  this is the case, Guido's fantasy/recollection is but the actualization 
of  a recollection-image, rather than the crystallizing of  a pure fantasy/recollection 
which retains its virtuality. Is the meeting with the Cardinal that happens in the mud 
bath, then, the actual meeting which Guido was so nervous about, or could it be yet 
another fantasy? The reference to the mud bath made by the Cardinal's assistant 
when Guido went to meet him in the woods earlier adds to our confusion over this 
matter, for the Cardinal does indeed have a 'private cubicle', when Guido is 
summoned to meet him. Is this, then, the film within the film? Is it fantasy, is it 81 
reality? We are no longer able to tell, for, subject to the movement of  world, we no 
longer have 'a place from which to ask'. 
The second meeting with the Cardinal is not-necessarily the only one, or the "true" 
one, as Fellini points out by referring to the mud bath meeting in the previous 
meeting in the woods. Even if  we are "wrong" here, and the meeting is meant to be 
the actual happening that follows once Guido returns to reality from his fantasy, 
when he next visits the recollection of  the meeting with the Cardinal, which will be 
the one that best fits the situation in which he finds himself? Will the past which 
best matches the present be the first, or the second meeting? How will the past know 
if  it is a fantasy or a reality? Which was the real meeting is a question that can and 
will only be answered in the future, a time which will make one of  the meetings, 
not-necessarily true. 
How are we, then, to discern the line of  flight, or trajectory through the labyrinth on 
which we fmd ourselves in this (seemingly second) meeting with the Cardinal? Are 
we witnessing a scene in the film being made in the film? Is it a fantasy, a fantasy 
within a fantasy, or perhaps even an actual happening? In fact, the private cubicle 
and its mystical self-opening window through which Guido communicates with the 
Cardinal, seems to be in a process of oscillation with the scene in the confessional 
in Guido's childhood past through which we have just moved. The partitioning of 
the Cardinal from Guido, then, is perhaps best conceived of  as the image that fits 
most easily with his slippage from the past in which he (as a boy) is partitioned off 
from the priest within the confessional, into the present in which he is similarly 
partitioned off  from the Cardinal in his 'private cubicle'. 
In the scene in which the boy Guido is taken to confess his sin of  Rumba 
fascination, we see most clearly the movement of  the subject through time, as it 82 
slips between different layers of  the past. When the boy Guido enters the 
confessional in order to do penance for his visit to La Saraghina, we see him 
disappear into the central of  three monstrously gothic cubicles. When he steps out 
again, however, he exits one of  only two monstrously gothic confessionals. There is 
no longer a cubicle to the right as we look, and indeed the room has changed shape 
to such a degree that there is now a wall, which was not there previously, next to the 
confessional which he leaves
31
• Within the confessional Guido has slipped between 
two different virtual sheets of  the past, and, in doing so, has become-other. The 
Guido that steps out of  the confessional is still the Guido who exists on the new 
layer that has been accessed, as each layer contains the whole of  the past, but Guido 
in the present has changed in this movement between the different sheets of  the past, 
the change in memory enabling a change in his future, now present, self Here we 
can begin to see the way in which the pure and empty form of  time provides the 
conditions for self-creation, the utilization of  a not-necessarily true past in order to 
become-other. 
Due to this indiscernibility of  the different sheets, not only is there no longer a 
distinction to be seen between actual and virtual, but also, when Guido slips into the 
past "initially", we cannot say with any certainty that the layer in which he finds 
himself is the virtual, or that the present which they left is the actual, because what 
does that then make the first layer of  time from which he slips into the second layer? 
Where he moves from in the past (the layer which, for all we can tell, is the actual) 
is the double, the situation which best fits the posture adopted by that with which it 
oscillates. In becoming indiscernible in this way, the subject slips from an actual 
situation (even if  it may appear to us to be a dream or a fantasy) into a virtual 
situation (new layer of  the past) which in tum becomes the actual from which he 
will move into the next virtual, and so on. This is why the crystal is akin to the 
revolution of  the mobius, effecting a shifting from an actual self, to a virtual self, to 
an actual self  once more, and so on and on, with the subject always co-existing with 83 
its emergent double due to the forking oftime, and always becoming-other through 
a movement of  world. 
There is no necessity, then, as there is in the movement-image, for the subject to 
always return to the present once the memory sought for has been uncovered in the 
past. Becoming-other is not the same process as that which culminates in the 
actualization of  a recollection-image. Instead, reasons Deleuze: 
... we constitute a continuum with fragments of  different ages; we make use 
of  transformations which take place between two sheets to constitute a sheet 
a/transformation  .... which invents a kind of  transverse continuity of 
communication between several sheets, and weaves a network of  non-
localizable relations between them. In this way we extract non-chronological 
time .... at once a past and always to come.
32 
The subject's return to the present, once travel begins to occur within 'non-
chronological time' in fact, may be due not to the actualization of  an appropriate 
recollection-image at all, but rather to an oscillating doubling, or match, between 
what is occurring there, and the memory in which we existed previously. In this 
way, the present remains only one layer of  the past (albeit the most condensed) 
which joins up with all the others through which the sheet of  transformation moves. 
The sensory-motor continuity of  the subject is thus undermined by the aberrant 
circuits oftime, as it moves around the subject. For this reason, the second meeting 
with the Cardinal, we can perhaps now see, is merely the double of  the image in 
which Guido previously existed in the past, in which he was in the confessional. His 
return to the present moreover, to this fantasy meeting in the mud bath, should be 
seen as a slippage between sheets oftime, rather than an empty-handed return from 
an aborted attempt to discover a recollection-image. 84 
As we see in 8%, the subject does not obey a sensory-motor, linear scheme of 
evolution, but rather, slips through time, creating a transformative sheet on which he 
is at times man, and, at times, boy. The interior of  the confessional (in the past 
containing the three confessionals) which he initially enters becomes the actual 
present for the boy, Guido, who makes an association with a parallel past to the one 
in which he finds himself, and slips imperceptibly around the mobius, into this other 
self  that inhabits this double, virtual (but becoming-actual) layer of  the past (the past 
containing the two confessionals). From here he slips into a new image which 
comes forward to double the new situation, the meeting with the Cardinal in the 
seeming present (the fantasy of  the private cubicle in the mud baths). 
Thus, when reviewed under the ungrounding conditions established by the third 
synthesis of  time, the initial leap into the past in general which was thought by 
Bergson to be the starting point in the search for recollection, is perhaps not so 
much a leap, as it is a slippage, and rather than this being an originary act, the 
movement of  slippage is in fact immanent to the subject's existence in time. The 
subject in the interval between perception and action, now seems to exist as a degree 
of  expansion or contraction, or indeed, transformation, which is more random than 
that theorized by Bergson. Bergson was, after all, actually describing a subject who 
was still subordinate to a sensory-motor continuum. By infmitely deferring the 
actualization of  the past that occurs in the recollection-image, the time-image 
struggles instead to ward off  the reterritorialization of  the past into a linear 
continuum, by maintaining the virtual nature of  the past at all times. It is this which 
creates, instead, the sheet of  transformation, across which the ungrounded subject 
traverses time. 
When the memory cone that is formed by the second passive synthesis of  time is 
ungrounded by the third passive synthesis of  time, we see in 8%, it unravels into a 
labyrinth. At this point time itself becomes the subject: 85 
... the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its 
foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round. . .. 
Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interior in which we 
are, in which we move, live and change.33 
The pure and empty form of  time, that in which we change, but which does not itself 
change, is the subject in which we are but characters, the myriad ages of  the subject. 
This is made explicit in the carousel ending of  8~, in which we are shown the 
contemporaneous nature of  several different stages of  the self As Guido's cast 
assembles at the scaffolding, his boyhood self  appears marching at the tail end ofa 
four-piece clown band. For the first time Guido the adult, and Guido the boy, are 
placed on the same, transformative, sheet of  time. 
The child in us, says Fellini, is contemporary with the adult, the old man and 
the adolescent. Thus it is that the past which is preserved takes on all the 
virtues of  beginning and beginning again ...  34 
Guido is at once an actual man becoming a virtual boy, and a virtual boy becoming 
an actual man. His identity, as he slips between sheets of  the past, is a process of 
perpetual crystallization between different sheets of  the past. Moreover, in each 
oscillation ofthe mobius, each split that occurs in the crystal oftime, it becomes 
increasingly impossible to determine which is becoming which. 
After his (fantastical? we cannot tell) suicide attempt, Guido fmally reconciles 
himself  to his sensory-motor suspension, his inability to act and to author the film. 
As Frank Burke has it, Fellini's film: ' ...  envisions death in terms of  integration, 
creative self-surrender  ...  ', as the loss of  an authorial self, which makes Guido's 
existence, instead, 'immanent'35. At this point, asking forgiveness of  all the 
characters in his life he admits: Now everything's become as it was, confused ... but 86 
this confusion is me.' Sitting in his car once again he is, as he was at the film's 
beginning, the subject unable to extend his perception into movement, who, instead, 
begins to witness the movement of  world around him. From the past, from his 
interaction with the confusion of  selves that he is, Fellini is now finally able to begin 
his film. It is now that the boy Guido appears with the adult, illustrating the way in 
which the past, or rather, the confusion of  not-necessarily true, virtual pasts, can be 
used to create the memory of  the future. It is this power of  transformation which 
makes the subject immanent, a subject yet to come. 
The subject thus ungrounded by time, simultaneously adult and boy, now has the 
power of  'beginning and beginning again' of  the eternal return. This is ultimately 
figured in the final image of  the boy, now in white, in a spotlight in the centre of  the 
circus ring, the power invested in the past to create a memory of  the future. This is 
Guido's temporal, as opposed to sensory-motor self, 'Guido as pure potential, 
renewa1'36, the power of  the boy co-existent with the man in the past that is, the past 
of  the third synthesis oftime. In the final scene ofFellini's 8lh we witness the power 
of  the eternal return to constantly unground the continuum upon which the sensory-
motor subject is based. The time-image has ungrounded the movement-image. 
IfFellini's crystals are, as Deleuze maintains, 'always in the process of  formation', 
and as such, illustrate 'life as spectacle, and yet in its spontaneity,37 then this is 
precisely because of  the many, not-necessarily true pasts that he creates for his 
characters. Fellini's crystal is always concerned with multiplying the entrances to the 
'giant Luna Park,38 spectacle of  life, life as it is lived within the open and expanding 
whole oftime. This multiplying process, in fact, he pursued throughout his oeuvre, 
by constantly creating and recreating different sheets of  his past, a trend within his 
work which exists in, amongst other films, I Vitelloni, Amarcord, and Intervista. By 
creating so many virtual, not- necessarily true pasts, Fellini established his oeuvre as 
a giant world memory, a memory of  the future which played upon the confusion between the real and the virtual inherent in the time-image subject's experience of 
the past. Fellini's cinema, rather like that ofResnais, which both Deleuze and 
Rodowick
39 analyse, shows the purely virtual movement of  the subject through 
different sheets of  the past. This is the subject in the time-image, who exists as an 
infinite number of  selves which together create the memory of  the future, based 
upon several not-necessarily true pasts. 
87 
However, the return of  the past in the time-image, and the subject's ability to 
become-other in a purely virtual time, is always reterritorialized by the return of  the 
past as it is depicted in the mainstream, the movement-image. As we saw in the 
scene from Vertigo, recollection-images (and as we shall see in further chapters, 
most conventional flashbacks) almost always prolong the subject's sensory-motor 
continuum and affirm the singular nature of  the narrative. Thus the potential for a 
dispersal of  the self into its myriad virtual becomings is always reterritorialized into 
the continuation of  a self-same, causally determined, singular self The continued 
subordination oftime to a movement through space, moreover, is ensured by this 
same process of  reterritorialization. 
The time-image, although illustrating the ungrounding of  cinema, is perhaps 
marginalized because the becoming-other that it offers is not that which is 
commonly experienced in everyday life. In fact, it illustrates a rare form oftemporal 
displacement, perhaps more akin to dream or fantasy than to "reality", which 
remains sensory-motor for most people. Its manifestation in memory disturbances, 
moreover, seems to suggest a kinship with memory as it may be experienced by 
subjects suffering from dehabilitating medical conditions, such as Alzheimers 
disease, or senile dementia. The problem this raises, of  course, is the replacement it 
suggests of  the organism's central role in memory recall. These medical conditions 
are, after all,  physica~ and most often due to brain deterioration. Deleuze himself 
alludes to this confusion when he cites Resnais' Je t'aime je t'aime, (one of  the few 88 
time-images) and Hitchcock's Vertigo (as we have seen, a movement-image) as two 
of: 'perhaps three films which show how we inhabit time, how we move in it, in this 
form which picks us up and carries us away.,40 Deleuze, at this point of  Cinema 2, is 
talking about our existence in the pure and empty form of  time, the form which, as 
he says, 'picks us up and carries us away'. This we have seen in 81;2, and it is 
certainly, as Rodowick has shown, also true ofResnais's film. Yet this is surely not 
what is seen in Vertigo, in which, rather than an ungrounding of  time, we witness 
the actualization of  the recollection-image, as part of  its broader movement-image 
structure. Perhaps Deleuze's mistake is actually quite a telling one, however, as, for 
most people, Vertigo is the more accurate expression of  how we inhabit time. 
The realization of  the crisis oftruth which is the time-image, then, is not something 
that we experience in our everyday lives. This fact is itself bolstered by the 
dominance of  the movement-image, which keeps an awareness ofthe time-image 
out ofthe quotidian sphere. Examining the dominance of  the movement-image, for 
this reason, is perhaps more rewarding than analyzing the time-image itself. 
Consequently, chapters four, five and six will examine the different ways in which 
the movement-image maintains its regime oflinearity, how it constantly 
reterritorializes the labyrinthine potential of  the time-image. Before we leave our 
examination ofthe time-image behind to concentrate on the movement-image, 
however, we shall continue, in chapter three, with the comparison between the two 
images. This time the focus will rest on the difference between the spectator that is 
enabled by each image, and in particular, their experience of  the film's temporal 
narrative. 89 
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3. The Incredible Shrinking Spectator. 
One of  the most apparent ways in which Deleuze's work on the cinema effects film 
studies is in the different approaches to spectatorship which it enables. Following 
initial inroads made by Steven Shaviro, in The Cinematic Body (1993)1 two books 
have emerged, in 2000, which use approaches informed by Deleuze to readdress the 
long standing debate around the formation of  the spectator, as subject, in the act of 
viewing a film. These works are, Laura U. Marks' The Skin of  the Film and Barbara 
Kennedy's Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of  Sensation. In the context created 
by these emergent works, this chapter will explore how the spectatorial subject 
experiences time differently when viewing movement-images, than it does when 
viewing time-images. In order to conceive of  this distinction more fully, however, 
we will engage most comprehensively with D.N. Rodowick's slightly earlier work, 
The Difficulty of  Difference (1991) which concentrates on Freud's psychoanalytical 
theorization of  the subject, but which does so in an almost Deleuzian fashion. 
Marks's inspirational work describes how the spectators of  various post-colonial and 
diasporic (what she bracket terms, 'intercultura1'2) cinemas encounter time-images 
which appeal directly to the suspension, during viewing, of  the link between the 
spectator's senses and their motor actions. These cinemas create haptic, or tactile, 
'multisensory,3 images, which are experienced in ways other than the mental 
comprehension of  the stories that films represent. For the spectator experiencing a 
film multisensorially, as she puts it, it is: 'as though one were touching a film with 
one's eyes,4, touching the very skin of  the film. These tactile images trigger 
(BergsonianiProustian) involuntary sensory memories in the spectator. The not-
necessarily true pre-colonial or pre-diasporic pasts which these sensory memories 
create, moreover, stand in direct contrast to the visually recorded past of  the 
established colonial, or national, history. Consequently a new, post-colonial, or 
diasporic memory of  the future can be established by these films. This future 93 
potential is created in the spectator, whose motor immobility whilst viewing allows 
them to travel, sensorially, through time, and therein to recover previously 
eradicated (not-necessarily true) pasts. Marks's work is thus an in-depth expose of 
the way in which Deleuze's modem political cinema creates, as he claims, a people 
yet to come. We shall further refer to Marks' work, below, in conjunction with 
Stephen Heath's discussion of  the different ways in which suture can be theorized 
when applied to different types of  films. 
Kennedy, a little like Marks, also concentrates on the sensation of  spectating as it 
effects both the mind and the body of  the subject. This is in contrast to most 
previously existing theories of  the spectator in film studies, which have, albeit 
understandably, privileged the subject's ocular perception of  film, at the level of 
representation. Kennedy attempts instead to formulate a (neo) aesthetics of 
sensation. From her Deleuzian perspective, spectating is re-theorized as an 'event,5, 
or 'haecceity,6 in which the spectator is 'subjectless,7, forming, at a molecular level, 
an assemblage, or 'mind/body/machine meld,g with the film. Thus, Kennedy's 
analysis shows that all films, regardless of  whether they are movement-images or 
time-images, are actually experienced at a molecular level, as well as at the molar 
level of  representation. 
At the molecular level, the spectator experiences the film as an interplay between 
cinematography, music, decor, lighting, pace of  editing, colour, movement in the 
shot, costume, and so on. Film thus exceeds the bounds of  representation, and 
becomes instead, somewhat akin to a musical symphony, of  which we physically 
experience its tones and rhythms, as well as mentally comprehending the stories it 
tells. Kennedy offers a micro-politics of  film aesthetics, in order to explain why the 
spectator can experience pleasure when watching films which are politically 
incorrect (and which should thus seem unpleasurable) when examined solely at the 
molar level of  representation. Certain of  Kennedy's conclusions are, however, 94 
problematic
9
, and, for this reason, her work will remain, along with Marks's, as an 
informing background to this chapter, which will focus primarily on the experience 
of  spectating as it effects the subject at a molar level. 
In light of  these ground-breaking works, what follows is a reanalysis of 
spectatorship as an event, but an event which is experienced differently, depending 
on the type of  image with which the subject forms a temporal assemblage. The films 
used to provide this contrast will be Jacques Rivette's time-image, Celine et Julie 
vont en bateau (1974) -hereafter Celine et Julie - and the more recent movement-
image, The Sixth Sense (1999). In The Difficulty of  Difference, Rodowick uses 
Celine et Julie to provide a psychoanalytical interpretation of  spectatorship, but one 
which re-addresses many ofthe assumptions about Freud's work made previously in 
fUm studies. The contrast between this - an extremely nuanced, and indeed, almost 
Deleuzian inspired psychoanalytical spectator - and the Deleuzian spectator which 
this work offers as a contrast, will enable us to show that spectating is a temporal 
process that is inherently labyrinthine (and which can be seen as such in time-
images) but which is reterritorialized into linearity, in movement-images. This is, it 
will be seen, to draw a similar distinction as that which Stephen Heath does (albeit 
using a different methodological approach to reach his conclusions) between the 
different ways in which suture can be seen to work in different types of  cinema. In 
the movement-image or, to be more specific, the action-image, this process is at its 
most conservative, and is achieved through a heavy emphasis on narrative 
continuity, and the employment of  certain cinematographic and editing techniques, 
such as the shot/reverse shot procedure. In the time-image, by contrast, suture 
becomes a process of  infmite deferral, in which the spectatorial subject is not 
constrained through the imposition of  the single, linear trajectory of  the ftlm's 
narrative, and is, instead, forever coming into existence, forever becoming-other. 
This subject position is realized in a variety of  ways in different time-images. In 
Celine et Julie this effect is achieved through the exposure of  the spectator to its 95 
labyrinthine self, through a subversion, or ungrounding, of  the conventional use of 
the shot/reverse shot procedure. 
Ungrounding Psychoanalysis. 
Celine et Julie is the story of  two women, a magician, Celine (Juliet Berto) and a 
librarian, Julie (Dominique Labourier), who live in present day (1974) Montmartre. 
After a magical/chance meeting they discover that they share memories ofa past in 
which a little girl, Madlyn, is murdered by one oftwo women, Camille and Sophie. 
Which of  the two women commits the murder is unknown, and the part played by 
the father (Olivier) in the child's death is also suspicious, as the two women are both 
in competition for his attention. This shared memory, Celine and Julie discover, is 
being continually replayed in a boarded up house, at, 7 bis rue Nadir aux Pommes, 
as a theatrical, domestic melodrama. This site of  the past we shall refer to from now 
on using Rivette's term, the "House of  Fiction". The two women decide to rescue the 
girl from the past, by entering the House of  Fiction, and, both disguised as the nurse, 
Miss Terre-Angele (mystery angel) playfully alter the seemingly inevitable 
repetition of  events that take place there, and thereby save Madlyn from her fate. 
Rodowick views the interaction between the events in the lives of  Celine and Julie 
in Montmartre, and the interruption caused by the events in the House of  Fiction, as 
illustrative of  his reading of  Freud's oeuvre, in which he fmds a double movement at 
work. In the process of  subject formation there are, according to Rodowick: 
... two different vectors in Freud's thought: on one hand, a teleological 
orientation and a logic of  binary division where the theory of  phylogeny 
informs Freud's ideas on bisexuality and the acquisition of  sexual identity 
through the Oedipus and castration complexes; on the other, his intricate 96 
understanding of  the nondialectical organization of  the drives, and after 
1920, an increasing emphasis on their entropic character. These vectors 
represent two forms of  reading and rational explanation that exist side by 
side in Freud's thought. My point then is not that Freud's writings are 
falsified by contradiction. On the contrary, his views after 1920 comprise the 
most replete account of  the specific logic of  contradiction that generates the 
complex architecture of  phantasy, where one activity of  mental life never 
ceases organizing, systematizing, and building higher unities against an 
equally powerful force of  disintegration. 10 
Rodowick's first chapter begins with a discussion of  Deleuze's attempts to think 
beyond binary reasoning in Dialogues and Anti-Oedipus. It is perhaps little wonder, 
then, that his reading of  'the specific logic of  contradiction' to be found in Freud's 
phantasy can be interpreted using the Deleuzian model which we outlined in the 
frrst chapter. When seen in this way, Freud's 'two different vectors' illustrate the 
constant struggle for reterritorialization that is enacted by the teleological, singular, 
linear direction of  the plane of  transcendence, against the perpetual ungrounding 
workings of  desire (on the plane of  consistency) which constantly attempt to disrupt 
the teleological line of  representation, and its binary logic. The struggle which 
Rodowick finds in Freud's theory of  phantasy is analogous, we contend, to the 
struggle between the reterritorializing singular straight line of  time and history, 
which creates the self-identical, singular subject; and the labyrinthine time of  the 
pure and empty form oftime, which liberates the subject through its becoming-
other, its return in difference. The struggle, to reiterate, is between the 
reterritorializing 'activity of  mental life' which 'never ceases organizing, 
systematizing and building higher unities' and its ungrounding virtual double, the 
'equally powerful force of  disintegration', which constantly works to disintegrate 
representation's homogeneity. 97 
Rodowick's critique of  the way in which film studies had previously used Freudian 
psychoanalysis - in a way that actually served to maintain, rather than to question, 
certain binary divisions - can thus be seen to be Deleuzian in its inspiration
il
. 
Indeed, Rodowick's use of  Freud comes with certain caveats which represent the 
thrust of  the post-structural philosophies of  theorists like Foucault, and Deleuze and 
Guattari. Freud's Oedipus complex, for instance, is reconsidered by Rodowick, and 
now appears as a 'historically defmed regulatory apparatus' rather than an 'archaic 
memory,12. The subject's linear, Oedipal trajectory, is thus still created by a 
repetition of  the same, existing, as it does, as a 'narrative' which 'must repeat, in a 
certain sequence, the precipitating events of  the past'  13. Yet the veracity of  the origin 
of  this past, and in particular, its origin in the primal scene,  is now thought to be 
constructed as 'a narrative and semiotic memory specific to the history of  the subject 
within the material, social context of  the family'14, rather than, as Freud thought, a 
speCIes memory. 
Moreover, the ability which phantasy has to unground the subject's linear trajectory 
is described in terms which seem to correspond to those used by Bergson that we 
saw in the previous chapter. The way in which memory returns in phantasy is not so 
as to retain a linearity to the subject's historical progression, rather, memory returns 
as 'multiple reinscriptions and transactions between disjunct historical strata where 
the subject is divided within itself
l5
. This description could as well be applied to 
describe the way in which multiple selves exist in Bergson's cone of  the past. 
Finally, the constant struggle between the two forces, to reterritorialize, and to 
unground respectively, are seen by Rodowick to twist the linearity of  the subject's 
phylogenesis into a m6bius strip, the same shape which, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, as that which characterizes the doubled subject in the pure and empty form 
of  time. The subject which Rodowick takes great pains to tease out of  Freud's work, 
then, is not, as we might expect, linear, male, unified, and dependent upon the 
exclusion ofthe female as its defining other. This is only one aspect of  Freud's 
subject. Rather, as Rodowick shows, due to the complex workings of  phantasy, the 98 
subject constantly faces its other self, its own ungrounding, its dissipation into many 
not-necessarily true selves. 
The constant struggle for this displacement of  the subject's phylogenesis is seen by 
Rodowick to be illustrative of  the 'parable ofspectatorship,16 that is outlined during 
an early scene in the film. This is the scene in which, whilst watching Celine's 
magic show in Montmartre, Julie first starts to remember (glimpses of) the past as it 
occurred in the House of  Fiction. At this point, Rodowick states: 
This other story bursts into the "first" film as visual scenes that insistently 
repeat themselves, producing terror and anxiety without submitting 
themselves to the reassuring organization of  conscious memory.17 
In this parable of  spectatorship the subject, as a subject in phantasy, 'is split between 
two mutually present yet incommensurable scenes, conscious and unconscious.'  18 
The logical continuity of  the first film is thus fragmented by the sudden insertion of 
flashes of  memories of  events in the House of  Fiction. The two scenes that coexist at 
this point, conscious and unconscious respectively, enable Julie's subjectivity to be 
seen as a mob ius strip, corresponding to the subjectivity which he sees in Freud's 
work. Julie, watching the magic show, and experiencing at the same time the return 
of  her previously repressed memories, exists as the subject in phantasy does, with 
the potential to unground the binary positioning of  the Oedipal trajectory, that which 
would position her, as female, as other. 
The question which then arises is whether or not Celine and Julie, as spectators, can 
escape the Oedipal narrative which, they begin to realize, positions them as other? 
Can they use phantasy to unground its reterritorializing binary, and, moreover, to 
make stutter its linearity, its perpetual repetition in the same form? This they can 
only do, Rodowick uses Rivette's film to point out, if  they cease to be passive 99 
spectators, and become instead, active intercessors in the family drama that stands in 
as their, albeit historically and culturally constructed, origin. Only by 'working 
through'19 the 'primal phantasy,20 of  the origin which exists in the House of  Fiction 
can they make their past, not-necessarily true, and by so doing, change their 
situation in the present, and create a memory of  the future. This they eventually do 
when they enter the House of  Fiction together (disguised as Miss Terre-Angele) and 
save Madlyn. At this point in the film they utilize the subject's mobius trajectory, in 
phantasy, in order to make what returns, difference itself 
Rodowick concludes, however, that the film can only ever 'dramatize the utopian 
trajectory that makes readers of  spectators,21. The spectator cannot experience, or 
take part in, this process. It is here, however, that the approach to spectating taken 
by theorists like Shaviro, Kennedy and Marks can allow us to conclude slightly 
differently, albeit whilst retaining a Deleuzian approach that shares many 
similarities with that ofRodowick. Rather like Marks, we contend that the spectator 
is directly involved in an experience oftime's passing, when watching a film. This 
experience is made manifest in different ways when watching different types of 
images, but it roughly breaks down into the experience of  the self  as evo lving in a 
continuous, linear direction when viewing most action-images, and as a dissipation 
into myriad labyrinthine selves, when viewing certain time-images. The different 
ways in which these images create, or suture, the viewing subject, are responsible 
for these differences. In Rivette's film, the magic show scene which Rodowick 
analyses can now be seen as a purposeful deconstruction, on the part of  Rivette, of 
the spectatorial subject that is sutured into existence by the movement-image. In a 
complementary scene which takes place a little later in the film, in contrast, in 
which we view the events in the House of  Fiction from the point of  view of  both 
Celine and Julie, sitting on an old trunk, we will see the subject as it is sutured by 
the time-image. Before we turn to analyse these sequences, however, we must first 
provide an alternative interpretation of  the film, in which the subjectivity which it 
portrays can be seen to be illustrative of  the subject we find in Deleuze's work, but in a different way than that which is described by Rodowick. His primary focus, 
after all, was an analysis of  the film as illustrative of  his conclusions concerning 
Freud's work. The reading that follows, then, will be an analysis ofthe film as an 
illustration of  this work's conception of  the  Deleuzian subject. 
Julie and Celine, Celine et Julie. 
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The main difference between the Deleuzian inspired reading of  the film offered by 
this work, and that previously formulated by Rodowick, is in the way in which the 
subject is conceived differently by each approach. Following his psychoanalytical 
approach, Rodowick formulates a subject who, although a mobius, is also always a 
singular entity. There is no question that Celine and Julie are anything other than 
separate entities, each woman a subject in their own right. Rivette's film can, 
however, also be used to illustrate a Deleuzian subjectivity in which the subject 
exists, in the crystal oftime, as a doubled entity. In this reading of  the film Celine 
and Julie are both the same subject, together illustrative of  its indeterminably 
oscillating virtual and actual aspects. In contrast to Rodowick's interpretation of  the 
film - which, he argues, begins in a linear fashion, and only becomes a mobius spiral 
with the return of  the memories from the House of  Fiction during the magic show 
scene - the film can, instead, be seen to exist as a mob  ius from its very opening 
scene, in which Julie conjures Celine into existence. 
The opening sequence begins with Julie, sitting alone on a park bench, inscribing a 
magic symbol in the earth from the Practical Treatise on Magic that she is reading. 
She then spies Celine, walking past her with the zany cartoon manner that she 
adopts for the entirety of  the film. The white rabbit chase begins, with its linear 
spatial and temporal continuity being provided by, as Rodowick observes, a very 
conventional form of  parallel montage. At certain points during this chase we see 101 
Celine drop random items, mostly clothing, which Julie appropriates by dressing up 
in them. The end of  the film, by contrast, after the plot has been worked out and 
Madlyn saved, "resolves" with the image of  Celine, this time, awaking alone on the 
park bench, having conjured up Julie, who walks past in the jerky manner 
previously peculiar to Celine. The film closes with Julie dropping her Practical 
Treatise of  Magic, and Celine beginning the chase in order to return it to her. The 
film's beginning and ending creates, then, a mobius spiral in which the two 
characters careen one after the other, winding up, or perhaps more accurately, 
superfolding, with a return to the opening chase, but in its virtual, doubled form. 
From its very beginning the film exists as a crystal that is expressed at both its 
internal, and its external limit. Ifwe return to Deleuze's definition of  the crystal 
momentarily this should become a little clearer. 
The crystal-image has these two aspects: internal limit of  all the relative 
circuits, but also outer-most, variable and reshapable envelope, at the edges 
of  the world. The little crystalline seed, and the vast crystalline universe ...  22 
As at once both 'seed' and 'universe', Rivette's film illustrates the way in which time, 
when encountered in the crystal in its smallest form, the seed, is able to be changed 
in such a way as to also change the outer limit of  the crysta~ the universe as 
'reshapable envelope', or temporal, mobius superfold. At its internal limit, the seed is 
the expression of  time's passing that is manifest in the magically doubled subject of 
Celine and Julie. They are figured as the oscillation between the self  and its virtual 
double that occurs when the subject realizes its own perpetual splitting in time, into 
a present self  that passes, and a past self  that is preserved. Consequently, they 
behave exactly as an actress might, listening to herself and beholding herself 
playing. Their activity, as seed, is such that, through their falsification of  the past, 
they are able to superfold the universe (seen, in this instance, in the film's mobius opening and "closing" sequences) in order to make its very past, not-necessarily 
true. 
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The subjectivation of  Celine and Julie is a process of  simultaneous becoming-
(each)-other. It is to Borges that we return, once again, for a fitting analogy. As 
Rosenbaum says of  the film and its characters: 'along with Borges, we can't really 
say whether its a man dreaming he's a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming he's a manr23. 
Indeed, their indiscernible oscillation is such that, by the end of  the film, we must 
question whether it is Julie, now the one conjured, that has become Celine, or if  it is 
Celine that has become Julie, the conjuror? Inevitably it is both, the crystal showing 
the becoming-actual of  the virtual at the same time as the becoming-virtual of  the 
actual. In Rivette's film, as was the case in Fellini's, inside and outside, self  and self-
as-other, dream and reality, all become confused in the oscillation of  the mobius that 
is the crystal. 
Rodowick makes a very convincing case for the linear, Oedipal logic of  the opening 
chase through the streets ofMontrnartre, with its 'relatively uninterrupted pattern of 
spatial and temporal succession and contiguity', beginning with 'the structure of 
Julie's look, which conjures forth the image ofCeline,24. This sequence, however, 
can be seen in a slightly different way, starting with Julie's look, and its conjuring 
forth of  Celine. As Janine Marchessault has it, admittedly in an article whose thrust 
is closer to Rodowick's than to our own: 
... Julie sits on a park bench reading a book of  magic. She reads an 
incantation aloud and covers her eyes. As she opens her fingers and peeks 
out, the camera cuts from a medium to a long shot of  her. The cut is so 
abrupt that at first we are not aware that the scene has cut to a shot of  the 
same person. Indeed, for a moment we believe that, from Julie's point of 
view, we are looking at someone else. This confusion is fundamental, for it 103 
is at this moment that the split occurs, and not long after that Celine skirts 
across the park. ... Thus it would appear that Celine emerges from Julie as a 
kind of  schizophrenic counterpart ...  25 
Although we are taking certain liberties by placing Marchessault's comments on the 
schizophrenia of  Celine and Julie slightly out of  context, her point concerning the 
way in which the shot structure functions remains pertinent to this discussion. In the 
film's opening sequence, although, as Rodowick says, a conventional parallel 
montage style is used to figure the chase sequence, and to keep the spaces which the 
two women occupy apart, the chase itself is used to illustrate the confusion between 
the two women. Just as Marchessault describes the confusion created by the abrupt 
cut which Rivette employs, in which the familiar is made suddenly strange, and the 
subject suddenly appears as other ('for a moment we believe that, from Julie's point 
of  view, we are looking at someone else') so too in the chase sequence do we see 
Celine and Julie begin to oscillate, as their becoming-(  each)-other creates an 
indiscernibility between the two women. 
When Celine initially drops a pair of  sunglasses, Julie, coming across them in her 
path, stops to pick them up. Next to fall is a headscarf, which Julie also salvages. As 
the chase progresses Julie continues to disguise herself as Celine, by dressing up in 
the discarded items. The two women are, literally, becoming-(  each)-other, and who 
is now who, is difficult to tell. The conventional, parallel montage which works to 
keep the two characters spatially divided, then, is used, as it cuts back and forth 
between them, to illustrate their growing indiscernibility. Indeed, the fact that, at the 
end of  the film we see this chase begin all over again, in its inverse, or virtually 
doubled form, only emphasizes their oscillation. Are we now watching Celine 
chasing Julie, or Julie chasing Celine? Is it a man dreaming he is a butterfly, or vice 
versa? Eventually, as the chase up the stairs next to the cable car leads Julie to the 
venue where Celine performs her act, as Mandrakore the magician, their 104 
indiscernibility is confrrmed. The magician has conjured the magician, the subject is 
becoming-other, 'as a kind of  schizophrenic counterpart' of  itself 
The women continue to become indiscernible in a variety of  ways throughout the 
film, with the coincidences eventually increasing to telepathic proportions. For 
example, as Julie prepares two Bloody Mary's, in her kitchen, out of  sight of  Celine, 
Celine declares her desire for a Bloody Mary. The address of  the House of  Fiction is 
remembered by Julie the next morning, even though Celine did not tell it to her the 
night before. They both share the same fantasy of  an American cousin with a pink, 
heart-shaped swimming pool, and so on. During the tarot reading at the library the 
doubling of  the two heroines is further emphasized. An exchange that takes place 
between Julie and her librarian colleague is exemplary in this respect: 
Librarian: (Interpreting the cards) The past. The hanged man. What is below 
is above. Your future is behind you and you plunge into the 
depths of  night. 
Julie:  My future is ... (cut to the 'Luna' card). 
Librarian: Your grandfather, the Hermit, protects you. You don't move. You 
don't advance. You advance but in total immobility. 
Julie:  Stagnation. Consequently my future is in the present. 
That Julie stagnates under the protection of  her grandfather is an obvious reference 
to her position as other within the patriarchal order. That this enables her to 
advance, but in total immobility, is her linear evolution as a return of  the same form, 
constrained within the Oedipal logic of  the patriarchal time of  history. There is, 
however, also a suggestion of  the possibility of  change in the existence of  the 
present as a time in which to create the future. 105 
If  she can bifurcate the line that leads inevitably towards death, then her future can 
be different, and her past contingent. Her future, as the isolated shot of  the 'Luna' 
card suggests, is available through the intuition of  the splitting of  time, her doubling 
with Celine and the recycling of  the past that this allows. Deleuze comments on 
Rivette's work that his concerns are similar to those of  the painter, De1aunay, in 
which case Celine and Julie would seem to correspond to what he calls the 'the solar 
woman and the lunar woman,26 of  Rivette's cinema. This is not to say that they are 
binary oppositions however, for: 
... there is no struggle between light and darkness, (expressionism) but an 
alternation and duel of  the sun and the moon, which are both light, one 
constituting a circular, continuous movement of  complementary colours, the 
other a faster and uneven movement of  jarring iridescent colours  ...  27 
Julie, with her red hair, is the sun, the 'circular, continuous movement', ofa 
'character with her own inner psychology', as Rosenbaum claims. Celine, for her 
part, is the moon, with its 'faster and uneven movements' that match her cartoonish 
behaviour, 'purely exterior' ifwe hear from Rosenbaum28 again. Moreover, that the 
two women are both light, albeit of  different sorts, and that neither is a 
complementary absence, or lack of  light, ensures that they are not oppositional 
binaries (the contrast of  light and dark that informs expressionism) but rather, 
oscillating doubles, both inside and outside, and past and present. It is through an 
interaction with her Luna self  then, her past, Celine, that Julie, the sun, will be able 
to create her memory of  the future. 
That Julie's past, embodied in Celine, is the future that is 'behind' her is also 
illustrated when the camera pans right at this point to reveal Celine sitting behind 
Julie in the children's section of  the library. She is physically behind her, but the 
shot is somewhat more playful than that, as she is also the past (the virtual "behind" 
of  the cone of  time's past/times' past) returning. She is the child that coexists with 106 
the woman. This is emphasized by her jerky cartoon movements and other 
wayward, but innocent mannerisms. That Julie and Celine are depicted in what is 
essentially a split-screen image at this point, with Celine sitting behind Julie, also 
serves to illustrate the simultaneity of  their next action. Celine, the embodiment of 
childhood, traces an outline of  her hand in red pen in a children's book, whilst Julie, 
by contrast, depicts a suggestion of  the same image through red fingerprints, 
expressing a more adult sense of  identity. In order to further emphasize this 
simultaneity, the actions of  the two woman are intercut by Rivette, in order to 
illustrate the coexistence of  woman and girl on the same transformative plane of 
time. Finally, in order to hammer home the message, as Celine bangs the books 
around to mirror Julie's banging of  her fingers on the table, the other librarian is 
heard to say: 'The children are really noisy'. 
The discovery, later in the film, that it is the symbolic red hand print on the 
bedsheets of  the murdered little girl Madlyn that they are both remembering, 
confrrms that the events in the House of  Fiction are their doubled (shared) memory 
of  an historically and culturally constructed past of  patriarchal repression. It also 
suggests that they are both Madlyn, the girl that coexists with the woman that C6line 
and Julie are, especially as both Celine and Julie are similarly marked with a bloody 
red hand print during their respective visits to the House of  Fiction. Consequently 
both readings of  the cards are correct, the future does lie in the present, and in the 
past, as it is through the oscillation of  both, the co-existence of  Celine and Julie in 
the crysta~ that the future is created. 
When Celine and Julie do eventually enter the House of  Fiction, it is noticeable that 
when they enter alone, neither is able to change the past, to cause it to become not-
necessarily true. The fact that only when they enter together is this possible 
illustrates that it is in the crystal oftime that this bifurcating of  the line oftime, 
which creates a new future, is made possible. This is also emphasized by Julie's 107 
actions around the two-dimensional picture of  the House of  Fiction that she draws 
on her blackboard. Frustrated at her inability to enter this representation of  the house 
(she is trying to draw its internal stairways and passages) she leaves the blackboard 
and attempts to enter the house itself. She is, however, unable to gain access to the 
house at this point as her double, Celine, is literally, locked within the house ofthe 
past. Separated by a linear view of  the time in which subjectivity is singular, and 
past and present (and child and adult), remain separate, molar entities, Celine and 
Julie cannot enter into the circuit that is necessary to make time move around them. 
They cannot create the crystalline seed that will enable them to superfold the 
universe. At this point the film cuts back to the image on the blackboard in Julie's 
apartment, over which the noise of  the doorbell (rung by Julie at the house itself) is 
heard. Entry is denied, the image illustrates, as long as the past remains subservient 
to the binary force exerted by representation. The construction of  the straight line of 
history is, as Celine and Julie discover, at the expense of  the excluded desire of  the 
schizophrenic double, which is reduced to the figure of  the female as other. Their 
exclusion from this past is directly figured in Julie's failure to enter the house. When 
they do gain entry together, through the 'memory potion' and the sweets, their ability 
to change the events within the House of  Fiction is depicted visually through their 
appearance as the double aspect of  Madlyn's nurse, Miss Terre-Angele. They are 
now the healing property enabled by the intuition of  time, the oscillating of  self and 
self-as-other in the double movement of  liberation and capture that is the process of 
subjectivation, of  becoming-other in time. 
Before the two women are able to enter the past together, and break up its 
conspiratorial plot, however, they must also free themselves from their present day 
entrapment as women within the patriarchal order. This, again, they can only do as a 
double, in the crystal, through a process of  becoming indiscernible from each other. 
They begin this process ofliterally becoming-each-other, with the playing out of 
each other's patriarchally subservient roles to the point at which the notion of  their 
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Celine in the magic show, she portrays the animated off  stage (unthought) Celine, 
who is usually absent from her stage persona. Celine's own earlier off-stage remark 
regarding her male audience ('I'll do  something like this. I'll attack them ... Think 
they come for my mug? No way, my ass!') is fulfilled by Julie in her Dietrich-esque 
cabaret masquerade. Julie's act pastiches the male audience's desire for female 
objectification. Her proclamation of, 'NaIve, I'm so naIve', is followed by the 
removal of  two apples from her top, to emphasize the sexual padding that the show 
consists o£ Then, weeping, she satirizes the notion of  the emotional woman (the 
other of  the rational man) as she begs to be excused for her inability to control her 
'irrepressible waves offeeling'. The show culminates with her literally attacking the 
two male tour agents, calling them 'cosmic twilight pimps. Voyeurs and perverts' 
and finally throwing her gloves at them, a formal challenge to fight. Conversely, 
Celine takes on Julie's impassive but determined aspect as she banishes Guilou 
(Celine's fiance) into auto-eroticism, breaking off  the engagement and telling him to 
'go jack off  among the roses'. Portraying each other's unthought potential in this 
way, they strip each other's passive aspect in the face of  the patriarchal, dispelling 
the retained childhood memory of  submission, and beginning their mutual 
becoming-other in the present. Performativity, portraying the self as other, is thus 
the action which makes stutter their identity as a singular repetition ofthe same. 
This liberatory power, that which falsifies time, is, moreover, that which is found in 
the mobius double of  the crystal. 
It is now that Julie replaces the picture of  her would-be fiance, Guilou, with that of 
the House of  Fiction at 7 bis rue Nadir aux Pommes. Female subjectivity, that which 
is denied by the patriarchal economy's Oedipal plot, finds the possibility of  its 
rebirth only after its continued subjection in the present is eliminated, and replaced 
by a relationship with the past in the present. The male audience of  the magic show, 
and the future of  marriage with Guilou, are both eliminated by the realization of  the 
schizoid self  as it splits in time. It is for this reason that Laura Mulvey'S statement 
that 'the OHine et Julie story shows little interest in transforming the heroines,29 109 
seems somewhat mistaken. In fact, the film is entirely concerned with their 
transfonnation. It  is not to stasis that the mobius story returns after all, but to 
difference, and this in itself is only made possible by the doubling and 
contemporaneous existence of  Celine and Julie on the same transformative plane as 
Madlyn, their childhood past. 
When Celine and Julie do enter the House of  Fiction together it becomes evident 
that Rivette conceives of  their primal scene as an historical and cultural construction 
that is similar to what Deleuze and Guattari's describe, in Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus, as the 'theater ... of  representation'  30. This is the theatre created 
by (amongst other things) the practice of  psychoanalysis, in order to Oedipalize the 
schizophrenic desire31  (the potential becoming-other) of  its patients into the causally 
determined straight line of  patriarchal history. In their post-structuralist critique they 
fmd the practice of  psychoanalysis guilty of  the continued, repeated imposition ofa 
familial origin to desire. This they describe as the reduction of  desire's 
schizophrenic becomings into the Oedipalizing, familial triangle of  '  mommy-daddy-
me.32. It  is this process which Celine and Julie confront in order to save Madlyn. 
The theatrical nature of  the events in the House of  Fiction are made evident in a 
number of  ways. These include, the boredom ofCeline and Julie as they wait in the 
wings, the blackout and applause that accompanies the end of  act one, Celine's 
disgust at the cold tea without sugar that she has to drink from her hip flask (the 
oldest of  theatrical props) and Julie's forgetting of  their lines and confusion over 
scenes. The events in the House of  Fiction would seem to illustrate that the past, as 
it is fonnulated by psychoanalysis, is, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, a 'dirty little 
family secret, a private theater,33. It would be tempting, then, to interpret Celine and 
Julie's destruction ofthe house's Oedipal repetition as an exposition of  the illusory 
theatre that is created by psychoanalysis itself. Thanks to Rodowick's re-reading of 
Freud, however, the implication that the practice of  psychoanalysis is the same as 110 
Freud's theory ofthe subject (in phantasy at least) cannot be upheld. Instead, we can 
perhaps now see Deleuze and Guattari's polemic as a criticism of  only one aspect of 
Freud's work, of  only one track of  the subject. After all, as Rodowick's reading 
shows, all attempts to reduce subjectivity to a single, linear form, through the 
imposition of  false origins such as the Oedipus complex and the masculine figure 
(WolfMan) of  the primal scene, will themselves be met by the dispersive, indeed, 
labyrinthine, movements of  the subject in phantasy. Deleuze and Guattari are, then, 
perhaps, guilty of  constructing a straw man in psychoanalysis. Indeed, Alain Badiou 
has shown, by critiquing Deleuze's privileging of  Nietzsche's powers of  the false 
over Plato's form of  the true, that Deleuze's interpretation of  Plato's truth is perhaps 
an oversimplification which similarly establishes it as a straw man. Alternatively, 
Badiou argues, Plato's truth can be interpreted as functioning exactly as the powers 
of  the false do in Deleuze's work.
34 It may be that Rodowick's reading of  Freud, and 
in particular of  his work on phantasy, uncovers a similar maneuver on the part of 
Deleuze and Guattari. They are perhaps guilty of  only objecting to those parts of 
Freud's work which are antithetical to their own, whilst ignoring how similar Freud's 
approach might actually be to theirs, if  they were to read it with a more charitable 
eye. 
This reduction of  Deleuze and Guattari's slightly all-encompassing criticism of 
Freud notwithstanding, when Celine and Julie do enter the House of  Fiction it is 
precisely to debunk the notion of  the primal scene as an origin for the subject's 
phylogenesis. As Celine and Julie declare prior to their entering of  the House of 
Fiction, their action will be one which falsifies the historical and culturally 
constructed narrative of  the patriarchal economy, and thereby allow them to save the 
little girl that they are: 
Celine: Once upon a time. 
Julie:  Twice upon a time. Thrice upon a time ... 
Celine: Only this time it won't be like the other times. We'll get her. 111 
This is seen to be the case whether due to the working through which Rodowick 
suggests, or indeed, through the re-aligning of  the labyrinth of  De  leuze, although it 
is, as we have stated, noticeably only once C6line and Julie enter the House of 
Fiction together, as a doubled subject, that they are able to effect this falsifying of 
the past. The singular origin of  the fairy story that is at the root of  history and linear 
time is thus reinscribed, in the present, but only through the double movement of 
becoming that is enacted by the schizophrenic coupling of  C6line and Julie. Hence, 
by saving the little girl, and bringing her to exist on the same temporal plane of 
transformation as themselves, as adults, C6line and Julie provide themselves with 
the opportunity for a female subjectivity no longer constrained within the patrilineal 
tradition. 
With each repetition of  the story within the House of  Fiction, once C6line and Julie's 
invasive presence has been felt, the repetitious narrative of  its Oedipal drama begins 
to run down to stasis. This is illustrated by the increasing amounts of  greasepaint 
worn by the characters, their increasingly stilted clockwork actions, and their speech 
which gradually becomes a monotonous drone. In their ghoulish aspect the 
characters in the drama slowly come to resemble C6line's description of  the House 
offiction, as a, 'mothball' smelling mortuary of  'stuffed ghosts'. At the very end of 
the film, C6line and Julie, with the now liberated Madlyn, finally take their boat 
ride. Floating past them in the other direction comes another boat, on board which 
are Olivier, Camille and Sophie, the characters from the House of  Fiction. Their 
fmal appearance is as fixed, statuesque, wax-work figures. As Rosenbaum 
comments on this sequence: 'The entire intrigue becomes a frozen theatrical 
tableau,35 a theatrical tableau that is, we contend, exactly illustrative of  the theatre of 
representation which is the family drama of  the Oedipal, primal scene of  history. 112 
The similarities between the two approaches, Rodowick's, and our own, then, are 
apparent. Whether it be phantasy, enabling a working through ofthe past, or the 
labyrinth, falsifying the past, the Oedipal trajectory of  the straight line of  time is 
depicted as the illusory, primal posturing of  a theatre in which all the roles are 
predetermined, and destined to eternally repeat themselves in the exact same way. In 
either reading, the entrance of  Celine and Julie into the drama is intended to explode 
the phallogocentric myth of  the primal scene that is imposed upon the past, and to 
expose the repetition of  the same which the theatre of  representation seeks to 
impose upon subjectivity, through its theatrical myth of  origin. 
Despite these similarities, however, the one major difference between the two 
approaches  remains that of  the way in which the subject is defined in each. The 
mobius subject of  the psychoanalytical approach remains singular, whilst the subject 
in the Deleuzian crystal appears as a double. For this reason alone the parable of 
spectatorship which Rodowick draws from the film would seem to be somewhat 
incongruous with a Deleuzian spectator. A reanalysis of  the magic show sequence 
seems appropriate, therefore, in order to discover how it temporally defmes the 
subject. 
Spectator - Movement-Image. 
If  we closely analyse the way in which the shot/reverse shot structure functions in 
this scene, it is possible to see this parable as only representing one form of 
spectating. In fact, the sequence actually works to deconstruct the way in which the 
spectatorial subject is defmed by the movement-image in such a way as to constrain 
it within a linear view of  time. The way in which the shot/reverse shot structure 
works in this sequence can be seen as an exposition, on the part of  Rivette, of  the 
workings of  the system of  suture as it is described by critics like Oudart and Dayan. 113 
Before we continue with this analysis, then, a brief  digression into the workings of 
suture is necessary. 
In his seminal article, 'La Suture', Jean-Pierre Oudart configured the process of 
suture thus. The spectator, watching the film, becomes aware of  an absence, the 
illusory fourth wall which suggests the constructed, fictional nature of  the film they 
are watching. This absence the film sutures over, through the use of  a reverse shot, 
which soothes the spectator's anxiety as to the origin of  the shot. The reverse shot 
places in the frame a character, from whose point of  view the previous, anxiety 
producing shot was supposedly framed. Oudart states that; 'within the framework of 
a cinematic enonce constructed on a shot/reverse shot principle, the principle of  a 
lack perceived as a Some One (the Absent One) is followed by its abolition by 
someone ... placed within the same field,36. In this way, the retroactive reverse shot, 
which follows the shot, is able to suture over the spectator's unease at their 
realization of  a structuring absence ('the Absent One') to the shot. The positioning of 
a character within the reverse shot, as origin of  the look, also serves to suture the 
spectator within the film's narrative, providing them with a character, a 'someone', 
with whose gaze they can identify, albeit momentarily. The subject thus continually 
fluctuates between a position within and without the film, recognizing the Absent 
One, and feeling anxiety, only to have this anxiety sutured over by the replacement 
of  a character in place of  said Absent One. Thus, as Oudart says: 'Suture represents 
the closure of  the cinematic enonce in line with its relationship with its subject ... 
which is recognized, and then put in its place as the spectator ...  ,37. 
Daniel Dayan, for his part, took this framework and developed it in a piece entitled, 
'The Tutor-Code of  Classical Cinema'. In this article he realized the ideological 
subject positioning inherent in classical cinema, which uses false origins to disguise 
the source of  its enunciation. For Dayan, filmic enunciation had an essentially 
ideological function. It  proposed to position the viewing subject through its 114 
imposition of  a specific ideological message. This message, however, needed to be 
naturalized, so as not to appear constructed, and to this end, the system of  suture 
was developed. It is through techniques such as that of  shot/reverse shot then, 
according to Dayan, that the artificially constructed origin of  the shot was masked 
by classical cinema's continuity editing. As he puts it, in this way: 'Classical cinema 
establishes itself as the ventriloquist of  ideology,38. Suture thus masks the 
ideological operation of  cinema by positing, with the reverse shot, a character as the 
origin of  each look, each ideologically positioning point of  view. For this reason, 
Heath refers to Dayan's 'tutor-code' theory as one which describes a 'theological 
cinema', a 'cinema ofrevelation,39 in which the gaze of  the Absent One is akin to 
that of  an absent, patriarchal, transcendent deity. The deity's divine message 
functions through its representatives, in this case, its 'someones' in the narrative. 
As Stephen Heath shows in his later work, 'On Suture,40 however, the description of 
the cinematic process of  suture described by Oudart and Dayan betrays a 
misunderstanding of  what is at stake in the idea of  suture itself Returning to 
Jacques-Alain Miller's original, psychoanalytical, formulation of  suture, Heath 
shows that the theory of  suture initially described the way in which the subject was 
formed as part of  a ceaseless dialogue with the other. The subject's unconscious, for 
Miller, drawing on Lacan, was thought to be constantly brought into existence, 
created as 'an edge, the junction or division between subject and Other, a process 
interminably closing,41 but never closed. The unconscious then, whose coming into 
existence momentarily "completes" the subject, exists as a movement, a slide in a 
chain of  signifiers that never reaches completion. It  ensures instead; 'a constant 
flickering of  the subject,jIickering in eclipses'42. Thus suture was the relation of  the 
subject to this chain of  signifiers, the process in which a temporary stand-in for the 
subject, which flickers in and out of  existence, is constantly created through a 
perpetual discourse with the other. With this description of  suture in mind, Heath 
went on to illustrate several difficulties with Oudart's translation of  suture into 
cinema. Of  most relevance to this discussion he states: 115 
The realization of  cinema as discourse is the production at every moment 
through the film of  a subject address, the specification of  the play of 
incompleteness-completion. What suture can serve to name is this 
specification, variously articulated, but always a function of  representation 
(the play for a subject, its taking place). The difficulty in the Oudart lies in 
the collapse of  the process of  specification into the single figure of  the 
absent one, a figure to which Miller's account of  suture as necessary concept 
for the logic of  the signifier makes no appeal, referring solely to the Other as 
site of  the distribution-circulation of  signifiers.
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For Heath, when Miller's theory of  suture was transferred into cinematic terms by 
Oudart, the position of  the other was replaced by that of  the Absent One. Oudart's 
emphasis on the spectator's realization ofa lack (the fourth wall as signifier of  the 
Absent One) when viewing, thus reduces the perpetual 'play of  incompleteness-
completion' of  Miller's suture into the signified lack of  a totalized, singular entity. It 
is for this reason that, when Dayan extends Oudart's reasoning, he inevitably fmds 
the theological gaze of  the (absent) father in the Absent One. In fact, Heath 
concludes, the conceptualization of  suture in cinema advanced by Oudart, and 
expanded upon by Dayan, is but one of  many ways in which suture can be 'variously 
articulated'. It is an interpretation of  suture that reterritorializes its infmitely 
deferring possibilities, its becomings, into a binary. 
Oudart's version of  suture is seen by Heath as descriptive of  one type of  suture only, 
that which works to constantly maintain the 'constancy', or rather, the 'consistency,44 
of  the spectatorial subject. This it achieves through the use of  certain procedures of 
continuity editing which work in the service of  the film's narrative. It  is, ultimately, 
fIlm's 'narrativization,45 which enables the privileging, by Oudart and Dayan, of  the 
shot/reverse shot procedure. This technique should not be thought of, however, as 
directly illustrative of  the process of  suture itself, as it is only one way in which it 116 
manifests itself. Heath uses as his counter-example, Chantel Akerman's News From 
Home. As it shall corne clear shortly, it is perhaps not a coincidence that he chooses 
for his counter example a time-image. Akerman's is a film which functions without 
character, or 'fictioning 100k,46, and which, therefore, has no recourse to a 
shot/reverse shot structure. According to Heath, however, it still sutures the subject 
all the same. The suture which this time-image effects is different from that of  the 
reterritorializing action of  Oudart's suture: 
We are placed in the film but that place is not secured, is shifted, and turns, 
in the meanings the film makes in that insecurity, in those dislocations, on 
the construction ofa central absence - the absence of  the daughter ... From 
that absence, the film refuses to suture, to convert Other to Absent One ... 
hence to resolve as a sign of  something for someone, to fix a unity ... Or 
rather, it refinds suture effectively as a term of  the logic of  the signifier ... 47 
In a fashion more akin to Miller's original theory of  suture, then, Akerman's film 
sutures the subject, but without fixing its identity within a linear narrative that 
maintains the consistency of  the subject. Rather, the subject as it perpetually comes 
into existence when watching News From Home, is created exactly as a 'flickering 
of  eclipses', a constant transformation of  the subject. The subject's existence in a 
dialogue with the other is thus not reduced to the need to suture over a realized lack. 
The other is not converted to Absent One, but rather, the subject's existence is 
immanent in relation to the shifts in position which it negotiates through its dialogue 
with the film. Thus it is a manifestation of  suture as 'the logic of  the signifier', rather 
than as the signified lack of  the Absent One. To imbricate this Lacanian inspired 
psychoanalytical theory with the Deleuzian thrust of  this work, however, would be a 
difficult undertaking. For our purposes, then, the constant dialogue between self  and 
other (in which the subject is perpetually brought into existence) is replaced by the 
Deleuzian subject's perpetual becoming-other due to its relation to itself-as-other in 
the crystal oftime. It is this double, after all, existing on the plane of  consistency, 
which has the potential to unground the singularity into which the plane of 117 
transcendence would reterritorialize the subject, the someone who stands in for the 
Absent One, as seen by Oudart and Dayan. 
Heath concludes from the difference between Oudart/Dayan's, and his descriptions 
of  suture, that there are many different types of  suture (or perhaps ways of 
conceiving it) which are made manifest in many different films. The suture that a 
fIlm describes, then, illustrates its existence on either the plane of  transcendence, or 
consistency. As he says: 'At one extreme, suture then becomes a term for any 
continuity join, for the matches of  classical editing ... it is equated with the system 
based on shot/reverse shot patterns of  'filling in' across and for the spectator from 
image to image,48. This extreme, as formulated by Oudart and Dayan, is the type of 
suture that is to be found in the narrative form of  the movement-image which, as we 
saw in chapter one, exists on the plane of  transcendence. Time-images, at the other 
extreme, create a different type, or indeed, different types, of  suture, which refuse to 
establish the subject within the narrative in the conventional manner described by 
Oudart and Dayan. This difference we can see if  we now return to Celine et Julie, 
and contrast the ways in which spectating is illustrated in the magic show, and the 
trunk sequences. In particular, by analyzing the different ways in which these scenes 
configure the spectator's awareness oftime, the contrast between the different types 
of  suture which they represent should become apparent. 
The magic show sequence exposes, and deconstructs, the workings of  suture as 
defined by Oudart and Dayan. This scene is used by Rivette to show the way in 
which the movement-image sutures its spectator, temporally, in order to ensure their 
consistency, their linear evolution through time. In this scene, the way in which the 
past is shown to return is such that, instead of  a character standing in for the Absent 
One, the past itself, as a single, linear trajectory, fulfils this function. Rivette's fIlm 
thus figures the consistent subject which is retroactively sutured through the 
shot/reverse shot structure, as a subject who exists in a linear time-scheme. The 118 
virtual potential of  the labyrinthine past, its forever falsifying, eclipsing ofthe 
subject due to the infinitely deferring logic of  the signifier, is replaced by a signified 
lack, the past that was, rather than the past that is. 
In the scene in question the camera initially cuts twice from the magic show on 
stage back to Julie's attentive face and, as it comes to rest there, we are twice shown 
a glimpse of  events in the House of  Fiction. The reverse shot is thus shown to be 
analogous to the family drama of  the theatre of  representation in its positing of  a 
false cause which confirms the narrative's linear trajectory through time, and 
maintains the singularity of  the subject. As the sequence continues and the camera 
comes to rest on Celine, seen from Julie's point of  view, flashes from the House of 
Fiction now begin to appear without an accompanying shot of  Julie's face. These 
flashes actually serve to replace the reverse shot altogether. We now no longer even 
need to see Julie's face as origin of  the point of  view from which we are watching, 
as the reverse shot is shown to be, in its own right, an origin akin to that of  the 
theatre of  representation of  the House of  Fiction. The someone who comes to stand 
in for the Absent One is always the same subject, the originary subject of  the 
singular line of  history. 
Rivette, by replacing the point of  view of  the reverse shot with an image of  the 
primal scene itself, directly exposes spectator positioning as a temporal placement 
which is manipulated into linearity through the imposition of  the false origin of  the 
reverse shot. It  is for this reason that suture, as it is described by OudartlDayan, is 
the ideal theory for describing the subject position created by the classical style of 
cinema, the cinema described by Deleuze as the movement-image, or, at the very 
least, its dominant form, the action-image. Time, in these films, retains its linearity 
in a retrospective reterritorialization with every reverse shot. As Dayan says: The process of  reading the film (perceiving its meaning) is therefore a 
retroactive one, wherein the present modifies the past. The system of  the 
suture systematically encroaches upon the spectator's freedom by 
interpreting, indeed, by remodeling his memory.49 
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The subject's memory, when remodeled, is changed such as to constrain it within a 
linear trajectory, rather than to leave it open to the suggestion of  myriad directions 
through the labyrinth of  time. In this way, suture, as defmed by Oudart/Dayan 
maintains the existence of  the singular subject who proceeds to evolve causally and 
in a linear fashion. What Rodowick has uncovered in the magic show scene, then, is 
the parable of  spectators  hip of  the movement-image, as it is exposed by Rivette. 
Whilst this may perfectly express the spectator as it exists from a Freudian, 
psychoanalytical perspective - which, as Rodowick himselfpoints out: 'can only 
consider the subject as a singular category whose divisions and complexities are 
bounded by the interiorized space of  an actual or imagined body,50 - it does not, 
however, account for spectating as it is experienced by the temporally doubled 
subject when it encounters a time-image. 
This distinction is further emphasized by the way in which the flashes of  the past are 
glimpsed in this sequence. As a spectator ofthe magic show, whose viewing is 
suddenly interrupted by memory flashes, Julie is analogous to the spectator of  a 
film, who fmds that its images call forth associative memories from her past. In the 
return of  the memories from the House of  Fiction, Julie is experiencing the return of 
recollection-images, which push forward in order to match the events she is seeing 
on stage. The illusion of  the cinematic message is foregrounded by Celine's 
performance of  her, necessarily illusionary, magic routine on stage. The memory 
that emerges in order to disperse this representation is the return of  repressed 
memories from the spectator's childhood, producing 'terror and anxiety' over the fate 
of  the little girl, Madlyn. The linking of  the magic show with the memory of  the 
primal scene in which the little girl is murdered (i.e sexually excluded so that the 120 
binary logic ofthe Oedipal narrative can privilege the male as subject) thus 
illustrates the match that exists between the two scenes, emphasizing their 
corresponding states as illusory, socially constructed narratives which serve to 
objectify the female. The two scenes thus create a circuit of  mutual tension, in 
which the recollection-image actualizes, and thereby validates the singularity of  the 
past. As we saw in the last chapter, recollection-images do not serve to falsify the 
past, rather, they affIrm its linearity, through their emergence as actualized 
repetitions of  the past that was, rather than the past that is. The past, as singular 
entity, then, is the Absent One that the movement-image establishes in its suturing 
of  the spectator. 
The fInal image which we glimpse from the House of  Fiction further confurns this 
conclusion, as it shows the two women who are trapped therein, Camille and 
Sophie, struggling together. Their potential to oscillate as a schizophrenic double, 
the potential that Celine and Julie are themselves able to tap into, is denied them, the 
image shows, by their struggle to join the patriarchal order. In their attempts to 
become Olivier's wife, they are both complicit in the symbolic murder of  the little 
girl. Through this act they  establish their own position as defIning other, and help to 
maintain the singularity of  the patrilineal time oflinear history. The virtual past 
which they could use to their advantage, the perpetually shifting logic of  the 
signifIer, is thus excluded by the binary logic of  the plane of  transcendence upon 
which the movement-image exists. Even though the spectator in this scene, the 
spectator of  the movement-image, is given access to their past, then, they cannot use 
its virtual, liberating powers to help change it. The liberatory potential which Marks 
discovers in the time-image is not apparent in the movement-image. 
Spectator - Time-Image. 121 
For the above reasons, we agree with Rodowick's conclusion, that Rivette's film can 
but 'dramatize the utopian trajectory that makes readers of  spectators', but only in 
this early scene, in which it is the spectator ofthe movement-image which we see. 
For, as we have begun to see recently, in the works of  theorists like Marks and 
Kennedy, this is a conclusion which it is perhaps now becoming possible to 
challenge. Following Marks and Heath, this challenge is perhaps most obvious if  we 
consider the different way in which suture is enacted in time-images. Ifwe look at 
the trunk scene, as a contrast then, we can see another process at work, another form 
of  suture. 
After their several, unsuccessful, separate trips to the House of  Fiction, both Celine 
and Julie sit down together, on the trunk in Julie's flat, and simultaneously suck the 
magic sweets that grant entrance to their shared past. In the sequence that follows, 
Rivette goes even further in his deconstruction of  the shot/reverse shot structure and 
the singular, linear subject position it inscribes. This is done in order to suggest a 
second, different, parable of  spectatorship. 
Initially, the opening two-shot ofCeline and Julie, as they take the magic sweets, 
establishes the dual point of  view of  their doubled subjectivity. Then, as the two 
women begin to watch the film, we see the shot that they see, of  Julie (as Miss 
Terre-Angele)  climbing the stairs in the House of  Fiction, and entering the room 
where Madlyn lies in bed. Ifwe were to follow the conventions of  the process of 
suture as outlined by OudartlDayan, at this point the reverse shot that we would 
expect to see would align us with the gaze of  a character (someone) and thereby 
suture over our spectatorial anxieties concerning the origin of  the shot (the Absent 
One). This reverse shot when it comes, however, is a shot of  not one, as you might 
expect, but two characters, both Celine and Julie. The singular origin that is usually 
imposed is here destroyed by the existence ofa doubled point of  view. Moreover, 
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of  the chain of  signifiers, is maintained, as the reverse shot refuses to suture Other 
into Absent One. There is no one, totalizing lack, as there is at the primal origin of 
history, but rather, an oscillation of  self  and self-as-other, as seen in the crystal of 
time. 
The return to the original shot, that which should return us to the narrative safe in 
the knowledge that we are looking from a certain character's point of  view, is then 
further destroyed by the appearance within the House of  Fiction of  not Julie, but 
Celine (as Miss Terre-Angele) repeating the removal of  the flowers previously 
performed by Julie. The different films seen by both Celine and Julie, both their 
spectatorial points of  view, are shown, as though they were happening 
simultaneously. Thus through the reflexive stylistics of  the film, Rivette is able to 
show us that the spectatorial subject is not singular, but perpetually doubling. The 
spectatorial subject's becoming-other is directly exposed in the trunk scene. Here the 
subject's perpetual dividing in the labyrinth is shown to ensure their experience of 
an infmite number of  different pasts that might have been. 
With the subject splitting in time, the number of  films seen also multiplies, creating 
a labyrinth of  different films along with the proliferation oflabyrinthine selves that 
is seen in the splitting of  Celine and Julie. Unable to identify with anyone 
character's point of  view, at this point in the film, the spectator of  Rivette's film also 
oscillates between those of  Celine and Julie, similarly experiencing herself  as 
vertiginously splitting in the labyrinth. Like Celine and Julie, the oscillating sun and 
moon, the spectator is also involved in a flickering of  eclipses, a perpetual 
becoming-other. 
Thus the scene shows that there is not necessarily any stability to be found in the 
shot/reverse structure. Suture does not occur as OudartlDayan describe it, simply 123 
through this technique (and others like it) but because of  the way in which it 
ultimateiyreduces the Other to the Absent One. If  this reduction to the theological 
binary is denied by a film, however, as it is in examples like those of  Akerman and 
Rivette, then suture must be conceived of  differently. In the trunk scene, the way in 
which suture functions is not so much as a dramatization of  the parable of 
spectatorship, as Rodowick's psychoanalytical approach concludes. Rather the 
spectator has a fIrst hand experience of  the process of  becoming-other itself The 
film as they have seen it up until this point, now becomes not necessarily true, and 
the linear subject position of  the magic show is ungrounded by the new labyrinthine 
spectator ofthe time-image. 
Rivette's film emphasizes the doubled nature of  the spectator's subject position, her 
becoming-other, by directly involving them in the process of  time's labyrinthine 
splitting
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. The extreme length of  his cinema also adds weight to this phenomena, its 
excessive duration making the spectator super-aware of  her changing self. Rivette's 
remarkably lengthy cinema utilizes abnormal spectatorial time in order to make an 
experience, or an event, of  viewing. James Monaco
52 sees this technique as one 
which helps the spectator to enter the fIction more completely. The actions ofC61ine 
and Julie as they sit on the trunk sucking the magic sweeties, however, suggests 
otherwise. As spectators of  the film that takes place within the House of  Fiction, 
C6line and Julie illustrate the destruction of  any sense ofunifled subjectivity that 
happens when a film is viewed. This is in evidence in C6line and Julie's different 
reactions to the events in the House of  Fiction. C6line's rapt attention is contrasted 
by Julie's intermittent sleeping, startled awakening, and requests for an intermission 
so that she can smoke. Together the actions of  this schizophrenic subject crystallize 
the simultaneous actual movement through time of  a present that passes, as Julie, 
and the virtual storing of  time as a past that is preserved, in C6line. 124 
Moreover, although Rodowick53 uses Rivette's comments on the 'work' that this 
inordinate amount of  viewing time demands of  the spectator (the film's ability to 
'transform' the viewer) in order to elaborate upon his notion of  Freudian working 
through that the spectator undertakes when she enters the film; it is just as 
conceivable that this 'transformation' of  the spectator in the interaction between 
spectator and screen can be taken even further than the utopian dream (the 'joke' of 
'forgetting one's place,54) envisaged from the psychoanalytic viewpoint. The 
transformation of  the viewer, her work when she enters into the film is not a 
metaphorical, but a literal activity. The excessive length of  the film, then, serves to 
emphasize the changing face of  the spectator when she encounters the images on the 
screen. 
When applied to Rivette's film, both the psychoanalytical and the Deleuzian 
approaches actually render many very similar conclusions. In fact it is striking how 
clearly Rodowick's Freudian subjectivity corresponds to the same virtual/actual 
relationship that is to be found in Deleuze's theory ofthe labyrinth/line oftime. The 
reason for this closeness is not without significance. The cinematic subject, as we 
saw in the trunk sequence, is inherently labyrinthine and always becoming-other. As 
both a Deleuzian (and indeed, also a psychoanalytical) reading of  the scene in the 
magic show illustrate, however, this is a process which the cinematic conventions of 
the movement-image work extremely hard to suture over. This it achieves through 
the continual, retroactive linearizing of  the subject by the imposition of  a series of 
false origins, and the binary logic of  the plane of  transcendence which perpetually 
signifies lack through the replacement of  Absent One with someone. 
Instead of  the spectator existing as a subject position, however, we are now able to 
see the process of  spectating as a temporal event. This is the same conception as that 
on which Marks' theory is predicated. Watching a film which encourages the return 
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the spectator to experience their existence as a process, or temporal event, in which 
their becoming-other is enabled by the falsifying powers of  the labyrinth of  time. 
This labyrinthine possibility of  the subject the movement-image constantly struggles 
to reterritorialize into a straight line, and thus maintain the singular nature of  the 
spectator. It  is this process which also ensures the diasporic subject's suturation 
within the linear time of  accepted history. The binary logic which informs this 
practice, moreover, that which Oudart/Dayan identify in their descriptions of  suture, 
is exactly that which exists on the plane of  transcendence. Thus the plane of 
consistency on which the time-image exists constantly threatens to unground the 
linear reterritorialization enacted by the movement-image. Yet it is the movement-
image which ultimately maintains its dominance, through its narrativizational 
imposition of  first causes, and its reduction of  becoming-other to Absent One. 
Sadly, and despite all its attempts to the contrary, Rivette's film is pre-destined for 
reterritorialization. In order to maintain its mainstream dominance over the time-
image, that which perpetually threatens to unground it, the movement-image ensures 
that time-images such as Ciline et Julie come to exist only as its corresponding, 
binary other. The Oedipal trajectory of  the movement-image maintains its linearity 
as mainstream norm through the sheer weight of  movement-images produced. This 
ensures that the time-image is effectively reduced to the minority position of  art 
cinema other. The female spectatorial becoming-other of  Rivette's film is in this 
way reduced to the figure of  the defming (female) other of  the linear temporality of 
the movement-image. Thus the movement-image ensures the dominance ofa 
subject which is unified, continuous, singular, and male. 
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At this point, a move towards an examination of  movement-images seems 
appropriate, in order to discover exactly how their reterritorializing of  the labyrinth 
oftime into a straight line is effected. As a conclusion to this chapter, then - and 
before we move on to provide in-depth analyses of  several other movement-images 
in the remaining three chapters - the recurrence of  Rivette's House of  Fiction in the 
recent movement-image, The Sixth Sense, should provide scope for an initial 
examination ofthe movement-image's reterritorializing force. 
The Sixth Sense is the story of  a child psychologist, Dr. Crowe (Bruce Willis) who, 
after being shot by an ex-patient, Vincent Grey (now an adult) spends his afterlife, 
as a ghost, unable to acknowledge his own death. Believing himself  to still be alive, 
Crowe takes on a case, that ofa child, Cole (Haley Joel Osment) the pale and 
somewhat spooky boy who can see dead people. His posthumous case, it transpires, 
gives him the answers to what had previously been wrong with Grey, who had the 
same ability to see ghosts that Cole manifests, and who Crowe feels he failed. The 
redemption which he gains from this posthumous case also enables him to realize 
that he is actually dead, and allows him to rest in peace. 
This is a pseudo-Christian tale of  redemption, and in its major plot twist (the fact 
that Crowe is a ghost) which is kept from us until the very end of  the film, is 
reminiscent of  a technique used several times previously. It  occurred in, for 
instance, Jacob's Ladder (1990), Abre los ojos (1997) and, to a lesser degree, in the 
endings of  Martin Scorsese's The Last Temptation of  Christ (1988), and Terry 
Gilliam's Brazil (1985). The death of  the film's hero at its start is not an entirely 
unusual device. In fact, it has several precedents, witness in particular, Billy 
Wilder's Sunset Boulevard (1950). Films like Sunset Boulevard, however, as we 
shall further see in later chapters, often offer themselves as a flashback, in which the 
events which led up to the death ofthe protagonist are portrayed chronologically, 
illustrating the singular, teleological direction through time which the film has 127 
supposedly taken in order to arrive at its end/beginning. The Sixth Sense, for its part, 
is only a variation on this reterritorializing theme, which stands in such stark 
contrast to the mobius becoming-other of  the narrative with which Rivette ends his 
time-image. 
Crowe's redemption comes about when he has a second chance to visit his past, and 
to change what happened there. It  seems, then, that the narrative is about the 
working through of  the past, an action which should, as Rodowick showed using 
Celine et Julie, help to liberate the subject. In theory, after all, making their past not-
necessarily true should help free them from the past that was. In this way the 
subject's life ceases to be a repetition of  the same, and becomes-other. In a sense, 
this is achieved by Crowe, who, by managing to help Cole, makes his past failure to 
help Grey, not-necessarily true. Yet this labyrinthine liberation of  the self  from the 
past is reterritorialized by the plot's use of  Cole as a repetition of  Grey (not only do 
they both have the same psychic gift, their similarity is also shown through the use 
ofa single shock of  white hair in the same place on their heads) which ensures that 
Cole's understanding of  his failure with Grey actually realigns the past into its one, 
true form. Rather than a falsifying of  the past, or the recognition of  many virtual 
pasts, the film's narrative enacts instead a recuperation of  the truth of  one past, a 
verifying of  its essential validity, as well as its singular trajectory. Crowe's ability to 
recognize the truth of  what happened in the past, moreover, serves to confirm the 
binary logic which underlies its linear trajectory. Until his false conception of  what 
happened in the past has been re-aligned, he cannot rest in peace. 
Working through the past, in this case, is not something that frees the subject from 
the past that was, or that enables them to wander within the virtual past that is. In 
fact, it is exactly the reverse of  this process. Crowe's false view of  the past is 
eradicated, the possibility of  there being many possible pasts is debunked, and the 
validity of  the one true version of  events is restored. Working through, in this 128 
instance, is not something that makes the past different, but something which makes 
it the same. It is not something which liberates, but something that confirms in 
retrospect. It  is a movement akin to the retroactive positing of  the origin which we 
saw at work in Oudart/Dayan's description of  the shot/reverse shot structure of 
suture. Moreover, rather like the bookending flashback structure of  films like Sunset 
Boulevard, the initial death of  Crowe actually only serves to make the film's 
conclusion a pre-determined point, that to which the narrative must return once all 
the events in the past have been made sense of It is in this way that the narrative of 
The Sixth Sense maintains its singular, causal, linear direction through time, its 
narrativization of  history. 
The patriarchal message behind The Sixth Sense is fairly blatant. Both Grey and 
Cole, we are told, are from single parent families, and both have 'possible mood 
disorders'. Crowe, in fact, initially assumes the mood disorder, in both cases, to be 
the result ofthe parents' divorce, and the respective father's absence from the family 
unit of  daddy-mommy-me. He thus attempts a cure by at once addressing the issue 
of  absentee patriarchy with the child, whilst simultaneously acting as surrogate 
father figure himself Indeed, it is for his failure in this respect that Grey kills him at 
the start of  the film, his failure to be a good enough surrogate father. This is the task 
through which Crowe can work through his guilt with the case of  Cole. The story 
we are told is ofa dead father figure, who discovers in his "son" his own rebirth. It 
is, as we have said, a particularly Christian parable. 
The criticism which we previously leveled at Deleuze and Guattari for their seeming 
oversimplification of  Freudian psychoanalysis would now seem a little harsh. After 
all, Rodowick's reading of  Freud's oeuvre has not been translated into the narrative 
of  The Sixth Sense, which concentrates solely on the most conservative aspect of  its 
reterritorializing, binary confirming, phylogenesis of  the subject. In fact, The Sixth 
Sense is a film which illustrates perfectly the reason for the criticism of  the practice 129 
of  psychoanalysis outlined by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus, and by Foucault in the ftrst volume of  his History of  Sexuality. 
The role of  the priest, as the one who takes confession, has indeed been transferred 
to the psychoanalyst in the twentieth century, exactly as they state. The treatment 
which is offered by their reterritorializing working through is that which 
Oedipalizes desire into the daddy-mommy-me unit of  the family. It  is for this 
reason, in fact, to emphasize the parallel between the role of  priest and that of 
psychologist, that the link between Cole's role as psychic medium, and the religious 
nature of  his 'gift' are made clear in the film. 
The spiritual nature of  Cole's psychic calling is sledge-hammered home with our 
frrst sight of  him, as he scurries to hide in a Church. The statue of  Jesus that he 
steals when leaving the Church is one of  many that he uses to adorn the shrine he 
builds in the tent in his bedroom, where he seeks spiritual solace when scared by 
ghosts. Moreover, his mother, carefully observing family snapshots of  Cole notices 
what appears to be a bright light either surrounding or hovering near Cole's head. 
This aura/halo marks Cole out to us as spiritually chosen, a notion re-emphasized by 
his laying on of  healing hands in order to quiet his mother in her troubled sleep. 
Finally, when taken to the hospital, the cause of  his not quite seizure simply cannot 
be explained by medical science, the sixth 'sense' being beyond the bounds of 
medicine. Science is all very well when it comes to curing the body, we are told, but 
what about our spiritual well-being, what about treating the soul? 
Slowly, as the events in the ftlm's narrative develop, Cole begins to accept his own 
special powers, but only through the growing acceptance of  his father figure, 
Crowe. When Crowe realizes the truth of  Cole's claim, he searches for him in the 
same church where they fIrst met. At this point, the scene is replayed, only the Cole 
previously seen seeking sanctuary amongst the pews, after running ahead of  Crowe 
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asking him if  he has been 'running around'. The elevated position renders his 
spiritual superiority visible, whilst his new-found confidence demonstrates the belief 
that he is beginning to feel in his own powers. 
Eventually, Cole realizes his calling, and begins to take confession. His first words 
to a ghost other than Crowe are 'Do you wanna tell me something?'. This, on his 
father/psychologist's instigation, he addresses to the vomiting ghost of  the little girl, 
Kyra, who visits him for help. The train of  events that follow, in which Cole realizes 
his potential as confessor, his revelation on the road to Damascus, is, by now, 
somewhat familiar. It is a domestic drama in which a little girl has been murdered, 
and in which her life is saved, after the fact, by the film's detective duo. It is the 
story from the House of  Fiction once again, only told this time with a few telling 
differences. The liberation of  the little girl that took place in Ciline et Julie, is now 
not the liberation of  the little girl ofthe past upon a plane of  transformation, but is 
figured instead as a little girl whose life they must save in the present, Kyra's 
younger sister. In The Sixth Sense, the past is not something that can be changed in 
the way which a labyrinthine view of  time would allow. 
Rather than the liberation of  the female from the patriarchal plot of  the House of 
Fiction, in The Sixth Sense the story is retrenched in such a way as to uphold the 
masculine linearity of  the patriarchal economy. Cole and his (literally) dead father 
figure, Crowe, arrive at the funeral of  the little girl, Kyra, in order to prove, to 
Kyra's father, the guilt of  the mother in her murder. Their father/son presence 
effectively reimposes the patriarchal law that the mother has transgressed. This 
time, in fact, the mother's crime is worse than that seen in Ciline et Julie, as the 
motive for the murder is not the, patriarchally acceptable, female desire to marry the 
father of  the girl. After all, Kyra's mother is already married, and has two daughters. 
The woman is not guilty of  attempting to propagate the destruction of  her own 
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inherent within the patriarchal- rather, she is attempting to destroy the family unit 
itself Destroying the familial unit of  mommy-daddy-me is shown to be the worst of 
all crimes against the patriarchal order, as it suggests the ungrounding of  the plane 
of  transcendence upon which the patriarchal's representative binary is predicated. 
The female, here, is not shown to be positioned as other in such a way as to suggest 
that an escape from such a positioning may be possible if  its culturally and 
historically constructed nature is realized. Instead she is shown as a threat to the 
patriarchal order itself. Not just the other which confIrms the authority of  the male 
within the patriarchal order, she is now the defIning other of  the patriarchal itself, 
the supposed threat which it constantly uses to uphold its own legitimacy. 
Moreover, Rivette used the poisoning of  candies and flowers, in his House of 
Fiction, to illustrate the way in which the domestic sphere can become a trap for 
women, despite its seemingly nurturing, and beautiful image. The Sixth Sense,  by 
contrast, uses the fact that the mother ofthe little girl killed her by poisoning her 
food to illustrate the paranoid fear of  a destruction ofthe woman's role as nurturing 
mother in the domestic sphere, a transgression against the law which must not go 
unpunished. 
Crowe and Cole fulfIl their lawful duty when they deliver the video of  the mother 
poisoning her daughter's food. The contents of  this video we see, in a conventional 
shot/reverse shot schema, from the point of  view of  the father. In this climactic 
scene, with the murdered little girl's patriarch standing in for the Absent One, The 
Sixth Sense sutures the spectator within a singular time  line, through its 
narrativization, exactly in the manner described by Oudart and Dayan. In the 
movement-image, then, the origin of  the shot, the Absent One, is always the father. 
Solving the crime, effecting the cure, either way, classical cinema sutures over any 
anxieties its viewer may have as to its validity. In Celine et Julie, Rivette illustrated 
and deconstructed, in the magic show sequence, the way in which the past functions 132 
in the movement-image to suture the spectator within a linear narrative. The Sixth 
Sense, for its part, blatantly manifests this very practice in its use of  the shot/reverse 
shot structure. 
When Cole has become accustomed to his role as confessor, one who allows 
troubled souls to rest in peace, we see him act in the school play. Cole plays the 
stable boy, the one who cleans out the horses. Yet before we see him attired in rags, 
a literal rendition of  a stable boy, we hear the backstage call for the 'stable boy'. The 
shot that follows of  Cole evidences the most blatant of  script  writing, giving the 
visual suggestion of  the utmost normality, nay, stability, to his priest-like calling. 
Cole is taking confession from the ghost of  a woman who died in a fire at the school 
several years previous. When Cole does take the stage, he draws the sword out of 
the anvil and reveals that he is King Arthur, the chosen one with the mystical power 
needed to save a nation, much as he is in life, as priest/psychologist. Although his 
mother is unable to attend the play, Crowe is seen glowing with paternal pride in the 
audience. Cole has a family once more, and is, consequently, the stable boy, the 
chosen one. 
Crowe, for his part, having worked through his guilt at failing to father Vincent 
Grey, has now reinstated the belief  in the power of  the dead patriarch, through Cole. 
His final act is to atone to his wife, Anna, for, as she claimed at the beginning, 
putting her - his family - second. This realization comes to him slightly earlier in the 
film when he says to Cole: 'I haven't paid enough attention to my own family. Bad 
things happen when you do that'. Entering the room where his wife sleeps, Crowe is 
accompanied by the bride's father's speech on the wedding video, as he gives away 
Anna. This is yet another device used by the film to affirm the legitimacy of  the 
patriarchal. As Crowe then says, 'You were never second, ever, I love you' the 
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Since Crowe's death, Anna was herself caught in a perpetuating loop, seen in her 
haunting of  the Italian restaurant where Crowe proposed to her, and the continual 
replaying of  the wedding video. She is now freed by Crowe's confession to her, in 
which the past is, once again, re-aligned in such a way as to then allow it to continue 
on its way safe in its retroactively verified singularity. Crowe's own haunting 
(repetition of  the same events) of  his past life is now also released, as the process of 
working through is reterritorialized in the form of  the primal myth which Freud 
posited. It is the death and return of  God, which ensures his internalization in the 
son, the continuity of  patriarchy, and his immanent return. As Cole asks when he 
realizes that he won't see Dr Crowe again: 'Maybe we can pretend like we're gonna 
see each other tomorrow, just for pretend?' To which Crowe replies; 'O.K., I'm 
gonna go now. I'll see you tomorrow, Cole'. The Sixth Sense is a family drama, an 
image of  people who are caught in an unhappy family situation, and who must seek 
advice from a priest/psychoanalyst in order to rest in peace. The father is not 
entirely absent, we are reassured, for his continued presence, although Absent One, 
is made flesh in the priest/psychologist (someone) and through him the family is 
restored to health, and the binary lack which defmes the plane of  transcendence, 
sutured over by history. 
The action-image uses narrative in order to reterritorialize the subject's labyrinthine 
becoming-other into a singular, linear timeline. Thus, a film which initially seems to 
be about freeing ghosts from their inevitable haunting of  the same places (their 
interminable  repetition of  previous actions) a film which should suggest a 
liberatory, Nietzschean falsifying of  the past, in fact only serves to bolster the 
legitimacy of  one, singular interpretation of  the past. The return of  the repressed, 
which Freud privileged in his theorizing of  the entropic death drive as belying 
existence, is thus upheld by the movement-image, despite Deleuze's critique of 
Freud in both his work with Guattari, and his earlier work, Difference and 
Repetition
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. Moreover Deleuze's replacement of  the eternal return as the 134 
ungrounding ofthis repetition of  the same is thus reterritorialized by the movement-
image, which constantly works to replace the plane of  consistency's both/and with a 
binary either/or, on the plane of  transcendence. The work which Rivette illustrates 
in his cinema, and which Rodowick does to find a more subtle form of  subjectivity 
in Freud, is thus effectively erased by the movement-image, which seeks to posit its 
spectator in a limited, shrunken, singular position. As Rodowick concludes, in the 
fmal chapter of  The Difficulty of  Difference: 
... films ... do not produce subjects but symbolic positions of  subjectivity, 
and these positions are virtual, not actual  .... Indeed, many historical 
individuals may accept and reconfirm their sense of  gender and social 
position by identifying with these positions. But the possibilities of 
resistance, reconfiguration, re-reading and,  in fact, a whole range of 
eccentric and non-contingent responses are equally po  ssible.  56 
In the film's discourse with the spectator, the process of  suturing in which the 
subject perpetually negotiates its existence, the virtual subject position which is 
made available to the subject, by the movement-image, is an extremely limited one. 
It  is one which seeks to establish a linear, continuous subject, through the use of  a 
narrative which effects the same process in its characterization, and its continuity 
editing. In this way it leaves very little room for a resistance to this position through 
an aberrant movement through time, or a falsifying of  the past, as there is in the 
time-image: witness Marks' theory with which this chapter started. For the spectator 
of  the time-image, however, this type of  resistance is made available precisely 
through the film's refusal to reterritorialize the film's narrative past into a singular 
trajectory, as we saw in the trunk: scene of  Rivette's film. The Absent One, the 
binary of  lack and its completion, is thus ungrounded by the time-image, which, in 
its recurrence, offers some small resistance to the monolithic power of  the 
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The movement-image's reterritorialization ofthe time-image, however, remains 
dominant, and is achieved through the use ofa patriarchal (often father/son, as we 
see in The Sixth Sense) narrativization which uncovers the truth, which is also the 
law, and by so doing, verifies the singular past that was. It  is not a coincidence that 
the liberatory spectating of  the time-image is experienced by two women in 
Rivette's film, but is reterritorialized into the single figure of  the father in the 
movement-image. This is yet another way in which the sexual binary of  Freud's 
phylogenesis is maintained by the movement-image, over the ungrounding which 
the time-image would enact upon it. 
Indeed, this creation ofa sexual division in the theorization of  time is a topic which 
we shall refer to in the next two chapters. The ungrounding of  the subject's 
phylogenesis through the use of  phantasy, as seen in Rodowick's reading of  the 
Freudian subject, will be seen to be reterritorialized into a distinct binary by the 
movement-image. Upholding the legitimacy ofthe patriarchal, fantasy now 
becomes the defming other of  phylogenesis, an other, moreover, which is also 
gendered as female. Thus, once again, do we see the transformation of  a both/and 
into an either/or. 
The plane of  transcendence which the movement-image creates through its 
distributional dominance, ensures that the ungrounding of  its linearity which the 
time-image could enact, is forever sutured over by the movement-image's 
replacement of  becoming-other, with a character who stands in for the Absent One. 
The binary force of  the movement-image, then, is always that which has the power 
to reterritorialize the time-image. The ways in which this is achieved through its 
narrativization will be the subject of  analysis in the final three chapters of  this 
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4. Helen and Lola's High School Reterritorialization. 
The next two chapters provide evidence of  the movement-image's 'certain 
tendency,l to reterritorialize performative changes of  identity within an 
essentialist gender binary. This is especially evident in contemporary films 
which manipulate time in their narratives. Whilst the late 1990s has seen a 
mainstream fascination with the manipulation of  time similar to that which 
occurred in the 1960s and 70s, this fascination has ultimately remained a 
narrative concern. This is very much in line with the previous resurgence in 
interest in this phenomenon as it manifested itself in the mid 1980s, in films like, 
The Terminator (1984) and Back to the Future (1985). In these films, the time-
image's overt concern with editing and the manipulation of  the representation of 
time - that which characterized the works of  Godard, Fellini, Resnais, Rivette, 
(et al.) in the 60s and 70s - was reterritorialized through the process of 
narrativization. For this reason we will now move away from the analysis of 
editing practices, and focus instead on narrative representations of  the labyrinth 
in 90s movement-images. 
This chapter concentrates on the way this certain tendency expresses itself in 
films which have a female lead, using in particular, Peter Howitt's Sliding Doors 
(1997) and Tomas Tykwer's Lola Rennt (1998). These two films initially suggest 
a narrative realization of  female identity as becoming-other. They appear to take 
the concerns of  the time-image and bring them into the mainstream. In actual 
fact, they demonstrate the reterritorialization of  the labyrinthine becoming-other 
manifest in the time-image into the singular, linear, continuous subject of  the 
movement-image. These films illustrate how narrativization ensures that the 
potential for women to perform their identities differently, to make use of  time's 
labyrinthine powers in order to falsify their past, is reduced to a passing fantasy, 
or dream, of  liberation. Ultimately it is to their continuous, apparently 
unchanging, essential self  that these women must return. 143 
The model oftime with which movement-image narratives reterritorialize time's 
labyrinth corresponds to Einstein's conception of  the relative, local times found 
in his special theory of  relativity. Drawing this parallel necessitates an initial 
exploration of  the legacy of  the debate between Einstein and Bergson which 
began in 19222. This will enable us to then show how, with recent advances 
made in quantum theory, a scientific rethinking of  Einstein's model oftime has 
been enabled. This is, moreover, a rethought model which suggests parallels 
with Deleuze's Bergsonian-inspired metaphysics of  time. 
After initially establishing the difference between the scientific and the 
philosophical models oftime, we will provide readings of  both films as 
exemplars of  the philosophical model. The reading we provide ofTykwer's film 
will then be questioned, revealing an Einsteinian temporal model underlying and 
reterritorializing what otherwise appears to be a BergsonianiDeleuzian inspired 
use oftime in its narrative. It will be seen how the film's linear temporal model 
positions it at the contemporary end of  a historical trend in female led narratives, 
a trend evident in such classics as Hitchcock's Mamie (1964). Both films will 
then be briefly re-examined as expressions of  national identity in the emergent 
situation created by the global economy. This will illustrate how other narrative 
concerns also reterritorialize any suggestion of  the possibility ofliberating 
identity through labyrinthine performativity. 
Finally, the equating of  female performativity with a dream state, or fantasy, will 
be shown to effectively marginalize its labyrinthine potential. The movement-
image thus creates a binary of  line and labyrinth, of  male reality and female 
dream, that hides the labyrinth's real, ungrounding force. This is the same 
movement we uncovered in the previous chapter through our concentration on 
the different spectators suggested by the movement- and the time-image. In both 
Pretty Woman (1990) and Romy and Michele's High School Reunion (1997) the 
binary is re-affmned within a narrative of  ownership that re-establishes male 
purchasing power as that upon which female performativity is predicated. In this 144 
way the linearity of  male law establishes itself against the female, labyrinthine 
performativity that it simultaneously sanctions and marginalizes. 
This will provide the fIrst half of  an argument that will then be concluded in the 
following chapter, where the emphasis will be placed on the possibilities 
available for masculine performativity within the linear narrative temporality of 
the movement-image. It  will illustrate the retrenchment, once again, of  the 
both/and of  the time-image's plane of  consistency into the either/or of  the 
movement-image's plane of  transcendence. 
Science and Philosophy. 
The debate between science and philosophy is not a new one. Lyotard, for 
instance, in The Postmodern Condition
3
, traces how, prior to its present day 
manifestation, science's search for legitimization through narrative was 
inextricably linked to the development of  western philosophy. This is not the 
place, however, for an in-depth re-examination of  this history. The purpose of 
this discussion is not to reconvene the science/philosophy debate in favour of 
either side, but rather to uncover the way in which Einstein's conception of  time 
functions philosophically, so that the same functioning can be subsequently 
uncovered when it occurs in cinema. 
Deleuze says of  Bergson's work,  that he: 'ultimately aims ... to give modem 
science the metaphysics which corresponds to it, which it lacks as one half  lacks 
the other.,4 An understanding of  how this metaphysics operates is thus essential 
to any understanding of  the gender politics behind the way time is represented in 
the movement-image. As we shall see, the reasoning which leads to the creation 
of  the concept of  space-time has much in common with that which helps create 
this gender binary. Movement-images are, after all, blocs of  space-time, mobile 
sections, or indirect images, of  time's virtual whole. It  is perhaps no surprise, then, that these illustrations of  time's subordination to a character's movement 
through space should share the same metaphysics as is evident in Einstein's 
conception of  space-time. 
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The debate between the scientific and the philosophical models of  time, those of 
Bergson and Einstein, can be seen to be a matter of  perspective. In Duration and 
Simu!taneiti, Bergson clashed with both science and received wisdom, by 
critiquing  Einstein's special theory of  relativity. This was not, however, a 
criticism of  the special theory of  relativity itself Bergson's disagreement, rather, 
was with the methodology employed by Einstein's approach, and the conclusions 
that it (almost inevitably) prefigured through its reasoning. Interpreted 
differently, specifically from the perspective provided by his own philosophy, 
Bergson felt that the special theory of  relativity actually offered the evidence 
needed to make sense of  his own previous work on time. 
Bergson reasoned that the notion of  space-time was a badly analysed composite. 
He argued that space was not the fourth dimension of  time, but rather, that space 
was the deposit left behind by the passing of  time. Einstein's space-time, then, 
was but another example of  the measurement oftime in spatial terms which 
produced paradoxes such as that of  Zeno's arrow. As Bergson showed with his 
explanation of  Zeno's arrow, however, paradoxes like this really only suggest 
that the theoretical framework employed to analyse concepts like space and time 
needs revising. When seen from a slightly different perspective such cases as 
that ofZeno's arrow will cease to appear paradoxical. This style of  reasoning 
also informed his criticism of  Einstein's conclusions. 
Einstein's radical move in formulating the special theory of  relativity was to 
attempt to break from the Newtonian model ofthe universe, a universe existing 
within an absolute, homogenous, or reversible time. In order to do so he 
theorized instead the existence of  many local times, relative to the observer 
within them. As Durie has it, Einstein's theory: 146 
... famously recasts the physical universe as a multiplicity of  physical 
systems of  reference in motion relative to each other without absolute 
frame of  reference. Yet it maintains a fundamental role for observation 
and measurement. 
6 
Although managing a break of  sorts, then, Einstein's approach contained a 
theoretical stumbling block in its over-privileging of  the observer involved in the 
scientific contemplation of  time. Although the observer had now been placed 
within time by Einstein, he still retained the Newtonian, apparently objective 
gaze, that which took in the whole of  time as it passed around him. Einstein's 
observer, although no longer detached from, or situated outwith time, was still 
somehow thought to be able to fix his own position in relation to all others. 
Einstein's conclusion, that separate local times exist for separate observers, was, 
in fact, a direct consequence of  this approach. Durie continues: 
... classical dynamics is constrained to posit a system of  reference as 
being absolutely at rest. But if  multiple times are derived from within 
classical dynamics, then it is of  necessity impossible to interpret these as 
indicating shifts in the system of  reference deemed to be motionless. 
Thus, if  one were to interpret the findings of  the special theory of 
relativity from within a philosophical world-view determined by classical 
dynamics, one would be forced to admit the reality of  multiple lived 
times.
7 
It is only because the 'system of  reference' of  the observer is believed to be thus 
fixed, or 'at rest', in relation to those which it observes, that time can be 
conceived of  as relative in this way. Ironically, for Bergson, Einstein's special 
theory of  relativity - that which is usually heralded as enabling the break from 
the Newtonian model ofthe universe through its rejection of  an absolute time, in 
favour of  relative times - was really the abortive reterritorialization, by Einstein, 
of  the almost glimpsed existence of  duration. Thus it was that, from the classical 
perspective which Einstein retained, in which the observer is fixed, one is 'forced 
to admit' the relative times of  his theory.  For Bergson, on the other hand, not 147 
only was duration the single time in which all observers were positioned, but it 
was also an expanding time in which the observer was unable to arbitrarily ftx 
their own position as one from which others could be measured. 
According to Bergson, all our individual consciousnesses exist within time, and 
expand along with it. Duration is our lived experience of  time, our consciousness 
of  it. The fact that we are conscious oftime in this lived way effects the way in 
which we are able to measure time. This single time of  duration, then, is not the 
absolute, homogeneous, reversible time of  Newton, nor does it allow for the 
relative experiences of  time of  Einstein's theory. Instead it is a singular 
multiplicity, made up of  all our individual experiences of  time's passing, 
experiences which occur simultaneously even though we seem to experience 
them as passing relative to the times of  others. As time, for both observer and 
observed, is perpetually becoming, the observer's own experience oftime's 
passing makes it impossible for them to quantify, or measure, the passing oftime 
for another, as though from a ftxed perspective within time. Within this 
expanding whole of  duration, the separate experiences oftime that individuals 
live, even though they are spatially separate, must actually be occurring 
simultaneously, as we exist contemporaneously within the single time of 
duration. Hence: 'Simultaneity thus depends upon contemporaneity, and more 
fundamentally still, upon duration.  ,8 This simultaneity makes it impossible for 
Einstein's local times to exist as there can be no ftxed perspective which would 
make another's time move relative to it. Perhaps the easiest way to understand 
the distinction between the two theories is through the famous example of  the 
twins and the rocket. 
The example of  the rocket and the twins provided one of  the seeming paradoxes 
that Einstein used to strengthen the case for his interpretation of  time as passing 
at relative speeds for different individuals. There are two twins, Peter and Paul. 
Peter takes off  in a rocket ship, travels for a year at just under light speed (faster 
than light speed in the vacuum of  space not being possible, in the Einsteinian 
universe), turns around, and returns to earth. On his return, although Peter has 148 
aged two years, Pau~ resident on earth, has aged two hundred years. The 
mathematical equations behind this example are based upon the Lorentz 
transformations
9
, and deal primarily with the difficulty of  observing time for 
observers within the local times that they experience. For Bergson, however, this 
theory failed to take into account the actual lived experiences of  time that would 
have occurred in the lives of  Peter and Paul. Both Peter and Paul, he argues, 
because of  their respective expanding consciousnesses within duration, would 
have aged simultaneously, and, consequently, would both be the same age with 
Peter's return to earth. How then does this apparent paradox emerge, of  time 
moving more slowly, for Peter, relative to Paul, in Einstein's interpretation? 
In order to believe that the time of  another passes at a speed that is relative to 
that of  oneself, it is necessary to believe that your own perspective is somehow 
fIxed. It is this belief  that allows that you have the ability to measure the speed of 
another, relative to yourself All that is actually being measured in this case, 
however, is a 'representation,lO of  the time of  another, a time which, as it is not 
actually the lived experience of  that person, is, in Bergson's words, the 'unrea~ 
auxiliary, imaginary time'  11 of  the physicist. For the observer on earth, imagining 
the time of  the other, this other is now reduced to the status ofa 'puppet,12, on the 
rocket, a manikin who is unaware of  the experience of  time's passing. In order to 
measure Peter's lived experience of  time passing, Bergson maintained, it is not 
enough for Paul to simply imagine or represent him, he must actually become 
him, and experience time as he does. 
If  the paradox is viewed in this way, Bergson continues, were we to privilege not 
the position of  Paul on earth, but instead, the position of  Peter on the rocket ship, 
this would now have to become our fIxed point of  measurement. It would now 
seem to Peter as though two hundred years have passed for him on his arrival 
back on earth, and only two for Paul. Moreover, the earth will seem to have 
carried away, and returned to him, Paul, at a speed just less than that of  light. 
This reasoning led Bergson to the conclusion that Einstein's interpretation of 
relativity failed to take into consideration the simultaneous experience of  lived 149 
time, of  both Peter and PauL If  you reason as Einstein does, whichever system of 
reference you privilege, be it Peter's or Paul's, becomes an illusory, fixed 
position from which to view the movement of  the other. By doing so, moreover, 
you theoretically position the observer which you privilege outside of  time. It is 
this detachment from duration which enables Einstein to hypothesize that 
multiple, relative, or local experiences of  time can exist. 
The theory of  relativity, when taken up by Bergson from his philosophical 
perspective, can now be interpreted differently. Bergson's view of  relativity 
allows for the coexistence of  many systems of  reference, simultaneously, within 
the same, singular system. It allows for, 'multiple, lived simultaneities,13. 
Bergson's already existing mediations on time (including those found in Matter 
and Memory and Creative Evolution) were for this reason, he felt, strengthened, 
and to a certain degree, completed by Einstein's special theory of  relativity. 
Rather than the local times of  Einstein, which also still retain the reversibility14 
of  time found in the Newtonian model ofa single, absolute time, we now have 
the irreversible, perpetually becoming duration of  Bergson. 
In his confrontation with science, however, Bergson came out the immediate 
loser. Little attempt was made by the scientists involved in the ensuing debates 
to address the radical critique of  scientific thinking provided by Bergson. 
Instead, criticism focused on his misunderstanding of  certain elements of  the 
special theory of  relativity. In particular, it became clear that he had made 
mistakes in his interpretations of  the Lorentz equations. For this reason it seemed 
that Einstein's interpretation was still the more likely ofthe two, judging by the 
scientific facts in evidence at the time. Sadly, this conclusion negated any need 
for the scientific community to regard its fmdings as being merely interpretations 
determined by the scientific perspective (the arbitrarily fixed position of 
judgement) from which events were observed. The "facts" of  the matter 
remained, seemingly, unchallenged. 150 
What was important about the confrontation, however, was that it enabled 
Bergson to complete his formulation oftime as duration, as a singular 
multiplicity. Deleuze took up and expanded upon this idea in several of  his own 
works, in particular in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of  Sense. In 
these texts he drew upon Bergson's duration in order to show that time was a 
virtual multiplicity. Time, as Deleuze saw it in Bergson's works, was a virtual 
whole. This whole was perpetually becoming-actual, in and through the multiple, 
lived simultaneities of  the lives of  Peter, Paul, and indeed, the "being" of 
everyone else. The virtual, he states in Difference and Repetition, 'is not opposed 
to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself The process it undergoes is that of 
actualisation.,15 Furthermore, 'to be actualised is to create divergent lines which 
correspond to - without resembling - a virtual multiplicity.'16 The lives of  the 
different observers, with their independent rhythms of  becoming, all coexist 
within the same singular time (duration) as differing actualizations of  its virtual 
potential. The divergent lines that they create through their actualization, 
however, although contemporaneous, bear no resemblance to the virtual states 
from which they derive. They exist, rather, as spatialized expressions of  time, as 
forms fashioned from the flux of  becoming. 
For Deleuze, Einstein's theory of  space-time resulted from his inability to 
distinguish  the existence of  the actual forms that he studied, from the virtual 
flux out of  which they emerged. Thus it was that, due to his need to revise 
Newton's absolute time from within the same framework of  classical dynamics, 
Einstein fell victim to the badly analysed composite of  space-time. In 
Bergsonism, Deleuze states: 'By confusing the two types - actual spatial 
multiplicity and virtual temporal multiplicity - Einstein has merely invented a 
new way of  spatializing time.17, Einstein, although conscious of  his place within 
a universe that is becoming (hence his reworking of  Newton's absolute time in 
the first place), continues to reason at the level of  being. For this reason he 
pushes the spatialization of  time further, providing the actual with a fourth, 
temporal dimension, but fails to realize time's existence as a singular, virtual, 
multiplicity. Essentially, he theorizes multiple, relative times in place of  the 
multiple nature of  time itself 151 
In The Logic of  Sense the reason for Einstein's confusion becomes apparent if  we 
consider Deleuze's description of  the becoming-actual of  the virtual time of 
Aion. The virtual multiplicity of  Aion, the third synthesis oftime, is at once 
thought to be the; 'straight line and empty form,18 oftime. Although time is 
immediately perceived as a straight line, as actual, as spatialised form, it also 
virtually subsists in its perpetual becoming-actual, as virtuality, or 'empty form'. 
The respective theories of  Einstein and Bergson, then, are direct expressions of 
the apprehension of  time as either space-time (in fact the misapprehension of 
Aion as Chronos, as the actual form taken by the virtual), or as duration, the 
virtual itself 
Deleuze continues to develop upon Bergson's re-reading of  Einstein when, in 
Cinema 2, he maps Borges' idea of  the labyrinth onto the process of  the 
actualization of  time. Duration is now seen to actualize not only into the lived 
experiences oftime of  Peter, Paul et aI., but also, time actualizes into an infinite 
number of  personal labyrinths. These are the possible worlds created by the 
multiple lived simultaneities of  Peter's, Paul's (and everybody else's) possible 
other selves. The existence, however, of  these parallel worlds, or in fact, 
universes, is not immediately evident to the perception of  the person involved. 
The individual experiences only one of  these lived durations, the straight line of 
time along which their life appears to progress. The actual experience of  any one 
lifeline ensures that the other lives which exist and become actual in other 
universes (the infinite bifurcations of  anyone person's labyrinthine becomings) 
remain virtual. Thus they remain seemingly unknown to the individual in the 
universe in question. It is the dawning intuition ofthe labyrinth, then, that 
enables the liberation of  identity which is performed when the powers of  the 
false are evoked in order to falsify time. 
What is most interesting about the debate between Einstein and Bergson is the 
way in which it has begun to resurface, not only in the philosophical work of 152 
Deleuze, but also in certain areas of  science. Most noticeable was its effect upon 
Order out ojChao/
9 (1979) a collaborative work between scientist Ilya 
Prigogine and philosopher Isabelle Stengers. This work attempted to formulate a 
theory ofthe universe as both being and becoming, when seen from a 
perspective different from that ofthe Classical, Newtonian model. They take as 
their starting point the fact that the irreversibility of  time suggested by the 
second law of  thermodynamics refutes the reversible notion oftime of  Newton: 
that which was so tellingly employed by Einstein in his theory of  relativity. 
Prigogine and Stengers question how, if  the universe is running down towards its 
inevitable, entropic, heat death, we can explain the continual expansion and 
movement towards ever-greater complexity of  the theory of  evolution? The 
pessimistic conclusion to the second law of  thermodynamics, the equilibrium 
state of  heat death to which the universe is thought to be heading, is really only a 
consequence of  its being formulated within a closed system (i.e within the 
Newtonian model). Once the same irreversible arrow oftime is seen from a 
different perspective, however, within an open system (one which relies upon its 
interaction with its external context to create assemblages) a different model can 
be formulated. This is a model in which the universe is expanding and 
multiplying towards irreversible complexity. This new theory sits in line with 
evolution, and maintains the irreversible arrow oftime of  the second law of 
thermodynamics. The universe it describes need no longer end in heat death, as it 
no longer exists in a closed system. 
The seemingly indisputable fact of  the second law of  thermodynamics is thus 
refmed through an examination ofthe framework of  reasoning which prefigured 
the necessity for such a conclusion. At this point, once outside the parameters of 
the closed system imposed by Newton, the law of  thermodynamics becomes 
simply an interpretation relevant to a certain, specific set of  conditions. It is, in 
short, no longer a fact, merely an interpretation drawn from a certain perspective. 
As they say: 'Whatever we call reality, it is revealed to us only through the active 
construction in which we participate.,2o The influence of  Bergson on this 153 
statement is evident. Not only does this apply to our existence in time, and our 
inability to objectively study the universe, as if  from outside of  time, but it also 
applies to the theoretical frameworks which we employ in order to explain the 
workings of  time, the universe, and so on. 
For Prigogine and Stengers, Bergson's theoretical direction is 'a program that is 
beginning to be implemented by the metamorphosis science is now 
undertaking,21. This is a metamorphosis shown in their own move away from the 
Newtonian model, which saw its final death throws in Einstein's local times, and 
towards a notion of  becoming without predetermined end. This movement 
within scientific thinking, towards the position initially outlined by Bergson, is 
also foregrounded by Timothy S. Murphy22. Murphy draws parallels between the 
works of  quantum physicists David Bohm and Basil Hiley, and that of  De  leuze. 
As Bohm (et al) has shown, at a quantum level, faster than light communication 
is now thought to be possible within our universe. The theory of  ,  non-locality' 
which this new information enables (i.e that all parts of  the universe can be in 
touch with all other parts, without needing to be spatially contiguous) 'undoes 
the reduction oftime to space performed by relativity theory and establishes an 
irreducibly privileged frame of  temporal reference for physical experiments.,23 
This, Murphy notes, allows Bohm and Hiley to suggest a new temporal model of 
the universe, in contrast to that of  Einstein's space-time. This model, 
interestingly, bears a remarkable resemblance to that of  Bergson's duration, and 
indeed, to Deleuze's Aion. 
In his piece, Quantum Ontology24, moreover, Murphy shows how correlations 
between the works of  De  leuze and Bohm enable us to think differently about the 
existence of  matter than has been previously attempted by Bohr, Heisenberg, and 
Neumann. The paradoxical discovery of  the existence of  matter as both wave 
and particle need not, contrary to the beliefs of  the aforementioned scientists, be 
explained away as merely 'a metaphysical gesture that has no measurable effects, 
since the object only exhibits properties when it interacts with the experimental 
apparatus'25. This explanation, Murphy shows, says more about the theoretical 154 
frameworks from which they approach the problem, their methods of  measuring 
and explaining the existence of  matter, than it does about matter itself Instead, 
the different approach taken by Bollin points towards the conclusion that matter 
exists in both virtual and actual states. The particle can now be seen to exist as 
the flickering in and out of  existence of  the actual along the wave front of  the 
virtual; that is, as virtual wave constantly in the process of  becoming-actual-
particle. Once again, with a different theoretical approach, a theory is proposed 
which can account for the seeming inconsistencies encountered by Bohr, et al. 
That both Bohm and Deleuze, as Murphy points out, view matter as the 
enfolding of  the virtual in the creation of  the actual, ensures that they both 'treat 
the universe as origami,26. Time, when conceived at a quantum level, would 
seem to bear a striking resemblance to Deleuze's Aion, the virtual time out of 
which the actual takes form in its different fo ldings. The similarities between the 
theories ofBohm, and Deleuze's ideas concerning time, themselves so heavily 
influenced by Bergson, would thus seem to support Prigogine and Stengers' 
judgement concerning the direction, or metamorphosis, that some areas of 
science are now undertaking towards Bergson's position. 
Seemingly the loser in the immediate aftermath of  his confrontation with 
Einstein, Bergson's work on time is now being reassessed. It is, after all, able to 
provide previously unthought of  explanations for the findings of  physics once it 
reaches a quantum level. David Deutsch's idea, in The Fabric of  Reality27 (1997) 
that at a quantum level we may benefit from thinking of  the universe as a 
muitiverse, could also be considered in this light. Certainly his idea that quantum 
theory can quite reasonably account for the seemingly staggering findings of 
chaos theory would appear to support the Deleuzian conception of  the labyrinth 
of  Cinema 2. 
According to chaos theory, based upon the model of  classical dynamics, as the 
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concerning the future state of  said system will tend to be unreliable. The effects 
of  the inaccuracy of  the initial measurements, after exponentially multiplying 
over a period oftime are, in fact, immeasurably huge. This effect is often 
expressed in the slightly misleading example of  the flapping ofa butterfly's 
wings which causes a hurricane several thousand miles away. 
This is not, however, thought to be the case under the rules established by 
quantum theory. Should the occurrence of  a hurricane be somehow attributed to 
the flapping of  a butterfly's wings, this seemingly random happening will only 
appear to be random when seen from the classical viewpoint. From the 
theoretical perspective of  the multiverse, by contrast, we will be aware that the 
flapping of  a butterfly's wings will actually cause a hurricane in some universes, 
but not in others. As Deutsch has it: 
Subjectively we perceive this as a single unpredictable or 'random' 
outcome, through the multiverse  point of  view all the outcomes have 
actually happened.
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The chain of  events that leads from the flapping of  the wings to the hurricane, 
when it does happen, will not, in this case, appear random. We will be aware that 
this is but one of  the occasions when it does happen, and that there are also 
occasions, in other universes, where (or we should really say, when) it does not 
happen. For every flap of  the wings, we will be aware that all the possible 
ramifications of  this action will take place somewhere, or rather, somewhen, 
amongst the infmite labyrinthine pathways through the multiverse. 
Again we see that the classical model is destined to reach certain conclusions 
due to its privileging of  its own frame of  reference over all others. The 
unpredictability of  the effect of  the flapping wings is not, however, as Deutsch's 
work shows, solely attributable to events that occur in our universe, in our 
particular frame of  reference. Rather, it is a consequence of  the unpredictability 
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the labyrinth. Once again, changing the frame of  reference has provided a 
different conclusion, and potentially cleared up another seeming paradox, that of 
the butterfly and the hurricane. Although Deutsch's theory differs radically from 
Deleuze's in many respects, it is in these small convergences that a pattern 
begins to appear that concurs with the philosophical view of  time previously 
theorized by Bergson. 
However, despite this movement within science towards the previously 
discarded Bergsonian view of  time, there is still a great deal of  resistance 
towards the suggestion that the theoretical framework which science employs is 
responsible for the conclusions it draws. Not to at least acknowledge this 
resistance would make the above evidence seem questionable. Perhaps the most 
pertinent example for this discussion would be the controversial Intellectual 
Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers' Abuse o/Science (1997) in which two 
professors of  physics, Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, criticized the use, or as 
they saw it, 'abuse', of  scientific concepts by several post-structuralists, 
philosophers, psychoanalysts, and feminists. The accused range from Lacan, 
Kristeva and Irigaray, to Baudrillard and Virilio. The works of  De  leuze, and 
Deleuze and Guattari, also warranted a chapter. The disputes caused by this 
book, and the positions taken for and against it are too many to be rehearsed 
here
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• The approach taken by Sokal and Bricmont, however, is of  interest if  we 
examine it in relation to the difference between the theoretical frameworks 
respectively utilized by Einstein and Bergson. 
In their introduction Sokal and Bricmont state their concern for American 
academia, which they perceive to be threatened by the doctrine which they 
blanket term, 'postmodernism'. This they define as doctrine which rejects 
Enlightenment rationalism, and which is marked by; 'a cognitive and cultural 
relativism that regards science as nothing more than a 'narration', a 'myth' or a 
social construction among many others.'  Indeed, they maintain, the authors they 
discuss: 'display a profound indifference, if  not a disdain, for facts and logic.  ,30 
Obviously, for anyone wishing to advocate the work of  any of  these so called 157 
'postmodern' authors, it would be very easy to state that this is exactly the stance 
taken by certain amongst them, and that Sokal and Bricmont, whilst correct in 
this respect, are tilting at windmills. Deleuze, for instance, states that, 'no special 
status should be assigned to any particular field, whether philosophy, science, 
art, or literature.'31 What, then, can be gained from a work which argues against 
postmodernism's Bergsonian, simultaneous relativism between disciplines, and 
advocates instead a binary logic of  scientifically proven truth vs error? 
What is interesting about this book is the way in which Sokal and Bricmont take 
their own frame of  reference, that of  science, and privilege it as the fixed 
perspective from which they can judge every other, as relative. As was the case 
with Einstein's rebuttal of  Bergson (,There is ... no philosopher's time,32), by 
privileging their own frame of  reference in this way, they inevitably 
predetermine the conclusion that any other discipline which attempts to utilize 
scientific concepts will be "wrong". The alien  framework into which these 
concepts are transported will, of  necessity, falsify the conclusions already drawn 
by science, and from the fixed point taken by science, these will appear 
incorrect. However - as the work ofBohm and to a lesser degree, Deutsch show 
(through their respective theorizing of  the move from the classical to the 
quantum model) as indeed does that ofPrigogine and Stengers in chemistry-
even if  the work of  philosophers like Bergson in the 1920s seems to disregard 
scientific "facts", it may be that new "facts" will emerge in the future which will 
make those previous "facts", not necessarily true. In retrospect, as is the case 
with Bergson's work, the falsified conclusions of  philosophers may become 
useful once the scientific framework shifts. Indeed, every time the metaphysical 
framework of  science alters different conclusions are enabled. This ensures the 
invalidity of  the very belief in facts which began with the fixed model of  the 
Classical, Enlightenment rationale. If  time is no longer reversible, if  everything 
must and does change (becoming, not being) then what is a "fact", after all, but 
an arbitrarily fixed, and therefore temporary, point in time? 158 
It  must be acknowledged that Sokal and Bricmont's critique of  the work of 
Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, does indeed show evidence of  their 
misunderstanding of  certain scientific concepts. In much the same way that 
Bergson made errors concerning the Lorentz transformations, errors have here 
again been made, with the result that the philosophers often draw what appear to 
be incorrect conclusions. Whether or not this is an 'abuse' of  science, however, is 
a different matter. As was the case with Bergson's initial failure at the hurdle of 
the special theory of  relativity, the way in which a misunderstood scientific 
concept can lead the philosopher to conclusions that may have wide-ranging 
repercussions is surely of  great importance in itself. Perhaps more important than 
the accuracy employed by the philosopher in their application and discussion of 
scientific concepts, is their ability to create new concepts by using them. 
From as early as 1968, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze has maintained 
that: 'A book of  philosophy should be in part a particular species of  detective 
novel, in part a kind of  science fiction.'33 He continues: 
How else can one write but of  those things which one doesn't know, or 
knows badly? ... We write only at the frontiers of  our knowledge, at the 
border which separates our knowledge from our brilliance and transforms 
the one into the other  .... We are therefore well aware, unfortunately, that 
we have spoken about science in a manner that was not scientific.  34 
This explicitly stated intent, of  taking scientific concepts out of  their scientific 
context in order to make help them resonate with those of  philosophy (exactly as 
Bergson did in 1922) is somehow missed by Sokal and Bricmont, even though 
Difference and Repetition is one of  the texts they analyse. Their argument then, 
that Deleuze, applies 'a great concentration of  scientific terms, employed out of 
context and without any apparent logic ...  ,35 now seems redundant, as to write 
'about science in a manner that was not scientific' was exactly his intention. 159 
The fact that Sokal and Bricmont fail to identify the 'logic' behind Deleuze's use 
of  these scientific concepts (even though it is expressly stated by Deleuze) is 
perhaps a result of  their expectations concerning the already determined 
conclusions drawn by science. When they fmd, instead, different conclusions to 
those which they expect, they conclude that philosophy lacks logic. What is 
evident, however, is a different kind oflogic. Following this logic, the 
transformation of  the initial concept, through its placement in a new context, 
does not produce the incorrect answer, but simply a different answer. What is the 
point, after all, of  a repetition of  the same conclusion? Surely a repetition of 
difference, created through a new assemblage, is infinitely preferable?  For this 
reason, philosophy's misunderstanding of  a concept is not of  so much importance 
as where the misunderstood concept takes the philosopher. Bergson, for instance, 
certainly understood the Lorentz equations 'badly', but his own theory oftime 
could not have been developed without it. The effect of  this work on Deleuze, 
moreover, would not have been felt, had he not made such a misunderstanding. 
It  is perhaps ultimately ironic that Sokal and Bricmont, taking passages from 
Deleuze's works, quoting them out of  their avowed, philosophical context, and 
then stating that they are 'utterly meaningless,36, are actually working in much 
the same way that Deleuze does in his creation of  science fictions. Being clear 
on how these two approaches do differ, then, is important. The positive 
outcomes to the fictionalizing process which Deleuze undertakes by using 
scientific concepts out of  context are only realized because of  his refusal to 
privilege not only science, but also his own discipline, as though it were a fixed 
perspective against which to judge the movement of  all others. It is for this 
reason that Deleuze so often works between disciplines, be they philosophy and 
science, philosophy and cinema, philosophy and art, philosophy and literature, 
and so on. To embark upon this same task of  fictionalizing from within a fixed 
perspective which believes itself to be the judge of  all others wil~ as the 
conclusions ofSokal and Bricmont show, inevitably result in an Einsteinian 
relativizing of  any other discipline's use of  these concepts. Rather than allowing 
them to create assemblages with other, new concepts, to work at the 'frontiers of 
knowledge', this methodology simply asserts the invalidity of  the other, relative 160 
perspectives. In essence it restores the binary of  true and false, and is as much as 
to hear Einstein say that Peter's watch is fast compared to his. 
The difference between the two approaches can be summarised as follows. 
Deleuze's science fiction asserts one possible science. Sokal and Bricmont's 
adherence to science as fact, in contrast, asserts that there is only one science 
possible. It is, once again, a manifestation of  the difference in thinking that 
characterizes BergsoniDeleuze's labyrinth on the one hand - in which 
experiences of  time's passing  are simultaneous - and Einstein's space-time on 
the other - in which all other times can be seen as relative from one privileged, 
fixed perspective. It  is this difference which stops this debate from being merely 
the Sokal and Bricmont pot calling the Deleuzian kettle, black. 
What we are left with in this debate, then, is a matter of  perspective similar to 
that which separated Einstein and Bergson's positions on time. For the scientific 
position held by Sokal and Bricmont, privileging itself above all others, the 
positions of  these respective others will seem false by their standards. For the 
philosophical  position held by Deleuze, by contrast, the position of  the scientist 
will appear as that of  one who, reasoning at the level of  the actual, misses the 
virtual from which the actual takes its form. 
Despite the implication of  Sokal and Bricmont's book, however, science does not 
simply occupy a plane of  transcendence which reterritorializes the plane of 
consistency of  philosophy. If  this was the case, the resonances that Murphy fmds 
between Deleuze and Bohm, and indeed, that which this work offers, between 
Deleuze and Deutsch  could surely not exist. It is not simply a matter, then, of 
correlating the gender binary of  the movement-image with a binary logic 
particular to science. As the movement from the classical, to the Einsteinian, to 
the emergent quantum view of  time illustrates, after all, science has a marked 
capacity for change. This is a capacity, in fact, which problematizes the binary 
logic evidenced by Sokal and Bricmont's reasoning. There does remain, 161 
however, a correlation between the movement-image's plane of  transcendence, 
and science's privileging of  the actual, that same reasoning which creates the 
idea that time is but a fourth dimension of  space. 
In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari defIne the relationship between 
the two disciplines as that between the plane of  consistency of  philosophy, and 
the plane of  reference of  science. Their claim is that, whilst philosophy examines 
the becoming-actual of  the virtual, creating concepts, science determines what 
the actual is, by creating functions. As they have it: 
... through concepts, philosophy continually extracts a consistent event 
from the state of  affairs - a smile without a cat, as it were - whereas 
through functions, science continually actualizes the event in a state of 
affairs, thing or body that can be referred to.37 
Whereas for philosophy, the being of  the cat vanishes in the event, or becoming, 
of  the cat's smiling, for science there is no smile without a cat that fIrst smiles. 
For science it is the cat that is important, the 'thing, or body that actualizes the 
virtual on a plane of  reference and in a system ofcoordinates,38. Science's 
reasoning at the level of  the actual, offorms, however, is the same practice 
which creates the paradoxes ofZeno, and the conclusion that time is a fourth 
dimension of  space. Thus space-time is a function that is almost pre-determined 
by the metaphysical approach to reality taken by science. Under the conditions 
of  space-time the event oftime's passing is not judged to be as important as the 
actualized form that it takes. Just as there can be no smile without a cat that 
smiles, there is no time without a space across which to measure its passing. It is 
this conclusion which leads to the conflation of  space with time. They continue: 
Concepts and  functions thus appear as two types of  multiplicities or 
varieties whose natures are different. Although scientifIc types of 
multiplicity are themselves extremely diverse, they do not include the 
properly philosophical multiplicities, for which Bergson claimed a 
particular status defIned by duration, "multiplicity of  fusion", which 162 
expressed the inseparability of  variations, in contrast to multiplicities of 
space, number and time, which ordered mixtures and referred to the 
variable or to independent variables.  39 
Science's focus on the actual, on 'multiplicities of  space, number and time' is 
what creates the theory of  space-time, the ordering, or measuring of  these 
entities in  their  actualized forms. Science takes the measure of  the smile across 
the cat's face. Philosophy's concentration on the virtual, by contrast, leads to its 
intuition of  duration, and the 'inseparability of  variations' encountered in the 
becoming of  assemblages. Philosophy charts the event of  smiling, of  the 
smiling/cat assemblage. 
It  should now be clear exactly what is at stake in the recent representations of 
labyrinthine time in cinema. Are we seeing the falsifying powers of  the labyrinth 
of  De  leuze, or are Sliding Doors and Run Lola Run merely 'impostures', 
masquerading a belief  in the virtual whole of  time whilst all the time upholding 
the actualized, straight line of  time? Are these films Bergsonian-inspired 
expressions of  a virtua~ labyrinthine conception of  duration's many, 
simultaneous times, or are they relative, local views of  time, as seen from a 
fixed, Einsteinian position? 
Running and Sliding. 
Both Sliding Doors and Run Lola Run are immediately striking in their use of 
multiple plot lines, and their centering of  the narrative around a female 
protagonist. Whilst Sliding Doors maintains two simultaneous plot lines by 
alternating between two parallel universes, Lola Rennt for its part plays three 
alternative versions of  the same events in series. Both these films can be read as 
representing a BergsonianiDeleuzian model of  time. In order to do this most 
effectively the films will be examined one at a time, beginning with Sliding 
Doors. 163 
Peter Howitt's film is the story, or stories, of  Helen (Gwyneth Paltrow) a young 
woman living in London, whose identity splits into two separate paths through 
the labyrinth oftime. After arriving one morning at work to discover that she has 
been fired from her job in Public Relations, Helen attempts to return home on the 
underground. In one story she catches the train, but in the other, she misses it, 
her way being barred by the closing of  its sliding doors, hence the name of  the 
film. The rest of  the drama is concerned with her two simultaneous existences, in 
which are played out what can best be described as the "happy" and the "sad" 
consequences of  her encounter with the train doors. 
In the happy incarnation, the Helen that catches the train returns home to find 
that her boyfriend Jerry (John Lynch) has been cheating on her. She leaves him, 
and resolves to rebuild her life without him. She is aided in this by her close 
friend Anna, and James (John Hannah) who now becomes her love interest. 
Helen meets James, in fact, on the very tube which sad Helen failed to catch. 
After an initial makeover in which she has her hair cut short and dyed blonde, 
happy Helen becomes a successful business woman, running her own PR 
company. In her sad incarnation, by contrast, the Helen that misses the train 
remains ignorant of  Jerry's infidelity, and is forced to work in two rather menial 
jobs (sandwich delivery and waitressing) in order to support him as a writer. She 
remains completely unaware of  the existence of  James. For brevity I shall refer 
to the happy incarnation as 'blonde Helen' and the unhappy incarnation as 
'brunette Helen' from this point onwards. 
In Sliding Doors, the ramifications of  a few seconds ofmeasurable time (the 
difference between catching, or missing a train) are played out across the 
labyrinth oftime much in the way which Deutsch suggests in his multiverse 
interpretation of  chaos theory. In some universes, the flapping of  the butterfly's 
wings causes a hurricane, in others it does not. Similarly, in some universes 
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blown love affair with James (as is the case with blonde Helen's life), and in 
another, after missing the train, it does not (witness the unhappy life of  brunette 
Helen). The film would, at its most obvious level, seem to correspond to both 
Deutsch's quantum reformulation oftime as the multiverse, and indeed, with 
Deleuze's labyrinth. Were this not enough evidence that Sliding Doors expresses 
the movement towards Bergson's idea of  time as it has been taken up by 
contemporary films, several other important events occur in the narrative which 
by themselves do not appear to be of  great significance, but which actually make 
this film particularly Deleuzian in its use of  time to create identity. 
Most obvious of  these is the intuition of  her multiple existence which Helen 
gains during the film. At one point in the narrative we see blonde Helen, on a 
boat on the Thames, cheering James on as he takes part in a rowing race. With 
nothing to indicate the shift between universes other than a panning shot, a slight 
change in the music, and a view which enables the viewer to see the space from 
which blonde Helen is now absent, the film then moves slickly into the story line 
of  brunette Helen. Walking along beside the Thames with Anna, and pondering 
the possibility that Jerry may be having an affair, she says: 'Its really weird. I 
knew there'd be a boat race going by, with purple and white shirts'. This 
sequence can help us develop an idea which Deleuze himself  takes from 
Bergson, in order to explain the phenomena of  deja-vu. 
Whilst discussing the splitting of  time which occurs in the crystal, and the ability 
that the subject has to then realise their own doubled existence - much as an 
actor does, listening to himself and beholding himself  playing - Deleuze states: 
The present is the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the 
virtual image, the image in a mirror. According to Bergson, 'paramnesia' 
(the illusion of  deja-vu or already having been there) simply makes this 
obvious point perceptible: there is a recollection of  the present, 
contemporaneous with the present, as closely coupled as a role to an 
actor.
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In this case, however, Helen's feeling of  dejtl-vu is not exactly the realization of 
the splitting of  the self, but rather, the realization of  the already split self, the 
contemporaneous lived experiences which are created by the labyrinth oftime. It 
is not so much the immediate realization of  the self  as having been there before 
(in the instant at which you split) but rather, the realization ofthe simultaneous 
existence in time of  an other self  that is there at the same time, but in a different 
manifestation. 
This effect is accentuated by the camera's discrete pan which moves, not across 
the unified space of  one universe, but rather, through labyrinthine time, or across 
duration, as it passes from one universe to another. In fact, when Helen's life is 
flISt seen to split the film uses a brief  parallel montage sequence in order to 
emphasize exactly what is happening in the narrative. As Helen simultaneously 
misses and catches the tube the camera rapidly, and repeatedly, cuts back and 
forth across temporal dimensions, showing the parallel routes taken by the now 
split Helen. In one universe we see Helen taking her seat on the train, before 
cutting back to Helen, in another universe, standing outside the train, and 
looking annoyed at having just missed it. That only one Helen is ever seen to be 
evident in the shot at anyone time makes it clear that we are seeing not one 
single space, unified by the movement of  the editing, but rather, the many 
pathways, or universes of  labyrinthine time. Here the film edits together not a 
single, actua~ homogeneous space, but the singular multiplicity oflabyrinthine 
time, its actualizations ofthe virtuaL 
Another seemingly unimportant incident which occurs in the life of  brunette 
Helen can also be regarded as containing an importance greater than solely that 
of  its narrative function. Growing increasingly suspicious that Jerry is having an 
affair, one night she finds her eye caught by a couple arguing in the restaurant 
where she works. The woman, obviously suspicious of  her partner, accuses him 
of  only ever buying her flowers when he has done something wrong, to which he 
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lingers for a moment on Helen's quizzical face, in order to drive home the point 
that she is seeing her own suspicions in the accusations made by the other 
woman. On her return home that night she fmds that Jerry has bought her 
flowers. Again, the camera lingers on her face suggesting that he has just 
confIrmed her suspicions. This incident illustrates the way in which Helen 
begins to grow aware of  her life as something that she is somehow watching 
unfold in front of  her, rather like a drama in which she is an actor playing a role. 
This is the knowledge gained by one who has intuition of  duration, of  the myriad 
other selves in which they exist in the labyrinth of  time. Although not directly an 
expression of  the existence of  labyrinthine selves, what this incident does show 
is the intuition Helen is gaining of  her existence as other. 
More important than either of  these minor glimpses of  herself as multiple 
Helens, however, is the conclusion to the fIlm, in which both Helens (who are by 
now both pregnant, brunette Helen to Jerry, and blonde Helen to James) are 
involved in serious accidents and taken to hospital. The fIlm ends with the death 
of  blonde Helen, and the survival of  brunette Helen, but only at the cost of  the 
loss of  her baby. As blonde Helen dies in hospital, with James weeping over her, 
brunette Helen awakens to fInd Jerry waiting by her bedside. At this point, 
brunette Helen has a flashback in which she sees: the bridge on which she and 
James made-up just prior to the accident, the American style diner where they 
fIrst went on a date, and, fmally, the train on which they fIrst met. The existence 
of  these displaced memories within the universe of  the brunette Helen suggests a 
very peculiar action that is taking place concerning the construction of  identity in 
time, in the fIlm's narrative. 
The memories of  blonde Helen's life which brunette Helen experiences are a 
representation of  the past that she 'might have had'. The appearance of  these 
memories allows her to make decisions for her future based upon a past which 
now becomes contingent, or not necessarily true. At this point she sends Jerry 
away, armed with a new resolve based upon memories from the past of  her 
blonde self, and becomes determined to make the past a different story. What has 167 
happened here is interesting because it suggests a labyrinthine realigning of  time 
for brunette Helen, from the present, backwards. This is evident in the order in 
which the places occur in the flashback she receives (from bridge, to diner, to 
train) as though blonde Helen's story line was running backwards to the point at 
which they initially split when boarding the tube. Thus brunette Helen's past is 
re-aligned with that of  blonde Helen with the arrival of  her memories. The past 
can be falsified, we are shown in the present actions of  brunette Helen, in order 
to ensure that the future is different from what it might have been. This is a 
cinematic illustration of  the labyrinthine powers of  the false which are activated 
in the third synthesis of  time. 
This ability to falsify the past of  her unhappy self, to make it not necessarily the 
cause of  her present state, is reinforced by the events that accompany her 
departure from the hospital. As she meets Hannah for the first time in her 
brunette incarnation, she correctly fmishes his Monty Python catchphrase for 
him; that which, in her blonde incarnation she had incorrectly presumed would 
be: 'Always look on the bright side oflife'. In the quirky world of  James, 
however, it turned out to be: Nobody expects the Spanish inquisition'. The 
uncanny sense of  dtija-vu created by her knowledge of  James' quirk illustrates 
that she is now fully in touch with her other past. She has become aware of  her 
labyrinthine self, and has gained intuition of  duration. Helen, moreover, has 
learned to use this intuition of  time in order to will a return of  difference. She has 
become an eternally recurring entity who has the ability to manufacture, or 
perform her future in such a way as to make the past that was, not necessarily 
true. The past at anyone time, Howitt's film shows, is not necessarily the past 
that leads up to, and causes, the present situation. You have the opportunity to 
change the past, in the present, at any moment, due to the continual splitting of 
time that constructs the labyrinth. Rather like the end of  Ctiline et Julie - in 
which the temporal coexistence of  Celine, Julie and Madlyn illustrates the 
continual possibility of  rewriting the past  in the present - the ending to Sliding 
Doors similarly portrays the ability of  Helen to falsify the past in the present. It 
is only this action, after all, which provides liberation in the future. 168 
The beginning and the end of  the film are also important in this respect. When 
brunette Helen fmally does meet James (although he has existed in many of  the 
same spaces as her throughout the film) it is in a replay of  their first crossing of 
paths with which the film begins. As Helen initially left work after being fired 
she took the lift down to street level. When she dropped an earring in the lift, 
James helpfully picked it up for her. As she leaves the hospital after her 
miscarriage, brunette Helen, momentarily stopped in her attempt to get an earlier 
lift by the closing of  its sliding doors, waits for the next one. Its opening doors 
reveal, James. She, once again, drops her earring, only to have James retrieve it 
for her, and the conversation concerning the Monty Python catchphrase ensues. 
We are left in no doubt at this point that the course of  blonde Helen's life with 
James will now happen to brunette Helen, and a happy ending is expected in the 
future. Again in a very similar manner to the way in which Rivette's film ends by 
creating a mobius spiral, here again the film's end begins in a manner evocative 
of  the eternal return. Brunette Helen's future will assuredly tum out to be a 
return, in difference, of  blonde Helen's past. 
This replaying of  the beginning of  the narrative at the end, this apparent return of 
difference so evocative of  eternal recurrence, is, however, a little problematic. 
Could it, alternatively, be viewed as the re-inscription of  a singular linear 
direction to the narrative at the very last? After all, at this point, the labyrinthine 
difference in the lives of  the Helens has been erased by the death of  blonde 
Helen. What we are finally left with is the single story of  brunette Helen, and her 
new lover-to-be, James. This could be seen as a return to a linear storyline, as if 
the other story had been but a temporary aberration, rather than one example of 
the myriad coexisting labyrinthine lives which accompany those of  the Helens 
we are watching. Ultimately, however, the film's ability to sway between the 
labyrinth and the line of  time makes it an almost perfect expression of  the 
actualization of  one line of  time from out of  the virtual labyrinth, without solely 
denying the other possibilities that accompany this actualization. It is a story of 
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Kieslowski's La Double Vie de  Veronique (1991) by contrast - in which Irene 
Jacobs plays the part oftwo identical women living separate lives - contains a 
similar narrative to that of  Sliding Doors but retained throughout within a single, 
linear time  line. This is the film which, although it does come close to a 
realization of  its full labyrinthine potential, ultimately privileges the actual over 
the virtual. Like Sliding Doors, the film explores the consequences of  the 
transference of  the memories of  one woman, Veronika, to her double, 
Veronique, when Veronika dies of  a heart attack whilst singing. Rather than a 
flashback, however, the transference is achieved through a sudden and 
inexplicable feeling of  grief for Veronika suffered by Veronique. This prompts 
Veronique to immediately quit singing herself, and to go to hospital for a heart 
scan. When Veronique becomes aware ofwhat has happened to her at the end of 
the film, she even begins to see Veronika's memories in her dreams. 
However, even though the idea of  the passing on oflessons learnt with which 
Sliding Doors ends is also to be found here, especially in the unprompted heart 
scan, this time the reduction of  the doubled subject to the single lifeline takes 
place in the same time-space. Veronika dies in Krakow, Poland, and Veronique 
lives in Paris, France. There is no possible suggestion that a multiverse, or 
labyrinth exists, or that it is being utilized by either character. The two characters 
are even shown to inhabit the same space-time when Veronique's tour bus passes 
through Krakow, and she is spotted by Veronika. The falsifying of  the past 
which the new memories provide is shown as the story of  a linear life, rather 
than oflabyrinthine lives. Indeed, the transformation ofVeronika into Veronique 
is related by the puppeteer/stalker who becomes Veronique's lover, as the story 
of  the metamorphosis of  a caterpillar into a butterfly. The linearity of  the 
narrative in this case retains an Einsteinian view of  space-time through its focus 
on the actual, unlike that of  Sliding Doors which delves into the process through 
which the virtual labyrinth comes to be actualized. 170 
Despite the difference between the two types of  ending, however, the need for 
the narrative structure of  Sliding Doors to return to a point oflinearity right at 
the last is undoubtedly due to the need for narrative closure that marks the 
movement-image. Despite its labyrinthine narrative, Sliding Doors is still a 
movement-image which links together spaces through the movement of  its 
characters, the two Helens. It is they that provide the spatial measure of  the times 
through which they pass. Whether or not this should detract from the 
labyrinthine possibilities of  the film, however is a different matter, and is best 
regarded in conjunction with several other films. 
Tom Tykwer's Lola Rennt is the story, or rather, the three stories, of  Lola 
(Franka Potente) who, at the start of  the narrative, receives a frantic phone call 
from her boyfriend Manni (Moritz Bleibtreu) a small time courier for a 
particularly violent, drug smuggling gangster, Ronni. Manni, whilst on an errand 
for his boss, has managed to successfully deliver his cargo, but on his return, 
(due to a serious of  mishaps that begin with Lola's failure to pick him up as 
arranged) has managed to lose the payment. With no way of  knowing where the 
money is Lola has to fmd a replacement 100 000 Deutschmarks and get it to 
Manni in twenty minutes. Should she fail, Manni, knowing that Ronni will kill 
him for his failure, will attempt to hold up a supermarket. The three stories that 
follow chart her three slightly different attempts to get the money from her 
father. The first ends in her and Manni's capture by the police after bungling the 
robbery of  the supermarket, and the accidental shooting of  Lola. The second 
ends with the accidental death of  Manni after Lola has successfully managed to 
obtain the money by robbing the bank where her father works, and the third (the 
happy ending) with Manni recovering his own money, Lola winning the same 
amount at roulette, and with both characters alive at the end. 
This is another film which at first glance would seem to illustrate Deutsch's 
multiverse reworking of  chaos theory, in which a difference in seconds can have 
vast repercussions within the many universes in which the consequences are 
played out. In each of  the three stories, Lola begins her mad dash across town 171 
with a flight (initially shown in animation) down the stairs of  the block of  flats 
where she and her parents live. In each of  the three stories, however, something 
slightly different happens when she runs past a young boy and his dog, who are 
loitering on the stairs. The ftrst time she passes the growling dog without 
incident and runs straight on. The second time she passes the boy trips her, the 
resulting fall down the stairs causing her to limp slightly and marginally slowing 
her run. On the third pass she leaps over the approaching dog, thus gaining a few 
moments on both of  her previous incarnations. 
The exponentially increasing knock-on effect of  this difference is made manifest 
in each case, when, on turning a comer she passes a woman with a baby in a 
push chair. This is the ftrst of  many such incidences in the fIlm when a freeze 
frame of  an incidental character's face is shown, over which we see the caption 
'AND THEN' and the whine of  a photographic flash is heard. This is followed by 
the appearance ofa series of  photographic snapshots showing the future of  the 
incidental character's story. The ramiftcations for the minor character ofthe 
different points at which the path of  Lola's life crosses her own are shown to be 
radically different in each of  the three stories. In the ftrst instance, the woman is 
found unftt to keep her baby, which is taken from her by the authorities, and, 
desperate, she eventually steals another. On the second occasion, Lo  1a arrives a 
few seconds later due to her limp, and as she brushes past the woman we 
discover that in this future the woman will win the lottery and ftnd happiness in 
a palatial home. In the third and ftnal story, Lola's earlier arrival will push the 
path of  the woman's life into religion. These three different destinies would seem 
to express, in a similar way to that used in Sliding Doors, the way in which the 
exponential, seemingly 'chaotic' increase in differences between events caused 
by a few seconds of  measurable time can spread out across the labyrinth of  time. 
This knock-on effect is noticed not only in this most obvious way, however, but 
also in the way in which the paths of  the characters involved in the main 
narrative do or don't interact. At one point, for instance, after running through a 
crowd of  nuns, Lola encounters a man riding a bicycle. On the fust two 172 
occasions the whine of  the camera flash is heard and we see the man firstly 
mugged and badly beaten only to meet his future wife in the guise of  his nurse, 
and then, the second time, becoming destitute, and eventually dying of  a drug 
overdose. On the third occasion, Lola swerves around the nuns, her change of 
course slightly altering that of  the man on the bike who also swerves to avoid 
her. This time we follow his narrative for a little while longer without seeing the 
snapshots, only to witness him sell the bicycle to the hobo who has picked up 
Manni's money. This chance occurrence, itself a consequence of  Lola's change 
of  direction, is what finally brings the hobo on the bike within range of  Manni, 
who then retrieves his money. 
The other instances which the film shows of  the myriad possible directions 
events are shown to take through time are too numerous to be recounted here. 
Suffice it to say that the number of  incidental characters that Lola Rennt brings 
into its narrative enables it to foreground the infmite number of  possible 
directions through the labyrinth that occur with every splitting of  time. The 
number of  actualized pathways through the virtual that exist, we can infer from 
this, is truly incomprehensible. 
The expression of  the passing oftime in this way is kept to a minimum in Sliding 
Doors. Mostly it is hinted at by the number of  sliding doors through which the 
lives of  the two Helens pass. The number of  possibilities which pass with each 
sliding open and shut are perhaps at their most obvious when blonde Helen, 
attempting to track down James in order to tell him that she is carrying his baby, 
is told by his secretary that he is with his wife. Shocked at fmding out that he is 
married, she leans her head against the wall for a moment, her position there 
causes the automatic, sliding doors to repeatedly open and close. With each 
slide, we have by this point in the film become aware, a portal into a different, 
parallel, universe is passing by. The sliding doors motif  also recurs in the first 
two stories of  Lola Rennt, as Manni awaits Lola's arrival outside the 
supermarket. As the clock nears noon, and Lola's time runs out, the screen splits, 
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sight, running to him on the right. The bottom of  the screen is then raised, 
creating a three way split-screen image with the ticking hands of  the clock 
completing the trio. Behind Manni, punctuating the movement ofthe hands of 
the clock, the sliding doors of  the supermarket repeatedly open and close in slow 
motion. 
Lola Rennt seems to show that the number of  possible entrances to the labyrinth 
are not only multiple, due to all the Peters and Pauls whose intersecting lives 
create a labyrinth within anyone universe, but so too are they temporally 
infmite, due to the infmite number of  labyrinths created by the infmite splittings 
of  every Peter, every Paul, etc. It  is this which separates Lola Rennt from a film 
like Robert Altman's Short Cuts (1993). The labyrinth as it is seen in Tykwer's 
film is no longer just the spatial crossing of  paths of  people's lives in one 
universe (as it is in Altman's representation of  Los Angeles as spatial labyrinth) 
it now also has infinite variations at a temporal level, even if  all we see of  it is 
the events in the one universe within which we have consciousness of  time's 
passmg. 
Lola, as was the case with brunette Helen's experience of  dija-vu, also seems to 
gain intuition ofthe multiple incarnations of  herself in which she exists. The 
lessons that Lola learns in some universes seem to be transmitted across time 
into others. In the first story, reaching Manni too late to stop his attempted 
robbery, she joins him in the supermarket where she disarms the security guard 
and takes his gun. Never having used one before she asks Manni how the safety 
works. He shows her and, in her nervousness, she fires off  a shot. In the second 
story, after having died and been resurrected at the end of  the first, she decides to 
rob the Deutsche Transfer Bank where her father works. This time she takes the 
security guard's gun, and to show her father that she means business, she 
expertly flicks the safety off  and fires two bullets into the wall. It would appear 
that she has received the knowledge of  the, now dead, first Lola. Her memories 
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Helen did to brunette Helen. These enable her to act accordingly. How else could 
she have known how to use the safety? 
The ability to falsify the past which Lola would seem to have is also illustrated 
in the flashback sequence which follows the end of  the fIrst story. In this 
sequence, as Lola lies dying on the road after the failed supermarket heist, she 
remembers a previous conversation she had with Manni over a post-coital 
cigarette. In response to Manni's declaration that he loves her, she says: 
'I could be some other girl.  ... What if  you never met me ... You'd be 
telling the same thing to someone else. . .. I think I have to make a 
decision.' 
At this point we cut back to Lola dying in the road. She continues: 
'But I don't want to leave. Stop.' 
Lola's actions when the story begins again, especially the things that she seems 
to have learned which give her enough of  an advantage to successfully complete 
the robbery and get away with the money, would seem to reinforce the idea that 
she has managed to make her previous past not necessarily true. Realizing, as 
Helen did with the incident over the flowers, that she is herself  the 'someone 
else' that Manni is talking to in many incarnations (i.e that she herself exists as 
other) she makes the decision to connect herself  to a new past in the replaying of 
the story, and by so doing, to create a future that is yet to come. 
Despite the similarities that exist between the two fIlms on first glance, however, 
they are in fact very different in one respect. Although seeming to maintain a 
similar focus on the actualization of  the virtual that occurs through the labyrinth 
of  time, on closer examination, the narrative of  Lola Rennt is actually 
theoretically inconsistent with the Bergsonian model. The above interpretation, seemingly evidence of  a BergsonianlDeleuzian view of  time, now begins to 
appear somewhat doubtful. 
175 
The major difficulty is caused by the way in which the succession of  the stories 
destroys the notion of  the irreversible 'arrow of  time' that is maintained by 
Deleuze's labyrinth. The labyrinth of  parallel universes which creates the 
simultaneous happenings which we saw so clearly in Sliding Doors is absent 
from Tykwer's film. In Sliding Doors, the ungrounding oftime, its return in 
difference, was figured as part of  the irreversible progression of  time (the arrow 
oftime) with the transference of  blonde Helen's memories to brunette Helen at 
the end of  the film. There was no question of  brunette Helen's story starting over 
again with her departure from the PR firm. The return of  difference is thus not 
shown to be the return to a first cause. Rather, it is the creation of  the future that 
is yet to come, based upon a past that this future will make contingent. The 
paradoxical return of  the new of  the eternal return thus necessitates an 
irreversible continuation through the expanding whole of  the labyrinth. The 
events in the three stories of  Lola, however, do not occur simultaneously, and so 
the transference of  memory cannot occur at a point which would ensure 
continuation in the direction of  the irreversible arrow. If  Lola really had received 
the memories of  her dying double, her life would have been changed from then 
onwards, as brunette Helen's is, it would not have reverted back to an arbitrary 
origin, as Lola's does. The eternal return of  Sliding Doors falsifies time 
backwards, in order to open up possibilities for the future. The return to the 
origin (Lola's red telephone) enacted by Lola Rennt, by contrast, illustrates 
instead a causal model of  time which is more Einsteinian than Bergsonian. 
Lola Rennt expresses a belief  in time concurrent with that of  Einstein's special 
theory of  relativity. It shows three relative, or local, experiences oftime's 
passing. Recourse to a full blown labyrinth is not achieved, as these stories, or 
universes, do not coexist simultaneously. Nor are they connected to each other, 
as the two parallel worlds in Sliding Doors are. Rather, the linear way in which 
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from a privileged perspective which is created during our viewing of  the first 
story. From this point of  view, the second and third replayings of  this story seem 
to be either slightly slower (in the fIrst instance, due to Lola's limp) or slightly 
faster (with her leap over the dog) but this is only relative to the first example. 
We are witnessing an Einsteinian conception of  relative times from a privileged, 
fIxed position. Lola Rennt shows many possible presents, all moving relatively 
to each other, as seen from the privileged perspective of  the spectator who has a 
fore-knowledge of  the first story. From this arbitrarily fIxed position we can say 
that Lola is running slightly ahead of, or behind, time, depending on the story. 
The three way split-screen image of  Manni waiting, Lola running, and the clock 
ticking can also be re-interpreted in this light. This shot illustrates how the 
spectator is given the illusion of  objective, spectatorial mastery over the relative 
experiences of  time lived by the characters. As Manni waits on his fate, time 
passes slowly for him. For Lola running to beat the clock, time passes almost too 
quickly. For the spectator, however, their relative movements appear to be seen 
objectively, due to the presence of  the hands of  the clock, as measure of  time. 
This image positions us as the Einsteinian observer, who believes himself able to 
judge the relative passing of  time for others against his own measure oftime's 
passing. This, as the paradox of  Peter and Paul showed, however, is an illusory 
objectivity which fails to take into account the simultaneous nature of  our own 
experience of  time's passing. 
When seen as an expression of  Einsteinian time, the snapshot narratives ofthe 
film's incidental characters become, fIttingly, much as chaos theory would 
suggest when viewed from within the model of  classical dynamics. This is not 
the parallel expansion outwards of  the ripple effect that we see in the two stories 
of  Sliding Doors. If  this was the case, for each of  the three encounters with the 
woman and baby, several possible futures would have had to have been shown in 
the snapshots of  'AND THEN'. Rather, with each different story we see the 
replaying of  events which might happen in one particular system, thus 
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predicting the future of  a system whose initial conditions are unstable. This is 
why, in each case it seems as though the flapping of  the butterfly's wings does 
indeed create a hurricane. Were we shown several other possible outcomes, 
however, these events would in no way seem so unlikely in their ramifications. 
Whilst Lola Rennt might initially seem to illustrate the same labyrinth we see in 
Sliding Doors, then, it is in its need to show the three occasions in order which 
ensures that it only actually shows a straight line oftime, one possible path 
through the labyrinth, but in three different variations. These are the same events 
occurring three times, not in three parallel universes, but in the same one, each 
time starting from scratch  41. 
If  the events in the three retellings of  Lola Rennt are not actually happening in an 
ever expanding multiverse, it might be pertinent to inquire as to how we are to 
account for the things that Lola learns from each previous replaying of  events? 
The answer to this question can be seen if  we draw on Deleuze's comment 
concerning th~ labyrinthine universe as it is figured in the later works of  Bunuel. 
Here there eXIsts: 
... a plurality of  simultaneous worlds. These are not subjective 
(imaginary) points of  view in one and the same world, but one and the 
same event in different objective worlds, all implicated in the event, 
.  1·  bl  .  42  rnexp lca  e umverse. 
If  the three stories of  Lola Rennt are not 'a plurality of  simultaneous worlds', as 
we find in Bunuel, then they may very well be 'subjective (imaginary) points of 
view in one and the same world'. In this case, the pillow-talk flashback which 
occurs at the end of  the first story, and indeed, the second incidence of  this, at 
the end ofthe second (this time apparently from Manni's point of  view) may not 
be flashbacks at all. They suggest rather that the three stories are actually the 
fantasies, the 'subjective' and 'imaginary' outcomes to a basic story which the two 
protagonists have invented together. 178 
The red dissolve to the pillow talk sequence, which occurs as Manni lies dying at 
the end of  the second story, tells a very different story to that of  Lola's concern 
that she 'could be some other girl' with which the fIrst story ended. In this 
instance, Manni's concern is for whether or not Lola would fmd another man if 
he died. 'You'd forget me', he concludes. Unhappy with the ending to the second 
story, in which he dies, Manni then reconstructs the story the third time, ensuring 
that he retrieves his own money himself. Lola's story, the second one, can now 
be seen to be her projection of  the need to 'make a decision', which she does 
when she robs her father. This is the different action that saves her life at the end 
of  the second story. Manni's story, for its part, is his re-assertion of  his own 
ability to save himself in times of  trouble. This is partly due, we learn at the start 
of  the fIlm, to his beliefthat one day there will arise a situation in which Lola 
cannot save him. It is for this reason that he must save himself. This story is also 
marked by Manni's insecurity that he could be replaced by another man in Lola's 
life, that she would forget him ifhe did die. This is reiterated in the fmal shot of 
the fIlm, a freeze frame on his face as he asks Lola, 'What's in the bag?' As the 
flash whines over this image we are left to wonder what Manni's 'AND THEN' 
will be? Will Lola actually tell him that she has 100 000 Deutschmarks, or will 
she keep it a secret and leave him? 
Ifthe stories are simply this, the replaying of  fantasies by the couple, then they 
now become the privileged, fIxed viewpoint from which the times of  the 
different versions become relative. It is as if  Lola says; 'In this one I am late', or; 
'In this one I am early'.  The other man and the other woman which they both 
fear is, in this case, not a Deleuzian themselves-as-other, but simply any lover's 
worry, that of  another person altogether. Far from being a different fIlm to 
Altman's Short Cuts, then, Lola Rennt is a little like watching Short Cuts three 
times, back to back, and slightly changing the scenario each time. The labyrinth 
is still spatial, single, and made up of  the lives of  people within one universe. 
The fact that these stories do not exist within the lived time of  duration is also 
made clear in the opening shot of  the clock, whose pendulum stops moving, but 
whose hands whir round faster and faster. Outside of  the real passing of  time, the 
lived experience of  duration, these are fantasy times, inventions which pass in a 179 
moment out oftime, seen from the fIxed perspective of  the fantasists Lola and 
Manni. Lola Rennt is not, as Sliding Doors is, an image of  the process of  the 
labyrinthine actualization of  the virtual. Rather, it is the playing out of  several 
possible, different actualizations until the correct one is found. In this respect it 
is a little like the moral fable, Groundhog Day (1993). It is, however, slightly 
more nuanced than this earlier film as it at least allows that the lives which cross 
the path of  the protagonist will be different each time, and not simply a repetition 
of  the exact same events. 
It  is because the narrative is searching for the happy ending in this way, as 
though as a solution to a puzzle, or the single correct way through a spatial 
labyrinth, that things which are learnt in one story are carried over into the other. 
Lola's knowledge of  firearms, for instance, which she acquires between the fIrst 
and second stories, is no longer a very complex matter. The second time a gun 
enters the fantasy Lola will already be aware of  how to use it. It is also in its 
linear progression that the film reveals itself  to be most like the computer games 
that it so resembles. Again in the opening image of  the clock we are shown that 
this is not real time, it is playtime, or gametime. This is emphasized by the 
security guard in the opening scene, who states:  'The game lasts ninety minutes. 
That's a fact. Everything else is just theory.' 
The characters themselves are introduced in true games console style, as small 
inserts, head and shoulder shots which spin through a series of  mug shot poses 
accompanied by camera flashes. The fact that at this point you would normally 
select a player to represent you in the world generated by the computer game 
further reinforces the fact that the playing out of  the scenarios is itself a fantasy. 
The opening phone call that Lola receives from Manni informing her of  prior 
events, her mission, and the consequences should she fail, is also a standard 
feature of  computer console games. The three stories, in linear succession, are 
now simply the events as they might occur if  the film was a game that somebody 
was playing, learning how to use fIrearms, never pursuing the same dead-end twice, and so on. Of  course, once you are killed in a computer game, the only 
thing to do is start again at the beginning. 
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As Claudia Mesch says, in 'Racing Berlin: The Games of  Run Lola Run', the 
Berlin depicted in Lola Rennt is: 'a cyberspace obstacle course or environment 
usually associated with interactive video and computer games.'43 Indeed, 
comparing Lola to Lara Croft (the heroine of  the computer console game, Tomb 
Raider) as Mesch does, we can now begin to see the ftxed perspective on time as 
something that lies not with either the viewer of  the fIlm, or with its fantasists 
Lola and Manni. Instead this position now appears to be occupied by both 
viewer and characters, as we identify with them just as we would with the 
character in whose body we act when playing on a games console. Maurice 
Yacowar's interpretation of  the film (in 'Run Lola Run: Renn for your life'), as 'a 
contemporary individualists Triumph o/the Will,44 due to what he sees as Lola's 
attempt to write her own will upon history, to defeat chance and destroy fate, can 
also be explained as a consequence of  its games console style. 
Lola Rennt is a ftlm which ultimately maintains its unity through the movement 
of  Lola's body as it runs through the frame. In this respect it is a contemporary 
equivalent of  Keaton's, Sherlock Jr. Not only does her twenty minute journey 
through Berlin impossibly unify discontinuous, or incommensurable parts ofthe 
city (much as Keaton's movements do the fantastical spaces through which he 
passes) the film's potentially incommensurable media are similarly unified by the 
figure of  Lola running. For this reason we remain focused on the narrative as we 
pass through a changing landscape made up of  both animation and live action 
footage that has been shot in colour, black and white, and on comparatively 
grainy video. It is her unified movement, then, that ftnally ensures the 
continuous, linear unfolding of  the fIlm's virtual reality, games console narrative. 
In this respect, Lola Rennt is the movement-image par excellence, the indirect 
expression of  time measured across space that is created through the movement 
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The recourse to computer game analogy to 'explain' a triple narrative is echoed 
in a third recent film with a very similar narrative structure. This is the French 
film, Epouse-moi (2000). The most lighthearted of  the three films, Epouse-moi is 
a romantic comedy in which a woman called Oriane (Michele Laroque) 
approaches a fortune teller in order to fmd out what her future has in store. He 
gives her three possible alternatives, three views which he finds in his crystal 
ball. Again the narrative reaches its resolution in the third ofthe magical 
storylines. In this case, the possibility of  alternatives to reality are not seen as 
games you can play, but as magical daydreams, and the inevitability of 
actualized linearity is maintained in the film's third narrative, its happy ending. 
The same could also be said for Tom DiCillo's film, Living in Oblivion (1995) in 
which the three separate stories are excused as dreams within dreams, and the 
linear narrative drive maintained by the filmmaker, Nick's (Steve Buscemi) need 
to get the shot on film. Indeed, perhaps it is this need to get the shot, to get the 
film made, which is the most obvious reason why all these films, even the 
apparently BergsonianlDeleuzian, Sliding Doors, ultimately have such a 
recourse to linearity. The simplest of  all reasons why there are not more films 
like Resnais' classic time-image, L'annee derniere it Marienbad (1961) is that 
clear, linear narratives sell, whilst convoluted, labyrinthine time-images do not. 
This is obvious from the development of  the linear narrative form as dominant 
over all others within the short history of  cinema, witness the classical 
Hollywood style of  cinema based upon continuity editing, the action-image. 
Despite the recent advances in scientific thinking towards the Bergsonian 
conception of  time, the movement-image's maintenance of  the Einsteinian view 
of  time in the majority ofthese films would seem to suggest that, whilst the 
labyrinth now exists and is depicted in more films than ever before, our growing 
intuition of  the labyrinth has provided an equally strong urge to reterritorialize 
this potential within a manageable, linear time frame. This is an urge to 
reterritorialize that is as evident in Einstein's science as it is in the narrative's of 
contemporary films. These films with female leads, in fact, show the ability to 
use the suggestion of  the labyrinth in order to marginalize it as binary other, 182 
before ultimately returning to the straight line of  the narrative. In this way they 
uphold the linear narrative as nonn, and represent labyrinthine deviations from it 
as temporary departures from this norm. The labyrinth becomes a sort of  carnival 
inversion of  the straight line of  time. 
As Dentith has it, when describing Bakhtin's interpretation of  the carnival: 'it is 
best seen as a safety-valve, which in some overall functional way reinforces the 
bonds of  authority by allowing for their temporary suspension.  ,45 Acting as a 
temporary release, or 'safety-valve' after which we return to the linearity ofthe 
everyday, these films reduce the movement of  the actualization of  the virtual 
back to a binary choice between the actual and the virtual, the line and the 
labyrinth. Moreover, by making the actua~ reality, and the virtual, fantasy, they 
ensure the continuation ofthe actual at the expense of  the possibilities which the 
virtual could offer, it is was seen to be something which could effect reality. 
Although it initially seemed that there was a move afoot to conceive time in a 
Bergsonian fashion, Sliding Doors begins to seem increasingly like an isolated 
exception to a more conservative rule. 
In fact all these movement-images - whether Bergsonian, like Sliding Doors, or 
Einsteinian, like Lola Rennt - which self-consciously explore different 
conceptions of  time are themselves merely aberrations from the single, linear 
temporal norm of  "reality" itself. These films provide a glimpse of  the 
possibilities that could exist if  we were to consider time differently, but which 
are really only, we are told, games, fantasies, magical fortunes, or dreams. Again 
it is the image of  the clock at the beginning of  Lola Rennt to which we return, 
the pendulum which says that real time has stopped, and that although the hands 
continue to move, this is only really play time, carnival time, fantasy, or dream 
time. It is only a movie. 
In fact, these temporary glimpses of  the carnival are the legally sanctioned 
expression of  a deviation from the norm which has a long history in cinema. 183 
There would appear to be a minor tradition of  films which champion the female 
lead's seeming ability to utilize the labyrinth in order to make the past a different 
story. This includes, Maya Deren's Meshes of  the Afternoon (1943-59), Ciline et 
Julie vont en bateau, Sally Potter's Orlando (1992) and now also Sliding Doors, 
Lola Rennt and Epouse-moi. We could add to this list makeover movies which 
explore femininity as a role that is performed, such as Sabrina (1954) and Pretty 
Woman, and also films in which make  overs playa lesser role, perhaps as part of 
a broader exposition of  clothing and identity. Examples of  this type of  film 
include, Grease (1978), Dirty Dancing (1987) and Clueless (1995). However, 
with the possible exceptions of  Rivette's film, which we have already discussed 
at length, and also both Meshes of  the Afternoon, and Orlando - which are 
somewhat more complicated, and require a much deeper analysis  - in many of 
these films the falsifying powers of  the labyrinth which we are initially shown, 
are ultimately reterritorialized. In a variety of  ways, as we have already seen 
with the computer game analogy of  Lola Rennt, and the magical fantasy of 
Epouse-moi, all these films in fact fall within the much broader tradition of  films 
in which attempts by women to change their past are exposed as fraudulent, and 
are eventually punished by their reterritorialization within the straight line of 
time. 
The classic example of  this type of  film is Hitchcock's Mamie. In Hitchcock's 
misogynistic parable, Mamie, (Tippi Hedren) is a woman who performs her 
identity differently in order to falsify her past. To gain employment in 
respectable firms, without proper references, she creates a series of  fictional 
pasts. Once employed on the strength of  this, she proceeds to clean out the safe 
of  her employers. As a professional thief she carries a set of  fake identity cards, 
and regularly changes her appearance and the roles she performs by varying her 
costume, and dying her hair. The film concludes that this woman who breaks the 
law must be brought back to the realization of  her essential self, and the reality 
of  her past, by the masculine law imposed by her husband, Mark Rutland (Sean 
Connery). This is an action which both re-imposes linear time, and also secures 
an origin from which history can be seen to stem The origin of  her difficulty 
(which is shown to be psychological) is figured as the inevitable primal scene, in 184 
which it is revealed that she is responsible for taking a man's life. Through her 
working through of  the primal scene, typically, the past is realigned from the 
origin onwards, and her attempts to falsify time are seen to be the workings of  a 
psychologically damaged child whose loss of  memory is due to the trauma 
caused by a murderous act. At the end of  the film, realizing the fraudulent life 
that she has been living, she says: 'I want it all cleared up'. Thus, once 'cured' of 
her mental condition she desires that the past be realigned, from its proper origin 
onwards. This will allow her to accept her place within a heterosexual couple, 
giving the appropriate respect to the linearity of  the patriarchal law, that which 
she is guilty of  having broken with her initial flight into the labyrinth. Here a 
loss of  memory, or indeed, a traumatic denial of  memory, is seen as the origin of 
her attempt to perform her identity. In this way the labyrinth's power to falsify 
the past is reterritorialized as the loss of  an essential self, which becomes 
disguised, as opposed to the performing of  an identity which has no essential 
origin. 
II 
Please Step Back in Line, Ma'am. 
The reterritorialization of  the labyrinth into the line is the inevitable nemesis 
inscribed within any film which attempts to represent the positive potential for 
femininity of  the  powers ofthe false. In one form or another it must be othered, 
if  the linear, masculine time of  the law is to retain its control. Notably, even 
Sliding Doors, which, until this point, we have saved from criticism in this 
respect, is also marked by a reterritorializing force. In the abstract, if  we 
concentrate our analysis solely on the film's representation of  narrative time, 
brunette Helen's fate at the end of  the film seems extremely positive. Ifwe 
analyse Howitt's film in its national context, however, then this no longer 
appears to be the case. Moya Luckett, for instance, has shown that Sliding Doors 
is a New-Labour PR image of  a post-devolutionary Britain which: 185 
... attempts to find the truth of  the nation rest on supporting characters 
who all have strong regional identities (James is Scottish; Helen's best 
friend Anna is Irish; and her two-timing fiance, Jerry, is played by 
Irishman, John Lynch). This leaves a vacuum at the centre of  the nation: 
in a London where there are no native Londoners. This suggests that 
national identity is always elsewhere ... 46 
The host of  ,  British' characters, coupled with the nationality of  Helen, played by 
the American, Paltrow, thus expresses the 'elsewhere' of  English national identity 
as it is figured in the film. This is the reterritorialization which the film enacts 
upon its protagonists. It exists as an image of  a Blairite belief in both post-
devolutionary, and Transatlantic harmony, within Britain, in the wake of  the 
swing from an industrial manufacturing, to a services economy. In this way is 
the central importance of  London, in a nation whose regional industries and 
populations have suffered directly as a consequence of  the recent centralizing of 
wealth in the capital, disavowed. The nation now appears in miniature, its 
regional differences seemingly eradicated by an image of  economic unity and 
parity within the services industry. Moreover, Sliding Doors stresses the central 
position of  London as the major centre for the nation's services industry through 
its representation ofthe happy life of  blonde Helen as a self-employed PR 
consultant. 
Blonde Helen's self-creation, in fact, is shown to be at once at its most 
potentially Deleuzian, and, simultaneously, its most reterritorialized, when seen 
within this Blairite image of  London. Having received a small business bank 
loan, blonde Helen is shown decorating her new premises. In this scene we are 
shown a very clear expression of  the influence of  the individual on the city 
spaces they inhabit. Painting the walls of  the offices a light blue, blonde Helen is 
dressed in sweaters that match the emerging decor, ensuring that she seems to 
blend in with, or become along with the spaces she interacts with. She creates a 
Helen-office assemblage, as she makes herself  over into a new role, a new 
identity within the city. She is performing the role of  the self-employed Blairite 186 
ideal, and in so doing, helping to maintain the city of  London of  which she is a 
part. She begins to oscillate with the city, merging, or, becoming-indiscernible 
from it, as it from does from her. The performance of  identity within the city is 
thus coupled to the performance that is the city itself, its own identity within 
time. 
This is an approach to identity in the city which as informed the work of  both 
Jonathan Raban, in his book, Soft City, and Elizabeth Grosz, in Space,  Time and 
Perversion. Raban theorized the city as a space in which it was possible to 
become-other, and by so doing, create the city anew. He says: 
... at moments like this, the city goes soft; it awaits the imprint of  an 
identity. For better or worse, it invites you to remake it, to consolidate it 
into a shape you can live in. You too, decide who you are and the city 
will again assume a fixed form around you  .... Cities ... are plastic by 
nature. We mould them in our own images: they in their turn, shape us by 
the resistance they offer when we try to impose our own personal form 
on them. In this sense it seems that living in cities is an art, and we need 
the vocabulary of  art, of  style, to describe the peculiar relationship 
between man and the material that exists in the continual creative play of 
urban living.47 
There is a clear double movement evident here, between city and individual, 
both of  which are formed in this process of  mutual becoming. The amount of 
primacy which Raban grants to the individual is striking, as he reasons in his 
particularly Foucauldian way, that cities are the points of  'resistance' to our self-
creations. Having much in common with Foucault and Deleuze's ideas of  life 
lived as a work of  art, identity as performance, and style as all important, 
Raban's work, as Paul Patton has it, ensures that, 'the inhabitant ofthe 
(post)modem city is no longer a subject apart from his or her performances'. 
Consequently, 'the border between self  and city has become fluid,48. At the point 
of  time's splitting, the point at which you conceive of  yourself  as a stranger, the 
city similarly splits, its virtual potential becoming visible as it awaits actualization along with the individual, depending on the path through the 
, 
temporal labyrinth which their life will now take. Along with the myriad 
labyrinthine selves  personified by the Helens, there also exists an expanding 
multiverse of  cities within which are played out the infinite possibilities of 
Deutsch's quantum conclusions concerning chaos theory. 
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Elizabeth Grosz has a similarly Deleuzian conclusion concerning the city. In her 
piece, 'Bodies-Cities,49 she formulates the body of  the individual in a similarly 
reciprocal relationship with the city. She states: 
... there is a two-way linkage that could be defmed as an interface. What 
I am suggesting is a model of  the relations between bodies and cities that 
sees them, not as megalithic total entities, but as assemblages or 
collections of  parts, capable of  crossing the thresholds between 
substances to form linkages, machines, provisional and often temporary 
sub- or micro-groupings. This model is practical, based on the 
productivity of  bodies and cities in defming and establishing each other. 
It  is not a holistic view, one that would stress the unity and integration of 
city and body, their "ecological balance". Rather, their interrelations 
involve a fundamentally disunified series of  systems, a series of  disparate 
flows, energies, events or entities, bringing together or drawing apart 
their more or less temporary alignments.  50 
For Grosz, the body and the city are involved in a process of  mutual becoming in 
which they are constantly 'defining and establishing each other'. They create a 
mutually-forming assemblage, an interface between subject and city, as seen in 
Helen and the office environment she creates for herself 
Indeed, in the flashback in which brunette Helen gains intuition of  her multiple 
existence it is, noticeably, city spaces that she sees: the bridge, the diner, and the 
subway. These city spaces are the memories that defme blonde Helen's 
character, they are the places in which her flow through the city intersected with 188 
that of  James. That these spaces are used by the film to represent blonde Helen at 
this point, illustrates the way in which she has formed as an assemblage with 
these city spaces as she passed through them. Moreover, the way in which the 
powers of  the false are utilized by brunette Helen at the conclusion of  the film, in 
order to falsify her past, and ensure that her own future will be different, also 
ensures that the same action is performed upon, and by, the city itself In Sliding 
Doors the city is shown to be a temporal entity that, due to its assembling along 
with its inhabitants, contains the same labyrinthine possibilities as that of  its 
peoples. The life of  the inhabitants of  the city is represented as a temporal event, 
in which there exists a double becoming, both the becoming-city of  the Helens, 
and the simultaneous becoming-Helen of  the cities. 
Yet despite the particularly Deleuzian view of  identity, performativity, and 
mutually becoming assemblages which are evident in Howitt's film, it remains a 
carefully constructed, Blairite image of  a hip and happening 90s London in 
which services are the rightful domain of  the successful middle classes. 
Performative self-creation is advocated, then, only as long as it is in the service 
of  private enterprise. Moreover, this is sanctioned only as a performance which 
also enables London to grow. The reward for this specific type of  performativity 
is seen in the gentrified lifestyles which are then enabled by the city, those which 
we see being led by the film's protagonists. The film thus creates an unreal 
image of  London life, set amidst a gloriously gentrified city, by the side of  a 
river Thames which has become the site of  weekend leisure activities - witness 
James' rowing and good hearted, tipsy communal singing. It is a nightmare of 
blandness which lacks the satirical edge, or telling scenic contrasts employed in 
previous images which explored London's changing economic situation, such as 
The Long Good Friday (1979). Noticeably, the inverse, dark side of  the London 
services based economy is played out in the narrative of  the unhappy, brunette 
Helen, who, without the necessary fmancial support of  those in private 
enterprise, is doomed to a life of  wait  res  sing and sandwich delivery. This reterritorialization of  female performativity in the service of  the services 
industry also stretches to the global level. The two narratives are in fact 
representative of  the two lifestyles prevalent in London, the global city. As 
Saskia Sassen has it, in The Global City, there is a new economic disparity 
evident amongst the population of  London: 
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Major growth industries show a greater incidence of  jobs at the high- and 
low-paying ends of  the scale than do the older industries now in decline. 
Almost half  the jobs in the producer services are lower-income jobs, and 
half  are in the two highest earnings classes.  51 
This is exactly the polarity between the high and the low paid sectors of  the 
producer services economy which is explored in the double narrative structure of 
Sliding Doors. On the one hand, blonde Helen maintains her position within the 
higher end of  the income bracket. With a start-up loan from Lloyds bank, as part 
of  the Business Expansion Scheme, she sets up her own PR consultancy:firm, 
and thus establishes herself as a self-employed member of  the global economy. 
She provides a lucrative producer service. Brunette Helen, by contrast, is 
reduced to a position of  subservience to the more highly paid producer services 
industry. Unable to fmd a job which she is qualified to do her only option is to 
take a lower level wage, as a waitress. In order to make ends meet moreover, she 
fmds that she needs two jobs, as the cost of  living in the global city is so high. 
To this end she takes the position of  sandwich deliverer. 
The double narrative, then, makes it quite clear that the life lived by blonde 
Helen is the one which will bring happiness in the global city. Blonde Helen is 
her own boss, has a makeover, attends the opening of  a new restaurant, dates a 
charming 90s man, and spends her weekends in gentrified parts of  London. In 
general she enjoys the leisure that her new life in the global city offers her. She 
and London create a mutually beneficial assemblage. Brunette Helen, for her 
part, is not so lucky. We do not see her creating such assemblages with the city. 
She has to take two jobs in order to make ends meet, supports an idle two-timing 
boyfriend, and has to suffer the indignity of  being chatted up by restaurant 190 
punters who are not even attractive. This particular northerner is delivered by 
Howitt, who sends up his previous smooth, womanizing alter ego, Joey, from the 
TV series, Bread. She even has to face the ultimate humiliation of  being told off 
by her boyfriend's mistress, who fabricates a food poisoning scare. The 
gentrified bridge, diner and tube station of  blonde Helen's memory, then, are the 
map of  directions which the film provides for anyone wishing to live in London, 
glo bal city. This is the right route to take, the consequences if  you don't are not 
worth thinking about! 
Lola Rennt also evidences a tendency towards the creation of  an image of  Berlin 
as an emergent global city. As Claudia Mesch states: 
Run Lola Run recasts Berlin as a network of  fast connections, lines of 
uninterrupted movement, and productive output. It  is therefore perhaps 
not surprising that Twyker's idealised and embodied representation of 
Berlin as Lola has been po  litically appropriated as a convenient icon by 
the city's status quo: an icon of  the successful reconstruction and rewiring 
of  a united Berlin into a fast global broadband digital 
telecommunications network.  52 
The city which has been, as Mesch also points out, described as 'the single 
biggest  construction site in Europe,53 is thus re-envisioned by Tykwer's film, as 
a rewired city, ready for trade with the global 'digital telecommunications 
network'. As Manni's smuggling across the border into Poland illustrates, Berlin 
is a city that stands as a frontier post between the east and west. In order to 
facilitate trade between the old and the new world, the rewired Berlin has the 
ability to facilitate communication between old and new technologies. Much as 
Lola unifies the different media through which she runs, both old and new (black 
and white and colour) and high and low quality (film and video) are similarly 
brought together by the film's imagining of  an already unified, post-wall city. 191 
There is much more that could be said of  both London and Berlin's 
representations as global cities. Suffice it to say that, as expressions of 
contemporary urban life they show how our daily movements through 
incongruous city spaces are provided with continuity by our bodily forms. How 
else, as we are ferried from place to place by tube, bus, car, and plane, can our 
continuous, daily lives be made sense of  than as a measure oftime across space? 
They are also films which show us how to best survive in this era of  multi-
tasking, in which we daily deal with various different types of  media, and are 
often forced to juggle several different modes of  employment. In spite of  all our 
becomings, we are shown, we must retain, a sense oflinear progression, a sense 
of  singularity and continuity to our identity. It is through our reterritorializations 
within the Einsteinian model oftime, and such political narratives as those ofthe 
nation and the global city, that this is achieved. 
The one exception which proves the somewhat harsh rule of  these films is Pedro 
Almodovar's Todo Sobre Mi Madre (1999) in which the roles performed by the 
heroine, Manuela (Cecelia Roth) constantly refuse reterritorialization. At times 
nurse, cook, prostitute, actress, sister, personal assistant, and mother, her 
chameleon-like metamorphoses illustrate her ability to become-other 
interminably. It  is only the film's concentration of  the narrative on her personal 
life, however, which saves her from reterritorialization within a meta-narrative 
of  the national, or the global city. Rather, her performativity is used by 
Almodovar to debunk the unsavory, manipulative, cuckoo representation of 
performativity given by the earlier film he references, Joseph Mankiewicz's All 
About Eve (1950). In Almodovar's film, female performativity is not reduced to 
the disguising of  an essential self (in the style of  Mamie and All About Eve) but 
is rather shown to be a liberatory, positive venture. In fact, the film also explores 
the transgressions of  performativity enacted by transexuality, and its blurring of 
the essentialist, biologically determined roles usually ascribed by compulsory 
heterosexuality. Its narrative, moreover, with its harrowing deaths being matched 
by subsequent (re)births (witness Esteban the third) also seems illustrative of  the 
eternal return. That said, this is a very unusual film in this respect. As Sliding 
Doors and Lola Rennt show, by contrast, labyrinthine performative identity is usually only shown in relation to some form of  guiding (reterritorializing) 
political subtext. 
It  Was All a Dream. 
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The heterosexual coupling with which Sliding Doors ends - that which is seen 
even more obviously in Epouse-moi whose very title suggests its third narrative's 
culmination in marriage - is the clearest way in which a labyrinthine film will 
fmally return to a straight line. The major reterritorializing force is always the 
fmal reimposition of  the patriarchal law. In particular, this is seen in the age-old 
re-affirmation of  a heterosexual union, and the object ownership ofthe female. 
In recent films this reterritorialization of  female performativity has often 
occurred in narratives which initially seem to champion the consumption of 
clothing in the service of  feminine performativity. The controlling hand on the 
purse strings which allow this perforrnativity, however, is nearly always shown 
to be male. Although not as obvious as Hitchcock's now laughably kitsch 
Marnie, a recent example of  this is found in, Romy and Michele's High School 
Reunion. 
Romy White and Michele Lineberger (Mira Sorvino and Lisa Kudrow) are two 
hapless but happy inhabitants of  Los Angeles's Venice Beach community. 
Returning to their old high school for their ten year reunion, they, in the style of 
Mamie, decide to invent a falsifying past to replace their not so impressive real 
lives. Dressing in matching little black dresses, and giving the initial appearance 
of  being the epitome of  sophisticated L.A. career-woman chic, they attempt to 
recreate themselves as the inventors of  Post-It notes. Their inability to pull off 
such a hoax, however, enables the film to highlight its moral, that performative 
identity does not work, and the true route to happiness is through that old, 
essentialist cliche of, "just being yourself'. 193 
As they drive to the reunion, Romy and Michele quarrel over who was the 
inventor of  Post-It notes, and who the designer of  their yellow colour. Michele 
then falls asleep, and dreams a version ofthe reunion, in which they manage to 
pull off  the hoax. Michele intellectually dismisses their old school rivals, the 
cheerleaders of  'The A Group', Romy gets the man of  her dreams, as indeed does 
Michele, and they are both lauded by everyone there in an inverse 'King and 
Queen of  the Prom' ceremony. They  jointly win the vote for: 'The person most 
changed for the better since High School'. The rift in their friendship which the 
argument over who invented and who designed Post-Its caused, however, widens 
in the dream, and in a flash forward to '70 years later' we see the two women 
apart and unhappy, with their differences left unresolved. On waking, Michele 
realizes that falsifying their past is not worth the cost of  friendship, and it is she 
who explains to the upset Romy (whose cover has been blown, embarrassingly, 
in front of  'The A Group') that they will be better off  "just being themselves". 
When they begin to behave as themselves, they do, of  course, have a marvelous 
time, gain one over 'The A Group', and enjoy a terrifically happy ending. 
The message is clear, performing your identity and falsifying the past may be 
alright as a dream, but it won't work in reality. Moreover, it is even flawed as a 
dream, and will most certainly lead to the dissolution of  friendships as you will 
no longer be the people who were friends in the first place. That it is shown to be 
better to be yourself is the affirmation which the film provides of  the continuous, 
actual, self-same I of  the straight line oftime. Becoming-other, then, is not an 
option that will bring happiness, it is just a hapless daydream, a safety valve 
release mechanism, a film. The happy ending which Romy and Michele find 
once they return to themselves is the return to normality after the dream is over, 
and its lessons learned. It is the reterritorialization of  performativity, and 
becoming, back within the coherence and continuity of  being. Furthermore, 
through Michele's alternative vision of  the future of  her dream, the two possible 
endings to the drama are evoked in order to reinforce the legitimacy of  the 
singular line of  time when the narrative fmally returns to its singular trajectory, 
and provides them with the obligatory happy ending. 194 
That the labyrinth is thus equated with a dream is perhaps not all that surprising. 
Dreaming is, after all, conditioned upon the temporary sensory-motor suspension 
of  the sleeper. The dream state, that which threatens to enable the emergence of 
the time-image, then, is quickly reterritorialized by the movement-image into its 
binary other. Any possible ungrounding ofthe plane oftranscendence by its 
plane of  consistency is thus effectively marginalized. This was already true of 
the dream sequence of  Sherlock Jr. cited by Rodowick as a prime example of  the 
movement-image's unification of  spaces through subject. This sequence Deleuze 
also described as evidence of  the actualization of  the virtual, in a specific type of 
image (the 'dream-image') that worked similarly to the recollection-image. 
Whilst, as we saw in chapter two, the recollection-image is actualized in the 
present, in a circuit with the perception-image; the dream-image: 'becomes 
actual in a different image, which itself plays the role of  virtual image being 
actualized in the third, and so on to infinity; the dream is not a metaphor but a 
series of  anomorphoses which sketch out a very large circuit.  ,54 He further notes: 
In the dream in Sherlock Junior, the image of  the unbalanced chair in the 
garden gives way to the somersault in the street, then to the precipice at 
the edge of  which the hero leans, but in the jaws of  a lion, then to the 
desert and the cactus on which he sits down, then to the little hill which 
gives birth to an island battered by the waves, where he dives into an 
already snowy expanse, from which he emerges to find himself back in 
the garden.  55 
In the dream sequence in Romy and Michele's, similarly, Michele and Sandy 
Frink's journey passes effortlessly through a series of  impossible spaces, most 
noticeably from incredibly large limousine interior, through the sunroof, straight 
to their entrance through the doors to the school hall. In both instances the 
movement-image links together incommensurable spaces through the unifying 
figure of  the continuous, sensory-motor character, ensuring that the image 
remains at the level of  the actual, and that any danger of  a virtual slippage 
between the sheets oftime are negated. 195 
Perhaps most surprisingly of  all, David Lynch's recent offering, Mulholland 
Drive (2002) whilst appearing to play with issues surrounding female 
performativity and the labyrinthine model of  time, and whilst apparently 
avoiding the perils of  reterritorialization, can also be seen to illustrate the cliched 
format that, "it was all just a dream". Initially confusing, the film is actually 
deceptively simple, and predictably linear. Ifwe follow the interpretation given 
by critic Vicky Allen, in 'Driven Round the Twist,56, beginning with the shot of  a 
head hitting a pillow, signifying sleep, the first two thirds of  the film is one long 
dream sequence. After this Diane awakes, and experiences a series of  flashbacks 
as she remembers her breakup with her lesbian lover, Camilla, and her resulting 
decision to have her killed. Her dreams then begin to invade her waking life, 
specifically in the guise of  two tiny versions of  an old couple, who gain entrance 
under her apartment door, wave their arms in the air, scream maniacally and run 
toward her. At this point she goes insane, and commits suicide. For Diane, 
performing her identity differently, in this case being happy with her lesbian 
lover, is all a dream. In reality, Camilla chooses a heterosexual romance, 
noticeably with a film director, and Diane's only solution is to kill both her ex-
lover and herself 
The best we can hope for is that Lynch is consciously playing with this cliched 
dream format, and knowingly exposing the movement-image's 
reterritorialization of  female performativity. If  not, then we have yet another 
example to add to an ever growing list which also includes: Vertigo (1958), 
Heathers (1988), Thelma and Louise (1991), Single White Female (1992), The 
Net (1995), Stella Does Tricks (1996), Kiss or Kill (1997), Road Kill (2000), The 
Man Who Cried (2001), Heartbreakers (200) and Me Myself, I (2002). All of 
these are films in which female performativity is seen to create a temporary 
flight from, or disguise of, the essential self(the core self  to which the 
protagonist must eventually return): or which state that suicide is an inevitable 
consequence for anyone attempting to "lose themselves" in this way. 196 
We can easily see that the same reterritorialization has been enacted upon the 
two Helens of  Sliding Doors, who, at the end, are reduced back to one Helen, 
whose alternative life seems but a dream. In fact, the story of  the two Helens is 
equated more to a childish fairy tale than to a dream, through the appearance, as 
the reason for her inability to catch the train, of  a little girl playing with a doll. 
As the girl blocks Helen's path a tinkling sound reminiscent of  a fairy 
godmother's magic wand is heard on the soundtrack. The fantastical nature of 
events is further emphasized by the film's replaying of  Helen's encounter with 
the girl, backwards. As we see her impossible run back up the tube station stairs 
in reverse, there can be little doubt that we are seeing a magical happening. 
Rather than a serious exploration ofthe labyrinth, then, what follows is prefaced 
by these signifiers of  fantasy to warn us that we are about to enter a realm of 
magic. Sliding Doors is a Cinderella story in which Helen gets her prince only 
once she returns to where she started, as poor old brunette CinderslHelen. Her 
other existence, as alter-ego, blonde Helen, is thus shown to be a temporary role. 
Her makeover establishes that she is the one who "shall go to the ball" and her 
death ensures that at midnight she turns back into a pumpkin, brunette Helen. 
With the final dropped earring, the film's magic slipper, its happy ending is 
ensured through her meeting with her handsome prince, James. 
These films' reterritorialization of  female performativity through the 
dream/fantasy motif  also links their narratives to a larger theme, that of  male 
ownership. When we first see Romy and Michele they are watching a 
remarkably edited version of  Pretty Woman on the television, which they are 
laughing at and generally deriding. This scene is of  great importance in the film, 
however, as it provides the first hint of  their ultimate reterritorialization with 
which the film ends. The two friends discuss the scenes in which Julia Roberts' 
character, Vivian, is frrst refused service in L.A.'s finest clothes boutiques on 
Rodeo Drive. The film is then cut to enable us to immediately see the radical 
change in her fortunes once Edward (Richard Gere) accompanies her on her next 
shopping expedition with Gold Card in hand. In spite of  herself, Michele is 
slightly overcome with emotion at this point, and blubs: 'I just get really happy 
when they fmally let her shop'. Both the film and the film within the film are 197 
reterritorialized in a way that is alluded to in this brief opening, and also 
recapitulated at the end. As part of  her analysis of  the use of  fashion in cinema, 
Stella Bruzzi points out that the Cinderella tale found in films like Sabrina and 
Pretty Woman, is one in which the falsifying ofa woman's past through the 
changing of  her appearance and behaviour (i.e. through performativity) is 
ultimately reterritorialized through the commodification of  the woman that this 
also enacts. In Pretty Woman, although Vivian is able, through the changing of 
her appearance, to falsify her past as a hooker, and become a refined lady, she is 
effectively bought by Edward in the process. Bruzzi states: 
'"  what really makes Vivian 'pretty' (and this is the film's most 
potentially interesting comment on femininity) is her capacity to spend 
copious amounts of  money on clothes. It is significant though that the 
money she spends is Edward's. The traditional economic exchange 
between men and women when clothes are the currency is characterised 
by the man spending on behalf of  the woman in order to buy her. ... The 
supposed attraction of  this commodification of  women through clothes is 
exemplified by the Rodeo Drive spending spree sequence ...  57 
Romy and Michele's own film ends with a similar reterritorialization, as they are 
funded in their ownership of  the boutique, 'Romy and Michele'S', by Michele's 
new millionaire boyfriend, ex-High School dweeb, Sandy Frink. The 
heterosexual coupling with which Pretty Woman, and to a lesser degree, Romy 
and Michele's ends, emphasizes the ownership of  the woman which is used in 
order to reterritorialize her brief  liberation through labyrinthine performativity, 
bringing her safely back within the patriarchal law of  the straight line of  time. 
The ownership of  the boutique is only made possible through the wealth of  the 
man, ensuring that the site of  the potential for female performativity is a site 
sanctioned by the law. The law which, as Bakhtin knew so well, is able to 
control the people much more effectively, if  it gives them a little play time, a 
little time to dream. 198 
The struggle which all these films enact, then, is over the ultimate end to which 
female performativity should lead. As Charlotte Brunsdon has shown in Screen 
Tastes: Soap Operas to Satellite Dishes, whether filmic representations of 
female performativity which have earned the ambiguous label 'post-feminist' are 
actually positive or negative is a difficult question to answer. In the two 1980s 
'girls films,58 that she analyses, Working Girl (1987) and Pretty Woman, 
Brunsdon finds evidence not of  a 'post-feminist' backlash, or return to pre-
feminist ideals, but rather, representations ofa post-feminist woman who is seen 
to be: 
... much more like the postmodern feminist, for she is neither trapped in 
femininity (pre-feminist), nor rejecting of  it (feminist). She can use it. 
However, although this may mean apparently inhabiting a very similar 
terrain to the pre-feminist woman, who manipulates her appearance to get 
her man, the post-feminist woman also has ideas about her life and being 
in control which clearly come from feminism. She may manipulate her 
appearance, but she doesn't do it just to get a man on the old terms. She 
wants it alL  ... Exactly to the extent to which this persona is constituted 
through a desire to make it individually, it is a persona that can be 
accommodated within familiar ... western narratives of  individual 
success.59 
However, whilst these films advocate a knowing performance of  femininity, 
only so long as it is in order to obtain both man and 'individual success', this is 
with the proviso that the heroine is shown to have an essential core to their being 
that deserves the rewards garnered by its performances. Performance is fine as 
long as it is in the service of  the success of  the essential, core female. Characters 
whose performances are shown to hide nothing substantial, nothing essential, 
Brunsdon shows, do not fare so well. Thus she illustrates how these films utilize 
certain aspects of  their feminist heritage, but are 'post'-feminist in their ability to 
disavow this very heritage. 199 
As befits the movement-image, the most obvious reterritorialization of  female 
performativity in these films, then, is in the essentialism of  their characters. The 
organic form remains a strong unifying characteristic. In the 90s films we have 
examined, a similar movement is evident in the privileging of  the singular entity 
to which the labyrinthine narratives ultimately return. The Helen with which 
Sliding Doors' narrative concludes, after all, is the same Helen as that of  the 
film's beginning. The film remains, for this reason, one, singular, continuous 
narrative (that of  brunette Helen) with an additional, temporary variation in the 
plot line of  blonde Helen. As the film comes full circle in its ending, an essential, 
continuous, sensory-motor Helen is retained. Although temporarily deviating 
from herself she is fmally reconciled in her return to her point of  departure, her 
return to her essential self. Similarly, in Lola Rennt, despite its seeming 
labyrinthine narrative, the film's Einsteinian times are there to enable Lola's 
essentialist self  to remain true to itself, whilst she tries out (or tries on) different 
identity roles in a series of  fantasy scenarios. 
The "working girls" of  the 80s films analysed by Brunsdon are replayed in the 
90s as expressions of  the urban, national, and global ends to which female 
performativity can legitimately be applied. Certainly, with the exception of 
Almodovar's film, in these 90s films post-feminist performativity is seen to be 
directed towards the positive outcome of  obtaining both man and individual 
success. These aims are themselves, however, reterritorialized within their 
respective urban, national and global contexts. Performing femininity in order to 
attain both individual success and a man do seem to be the aim, but to what end 
are these goals then represented? In Sliding Doors, for instance, as was the case 
with Edward's Gold Card in Pretty Woman, the role of  the man in underwriting 
individual success is again emphasized. Helen, after all, only decides to become 
a self-employed PR consultant due to the prompting of  James. In her case, a little 
like in Romy and Michele'S, the right man for the post-feminist woman is 
thought to be the one who can help her to get the individual success she wants. 
This is what marks out the narrative with James as so different from that with 
Jerry. Perhaps Lola Rennt offers a contrast, the ambiguous fmal'AND THEN' 
created by Lola's bag of  money suggesting that she may not need Manni after all, 200 
now that she has the financial means to decide her own future. Even here, 
however, the goal could still be said to remain, man and individual success, 
reducing the ending to a question of  whether or not Manni is the right man for 
her now that she has gained individual success. 
No matter how seductive the image of  the liberated woman may initially appear, 
there always seems to be some way in which the labyrinthine powers which she 
evokes in the performance of  her identity are reterritorialized within the straight 
line of  time. The past is never falsified for long before a return to an essential 
self is ensured. Moreover, the retrenchment of  the performance of  femininity that 
the process of  narrativization highlights also works on a variety of  other levels. 
As we have seen it is strongly effected through the Einsteinian model of  time, 
but even when it is not (e.g. Sliding Doors) the national political, and global 
concerns of  the narrative still restrain female performativity to the obtaining of 
certain legally sanctioned ends. In a similar fashion, the heterosexual narrative of 
ownership ensures that the use of  clothing to perform a range of  different 
feminine roles is finally controlled by the man who own the clothes boutique. It 
is only a male sanction which enables female performance to deviate from the 
norm, and so it is never likely to be more than a temporary, controlled deviation. 
The movement-image equates female labyrinthine becoming with a dream state, 
a game fantasy, or film, in order to marginalize it in relation to masculine reality. 
This binary process, this reterritorialization of  a both/and into an either/or, is also 
something which works upon masculinity in a similar way. It is therefore 
necessary to tum to an analysis of  the recent portrayal of  men, in relation to time, 
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5. Don't Mess With Mr. In-between. 
The labyrinth oftime should be a neutral force in terms of  both gender and 
sexuality. It should provide the potential for both men and women to falsify their 
pasts, and, therefore, to perform their identities differently. Yet this is manifestly 
not the case in contemporary cinema. As we saw in the previous chapter, in films 
which seem to illustrate a labyrinthine existence for women, the liberatory 
possibilities made available through this type of  temporal existence are rapidly 
reterritorialized. This is usually achieved through the narrative's fmal return to 
the straight line oftime. The very idea of  the labyrinth oftime is thus 
immediately discredited as a passing fantasy, game, or dream. This chapter will 
concentrate on how this same tendency can be seen in relation to the cinematic 
representation of  men. It focuses on several films, emerging in the last decade, 
which foreground the functioning of  time in their narratives. These include, The 
Talented Mr Ripley (1999), Memento (2000), Possible Worlds (2001) and Liar 
(1997). The focus will be placed upon representations of  the labyrinthine 
performativity of  masculinity and their almost inevitable correlation with the act 
of  murder. 
Initially this chapter explores how attempts made by the protagonist of  Anthony 
Minghella's The Talented My Ripley, to assume the identity of  another, are 
equated with the closeting of  homosexuality. It  will be seen to be in this way that 
the film retains the belief in an essential self  that exists beneath all the masks of 
performativity. The film thus marginalizes both the labyrinth, and transgressive 
sexual performativity, as defming others of  the heterosexual norm. The 
flashback structure to the narrative, moreover, creates a straight line oftime 
which ensures that, although Ripley gets away with murder, his punishment is 
his inability to ever return to the lawful straight line of  history. Forever locked in 
the labyrinth, his essential self  is doomed to eternal misery. Christopher Nolan's 
Memento, for its part, initially appears to provide a contrast to this negative 
representation of  transgressive performativity.  Ultimately, however, it is yet 205 
another noir narrative in which the male protagonist's desire to become-other is 
shown to be tantamount to getting away with the murder of  the essential self 
Moreover, through its use of  flashback, this film also maintains a linear narrative 
time-scheme. Thus the binary reasoning evidenced by both films negate all 
possibility that labyrinthine performativity could be used positively by men. 
Finally, two other exceptional films will be examined, Possible Worlds, and 
Liar. Both seem to set out to critique the narrative reterritorializations evident in 
the above films. However, it will be shown, they too are unable to extricate 
themselves from the reactive forces ofthe straight line oftime. The reason why 
this is will be examined in the following chapter, which examines the political 
context within which these images are created. In particular, the difference 
between the movement- and the time-image's representations of  history will be 
discussed in relation to the changing global balance of  power after WWII. 
Getting Away With Murder. 
For Judith Butler, both gender and sexuality are social constructs. Male and 
female gender roles are not the effect of  an original sexual divide (man/woman), 
but rather, this illusionary origin is retroactively created through the continuous 
repetitions of  gender roles. Gender is a performance that, when its roles are 
repeated in the exact same manner, constantly re-establishes the accepted norms 
ofheterosexuality. In Imitation and Gender Insubordination she says: 
... heterosexuality must be understood as a compulsive and compulsory 
repetition that can only produce the effect of  its own originality; in other 
words, compulsory heterosexual identities, those onto  logically 
consolidated phantasms of  'man' and 'woman', are theatrically produced 
effects that posture as grounds, origins, the normative measure of  the 
real. 
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Our sexual identity is but the continual re-imposition of  a seemingly originary 
but actually illusory biological division, through the repeated playing out of 
established heterosexual gender roles. The creation and maintenance of 
compulsory heterosexuality is a causal process, with establishes an illusory fIrst 
cause in the organism. It  maintains its hegemony by ensuring its perpetual return 
in the same form. All attempts to perform these roles differently are immediately 
marginalized as other. The single, linear time  line immediately apparent in the 
construction of  the heterosexual division of  'man' and 'woman' ensures its 
contribution to chronological views of  history, and patrilineal reproduction, as 
the norm. 
Yet this construction of  gender, and indeed, sexual roles through a 'compulsory 
repetition' contains within it its own possible ungrounding. Just as the labyrinth 
exists as the ungrounding of  the straight line, so too does the repetition of 
difference perpetually haunt the repetition of  the same that is compulsory 
heterosexuality. Butler continues: 
... if  heterosexuality is compelled to repeat itself  in order to establish the 
illusion of  its own uniformity and identity, then this is an identity 
permanently at risk, for what if  it fails to repeat, or if  the very exercise of 
repetition is redeployed for a very different performative purpose? If 
there is, as it were, always a compulsion to repeat, repetition never fully 
accomplishes identity. That there is a need for repetition at all is a sign 
that identity is not self-identical. It requires to be instituted again and 
again, which is to say that it runs the risk of  being de-instituted at every 
interval. 
2 
Should the repetition of  the same which informs the straight line ever be made to 
stutter, to branch off into a repetition of  difference, then the straight line would 
begin to become a labyrinth. Consequently, the self  would now no longer be 
'self-identical', but becoming-other. The potential for the de-institution of 
identity Butler sees in willful attempts to perform identity differently. For, if 
sexual and gender roles are but theatrical roles that are legitimized through the 207 
repetition of  the same, then to play one of  these roles differently, is to unground 
the illusion of  the continuous, evolving self. The most obvious examples of  such 
a practice would be drag. For Butler, however, various homosexual 'styles' which 
function as stutterings of  heterosexual roles also qualify. These include, she 
argues: 'lesbian butch and femme gender stylization,3. In fact, the labyrinth of 
time whose powers of  the false these practices utilize in order to create a new 
personality, should, in theory at least, enable anybody to perform their identity 
differently, to take a new path in time, to return in difference. A heterosexual 
who performs their role differently can thus also be seen to begin to create a 
becoming-queer
4 of  their identity. 
The performance of  the self as becoming-other should be open to everybody, 
regardless of  their sexuality. As the singular line of  time contains the potential 
for its own ungrounding, that of  the labyrinth, performing one's identity 
differently should provide a possible new direction, for literally anyone, at any 
point in time. This view of  identity, however, as a Nietzschean copy of  a copy, 
without recourse to origin, seems to be a utopian dream. Undoubtedly this owes 
much to the strength of  the reterritorializing form of  the true, against whose 
reactive forces the powers of  the false must continuously struggle. Whether 
identity can be seen to be perpetually in the process of  actualization in this way, 
or as already actualized in a straight line, is the point of  contention which we 
will examine in relation to formations of  masculinity in the movement-image. 
Within cinema there is a long tradition of  films which examine the problems 
which arise when men attempt to perform their identity differently. More often 
than not this general tendency is situated around the uneasy line drawn by the 
law. On the one side lies the man involved in illegitimate operations. These 
include: the confidence trick, short or long term grifting, the sting, the scam, 
contract killing, all manner of  gangster activities, robbery and drug trafficking. 
On the other side there is the upholder of  the law, he who performs his identity 
differently only in an attempt to mingle in the underworld. This type is usually 
epitomized by the undercover cop, but could also extend to include the 208 
government backed spy or assassin, the one officially "licensed to kill". In 
Cinema 2, Deleuze argues that, with the time-image's realization of  the powers 
of  the false: 'the forger becomes the character of  the cinema.'5 His power to 
perform his identity comes directly from the labyrinth. He is: 
... the man of  pure descriptions and the maker of  the crystal-image, the 
indiscernibility of  the real and the imaginary ... he provokes undecidable 
alternatives and inexplicable differences between the true and the false, 
and thereby imposes a power of  the false as adequate to time, in contrast 
to any form of  the true which would control time.
6 
Deleuze charts the emergence of  the 'forger' in post WWII cinema as the hero 
par excellence. This emergent figure is used to support his belief  that truth has 
been placed in crisis by the powers of  the false due to his use of  the labyrinth's 
powers in order to falsify the straight line oftime. The positioning of  the role-
playing activities of  the forger around the question of  the law, however, ensures 
that even when a masquerading male is valorized, it is very often a character 
who is performing their identity in order to get away with murder. This is the 
case even though many of  these films specifically examine the hero's struggles 
as he tries to avoid crossing the line of  the law. The forger's emergence may 
illustrate the crisis of  truth felt on the movement-image's plane of  transcendence, 
but it is soon reterritorialized in order to  suture over this crisis. The Talented Mr 
Ripley is no exception. 
Minghella's film is the story of  a man who deliberately and willfully self-creates 
himself as another. The protagonist, Tom Ripley (Matt Damon) murders one 
Dickie Greenleaf (Jude Law) the son of  a rich American shipbuilder. He then 
proceeds to impersonate Dickie, using his passport, clothes, and bank account, in 
order to live the life of  a rich, young man of  leisure in 1950s Europe. It is, in 
short, the story ofa man who, by performing his identity differently, gets away 
with murder. 209 
The film also contains a queer subtext, that Ripley not only envies Dickie his 
wealth and status, but that he also desires him sexually. This desire for Dickie, 
who is himself engaged to Marge Sherwood (Gwyneth Paltrow) remains 
unfulfilled. Instead, Ripley's chance at happiness in a homosexual relationship is 
provided by the character Peter Smith Kingsley (Jack Davenport) who, sadly, 
Ripley is forced to murder in order to maintain his assumed, false identity. It is 
with this blow to Ripley that the film ends. Its final image is that of  Ripley 
sitting alone on his ship's bunk, with the closet door yawning open towards him 
with the movement of  the ship, as though beckoning to him to enter its confines. 
A charitable interpretation of  this film would be that it sets out to illustrate the 
way in which the social context, the rather conservative 1950s Europe through 
which Ripley travels, is the root cause of  his final unhappiness. During the 
investigation into the murder of  Dickie's friend, Freddie Miles (Philip Seymour 
Hoffman), for instance, Ripley is questioned by the police. One of  the questions 
he is asked is whether he is a homosexuaL This incident enables Smith Kingsley 
to comment that: 'Officially, there are no Italian homosexuals  ... makes Leonardo 
and Michelangelo very inconvenient.' The fmal image of  the closet then, would 
seem to suggest that it is the official denial of  homosexuality, that which 
necessitates the closeting of  Ripley's true feelings, and his consequent inability 
to be "out", which are to blame for his murderous actions. Smith Kingsley's 
comment about the denial of  homosexuality from official versions of  history 
would also seem to support this view. 
There is a degree, then, to which the film deliberately works as an exposition of 
the problems that arise when homosexuality is repressed. This charitable 
interpretation, however, seems somewhat problematic, as this is a film which, 
despite its possible merits, readily maintains the equation between homosexual 
desire and murder. There is a sense in which, although Minghella attempts to 
show that it is the sexual repression enforced by compulsory heterosexuality 
which leads to violence, Ripley still fits the Hollywood stereotype
7 ofthe homo-
cidal queer. Like so many before him, he is represented as preying upon the 210 
heterosexual populace. Thus, whilst the film deliberately addresses this 
exclusion of  homosexuality from official history, and the repression of 
homosexuality which this entails, in doing so, it actually becomes complicit in 
the same processes. This occurs in a number of  ways. 
In terms of  adaptation, although we do not wish to raise Patricia Highsmith's 
novel to the status ofan origin from which this, the second adaptation of  the film 
somehow deviates, the difference between the two texts is quite noticeable. The 
suggestion of  Ripley's queerness is only an undercurrent in the book. It features 
as an insinuation from Marge, something that the reader is left to consider as a 
possibility that Tom is perhaps denying to himself. Even this, however, seems 
doubtful, as Dickie is depicted by Highsmith as a rather dull and untalented 
person who it would be difficult to fall in love with. This is in stark contrast to 
the steely attractiveness ofMinghella's Dickie, Jude Law providing a much more 
plausible object of  desire. Certain events in the film, moreover, do not take place 
at all in Highsmith's story. Most noticeably, Tom's attempt to get into the bath 
with Dickie, his most overt sexual advance in the film, is added by Minghella. 
So too is the affair with, and murder of, Smith Kingsley. He is a minor character 
in the novel and there seems to be little indication that he is anything other than 
heterosexual. The reterritorialization of  Patricia Highsmith's Ripley which the 
film enacts is symptomatic of  the way in which movement-image narratives 
work to maintain the legality of  the straight line of  time. The equation of  the 
homosexual with the murderer, then, has broad ramifications when seen in 
conjunction with the time scheme used by the film. 
The film's narrative is linear, and posits its own first cause retroactively. It  takes 
a device often found in film noir, including Billy Wilder's classics, Double 
Indemnity (1944) and Sunset Boulevard, but which is also found in more recent 
films with noir characteristics such as Shallow Grave (1994) and American 
Beauty (1999). The film begins at the end, with the image of  Ripley on the ship's 
bunk, after killing Smith-Kingsley. It  then jumps to the "beginning", to the party 
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This particular narrative device posits a first cause from which all the events that 
then followed (the story as we watch it unfold) seem to have occurred inevitably. 
It is as though no other possible future could have been created, no other path 
through the labyrinth being open for Ripley to take. This plot structure works to 
create a singular, linear history that begins with a very defmite first cause, albeit 
a falsely posited one. Ripley's fate is sealed from the opening shot of  the film. 
We already know how the film will end, it is now just a case of  getting there. It 
is, as we saw in chapter two, the conventional use of  the flashback in order to 
maintain linearity8, causality, and indeed, the chronological view oftime upon 
which both history and the movement-image are based. It is also, as we saw in 
chapter three, the device used to re-align the correct, causal past with the present 
in The Sixth Sense. It works, moreover, in the same way as Butler describes the 
ontological consolidation of  'man' and 'woman' that is achieved by the 
compulsory, heterosexual repetition of  roles. By firmly establishing itself as a 
repetition of  the same, the narrative disavows any possibility that it could be 
ungrounded by the labyrinth's virtual becoming-others. 
The path of  Ripley's life is not something that ever contained the same 
labyrinthine possibilities that were available to the Helens of  Sliding Doors. 
Even though he is a person whose identity does seem to be the effect of  a 
performance in which he willfully becomes-other; in a particularly reactionary 
fashion the narrative structure condemns his desire to leave his allotted social 
and sexual role as the act of  getting away with murder. Although Ripley initially 
seems to be a good example of  performative identity, the positivity of  such a 
view of  the subject has its own negation inscribed within the film's very opening 
shot. The narrative forms a loop that closes on Ripley, rather like a trap set by 
destiny. As opposed to the joyful mobius in which Celine and Julie oscillate at 
the close and opening of  their film, Ripley is encircled by the film's bookended 
narrative, which becomes his closet. It is not the 1950s that causes Ripley's 
unhappy fate, then, but the film itself, which throws up the sumptuous 1950s 
leisured lifestyle of  the nouveau riches as a smokescreen to cover its own 
reactionary intent. In short, the flashback makes the unhappy ending that awaits 
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Both Ripley's performance of  his identity, and (as it becomes conflated with this) 
his homosexual desire, are shown to be against the "law". His actions are crimes 
against the patriarchal order. Director Minghella himself states: 
I was charmed by the idea of  a central character who could commit 
murder and get away with it. It's not that I enjoy the amorality of  that, I 
wanted to say that getting away with it is his punishment.
9 
The law that Ripley transgresses is precisely that of  linear time upon which, as 
Butler shows, heterosexuality is based. By attempting to become-other than he 
is, he creates a stuttering in the repetition of  the same which functions to 
maintain linear time, and ultimately he is punished for it. The murder that he gets 
away with, however, is not just that of  Dickie (and indeed, Freddie) but the 
murder of  his essential self Instead of  the loss of  self  in becoming-other being 
seen as the liberatory loss of  the self into selves, it is instead seen to be the 
murder of  an original self The mask of  false Dickie which he then dons becomes 
a mask which it is impossible for him to remove. There remains, however, an 
original identity beneath this mask, that of  the ever suffering Ripley, the 
essential self  that he has murdered through masquerade. Thus, Ripley's leaving 
of  his allotted sexual and social position, his attempt to become-other, will create 
its own punishment, and ensure his eventual incarceration as binary other, as 
false Dickie. This will also ensure, the film's moral informs us, his inability to 
live a life that may have brought him happiness, with gay lover, Smith Kingsley. 
The homophobia ofMinghella's take on Highsmith's novel, then, is evident in its 
formal construction. Minghella's film implies that to stray from the original self 
is not to become-other, but to create a bad copy. This is the case whether it is a 
murderer who assumes the identity of  another, or a homosexual, both of  which 
are now, ultimately, the same "act". To willfully perform so as to create a 
repetition in difference is to murder the singular, unchanging (i.e. repetition of 
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the deviation from the singular path oftime, into the labyrinth, is through 
homosexual transgression, or the masquerade of  innocence adopted by the 
murderer. The potential of  the ungrounding labyrinth is thus reterritorialized as 
illegal other by, and to, the straight line of  time. The Nietzschean character 
created by Highsmith, the man who can quite literally get away with murder, 
here has his amorality retrenched within a seemingly sympathetic, but ultimately 
negative allegory for homosexuality. As Charlotte O'Sullivan
10 notes in her 
review of  the film, the work of  the author who gave us The Price a/Salt (1952)-
perhaps the first novel in which a gay couple are allowed a happy ending - is 
recreated for the cinema as the moral tale of  a transgressor who finds himself 
punished by his very act of  transgression. For this reason, whatever good 
intention Minghella may have had seems negated by the opening and closing of 
the film's narrative. This is a film which expresses perfectly the fear of  a 
heterosexual culture facing the possibilities that lie at its own heart, its own 
queer unthought, its own becoming-queer. 
The soundtrack which accompanies the opening shot of  Ripley adds a Biblical 
dimension to his murder by equating it with the story of  Cain and Abel. Over the 
image of  Ripley on his bunk we hear: 
From the silence, from the night, 
Comes a distant lullaby. 
So surrendering your soul, 
The heart of  you not whole, 
For love, for love, 
Walk tall. 
Cast into the dark, 
Branded with the mark, 
Of  shame, Of  Cain. 
The song firmly places Ripley as an outsider to social, legal norms. He is the 
binary other, the criminal, the sinner. It also aids the conflation of  the murderer 
with the homosexual. The song signals that, as murderer, committing crimes 214 
against civil law, Ripley is excluded, cast out into the 'silence', and the 'night'. 
These are also the states which serve to justify the existence of  the divine Word, 
and the divine ("let there be" day-) light, as norm. The surrendering of  his soul 
further places his project on the side of  evil, the selling of  one's soul to the devil 
in order to gain life. In this case, of  course, life as another. Finally, his likeness 
with Cain is his mark of  eternal wandering without punishment, his getting away 
with murder. The song's subtext, moreover, adds that as homosexual, his phallic 
act of  killing his brother is also a sin against divine law. The divine punishment 
which this sodomy entails is his wandering forever as an outcast from society, 
branded with the mark of  shame. It is this which must be forever disguised, or 
closeted, his sin against the heterosexual brotherhood. 
In fact, in a grotesque parody of  the love which dare not speak its name (or in 
this case, show its marked face) when Ripley eventually strangles Smith 
Kingsley he is lying face downwards beneath Ripley. This is the only murder in 
the film which we are not shown, although its violence is far less disturbing than 
that of  the other two murders. Both Dickie and Freddie, by contrast, are shown 
being beaten about the head until they are dead. It  is not the violence which 
makes this image taboo, it would seem, but rather the position in which it is 
committed, that of  anal penetration. Indeed, the image which immediately 
follows further conflates homosexuality with murder and divine retribution. 
Ripley is finally pictured sitting alone on his ship's bunk. His sex life as a 
homosexual is shown as ultimately unfulfilled, his punishment for straying from 
the heterosexual path being that his bed contains only himself, 'silence' and 
'night'. In this way his preferred sexual practice is seen to be the reason for his 
downfall. Moreover, it is a bed that is not his own, his transitory wanderings 
adding to the image of  his damnation. Once again, a potentially positive, 
nomadic wandering appears instead as a punishment, his casting out into the 
dark of  night. 
Either way, as murderer, or homosexual, within the binary reasoning of 
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the essential, heterosexual notion of  the self This he commits through 
attempting to become-other, and thus murdering the singular form of  being. 
Symbolically, the homosexual Ripley, positioned outside oflinear history 
through his exclusion from patrilineal reproduction, acts as the destroyer of  the 
'Greenleaf family tree. The pun on the family name, seemingly with satirical 
intention from Highsmith, thus becomes literal in Minghella's film. It  both warns 
us of  the loss of  history should such devious actions of  sexuality go unpunished, 
whilst also stressing the guilt inherent within deviations from accepted 
heterosexual, male, performances. Mr Greenleafs occupation, that of  ship 
builder, further emphasizes what is at stake in the loss of  patrilineal progression, 
the loss of  western history itself. The tradition of  shipbuilding, with its roots in 
mercantile trade, and its use in the maintenance of  colonialism, is itself complicit 
in the creation and maintenance of  the luxurious lifestyle in which Dickie and 
friends all indulge. Indeed, the scene in which Ripley meets Mr Greenleaf in his 
ship yard firmly conflates his trade and his family line, as in the background to 
the meeting we see, in huge letters, the word, 'Greenleaf emblazoned on his 
fmn's buildings. Both family name and company name, its lineage and its 
capitalist heritage are shown to be  threatened by the actions of  patrilineal 
cuckoo, Ripley. 
The appearance of  the closet in the closing sequence also deserves close 
attention. Yawning and beckoning to Tom, its steel hangers clanking in a way 
that can only be meant to suggest chains, the image of  the closet illustrates the 
punishment which awaits the transgressor. As Minghella states, Ripley's crime is 
also his punishment, and, guilty of  donning the mask ofhetero-Dickie, he must 
remain forever closeted within his false identity. The closet provides what Eve 
Sedgwick calls the 'double bind,ll from which Ripley can never escape. His 
attempt to escape its clutches when he takes on the role of  false Dickie merely 
ensures that he enters an even bigger closet. As Butler further comments, there is 
a Kafka-esque inevitability to the guilt of  the homosexual: 
... one comes out a/the closet ... but into what? ... the room, the den, 
the attic, the basement ... some new enclosure whose door, like Kafka's 216 
door, produces the expectation of  a fresh air and a light of  illumination 
that never arrives? Curiously it is the figure of  the closet that produces 
this expectation, and which guarantees its dissatisfaction. For being "out" 
always depends to some extent on being "in"; it gains its meaning only 
within that polarity. Hence being "out" must produce the closet again and 
again in order to maintain itself as "out." In this sense, outness can only 
produce a new opacity; and the closet produces the promise of  a 
disclosure that can, by definition, never come.  12 
Whilst performativity should be concerned with taking clothes out of  the closet 
and trying them on, as potentially role defining, in Minghella's film it becomes 
instead the donning of  the closet itself This is the process through which we 
watch Ripley proceed, in which, instead of  a metamorphosis of  self, we see his 
attempt to escape create an even bigger closet. From queer Ripley inside 
seemingly normal Ripley, we move to Ripley (now all the way queer) within 
seemingly normal Dickie. It  is at this point, of  course, that the sticky situation 
with Meredith Logue (Cate Blanchett) occurs, in which his hetero-impersonation 
demands that he kill Smith Kingsley ifhe is to maintain his mismatch disguise. 
In this way the binary of  inside and outside is also maintained by the film, 
ensuring Ripley's inability to ever escape through the performance of  the self-as-
other. 
If  we return to our charitable interpretation, in this way the film could be seen as 
an allegory for the way in which the closet works to perpetually isolate Ripley. 
However, the fact that it also works to ensure that male attempts to perform 
identity differently are seen as both disguise and perpetual incarceration, rather 
than as escape, detracts somewhat from this interpretation. Through the binary 
reasoning of  the law, to be "out" is dependent upon still being "in", ensuring that 
Ripley is constantly on the run from his guilt before the law. Essentially he can 
never get away with murder, even when he does get away with it. Thus the 
image ofthe closet in Minghella's film illustrates the 'disclosure that can ... 
never come' when performative identity is reterritorialized within a heterosexual 
binary of  model and false copy. 217 
The closet also foregrounds the role of  clothing in the theatrical game of 
performing identity differently. At the very start of  the film, Ripley, sitting alone 
in his cabin and facing the closet, is heard to say: 'IfI could just go back, ifI 
could rub everything out, starting with myself, starting with borrowing a 
jacket  ...  '. Immediately after this we cut to the first cause of  the narrative, his 
meeting with Dickie Greenleafs father, whilst wearing the borrowed jacket of  a 
Princeton graduate. Ripley's wish, that he can eradicate the past, is exactly what 
performative identity should enable you to do. In fact, using the labyrinth to 
make the past that was not-necessarily true, to rub everything out, to rub out the 
past selfas direct cause of  the present self, was exactly what Highsmith's novel 
enabled Ripley to do. Yet this act of  self-creation through falsifying the past is 
seen instead by Minghella's film in Ripley's wish to annihilate the past, different, 
performance of  the self, rather than end up where he is now. Better to go back to 
the smaller closet, the film argues, than break the law, wear the jacket of  another, 
and enter an even bigger one. 
Instead of  becoming liberated from the previous self, it is the maintenance of 
this self  behind the performative mask which depresses Ripley so. In Minghella's 
terms, Ripley's punishment is that: 'He can never be like he is,13. This is an 
almost tautological statement which, although seemingly sympathetic to the 
necessity for Ripley to live in the closet, is also illuminating in that it is 
predicated upon the seemingly indisputable fact that beneath every mask, every 
borrowed jacket, there remains an original self. If  this is the case, masquerading, 
or becoming-other is simply the creation of  a prison for the self, from which it is 
impossible to escape. It is to create a mismatch between the essential self  and its 
appearance. Indeed, for Minghella, it would seem that it is better never to have 
existed than to live like this. The idea that all a person is, is determined by their 
performance, is thus dismissed. When seen from within the binary reasoning of 
the movement-image, the 'disclo(the)sure' that can never come is a torment, 
rather than a possible route to freedom through becoming-other. 218 
The distinction between the real and the bad copy which the film upholds is 
further evident in the sequence in which Ripley is caught by Dickie whilst trying 
on one of  his jackets. Ripley, seemingly 'like he is' for once, cuts a particularly 
effeminate figure, in dress jacket without trousers, dancing with hat and cane to a 
popular song. Caught in the act of  being himself  (of  course, we know this to be 
not an "act", but Ripley actually being "himself') Ripley hides behind a full 
length mirror, his head peeking over the top, but the rest of  him hidden. Dickie, 
however, is reflected in full in the mirror, trousers and all. In contrast, Ripley 
appears a partial man, a bad copy of  the real thing, whose sexuality is also seen, 
by comparison, to be that of  one caught, guiltily enjoying the pleasures of 
another's identity, whilst being unable to fully fill his heterosexual trousers. 
Dressing up, or masquerading should be one of  the positive ways in which the 
obliteration of  the self  into a procession of  simulacras, of  copies without 
originals, is made possible. In this case, however, Ripley's regret over the jacket, 
as well as over the past, is something that he is morally burdened with due to the 
constraints of  linear time. Donning the jacket of  someone else, attempting to 
become-other, the noir temporality illustrates, was both the first cause of  his 
downfall, and his fmal punishment. It is for this reason that Minghella's 
statement concerning Ripley, that; 'He can never be like he is', stands in such 
stark contrast to Rimbaud's statement; 'Je est un autre',14 that is appropriated by 
De1euze in order to explain his theory of becoming-other. Minghella clearly 
assumes an essentialist self, what Ripley is, the disguising of  which causes his 
terrible punishment. To be like he is, is now impossible due to the mismatch of 
disguise and essential self Becoming is here not shown to be the liberatory loss 
of  the self  in the labyrinth, the 'I is another' of  Rim  baud, but rather the loss, or 
lack (in a binary sense) of  being and originality. Ripley's unhappiness is due to 
his masquerade's obscuring of  his essential self 
As Ripley says to Smith Kingsley, just prior to murdering him, 'I'm lost'. The 
Biblical damnation which he faces is that of  a man who has lost his I, his essential self: his surrendered soul. In line with Butler, and to bring the film 
back, once more, to its start, he further states: 
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'I'm gonna be stuck in the basement aren't I, aren't I? That's my terrible 
...  all alone in the dark, and I've lied, about who I am and where I am and 
now no oneIll ever find me. I always thought it'd be better to be a fake 
somebody than a real nobody.' 
The 'fake somebody' that he has become leaving the 'real' Ripley to his 
unmentionable ('my terrible ...  ') fate, that which literally cannot speak its name! 
The basement, the darkest of  subterranean closets is where we first fmd Ripley at 
the start of  the film, creating himself: as he listens to jazz records, polishing his 
shoes and dressing in shirt and jacket to travel to Italy. A dream or passing 
fantasy for femininity, for homosexuality the labyrinth is a closet, a basement, a 
prison. When he returns to the closet at the end of  the film, its door swinging 
shut on him, he has come full circle, and despite all his attempts to become-
other, he has never really left the closet. Earlier in the film, in conversation with 
Smith Kingsley, Ripley evoked the image of  the basement, this time as a locked 
and dark place in which the past is stored; complete with demons and the truth of 
all his evil doings. In this film, the past is not something from which you can be 
liberated, it cannot be made contingent, it is the cause of  everything that you are 
now, in the present. The past of  linear time is, for the man who tries to cheat 
time by performing his identity and evoking the powers of  the false, also the 
closet into which he will repeatedly be closed. There is no escaping it, no getting 
away with this "act" of  murder. 
Finally, a typical noir use of  voice  over hammers home the final nail in the 
homosexual's coffm. As Richard Dyer points out of  voice  over in film noir, it 
serves to illustrate the inevitable fate of  the film's protagonist: 
The end is known to the voice-over from the beginning even if  not 
always to us, and all the events can be seen as leading inevitably, 
inexorably, and gratuitously to it.I5 220 
In Minghella's film, Ripley's voiceover is also instrumental in its maintaining of 
the binary between the real and the simulacra. It enables us to hear his "inner" 
thoughts, and thus stresses the existence of  a "real" Ripley under the mask of 
false Dickie. Charlotte O'Sullivan states succinctly: 
By combining sex with an unhappy ending and a contrite beginning ("If  I 
could just go back. .. " intones Tom) Minghella more than satisfies 
mainstream requirements.  16 
Through its combined use of  flashback, images of  the closet, and its binary 
maintaining voiceover, the ftlm effectively reterritorializes Ripley's becomings 
into a trapped form of  being. It now seems extremely doubtful that Minghella's 
film is, as we could previously hope, a purposeful deconstruction of  the 
stereotypical, "punish the homosexual" ending. Straight lines oftime, we are 
shown, are for straight men. The homosexual cuckoo who tries to live in this 
time cannot help but be unhappy. 
The Talented Mr Ripley shows how the potential for change created by the 
becoming-active offorces which queerness puts into play is always prey to the 
reactive forces of  homophobia, racism and heterosexism. The movement-image's 
narrative reterritorializations illustrate the way in which the agency of  the 
homosexual subject is  always placed under erasure. As Elizabeth Grosz points 
out: 
Where active forces affIrm, produce, and stretch, reactive forces judge, 
pontificate, produce ideologies and modes of  explanation, devise 
ingenious theories, compromise. They can be identified with the 
production of  religion, morality and law, with the systems constrained to 
endless reproduction of  the same, without affIrming the infInite nature of 
chance, change and transformation.  17 221 
Guilty of  crimes against 'religion, morality and law', Ripley's attempt to utilize 
the labyrinthine powers of  the false, is 'judged' by Minghella, and 
reterritorialized within the repetition ofthe same ofthe movement-image's linear 
narrative. Any queer stuttering of  the heterosexual norm is thus denied. The 
reactionary move of  punishment which is performed upon Highsmith's novel 
illustrates perfectly the way in which the struggle over the past is played out 
between the ability to creatively falsify, to create a future yet to come by making 
the past contingent; and the policing of  this action which the movement-image 
enacts. In this process, moreover, history establishes the validity of  the singular, 
non-contingent past, through the placement of  a retroactive origin. This becomes 
the cause from which all proceeding events are deemed to have followed.
18 
Although the figure of  the forger is evident in Ripley, his positive action, the 
creation of  the self in difference, is easily reterritorialized by the movement-
image. It  becomes instead a binary negative, a loss of  self. From the creation of 
the sel£: as a copy of  a copy, or multiple sel£: we inevitably return to the loss of 
self, self-deceit, and the bad copy of  the essential original. Thus the ungrounding 
force of  the labyrinth, the powers of  the false, constantly emerge in cinema only 
to be reterritorialized by the reactive forces of  the movement-image. It  is this 
same process, after all, which maintains history, compulsory heterosexuality, and 
patriarchal dominance. This is a theme that is given a slightly different spin in 
Memento. 
Habitual Criminal 
Memento is the story of  Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) a man obsessed with 
fmding and killing the murderer of  his wife. The only problem is, he has a 
chronic case of  short-term memory loss. Being unable to make any new 
memories, Shelby can only retain information concerning the present for a very 
brief  time. As he is unable to recall anything that has happened since his wife's 222 
death he lives much of  his life following clues that he has left for himself in the 
past. 
Again we are faced with a film that on the surface appears to be about the 
potential for masquerading, for performing identity differently, and, again, it is a 
film in which this positive trajectory is represented as getting away with murder. 
Credited by Sight and Sound reviewer, Chris Darke as 'A new spin on noir,19 
Memento is a film which initially appears to have broken out of  the mould of  the 
bookending flashback tradition, but which, on closer inspection, actually affirms 
the straight line of  time through its narrative construction. On first viewing, the 
film appears to be the story of  a man who falsifies the past, and who, by making 
it not necessarily true, lives his life through the performance of  a series of  roles. 
Shelby's life appears labyrinthine, and his identity, self-consciously 
performative. The narrative of  the film, moreover, appears to work in the same 
way, starting at the end, and then realigning events backwards across time, in 
order to explain how we reached the film's beginning, and the narrative's end. 
Neither the time of  the narrative, nor that of  Shelby, however, is quite what it at 
first seems. 
Although initially appearing to be a film which realigns time from the present 
backwards, it is actually a film which only appears to be different on first 
viewing, as it is so confusing. In point of  fact it still works within the loose 
parameters of  the traditional noir flashback structure, creating a retroactively 
posited false origin in order to reterritorialize identity within the singular, 
continuous being of  the movement-image. It  is, exactly as Darke says, a new 
spin on noir, but it is only that. It  is a new way of  illustrating the same process 
which we saw at work in Minghella's film; a novel way of  exposing the 
liberatory possibilities made possible by the labyrinth oftime, whilst 
simultaneously reterritorializing them so as to privilege the straight line of  time 
and the essential self. 223 
We shall examine Shelby frrst. Shelby's persistently recurring lapses of 
concentration ensure that his past appears to be constantly in the process of  being 
palimpsestically overwritten. In order to cope with his inability to make new 
memories, and to enable him to deal with both day to day life, and the 
investigation of  his wife's death, Shelby leaves a series of  messages for himself. 
These concern the identities of  the people around him, and the facts of  his 
investigation as it proceeds. They take the form of  notes on paper, on the backs 
of  photographs of  people and places, and as tattoos on his body. Due to his 
constant lapses of  attention, everytime he reads one of  these notes, it is as though 
for the first time. It  is rather like he is receiving a time-capsule message from an 
altogether different person from the past, which is, of  course, exactly what is 
happening. In effect, each time he reads a message he has become a different 
person, due to his loss of  memory, and the consequent falsifying of  the past this 
enacts. 
The film uses this bizarre situation in order to show the impossibility of  either 
recording or representing truth, or facts, historically. In the black and white 
sequence which dominates much of  the first half of  the film we see Shelby 
tattooing FACT 5 onto his leg. In the process of  doing so, however, he receives a 
number of  misleading phone calls. As a result, he changes his initial tattoo of; 
'Access to drugs' to, 'Drug Dealer'. The misinformation which leads him to this 
conclusion, however, will be forgotten the next time he reads the tattoo, which 
will seem to be an undeniable, historical fact. In this way the film foregrounds 
the fact that all history is an illusion which can only be legitimized, or falsified, 
in retrospect. All pasts are, we are shown, not-necessarily true. 
Shelby also constructs, often on the spur of  the moment, probable causes which 
seem to him to be extremely plausible reasons for the present situations he fmds 
himself in. The validity of  the narratives that he spins in order to explain his 
present situation however, is something which he has no way of  knowing. He 
has become extremely adept at lying to himself in this way, having mastered the 
creative forgetting that enables becoming-other. For instance, after the murder of 224 
drug dealer Jimmy Grants, Shelby adorns himself in Jimmy's clothes and drives 
away in his expensive looking Jaguar. Then, slightly later in the narrative, 
having lost all memory of  killing Grants, it becomes evident that Shelby has no 
idea that he is wearing a dead man's clothes, or that his sudden appearance in 
designer clothes is out of  the ordinary. When Teddy, who knows exactly what 
has happened, asks him where he thinks he has got the money from for such an 
expensive lifestyle, he immediately creates a fictional cause: 'I have money ... 
from my wife's death, I used to work in insurance, we were well covered.' 
Shelby instinctively creates a time line which explains his present situation, 
thereby making the events that actually led to his current situation, not-
necessarily true. Even though the falsifying of  the past in this film is seen, as it 
was in The Talented Mr Ripley, as something that ultimately enables the 
protagonist to get away with murder, it does still seem to be a very clear 
expression of  the ability to falsify the past that the labyrinth ensures. In this 
respect the film might be said to have more in common with Sliding Doors than 
it does with Minghella's film 
The film also appears more positive in its seeming denial of  the existence of  an 
essentialist self, and its continuity of  being as a repetition of  the same. One of  the 
tattoos on Shelby's arm, containing information about the killer, reads: 'FACT 3: 
FIRST NAME: JOHN'. This seemingly irrefutable fact, however, is something 
that has become, at some point in the past, subject to scrutiny. Consequently, it 
has been revised. Underneath, in Shelby'S own amateur hand, a tattoo has been 
added that reads, 'OR JAMES'. In the labyrinthine life of  Shelby, even facts as 
irrefutable as someone's name are changeable. More importantly, the changed 
tattoos show that the organic form is also capable of  lying. There is no longer a 
belief  in a fixed, essential, continuous organism, just a perpetually shifting flux 
of  matter. The body is a becoming surface that changes through time, being 
palimpsestically rewritten in the process. 
Again, this is illustrated by the incident in which the femme fatale, Natalie 
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her in the face. She is then able, once Shelby's memory has lapsed, to use the 
scars he has given her to manipulate the unsuspecting Shelby into ridding her of 
Dodd. It is he that she says is to blame for her bruised and cut face. In Memento, 
the body appears to be theorized as a boundary, forever in the process of 
becoming as it is written upon, and palimpsestically falsified. The primacy of  the 
biological organism, so beloved of  the movement-image due to its capacity to 
create and maintain the binary of  a separate inside and outside, subject and 
world, is here seen to have lost its currency in its encounter with labyrinthine 
time. 
The film also deliberately foregrounds the belief  that there is no singular, 
identical identity to the subject, only becoming-other, the self as a repetition in 
difference. Responding to Shelby's repeated attempts to assert the fixity of  his 
identity; 'I'm Leonard Shelby, I'm from San Francisco', Teddy replies; 'That's 
who you were. You do not know who you are, what you have become ...  '. As 
Shelby himself  realizes when he begins to willfully deceive his future selfby 
dressing in the clothes of  the murdered drug dealer, Jimmy Grants (and again as 
he substitutes his picture of  his pick-up truck for that of  his newly acquired 
Jaguar, which he marks, 'MY CAR'), identity is in fact, a process of  becoming-
other, of  masquerading. In this process, the past, and indeed, the past self, both 
become contingent. Who you are is who you are becoming, not who you were. 
From this reading of  the film, it would seem that, despite the murders which 
Shelby uses his becoming-other to get away with, Memento at least allows the 
protagonist the liberty which is not given to Ripley. Shelby appears to have 
access to the positive aspects of  the labyrinth oftime. If  this is the case, one 
could almost forgive the cliched getting away with murder narrative. However, 
in the true spirit of  the noir, on closer examination it becomes clear that 
everything is not as rosy as may at first appear. 
The film's narrative also works to reterritorialize Shelby's labyrinthine 
performance of  his identity, within its linear schema. Although it initially seems 
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which the film acts to retrench the events of  the narrative within a binary logic, 
and a linear view of  time. 
The film begins with the fading out of  development of  the photograph Shelby 
takes of  Teddy's body, after killing him. This is the end of  the film's narrative. 
The film then begins to play backwards, the photo sliding back into the camera, 
blood off  the walls back into Teddy's head, the bullet back into the gun, and 
fmally, Teddy back to life. The opening sequence is used in order to acclimatize 
us to the way in which the narrative will now proceed, the film playing 
backwards in a series of  colour episodes, each one of  which ends with the same 
event as that which began the previous episode. The narrative thus unfolds 
before us as a sequence of  events played in reverse order. It would seem as 
though the line oftime which the narrative constructs is, as Shelby's memories 
are, always realigning itself, from the present backwards. However, this is 
patently not what is happening, and this novel way of  showing the narrative is 
actually only the continual retroactive imposition of  a series of  causes for the 
events which we have just seen occur. Thus the narrative gains its consistency 
from its retroactive linearity, in which the past is definitely that which causes the 
present which we have already witnessed. For this reason, any possibility of  a 
contingent past to the film's narrative is also negated. In effect, the film is 
constructed as the playing out of  a series of  flashbacks that provide the narrative 
with its retroactive logic. Again, unlike the mob ius looping with which Rivette's 
film concludes, with the narrative's circle beginning again in difference, the 
cycle of  each narrative episode in Memento always completes itselfby beginning 
again in an identical manner. The film's narrative creates a single, continuous, 
linear timeline, which is established through the repetition of  the same events, 
only, due to its new spin, backwards. 
Furthermore, each of  these narrative episodes is interspersed by a small part of 
the  black and white sequence in which Shelby, in his motel room, talks to 
Teddy on the telephone about Sammy Jenkis. This sequence is the originary 
moment ofthe narrative, the point at which the story begins. It is also this 227 
sequence which provides the noir bookending to the narrative as the colour 
episodes play backwards until they meet the black and white sequence. The point 
at which they overlap is the murder of  Jimmy Grants, the drug dealer that Teddy 
has manipulated Shelby into believing to be his wife's killer. Here the black and 
white becomes colour, with the developing of  the photo Shelby takes of  Grants' 
corpse. The two directions through time in which the narrative simultaneously 
moves, when they meet and correspond so exactly in this way, emphasize the 
way in which the film that we see is, typically of  a noir, one singular, linear 
time  line. The flashback plays forwards through time, from its origin, in order to 
explain, retroactively, the events which we witness at the start of  the film. The 
events that led up to and caused the first event that we saw are thus shown, albeit 
in a broken up and fragmented fashion, as though the fmal event to which they 
lead is one which is inevitable. It is destined to occur in the self  same way that 
we initially saw it happen. 
The film's underlying chronological order becomes much easier to detect after a 
few viewings. In the black and white sequence Shelby is busy tattooing a clue 
onto his body, this is 'FACT 5'. The colour narrative for its part, that which the 
black and white sequence (literally) "develops" into, is concerned with what 
happens as a consequence of  the tattoo 'FACT 6'. The film's overall linear 
schema proceeds, then, by the numbers. Although it does not exactly follow the 
pattern of  films like Sunset Boulevard - of  starting at the narrative's end, jumping 
to its beginning, and then replaying events until they reach their inevitable end-
the mutually reinforcing directions that it does take serves solely to create a new 
spin on this old technique. The narrative progression of  the film is, in noir terms, 
although slightly disorientating in its originality, still predetermined by the 
linearity of  its narrative. This time it is a narrative which begins at either end of  a 
straight line and runs until they meet in the middle. By stopping at this point we 
are left with the knowledge that Teddy's death is now inevitable, and that the end 
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What is different about this film, however, is that the death of  the protagonist 
usually inscribed within the bookended noir narrative (the body in the pool that 
begins Sunset Boulevard, or in the morgue in Shallow Grave) is not evident. In 
fact, from the film's very opening we know that Shelby is alive at the end. Even 
the mitigated death of  Ripley, his life sentence of  perpetual closeting, is absent. 
Is there some hope, then, that this film could be seen as providing a more 
positive representation oflabyrinthine  performativity for a man? Does Shelby 
somehow manage to escape the hermeneutic trap of  the straight line of  time 
established by the narrative? Perhaps so, for, as we have shown, even though the 
actions of  Shelby are definitely those of  someone who is willing to deliberately 
deceive himself in order to get away with murder, he does seem to be a character 
who is in touch with the labyrinth of  time. Is the linear construction of  the 
narrative alone enough to reterritorialize this transgressive performativity? 
Not surprisingly, the answer to this question is no. The point at which the two 
narratives meet, the murder of  Jimmy Grants, enables the film to reterritorialize 
Shelby's attempts to perform his identity through a masquerade of  the selfas 
other. It is no coincidence that when Shelby takes the photo of  Grants' corpse he 
is busily changing into the dead man's clothes. Although he is not assuming 
Grants' identity per se (as Ripley did, using Dickie's passport) Shelby is, rather 
like Ripley, exploring the idea that it is the clothes that make the man. In this 
way the film stresses the process of  becoming-other as an "act" that is the 
equivalent to the loss of  the self Shelby himself tells Teddy; 'I think I'd rather be 
mistaken for a dead guy than a killer.' The murder that Ripley and Shelby are 
guilty of  committing, is here again formulated as the loss of  an essential self 
Like Ripley, Shelby'S masquerade is now only a disguise, that which hides the 
killer beneath the veneer of  another. His loss of  self  ensures that he is now, quite 
literally, a 'dead guy'. 
The film also seems to be deliberately punning on the fact that this change of 
costume brings colour to his life, as the drab black and white existence develops 
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exciting life, but it is ultimately gained at the cost of  the self In a manner 
reminiscent of  characters which express a very binary styled presence of  evil 
(e.g. George Lucas' Darth Vader) both Ripley and Shelby are figured as the 
walking dead. They have sold their souls and turned to the dark side, by 
attempting to struggle against the inevitability of  their manifest destinies. Like 
Vader, they are dead men, walking around inside a disguise of  pure evil. 
Becoming-other than they should have been they express the movement-image's 
belief  that the labyrinth, which constantly poses the threat ofungrounding the 
stability of  the straight line, is really only its binary opposite, the lurking evil, 
that defines the line oftime as good. Once again, the potentially positive idea of 
metamorphosis as the becoming-other of  the selfis equated with murder and the 
loss of  the essential self, by the binary logic enacted by the reactive forces of  the 
movement-image. The idea that the self is constantly becoming, as a procession 
of  simulacra without origin, is thus seen to be a naive dream with which evil 
doers fool themselves in order to excuse their breaking of  the law. 
The sad fact is that Shelby'S amorality, so beguilingly attractive in its seeming 
innocence, is actually figured in the film as a complete con. It is Shelby who is 
fmally  shown to be deliberately deceiving himself in order to get away with 
murder. In this case the endurance of  a continuous, unified self  beneath all the 
masks is much more cleverly figured than it was in Minghella's film, but it is still 
there, and is seen in Shelby'S habits. In fact, the film goes out of  its way to 
emphasize the underlying continuity to Shelby'S being. Its overall message is that 
he is lying to himself in order to be happy. He even says as much at the end, 
when he deliberately leaves the clue that the tattoo of  'FACT 6' entails, Teddy's 
license plate number. It is this which will enable him to kill Teddy with a clear 
conscience, acting on what he believes are facts. He says: 'Do I lie to myself  to 
be happy? In your case Teddy, yes I will'. This statement itself is interesting, as, 
rather like in Deleuze's deconstruction of  Descartes' cogito, there is a split I in 
evidence. The I that contemplates (I think) and the I that endures (I am) are here 
equated with the I that lies (I lie) and the I that is happy (to myself). This split I, 
however, is figured as a controlling I, the lying I that is manipulating its other 
half, the I that endures, which is seen as unknowing victim to the I that 230 
contemplates. If  the I that endures is also the I which corresponds to the past that 
is preserved, in the labyrinthine splitting oftime, then so too is the I that lies the 
I that corresponds to the present that passes. It follows, then, that the I that 
endures, the preserved I of  Shelby is the I that is constantly being lied to, and 
manipulated, by the I that passes, in the present. Thus, despite the labyrinthine 
deceits perpetrated by the passing I of  Shelby, there is always an underlying, 
linear, forward moving I in existence. Rather like the narrative, then, Shelby'S 
life moves in two directions, both forwards and backwards through time. 
This manipulation of  the self, this deliberate setting up of  his future self (the I 
which endures) by the manipulative I of  the present, in such a way that he will 
unknowingly falsify the past through actions based upon false information, is 
explained away through most of  the film as a consequence of  his condition, and 
his subsequent gullibility. This is established, for instance, in the long black and 
white sequence in which, influenced by his phone conversation with Teddy, he 
changes the tattoo of  'F ACT 5' to 'Drug Dealer'. Moreover, we are led to believe 
that he is mostly manipulated by other people. Teddy would appear to be the 
master manipulator in Shelby'S life, but so too does Natalie manipulate him for 
her own ends, when she uses him to rid her of  both Dodd and Teddy. Even the 
motel receptionist, the crazily bearded Bert, gets in on the act by renting him 
several rooms at once. Yet these incidences are really only part of  the 
smokescreen which Shelby is actually creating around himself. They are all part 
of  his cover. Beneath it all there is a master manipulator at work, Shelby himself. 
At several points in the film, however, he is deliberately uncovered by Nolan, 
who slips inconsistencies into the narrative. These inconsistencies, due to our 
normal expectancies of  linearity, initially pass unnoticed, especially with the 
confusion which the episodic plot also creates. 
After finding himself in a motel room with Dodd, and being unable to remember 
why this is, he confronts Natalie, and asks her why he has found a note in his 
pocket which tells him he has to get rid of  Dodd for her. More succinctly, he 
shows her the picture of  the bound and gagged Dodd, and says: 'Who the fuck is 231 
Dodd?' As she explains to him her perspective on the events, Natalie, attempting 
to cover her own tracks, tries to tear up the photograph of  Dodd. In a very brief 
aside to their discussion, Shelby snaps: 'You have to burn them'. How does he 
know this? As the film further unravels, and we witness his conversation with 
Teddy, just after having killed Grants, we see Shelby burn the photos of  his 
actions, the picture of  Grants' corpse, and that of  his own smiling face after the 
previous murder he committed, killing his wife's killer. As this event preceded 
the conversation with Natalie, our minds will retroactively posit this as the origin 
of  his knowledge. Yet if  Shelby's memory is constantly being erased, or as he 
has it, fading (like the photograph with which the film opens) how can he 
possibly "remember" that the photos must be burnt if  they are to be properly 
destroyed? The fact is, Shelby's memory loss is a con which he is working on 
himself, the mask of  which occasionally slips under stress, revealing his ability 
to remember information when he really needs to. 
Other incidents also occur. Again concerning Dodd, when hiding in wait in the 
bathroom of  Dodd's motel room in order to jump him, Shelby's concentration 
slips, and he forgets why he is there. Looking at the bottle with which he had 
planned to brain Dodd he says; 'I don't/eel drunk', signaling his forgetting of  his 
previous intent. Being in a bathroom, he innocently decides to take a shower. 
Yet when Dodd arrives home, and Shelby is in the shower, supposedly blissfully 
unaware of  why he is where he is, whose room he is in, or what his purpose is, 
he immediately jumps Dodd, struggles with him, and knocks him out. Why does 
he do this? For all he knows, Dodd could be his friend, or even a roommate. 
Admittedly this may not be such a strange reaction to finding an unknown man 
in your bathroom, especially after the attack on his wife in his own bathroom. 
Yet to Shelby, everybody is unknown. This does not, however, make them 
potentially hostile. For the viewer, however, the completion of  what was a linear 
narrative is thus achieved, and we, knowing that Shelby was lying in wait all 
along, think nothing of  this minor inconsistency. 232 
Certain other slight slips also stand out. After killing Jimmy Grants, Shelby is 
taken by surprise when Teddy arrives on the scene. Finding a picture of  the 
smiling Teddy in his pocket, on which nothing is yet written except his name 
and number, he decides, on the spur of  the moment, to trick him. He fools him 
into coming downstairs with him, where he witnesses the dead body of  Grants 
(again the evidence of  the murder is hidden in the symbolic closet that is the 
basement) and jumps him. Why? We are to find out, as the story continues to 
unravel backwards, that it is because he had been sent to his rendezvous with 
Grants by Teddy. Yet Shelby does not know, or rather, remember this fact. In 
truth, he has no idea who the smiling Teddy is at all, or else why look at the 
picture in his pocket in the ftrst place? As far as he knows, Teddy could, as was 
also the case with Dodd, be his friend. 
It  begins to become obvious that Shelby is someone who automatically assumes 
that he can trust nobody, and that he has no real friends. Ifhe is a complete 
innocent, however, we have to wander why this is. The noir alienation of  his Los 
Angeles milieu is used by the film to suggest that his underlying suspicion is 
caused by the way in which people are constantly taking advantage of  his 
condition. Yet this is not a satisfactory answer, for, when Shelby happens to 
discover that he is being conned into renting two rooms, and says; 'Well, at least 
you're being honest about ripping me off Bert the receptionist replies; 'You're 
not gonna remember anyway.' How, then, is it possible for Shelby to remember 
that people are taking advantage ofhim? If  it is impossible for him to make new 
memories, where does this suspicion constantly reappear from? Perhaps another 
explanation for his behaviour would have to be that Shelby assumes he has no 
friends because he knows that he is a wanted man, a man who is attempting to 
get away with murder. Shelby feels guilt, and behaves as one who is constantly 
on the run. Yet this is also strange when we consider that he has managed to 
make no new memories since the death of  his wife. How can he possibly know 
that he is anything other than the innocent which his condition allows him to 
pretend to be? The fact is, he does know, as it is his condition that is the fake, 
and because he is constantly in the process of  setting himself up. It is through 
these slight inconsistencies, then, that Nolan's film begins to equate the becoming-other of  the self, the falsifying of  one's own past, with the 
manipulation ofthe self, for evil ends. 
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Shelby himself knows that the person who is trying to take advantage of  him is 
himself In an early monologue he states: 'You have to be wary of  people writing 
stuff for you that's not gonna make sense, or is gonna lead you astray, I mean, I 
dunno why these people try to take advantage of  somebody with this condition'. 
In point of  fact, however, Shelby is aware that this is exactly what he is doing to 
himself He again confesses to Natalie: 'I think someone's fucking with me, 
trying to get me to kill the wrong person'. We wonder if  it is Teddy or Natalie 
that he is beginning to suspect, yet it can be neither, as there is no way for him to 
have remembered this. It is himself, the I that lies in the present, that he is 
becoming suspicious of It  is himself, the present self, who is prearranging ways 
in which his future self will act as though on misinformation, left by a past self, 
believing it to be fact. Not only is performative identity, and utilizing the powers 
of  the false, once again equated with the act of  murder, its harmful consequences 
are also shown here as capable of  creating the illusion of  a causal, linear, and 
singularly coherent timeline. The advice on which the present Shelby acts, then, 
is always validated, in retrospect, ensuring that an illusory, but seemingly 
factual, origin for his actions is always posited. In this way a causal linearity is 
maintained by his life. Shelby'S use of  the powers of  the false, rather than 
falsifying backwards, creates a series of  false origins to his actions in the same 
way that the plot does, with its series of  sequences which end with the beginning 
of  their predecessor. Shelby'S life cannot deviate from the path that he ultimately 
predetermines for it, as he will not let it do so. 
The faking of  his condition is explained, mostly through the Sammy lenkis 
anecdote, in a way which also serves to maintain a binary between the body and 
the mind. This  explains the manipulation of  the self as an action of  mind over 
body. As a consequence, both Descartes' primacy of  the cogito over the body is 
maintained, and also, the falsifying of  the organic form through time which we examined previously, is effectively reterritorialized by being shown to be the 
effect of  the action of  the mind. 
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Shelby's assessment of  Jenkis' condition was that his inability to make new 
memories was a psychological, rather than a physical condition. Jenkis' failure of 
the serious of  lab rat style tests to which he was subjected suggested to Shelby 
that his condition could not be physical. If  it was he would have learned to avoid 
the electrified objects through conditioning. Believing his own condition to be 
real (i.e. physical) however, he should, he reasons, be able to live his own life 
through conditioning. 'Habit and routine make my life possible, conditioning, 
acting on instinct.'  Shelby is attempting to live purely as a physical presence, a 
body that acts according to its conditioning through routines and habits, a body 
that is a repetition of  the same. Indeed, the validity of  this technique would seem 
to be borne out by Laura Marks' criticism of  Bergson for his diminishing ofthe 
importance of  habit.
20 As Marks illustrates, after all, habit is telling in its 
acknowledgement of  socially learned, or conditioned, cultural responses to a 
range of  stimuli. For this reason, if  Shelby'S life were purely physical, and 
controlled by conditioned instinct, this would go a long way towards explaining 
his violent reaction when surprised by Dodd and Teddy. As we begin to believe 
that Shelby is actually faking, however, this view begins to seem a little unlikely. 
Ifhis condition is in fact psychological, the realization strikes us, this habitual 
body is actually being manipulated by his mind. In this way is the mind/body 
dualism reinforced, the primacy of  mind over body maintained, and the 
falsifying of  the organic form reterritorialized as an effect of  the manipulations 
of  Shelby's mind. 
In Bergsonian terms, what the film actually shows is the way in which habit, the 
quotidian repetitions of  our day to day life which occur in the passing present 
(that which, as we saw in chapter two, is the first synthesis, or, 'foundation' of 
time) is positioned as one half of  a physical instinct/mind split by the film's 
narrative. When we initially believe Shelby'S condition to be a physical one, then 
habit, the passing present, is shown to be a purely physical existence which has 235 
been freed from its connection with recollection (the second synthesis oftime as 
seen in Bergson's memory cone) due to Shelby's inability to create new 
memories. His ability to live without memories also ensures his seeming ability 
to utilize the third synthesis oftime, the labyrinthine powers of  the false which 
enable the ungrounding oftime that is the eternal return. It would thus seem that 
the film shows mind and body acting as one in this eternally recurring present, 
continually falsifying time, and palimpsestically rewriting the body and indeed 
the entire "self". This self, moreover, now appears to be without inside/outside 
binary, existing instead in a constant fluxing in and out of  being, a continual 
becoming-other. 
Yet when the film begins to hint that his condition is not actually physical at al~ 
but that he is, in fact, faking it, this positive, Bergsonian-inspired interpretation 
begins to appear unlikely. As a psychological problem, the physical being of 
Shelby - formed through his eccentric habits such as the tattooing, leaving of 
messages to himself, writing on the back of  photographs, etc - begins to appear 
as the actions of  a puppet, or shell, which is controlled, in retrospect, by his 
mind. The linearity which the self  reinscribes through its knowing manipulation 
of  the predictable repetition of  the same which habit demands - i.e through 
Shelby'S positing offalse clues that will lead to murder - makes this a much 
more negative take on the possibilities that could exist in this bizarre situation. 
Habit, the repetition of  the same, in fact, is used by Shelby in order to ensure that 
he never forgets his quest for his wife's killer. The tattoo on his left hand, which 
reads, 'remember Sammy Jenkis' is the most persistent evidence of  this. It 
denotes Shelby'S conditioning ofhimselfto remember a false past in order that 
he can commit future murders. Teddy stresses to Shelby that he is: 'Conditioning 
yourself  to remember, learning through repetition', as though ontologically 
consolidating himself in retrospect. Each retelling of  the Sammy Jenkis story in 
the same way, each repetition ofthe same tale, retroactively re-posits the fulse 
origin that validates his own condition. If  this tattoo lies, by triggering the same 
false memory each time it is read, if  the organic form is not to be trusted, it is 236 
because, ultimately, it has been manipulated by the mind, which predicts in 
advance the future consequences of  its actions. Moreover, it ensures that Shelby 
can in fact condition himself  to make new memories, to 'remember' things which 
have happened since the incident with his wife, (i.e to remember the fictional 
story of  Jenkis). The I that lies, the mental I of  the present, is now the 
manipulator of  a separate I, the bodily I that endures through its repetition of  the 
same. We are back in the realms ofa conscious and an unconscious, an ego and 
an id. 
Shelby utilizes the creative power of  forgetting only if  and when it suits him to 
do so. After hiring a prostitute in order to help him to re-stage his discovery of 
his wife's attack, he takes several of  his wife's personal belongings (which he had 
instructed the prostitute to scatter around the room) and burns them. Sitting by 
the fire and pondering the number of  times he must have done this, he says: 'I 
can't remember to forget you', even though it is obviously himself who has just 
manipulated him into this act of  remembering. This action of  remembrance, 
moreover, stands in direct contrast to the action of  burning the photographs of 
Jimmy Grants' body, and himself, which he did previously in order to forget the 
murders he had committed. 
Shelby desires the glamorous life of  one who gets away with murder (falsifies 
time backwards), but who believes himself  to be a righteous avenger (moving 
through time, forwards). It is for this reason that he conditions himself  to act 
upon false evidence, removing pages from his police report in order to create 
what Teddy calls: 'A puzzle you could never solve'. Living the life of  the 
wounded and vengeful detective, very much in the noir style of  Dave Bannion 
(Glenn Ford) in Fritz Lang's The Big Heat (1953) he describes himself as living: 
'only for revenge'. His use of  the labyrinthine powers of  the false are always in 
the service ofa linear purpose which he follows, the quest for his wife's killer. 
He is, as Teddy tells him: ' ...  living a dream ... a dead wife to pine for, a sense of 
purpose to your life, a romantic quest ...  '. In Memento, the life of  the protagonist 
is seen to be a repetition of  the same, which uses the repetition of  difference (that 237 
which so threatens to unground it) to actually reinforce its legitimacy. Thus it is 
that the film is able to provide us with a glimpse of  the powers of  the false at 
work, but to also show that both the act of  performing identity, and the 
ungrounding of  time which it enables, is tantamount to getting away with 
murder. 
Like Minghella's film, it is almost tempting to see this as an intentional 
exposition of  the way in which the ungrounding powers of  the labyrinth are 
manipulated by the straight line of  time. Shelby even has his own false origin to 
provide his quest with its purpose and drive, the death of  his wife. The loss of  his 
place as one half of  a heterosexual coupling is seen as reason enough for his 
unquenchable but somewhat twisted quest for justice, outside of  the bounds 
normally ascribed by the law. 
In the film's fmal episode, however, when Teddy begins to question Shelby'S 
memory of  what happened to his wife, we are shown that Shelby'S real crime is 
his own complicity in his wife's murder. Teddy suggests that Shelby himself is to 
blame for her death, through his administering of  an overdose of  insulin. This is 
an event which Shelby had previously maintained was the fate of  Sammy Jenkis' 
wife. At this point the flashback we had previously witnessed of  Shelby pinching 
his wife's thigh is replayed. This time, however, we see that her small 
exclamation of  'Ow' is not due to his pinching her, but to his injecting of  her. 
Shelby blankly refuses to accept this alternative truth. Thus, the same realization 
which brunette Helen uses positively in Sliding Doors, is here immediately 
reterritorialized by Shelby, in order for him to maintain his linear existence, and 
his murderous quest for revenge. 
As Dion Tubrett states in; "So Where Are You'?' Shelby also uses his wife's 
murderer, John G, as an other against which he positions his own righteous life 
and quest for vengeance. Tubrett states: 238 
John G '"  is a kind of  mirror for Leonard: a mirror image, the inverse of 
Leonard; and a double, an external embodiment of  his own negative 
attributes .... John G fills a role for Leonard: he is the embodiment of  his 
motivation to live.  21 
The binary that this type of  double allows Shelby to maintain - between self and 
external other - enables his avoidance of  his own status as an entity with the 
capacity to double, to become-other in time. Rather than having to admit the 
possibility of  multiple pasts, and the fact that he could have been his wife's killer 
in some past or other, this internal/external, goodlbad, doubling with John G 
enables his single-minded quest for the murderer as other. 
At the film's close, driving along in his car, having made the decision to fool his 
future self into killing Teddy by having his license plate number tattooed on as 
'FACT 6', Shelby closes his eyes at the wheel. He sees himself, lying on a bed 
with his wife, and on his chest we see the 'I'VE DONE IT' tattoo, which he 
previously told Natalie he would have done once he had found and killed his 
wife's killer. At this point, the future is open to him, and, like brunette Helen, 
there are at least two directions that it could take. Either he could allow himself 
to forget his false cause, his wife's death and his quest for vengeance, or he could 
continue on his way, and knowingly murder Teddy. It is a choice between two 
tattoos, either 'I'VE DONE IT' or, 'FACT 6'. He decides to kill Teddy, and gets 
'F ACT 6'. He denies the real powers of  the false, which are an active power of 
falsifying which allow the past to be forgotten (in the sense of, made contingent, 
or not necessarily true) and opts instead to maintain the linear time  line of  his 
unending quest. His self-falsifying act, then, is a retroactive positing of  a first 
cause, the tattooed 'FACT 6' which will legitimize his future act of  murder. 
Rather like the repetition of  the same that is his constructed memory of  Sammy 
Jenkis, so too must his memory of  the outcome of  his quest be kept the same (i.e 
he must never allow himself  to think that he has done it) if  he is to maintain his 
cover, his linear self, and his capacity to murder. The realization supplied by the 
labyrinth, that in the ungrounding of  Chronos the telos itself becomes the quest, 
is here made to appear as the manipulation of  time by the murderer. 239 
Moreover, Shelby's denial of  Nietzsche  an forgetting as a liberatory device 
actually reinforces the inevitability of  the linear narrative. There was, after all, 
little likelihood of  any other conclusion once we witnessed Teddy's death at the 
start. The linear trajectory of  the narrative is thus upheld, and the film which 
seems at first glance to represent the labyrinth, in fact, works to deny its 
possibility as anything other than a tool for self  deception which, no matter how 
seductive it may appear, is against the law. The best that can be said about the 
film is that it illustrates a character who uses the falsifying powers of  the 
labyrinth in order to get away with murder. Over and above this, the film 
constructs both its narrative and Shelby's identity in such a way as to 
reterritorialize any liberatory potential it may have gleaned from the labyrinth's 
ungrounding of  time, back within the linear time frame of  the movement-image, 
and uses a traditional binary logic in order to do so. 
II 
His and Hers Watches. 
The murder that these men are enacting, it would seem, is actually more specific 
than is represented in either film. It  is the murder of  Enlightenrnent man, the 
illusory, essential self of  Descartes' cogito. Without this, the binary reasoning 
upon which the heterosexual divisions of  man and woman are based, history 
cannot function. Consequently, labyrinthine perforrnativity cannot be shown as 
something that has a positive outcome for men, who must remain on the side of 
singularity, causality and form, if  the legality of  the heterosexual structure is to 
remain in force. 240 
The reason why there are so many films which deal with the identity of  those 
who live on either side of  the binary created by the law, is now perhaps a little 
clearer. The movement-image's certain tendency towards the binary creates the 
debate seen in so many gangster and undercover cop films over the identity of 
the hero. These films very often conclude in one of  two ways. On the one hand 
there is a return to an original state, an essential identity, with the stripping away 
of  all masks. Examples from either side of  the tracks include, Goodfellas (1990) 
and Deep Cover (1992). This return to the self, when figured on the side of 
righteousness, is also a common trait in many superhero films, such as Superman 
(1978). We can also include in this category "laying to rest of  the disguise" 
films, in which the actions committed whilst masked are such that a return to the 
origin becomes impossible. This is usually because an undercover cop has 
crossed the line and committed murders. In these films some sort of  alternative 
release is proffered instead, often that of  a sacrificial death as form of  atonement. 
Examples of  this type of  film include: City on Fire (1987), State of  Grace 
(1990), Reservoir Dogs (1991) and Hard Boiled (1991). Alternatively, a period 
of  incarceration can be offered as penance for transgressing the law through 
performativity. This occurs in Plein Soleil (1959), for murder, American Gigolo 
(1980), for prostitution, and Light Sleeper (1991), for drug dealing. 
On the other hand, there are films in which the essential self gets lost beneath the 
mask. Instead of  this being seen as a liberatory becoming, however, this is 
depicted as a warning of  the dangers that can occur when masquerading is taken 
too far. Loss of  self films include: Psycho (1960), Shock Corridor (1963), i. d. 
(1994) and now also The Talented Mr Ripley. Loss of  self  can also be figured, 
symbolically, as death of  self, as it is in the "undercover investigative journalist" 
formula, for instance, The Parallax View (1974) and The Passenger (1975). 
This is not intended as an exhaustive list, or a universal law, but rather as a very 
general pattern which many films seem to follow. Slight variations on this 
tendency occur in such films as: Detour (1945), It's a Wonderful Life (1946), 
Out of  the Past (1947), Grip of  the Strangler (1958), Le Samourai (1967), 241 
Performance (1970), Day of  the Jackal (1973), Taxi Driver (1976), 
Quadrophenia (1979), An American Werewolfin London (1981), Bladerunner 
(1982), Europa, Europa (1991), Suture (1993), The Madness of  King George III 
(1994), FaceIOff(1997), The Assignment (1997), The Man in the Iron Mask 
(1998), Ghost Dog (1999), Fight Club (1999), Boys Don't Cry (1999), The Limey 
(1999), Family Man (2001), Bedazzled (2001) and Comedie de l'innocence 
(2002). These variations point to the important role that genre conventions play 
in determining these outcomes. For instance, the undercover journalist, the urban 
samurai, the costume drama, the psychological thriller and the teen movie, all 
provide variations on the noir conclusions found in undercover cop and gangster 
movies. In all ofthe above films, despite the specific variations that their genres 
provide, there is a more general pattern at work. They all enact some 
reterritorialization, back within the binary of  good and evil, upon male, 
labyrinthine performativity. Even in the rare instances where he does get away 
with performing his identity, like Memento, The  Usual Suspects (1995), Liar 
(1997), Grosse Point Blank (1997) and Fallen (1998) the male character is seen 
to be, at the very least, guilty of  getting away with murder. 
The films that I have analysed in the last two chapters would seem to suggest 
that within our binary informed way of  thinking, labyrinthine falsifying of 
identity is something that is allowed to be associated with women (but only as a 
brief, sanctioned fantasy) and which is seen as illegal for men, the upholders of 
the law. The prevalence of  positive images ofperformativity in films about 
women (despite its inevitable reterritorialization) perpetuates the myth that this 
positive potential is only something available to women, and thereby reinforces 
the binary. The illusion is, to be clear on this, that cinema shows us becoming-
other as something that is only positively available to women, and only for a 
finite period of  time, thus making it a binary opposite to being, the state of  man. 
This negates the labyrinth's liberatory potential for men, and ensures its 
continual status as outlawed time. 242 
This reterritorialization that is enacted by the movement-image is in no way a 
new thing. As Julia Kristeva shows in her piece, Women's Time, it is always 
tempting to oppose the linear time of  the patriarchal order with the appropriation 
of  eternal recurrence for the female. This is, she shows, a move which has 
occurred throughout history - 'one is reminded of  the various myths of 
resurrection which, in all religious beliefs, perpetuate the vestige of  an anterior 
or concomitant maternal cult,22 - and it is one which has served to bolster the 
patriarchal order. By making women's time 'anterior', the legitimacy of  the 
linear, masculine time is upheld. It is the order, being, or actualized form, that is 
built upon the chaos, becoming, or labyrinthine virtuality of  the feminine. By 
othering the female in this way, by casting her into the eternal return as though 
into a primordial, and now lost, time, the labyrinth's potential for ungrounding 
the straight line oftime is again undermined. Rosi Braidotti's assertion, that 
Deleuze's philosophy oftime is, 'naively undifferentiated,23 in terms of  gender is 
thus borne out by the movement-image's marginalization of  Aion. It  is the 
political ends to which the labyrinth is used, after all, which effect exactly how 
liberatory it appears. In fact, the labyrinth becomes a place of  incarceration for 
the female, a time in which she becomes lost, existing as one who is subject to 
the linear time of  the masculine law. This prison is, much as F  oucault24 critiqued 
in the operation of  the penal system, a place which both contains and maintains 
the notion of  duplicitous femininity. Even Almod6var's, Todo Sobre Mi Madre, 
which we saved from criticism in the previous chapter, does not escape 
positioning within this binary schema of  gendered times. The film's emphasis on 
the all female community to which labyrinthine time is ascribed is again 
suggestive of  its status as a gendered time which is available only to women. 
This ensures that it remains the binary opposite of  the straight line oftime, which 
is, subsequently, masculine. In this sense the film has much in common with the 
Bette Davis classic, Now Voyager (1942) another film ofliberatory 
performativity which is reterritorialized in the same way. 
The films analysed so far seem to suggest that the binary which is so often 
created (loosely speaking, that of  the straight line or time for men, and the 
labyrinth for women) is used by cinema to negate the potential for queering that 243 
the labyrinth actually makes available to both sexes. Not only does this work to 
reterritorialize women as binary other, but so too does it repress men. This is 
most easily seen in its treatment of  homosexual men, but it actually applies to all 
men, who must be channeled into a legal, straight line at all costs. The existence 
of  the seductively attractive illegality represented in the getting away with 
murder plot acts much as the women's labyrinth films do. They are an escapist 
fantasy that it is nice to contemplate briefly, before our inevitable return to 
reality, our reterritorialization. They too are used as a safety valve mechanism. In 
this way are movements which may initially appear to express the becoming-
woman, or the becoming-queer ofthe use oftime in movement-image narratives, 
reterritorialized. The plane of  transcendence's binary thought allows them to 
surface, but only for a brief  period oftime, before it disavows them with 
illegality. 
The difficulty which we face when trying to conceive of  the labyrinth oftime 
from within a binary image of  thought has recently been explored by Robert 
Lepage, in the Canadian film, Possible Worldi
5 (2000). This is a film which, 
again like Memento, is initially quite confusing to watch. This fact itself says 
much about how used we are to straightforward, linear narratives, and indeed, 
how heavily marginalized art cinema films which experiment with time have 
become, as a result of  mainstream expectations of  linearity. Whether intended or 
not, Lepage's film illustrates the way in which the labyrinth, as a topic for film 
narrative itself, is reterritorialized into the art cinema other by the cinematic 
mainstream. It  is for this reason that the selling out to overall linearity to which 
Sliding Doors, Lola Rennt and Epouse-moi all succumbed ensured that they were 
all reterritorialized in their very inception. 
Possible Worlds follows the journeys of  George Barber (Tom McManus) as he 
travels through several parallel universes. In all of  them he searches out and is 
drawn to - in a self-consciously mannered reference towards both La jetee and 
Alain Resnais', Je t'aime, je t'aime (1967) - his wife, Joyce (Tilda Swinton). 
Barber's ability to move in this way is explained in a completely Bergsonian 244 
manner as being due to an early intuition of  his multiple existence, whilst sitting 
a maths test, aged 7. Barber describes having a sudden realization that he could 
complete the maths equation in one of  two ways. Suddenly seeing himself  as 
another, simultaneously completing the equation in two ways, he also begins to 
see through the eyes of  himself-as-other. This other Barber is a boy who has a 
memory that he does not have, of  being bitten by a dog. He also has a 
corresponding bite scar on his hand. Barber is a little like Bergson's actor, 
beholding himself  playing in the splitting oftime. He is aware of  himself as 
existing in many different parallel universes, and suddenly, gaining the power to 
slip between them, he begins to make the past of  each self  that he becomes, not 
necessarily true. 
The BergsonianlDeleuzian image of  a temporal subject continues to be 
established through some slick special effects and editing. When Barber slips 
through time, everything around him begins to becomes fluid. It seems that his 
movements are occurring at a molecular level. He is, as Joyce tells him, 
insubstantial, rather like 'smoke'. Thus the film avoids privileging the molar, 
organic form ofthe body. This is reinforced when, in a particularly Fellinian 
manner, Barber states that he does not so much have a memory, but rather that: 
'In the collection of  people I call me a memory occurs.' Barber is not a single, 
organic entity whose memories are stored in his brain, he is a multiple entity 
which moves aberrantly through a giant world memory. As he further says; 'I am 
everybody', and; 'I know everything', a realization which, as we saw in chapter 
two, occurs only once we conceive of  the self  as existing within labyrinthine 
time. At the film's end, moreover, Barber denies that there is anything constant 
beneath; 'All the changes'. A soul, an essential self, he argues, leaves you; 
'Imprisoned'. Barber has realised that time is now the subject, and we are but 
characters in time. Thus Lepage's film seems to be an exposition of  the labyrinth 
that could have emerged straight from the pages of  De  leuze's Cinema 2. 
Indeed, to the Deleuzian fanatic watching this film, there even seems to be a 
homage to Deleuze's26 description ofOzu's use of  the vase in Late Spring (1949). 245 
Although it is unlikely that this is deliberately so, Barber stares at the vase for an 
extended period of  time, before explaining that he was: 'Comparing it ... to 
itself. Barber, aware of  the existence of  myriad such vases in the labyrinth of 
time, was slipping between universes, comparing the many different existences 
in which the vase manifested itself Indeed, as there are an infmite number of 
universes, and as all possibilities must inevitably be played out across them, in 
some universes, Barber informs us, the vase is also actually a beach. The point 
is, the vase not only endures in time in one universe, as Deleuze describes the 
becoming of  Ozu's vase, but so too does it become-other in the labyrinth. The 
metamorphoses through which it passes is much more evident in this much 
wider arena and in some universes, as a consequence, the vase manifests itself as 
a beach. 
The film further expresses its BergsonianlDeleuzian conclusions when Joyce, in 
the final conversation of  the film, discusses the flaws inherent in binary thinking. 
She says: 
'The word 'not' is really magical ... but it's not that, it's something more 
... it's a way of  getting round our ignorance ... everything we cannot 
conceive of .... but there's really nothing behind it, just a bunch of 
ghostly possibilities ... everything simply is ...  ' 
Joyce argues that there should not be 'not' something, just a lot of  everything that 
'is'. Rather than a lack of  something, many somethings. Rather than a straight 
line or a labyrinth, many straight lines that is a labyrinth. The very idea that there 
can be an origin, is thus decried. Rather than a something or a nothing (a 'not' 
something) at the origin, there are many somethings. Rather then an either/or, a 
both/and. 
Yet Lepage's film ultimately, and very deliberately, pulls the ungrounding rug of 
the labyrinth out from under the spectator's feet, by reterritorializing Barber's 
narrative within a binary-informed meta-narrative. Barber's brain is actually 246 
being kept alive in a sensory deprivation tank, by the evil Frankenstein figure, 
the scientist, Dr Kepler. Through this conceit, Lepage highlights the way in 
which the ungrounding ofthe straight line of  time performed by the labyrinth is 
always reterritorialized by the movement-image's narrative, by making it a 
dream labyrinth within a linear reality. Barber's movements are seen to be the 
disembodied delusions ofa brain in ajar, yet another variation on the "its all a 
dream" theme. Moreover, the narrative in which it is situated is the most linear 
of  plots, that of  a police investigation into Barber's murder, and the removal of 
his brain. Indeed, in the true noir style of  Sunset Boulevard (et al) the narrative 
begins and ends with the death ofthe protagonist, trapping him in the moment of 
death, and making the rest of  the film the dreams of  an already dead man. This 
"brain in a vat" formula is effectively the same as that which we previously saw 
in The Sixth Sense. Admittedly this technique enables the film to show that 
Barber's labyrinthine slippages between the virtual sheets of  time occurs only 
with his complete sensory-motor suspension. However, this also reterritorializes 
this notion back within a Cartesian body/mind binary. Unlike, say, the time-
images ofFellini, there is no possibility that both body and brain can become-
other in time. 
We are now shown that the fluidity Barber experiences between worlds is really 
caused by Kepler's dunking of  his brain into, and taking it out of, the sensory 
deprivation tank. He is a virtual traveler within time, its true, but only outside of 
his normal bodily existence. It  is no coincidence that Barber's conditio~ as brain 
in ajar being manipulated by an evil genius, is so reminiscent of  Descartes' own 
reasoning in his Meditations. As Descartes argued, even if  some malignant 
demon should attempt to manipulate all that you perceive, the one thing that you 
can be sure of, is your intellect, your thought. Time travel is now a fantasy, a 
dream, not something that is actually possible as a way of  life. In this way time 
travel is reduced to something which exists within the organism, in its brain, 
rather than time being something through which the subject moves, dispersing as 
it does so. Time is thus reterritorialized back within the linear movement through 
time of  the organic form, rather than existing as a virtual whole that is forever 
becoming-actua1. Thus the Enlightenment, scientific worldview brings us back 247 
within the binary of  inside and outside, and once more privileges the rationality 
of  the mind over all else. 
The scientist, Kepler, acting as Frankenstein, illustrates the impossibility of 
labyrinthine subjectivity due to the strength of  the plane of  transcendence's 
reterritorializing forces. As he tells Barber: 'I'm going to kill you in every world.' 
The murder of  Barber is a symbolic death, describing science's reduction of  the 
virtual event to the actual state, the act which reterritorializes the labyrinthine, 
singular multiplicity of  Aion into the straight line of  Chronos. Consequently, 
Barber's myriad, virtual, becoming-other selves are all "killed" in their reduction 
to the singular, actual self. Again through its oblique references to Lajetee and 
Je t'aime, je t'aime, Lepage's film points to the role ofthe scientist as one who 
maintains the linearity we saw enacted by Einstein in the previous chapter, 
through his privileging of  a certain fixed perspective from which to judge all 
others. As Rodowick
27 has shown of  Je t'aime, je t'aime, it is the scientist's 
inability to conceive oftime as the labyrinth that ensures his failure to 
understand, to gain intuition of, the virtual time travel undertaken by the 
labyrinthine subject. 
As a result of  the binary reasoning through which the meta-narrative enacts its 
reterritorialization of  the labyrinth, Barber's appearance, although he is 
supposedly becoming-other throughout the film, remains ostensibly the same 
throughout his different incarnations. Joyce's appearance, however, changes 
radically each time. Tilda Swinton, who, as a star, we associate with a female 
becoming-other, due to her portrayal of  Orlando in Sally Potter's film, seems the 
natural choice for this role. Yet Barber should also change as he slips between 
universes. The fact that he doesn't shows once again the binary into which 
labyrinthine films are reterritorialized, that of  a multiple female role, and a 
singular male. Moreover, in the many recurring beach sequences Joyce also 
becomes equated with the sea, and Barber, the land. It  is he, after all, who 
emerges from the phallic lighthouse to witness the men who can only speak the 
words; 'slab' and; 'block'. These terms are themselves symbolic, describing the 248 
building blocks from which form is constructed. Joyce, for her part, is the 
underwater swimmer who could ho ld her breath for the longest as a child, and 
who wishes that she had gills. The binary that is maintained, to be clear, is 
between the fluid, molecular becomings of  the sea, which are multiple, and 
female, and the solid, singular, male, form of  the land. 
Lepage's point seems to be that it is impossible for Deleuze's conception of  time 
to exist as anything other than a dream if  you exist in a universe ordered in such 
a way as to keep the man as the singular form (one brain, one rationality, one 
linear identity) and the woman, the multiple (labyrinthine identity). Indeed, this 
Barber himself realizes at the film's conclusion, when he states: 'There's only one 
world, I have been dreaming.' In the singular world of  form, the labyrinth is all 
"just a dream". Finally, as the film ends, Barber speaks the final words; 'Thank 
God', when the light stops flashing out to sea. In the film's meta-narrative of 
"reality" this signifies that his wife has turned the vat's life-support system off. 
The linear narrative thus ending with recourse to a singular deity, and the end of 
the teleological male trajectory of  the narrative (as it is also figured in the 
flashbacks of  Wilder) is, predictably, Barber's death. Either this is a film which 
completely conforms to type, or, to give it the benefit of  the doubt, Lepage's film 
uses its meta-fictional structure specifically in order to critique the movement-
image's need to reterritorialize the labyrinth by positioning it as binary other, 
whenever it appears on film. 
A Total Lack of  Respect for the Law. 
One film which perhaps goes even further than Lepage's is the little known 
independent noir, Liar (1997) directed by Josh and Jonas Pate. This film exposes 
the law as the force which attempts to get away with murder. The narrative 
involves the interrogation of  James Wayland (Tim Roth) over the murder of  a 
prostitute, Elizabeth Loftis (Renee Zellweger) by police officers Phillip Braxton 
(Chris Penn) and Edward Kennesaw (Michael Rooker). The film's gambit is that 249 
Wayland, a habitual liar, can lie his way through a series of  lie detector tests. His 
ability to beat the polygraph machine is shown to be due to his medical condition 
- he suffers from Temporal Lobe Epilepsy (T.L.E.) - and the medication which 
he takes as a result. The reason for his lying is that he believes Kennesaw to be 
guilty of  the crime, and wants to blow the cover of  the law as the one who gets 
away with murder. 
As Wayland lies his way through the interrogation we begin to see the events of 
the night in question, replayed as a series of  flashbacks. During this sequence, 
his ability to lie so effectively is shown to be due to his ability to falsify the past. 
Believing himself  to be telling the truth he can defeat the polygraph, so long as 
he can falsify the past in such a way as to make the "false" answers he gives in 
the present, "true". This he does by matching a false past to his false answers. 
Wayland is a labyrinthine entity who utilizes the powers of  the false. Hardly 
surprising, perhaps, in a film called 'Liar', Wayland is exactly the forger that 
Deleuze identified in post-war cinema. In contrast to the one past, the one truth 
which the police seek, with all their scientific methods, Wayland opposes the 
multiple pasts of  the labyrinth, the multiple selves of  Wayland. 
After his first polygraph test, left alone in the room by Braxton and Kennesaw, 
Wayland repeats to himself: 'I believe in me, I believe in me, I believe in me'. 
During this scene we see a glimpse of  the park where he falsely claims to have 
frrst met Loftis on the night of  her death. As it eventually turns out, he knew her 
much better than he says, but by making himself believe his own story, his false 
past, he is able to convince the police otherwise. In this way we are shown that 
his present self, and how truthful it is, depends upon the version of  the past that 
he creates using the powers of  the false. That Wayland is aware of  his multiple 
existence is shown in one of  the flashbacks to a previous conversation with 
Loftis. This is conducted, Paris/Texas style, on a telephone, through the window 
of  a stripper's booth. In response to his philosophical croakings on the absence of 
any; Thinker behind the thought', she asks him; 'You always talk like this, don't 
you?'. He replies; 'No, I sometimes imitate people ... like myself. Watch, this is 250 
my best Wayland ... like myself, like myself, like myself.' Wayland is well 
aware that the self  is a performance, and that beneath each mask there is but 
another mask, making the self but a repetition which it is possible to either 
ontologically consolidate, by repeating it in the same way, or falsify, by 
repeating it differently. In contrast to the patrilineal cuckoo of  Ripley, then, who 
initially imitates Dickie's father - an expression of  his ability to validate his 
inauthentic impostoring through the retroactive positioning of  himself as a false 
cause - Wayland understands his own identity to be a matter of  self-performance 
without first cause. He is a series of  masks which are, 'like myself, like myself, 
like myself. Moreover, as this flashback is played, Wayland is denying ever 
having met Loftis before the night of  the murder, thus emphasizing the way in 
which he falsifies the past through his performance of  the self, his "lies". 
This ability is shown most clearly in his testimony concerning his fictional 
meeting with Loftis. At this point, the noir technique of  the voiceover is also 
falsified. As we saw with The Talented Mr Ripley, the voiceover is usually used 
in order to make the past a single, inevitable linear trajectory. As Ripley muses; 
'If! could just go back .. .' we are flashed back to the start of  his story, and then 
watch as it is retold just as it happened. Thus the noir voiceover usually serves to 
legitimize the singular nature of  what happened, one person's flashback serving 
as definitive evidence for the way in which the past occurred. In Liar, this 
technique is made to stutter, as Wayland relates the events of  his supposed 
chance meeting with Loftis in the park. 
In Wayland's case, instead of  one person's memory legitimizing the singular 
occurrence of  the past, the opposite happens, and one person's memory becomes 
multiple, as the past is falsified. Initially, his retelling of  the meeting in the 
voiceover fits exactly with the conversation we see as it is played out in the 
flashback. Then things slowly begin to change. Wayland, creating a reason why 
his phone number was found in the dead Loftis' pocket, begins to falsify the past. 
'Do you have a cigarette?' we see Loftis ask in the past. 'Do you wanna go get a 
drink? she says' we hear Wayland say in the present. He then extrapolates as we 251 
watch Loftis searching her handbag for a cigarette: 'I'll have to raincheck I tell 
her, I'm not in the mood'. The stuttering of  the past continues as we see her say; 
'Oh God I'm dying for a cigarette' in the past, whilst Wayland simultaneously 
says, 'Well how can I reach you to cash it in? she says', in the present. Finally the 
past has been altered enough for him to posit his explanation: 'I pull out a piece 
of  paper and give her my number'. With a new, contingent past, Wayland's story 
becomes "true", even through we know from the inconsistencies between the 
past (image) and the present (voiceover) that he is lying. 
Eventually, Wayland and Kennesaw change places, and as Wayland asks 
Kennesaw questions, Kennesaw, hooked up to the polygraph machine, appears 
to implicate himself in the murder of  Loftis. It transpires that he knew her, and 
was using her in order to execute violent role-playing fantasies in which she 
stood in for his wife. Although Kennesaw says he didn't kill Loftis, and the 
machine remains stable, when Wayland asks him if  he killed his wife, the 
machine goes haywire. Kennesaw (the law) is thus implicated as the one who 
commits murder, through the othering (murdering) of  women upon which the 
linearity of  the patriarchal order is based. The ease of  his substitution of  women 
is thus explained, due to their object status (Loftis is a prostitute) as is his 
manipulation of  all women into the role of  the wife. The law is guilty ofthe 
binary division of  men and women that is created through the playing out of 
gender roles as a perpetual repetition of  the same. 
The use oflinear time in the establishing of  this "truth" is also condemned by 
Wayland, who tells Kennesaw: 'Your whole life is a lie, from beginning to end.' 
Linear time is the beginning to the end of  the lie that there is a singular truth, the 
patriarchal order. The fact that Wayland is aided in his quest against the law by 
an aging underworld matriarch, anatomically named 'Mook', further emphasizes 
the ungrounding of  the masculine law that Wayland is attempting by using the 
usually feminine powers of  the labyrinth. 252 
For once, it seems, an attempt to unground the straight line with the labyrinth has 
been figured not as the protagonist's transgression against the law. Rather the 
transgression against the many possibilities that the labyrinth offers, which the 
law enacts, is shown to make it the guilty party. It is this reterritorialization 
which creates the binary which excludes women, represses men into a straight 
line, a linear narrative and singular past, and which thus gets away with murder. 
However, as usual, the Deleuzian scholar, searching in vain for an exception 
even if  it is only to prove the rule, finds the story reterritorialized in a number of 
the usual ways. 
It is Wayland's condition that provides him with the ability to falsify the past. 
Time travel and the falsifying of  the past are here shown to be due to a chemical 
condition, in which the brain is able to black out deeds, to fool itself It  is thus 
Wayland's epilepsy which is used as an explanation for his ability to change 
personality. Once more, it is the mind which is privileged as the controlling force 
over all else, and the organism in which time moves, and not the reverse. 
Moreover, Wayland's false testimony, concerning his meeting with Loftis, can 
almost as easily be seen as the creation of  a false origin, from which the "truth" 
of  his statement in the present is validated. Most importantly, we are left unsure 
at the end as to exactly who did kill Loftis, as some small doubt still remains as 
to whether or not it was really Kennesaw. In the fmal twist, after Wayland has 
successfully faked his own death, we see him, once again, out stalking young 
women in the park. Perhaps, after all, it was he, the labyrinthine man, who was 
the one guilty of  getting away with murder. Indeed, as Wayland's power to 
falsify time is equated with his inability to have sex (sex being shown to be a 
stressful act which brings on his epilepsy) we are left with the representation of  a 
mentally ill, possibly murderous liar, who is not seen as potent enough to take 
part in history, in the regeneration of  the species, and the heterosexual law of  the 
patriarchal order. Moreover, Wayland is also "deceased", in the sense of  having 
lost his essential selfthrough the performing of  his identity. 253 
Once again, the implications of  the ungrounding oftime are too vast for us to 
grasp in a way that is not at least reterritorialized to some small degree. 
Furthermore, despite the film's acknowledgement of  who it is who is really 
getting away with murder, and its portrayal of  the guilt ofthe law, the minor 
league cult status of  the film ensures that it merely exists as the exception which 
proves the general tendency ofthe movement-image to be the rule. The one 
trend that we do seem to be seeing here,  despite the pessimism of  the 
conclusions we have drawn so far, is a greater preponderance of  films, especially 
in the 1990s, in which labyrinthine time and performativity are expressed as 
being mutually dependent. Despite the reterritorializations enacted upon these 
films by the movement-image, the fact is that more and more of  them are 
emerging. Before Lola Rennt, for instance, Tomas Tykwer's Winterschlafer 
(1997) explored the actions of  a character, Rene, who suffered from a physical 
condition very similar to that of  Shelby's in Memento. As we might expect, Rene 
is yet another character who gets away with murder through the forgetting of  the 
past. Despite the usual reterritorializations, there does seem to be a much greater 
degree of  self-consciousness about these films. It  is almost as though the cliched 
reterritorializations of  pat morality have been piling up for so long that the 
ungrounding force of  the labyrinth needs a greater release each time. Indeed, the 
reterritorializations needed to bring this new unthought monster under control 
each time are such that films about time are having to become more and more 
convoluted, as we saw was the case with Memento. 
As a possible, solitary exception, David Lynch's Lost Highway (1996) goes out 
of  its way to avoid such reterritorializations. It is a film which is almost 
impossible to interpret in anyone way as it is, simultaneously, eternally 
returning mobius, a labyrinth between whose universes characters slip, and an 
exploration of  male performativity through difference. Yet, adopting such a 
strategy of  convolution in order to avoid reterritorialization is itself almost 
certain to lead to the film's reterritorialization as art cinema, or cult other. 
Moreover, Lost Highway's success in this respect also makes his more recent 
treatment of  feminine masquerade, Mulholland Drive, seem all the more 
conservative by contrast. 254 
The question which the movement-image's constant need to reterritorialize 
seems to  beg, is, why must we always do this? Why must the binary always be 
privileged, why the linearity of  time always restored, and why such pessimism 
towards labyrinthine performativity? The answer to these questions returns us to 
the point at which we began this project, WWII and the shifts of  power, 
especially between Europe and America, that occurred in its aftermath. How can 
we advocate labyrinthine performativity, and becoming-other, when our lives, 
our pasts, are marked by national, collective, and individual, culpability in the 
events of  the past? History, truth, the maintenance of  the nation, and the global 
balance of  power, are all at stake in the "amoral" claims to falsification 
performed by the characters in these films. In order to conclude this thesis, then, 
the final chapter will initially analyse Costa-Gavras' The Music Box (1989) 
before turning to examine the struggle for reterritorialization of  the labyrinth at 
work in two 90s films about the second world war, from a French and an 
American perspective. These are, Un Heros tres discret (1995) and Saving 
Private Ryan (1998). 255 
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6. Reterritorializing Cinema. 
In light of  the conclusions drawn in the previous two chapters we will now turn 
our attention to the context within which these movement-images emerged. This 
will enable us to offer new directions for future exploration by situating the 90s 
fIlms discussed and the "history" of  cinema offered by Deleuze's cinema texts 
within its global context. This chapter, then, whilst offering certain, general 
conclusions, is in fact also intended as a reflection of  an area yet to be explored 
by fIlm studies. Using Deleuze's models of  the movement- and the time-image, 
what can be said of  the differences between the continental, or perhaps rather, 
the global context in which these images emerged? What can "Europe" and 
"America" tell us about the "western" films we have discussed so far? 
Firstly, through an analysis ofCosta-Gavras' The Music Box (1989) we will 
illustrate the way in which the lawful linearity of  national history is itself  based 
upon the simultaneous utilization and disavowal of  the labyrinth. This analysis 
will allow us to demonstrate how the powers of  the false which are utilized in 
order to establish the narrative of  the nation are marginalized through their 
conflation with an inherently evil other. We will then proceed to draw a very 
broad distinction between the different representations of  the past found in 
American movement-images, and European time-images. In particular we will 
contrast Steven Spielberg'S Saving Private Ryan (1998) as expression of  the 
straight line of  time of  American national history, and Jacques Audiard's Un 
Heros Ires discret (1995) as representative of  European cinema's self-
consciousness in regard to the use and disavowal of  the labyrinth. America and 
Europe will be examined as contexts whose histories and populations inform the 
emergence of  the different views of  time seen in the movement- and the time-
unage. 259 
As we saw in chapters four and five, the main reason for the conservative, 
becoming-reactive of  the labyrinth's forces is the need to uphold the single time 
of  history. This official, truthful account of  the past retains its legitimacy through 
the exclusion, or marginalization, of  all potentially ungrounding forces. 
Consequently, instead of  a line ungrounded by a labyrinth, we have a line 
opposed by its binary other, the labyrinth. The movement-image, moreover, 
reterritorializes the labyrinthine performativity of  its characters within a binary 
which upholds the straight line of  time as male, and the labyrinth as its female 
other. In this way, the danger which the labyrinth affords the line of  time, its 
potential ungrounding force when harnessed by either gender, is reduced to 
either an illegal act when performed by men, or a legally sanctioned but 
extremely temporary act, when performed by women. This conclusion, however, 
needs to be placed within a more specific context. As we saw with the films with 
female leads, for instance, the urban, national, or global context in which they 
emerge also effects the way in which they are reterritorialized. Thus, although 
the gender binary which we uncovered in these narratives draws us towards the 
conclusion that it is history that is at stake, exactly whose history are we talking 
about? Is this a phenomenon that is nationally specific, or is there a broader 
movement at work in these 90s films? 
Deleuze's privileging ofWWII as the site of  transition at which the time-image 
emerged would suggest that this is actually agio  bal question. The atrocities that 
occurred during the war, after all, enabled the realization that the entire world 
was culpable for the crimes committed on all sides. The Final Solution, for 
instance, was an act which, economically speaking, flew in the face of  all reason 
in time of  war. Unjustifiable in the usual respects, how could this type of 
genocide be understood? As Peter Canning states as part of  his discussion of  the 
ethics of  cinema evident in Claude Lanzmann's Shoah (1985): 
... no commonplace explanation for the holocaust has been found that 
could be agreed upon by educated men and women to serve as moral 
lesson: the thing just refuses to fit into any intelligible category. The 
mass extermination ofa "race" that was serving a useful economic 260 
function just does not make economic sense - the only kind of  sense that 
democratic capitalist democracy is equipped to recognize. Taking Jews 
off  war-production assembly lines (where there were shortages of 
workers, and when the war machine was desperate for supplies) and 
feeding them into incinerators is evidence of  economic self-destruction, 
of  insanity. 1 
This unjustifiable military and economic lunacy could only be understood as an 
exposition of  the way in which the binary of  exclusion works when taken to its 
n'th degree. As this binary reasoning tempers all thinking, it should have been 
impossible for anyone, globally, to deny their involvement in this atrocity. The 
singular narrative of  history, that which had previously been maintained by both 
the nations of  the victors and the vanquished, was, after all, also based upon this 
same binary. How was it possible, then, for the continuity of  this narrative to 
remain uninterrupted in the post-war years? It is for this reason that Deleuze 
believes the time-image to have emerged when it did, signifying a global 
recognition of  the crisis of  truth, and the subsequent crisis of  the movement-
image's truth-seeking narrative. 
Yet, despite this realization, and despite the brief  emergence of  the ungrounding 
force of  the time-image, the movement-image maintained its dominance in the 
post-war years. Moreover, it still does so today. Why is it that, even with the 
self-awareness caused by the war, that very awareness which called the 
falsifying time-image into existence, we still ho ld true to the binary? Why is it 
still: 'Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler,2? 
Perhaps the realization is simply too much to bear. Perhaps for this reason 
whenever a labyrinthine performance of  identity threatens to unground the 
straight line of  time we refuse to countenance the crisis of  truth which it will 
inevitably bring to light. Hiding behind our seemingly consistent belief in the 
"truth", we posit that the mass extermination of  the Jews was but the act ofan 
innately evil other. In this way we  maintain the straight line of  time, and negate 261 
the necessity of  having to face our own culpability in the maintenance of  this 
system of  thought. But this is not the answer. The reason is much less forgiving 
than simply human frailty. The reason is human "strength". In point of  fact, we 
uphold the line of  time, history, and the singularity of  truth, by deliberately 
representing labyrinthine performativity as the most dangerous, or innately evil, 
force known to man. We do this because we need, or rather, we want, the law. 
This is the case even though we know that the law is to blame for atrocities such 
as the holocaust, atrocities, moreover, committed in our name. 
As Deleuze and Guattari showed in Anti-Oedipus, it is the fascism in all of  us, 
our desire to become-reactive which ensures that desire ultimately desires its 
own repression. It  was for this reason that the post-war realization of  our 
collective guilt was immediately reterritorialized, and the binary retained. As 
Canning further states, we: 
... hang on to illusion by repressing the truth (awareness of  its false 
condition) and sustaining a disciplinary-subjective position tom between 
fantasies of  transgression, with occasional peccadilloes, and its own bad 
conscience (the "normal neurotic" position represented by the "Name of 
the Father,,).3 
This is the real reason why the movement-image, with its linear narrative, and its 
binary structure maintains its dominance today. Through its reterritorializations, 
the lawful, patrilineal heritage which history maintains ('the ... "Name of  the 
Father"') is maintained as the upholder ofa truth. According to our binary 
reasoning, it is against this truth which the wartime losers must have, we 
retroactively judge, transgressed. 
It  is for this reason that so many post-war representations of  the Nazis have 
emphasized both their tendency towards homosexuality, their inherent evilness, 
and their duplicitousness. In Roberto Rossellini's, Roma Citta Aperta (1945) for 
instance, the female Nazi, Ingrid (Giovanna Galletti) is a preying lesbian who 262 
seduces Italian women with the promise of  drugs and fine clothing. The 
homosexuality of  the effete Major Bergmann, moreover, is suggested through 
his effeminate mannerisms. Rossellini famously cast the dancer Harry Feist in 
this role as he felt his gestures evoked the decadence befitting a Nazi. The 
duplicitousness ofthe Nazis is also stressed by the layout of  the rooms in 
Gestapo Headquarters. From torture chamber, Bergmann passes easily through a 
door to his office, and then through another to the sitting room where he and his 
friends drink and chat amiably. The layout of  the rooms is used to show that 
behind the fa<;ade of  cultured respectability there lies an inherent evil, that which 
the Nazis practise upon the bodies of  their enemies. 
Through this type of  representation, the Nazi, as marginalized other, takes on the 
collective guilt of  the victorious allied powers. Hence the holocaust becomes 
simply the action of  an inherently evil, degenerate, other nation. This effectively 
erases the memory of  the myriad, equally heinous colonial acts of  mass genocide 
previously committed by the victorious powers, Britain, America, and so on. In 
terms of  time this mechanism also works to ensure that the labyrinth, and indeed, 
the notion of  a discontinuous history, is a force equated with evil. Legally, its 
powers allow, as Canning says, only temporary 'fantasies of  transgression' such 
as those of  Sliding Doors, and Lola Rennt. Illegally, or rather, essentially, 
however, it is a force for pure evil, the force that gets away with murder. The 
reasons behind this maintenance of  the exclusive binary which perpetuates the 
myth ofa singular, continuous history in the west, in spite of  the realizations 
made during the war, is figured in The Music Box. 
Musical Heirs. 
The Music Box is the story of  a female lawyer, Ann Talbot (Jessica Lange) 
whose elderly father, Mike Laszlo (Armin Muller-Stahl) is accused of  war 
crimes. It is alleged that, during the latter stages of  WWII, whilst serving as part 
of  the Hungarian Special Section (a Gestapo-organized death squad, locally 263 
named the 'Arrow Cross') Laszlo personally tortured and murdered a number of 
Hungarian Jews. With the conclusion to the war he fled Hungary as a refugee. 
On arrival in the US, he gained citizenship by claiming to have previously been 
employed as a farmer. He then worked in a steel mill for thirty years, raised an 
all-American family, and took part in anti-communist demonstrations. The story 
centres on Ann's defense of  her father, during which she discovers that he was in 
fact the barbarous monster, 'Mishka' who committed the crimes of  which all-
American Mike Laszlo is accused. The film's conclusion, as Laszlo is legally 
acquitted, follows her own personal investigation into the patriarchal conspiracy 
to cover up his transformation (from Mishka to Mike) at both a personal, and a 
nation level. Eventually she blows the whistle on both her father and the 
patriarchal order, primarily to stop her own son, named Mikey, after his 
Grandfather, from following in his footsteps. 
In this respect The Music Box appears to be a film which acknowledges the 
dangers oflabyrinthine performativity, when the past is falsified in order to 
cover up crimes against humanity. As well as obvious parallels with real war 
criminals, Laszlo's character can thus be read as a stand-in for historical 
revisionists like the pro-Nazi author, David Irving. Bringing Laszlo to justice 
rightfully maintains the legitimacy of  "truth" in relation to one single past, one 
single history. Yet the film is by no means this simplistic. 
Actually, it is the story of  two fathers. In counterpoint to Laszlo, Costa-Gavras 
offers Ann Talbot's father-in-law (Mikey's other grandfather) from whose son, 
Dean, Ann is now divorced. Harry Talbot is a highly successful, right-wing 
lawyer. Together, Ann's two fathers, Talbot and Laszlo, are depicted in the film 
as the same force, in both its American, and its European incarnation. They are 
the patriarchal law which maintains its power through the illusion of  its 
unchanging continuity. This is so even though its constantly shifting political 
alliances, especially those evident at the end ofWWII and the start of  the cold 
war, ensure that it is actually a discontinuous force. The law, we are shown, 
utilizes the labyrinth, but hides its inherent duplicitousness beneath the favade of 264 
maintained respectability, the straight line of  national history. Thus the case to 
determine Laszlo's guilt as the labyrinthine, duplicitous Nazi hiding behind the 
legality of  American history becomes, through the conflation of  these two father 
figures, an expose of  the law itself The film illustrates how, in order to maintain 
the dominant, global position which it achieved at the end ofWWII, America's 
historical, righteous, and legal entitlement to the position of  "good" must be 
maintained at all costs. Furthermore, complicity with the fallen Nazi regime in 
the immediate post-war, and the ensuing cold war, years must be sutured over by 
a consistent, continuous historical narrative. This is why it is so important that 
Laszlo's guilt be not proven, and the law's utilization of  the labyrinth disavowed. 
At first glance, this fIlm seems extremely conventiona1. Laszlo is, once again, 
the perfect expression of  the forger. He is a man with two histories, both an 
Hungarian and an American past. These respective pasts, moreover, are 
associated with his two names; Mishka, in Hungary, and Mike, in America. 
Laszlo is thus a character who uses his epistemic, discontinuous history to enable 
him to perform his identity differently in different contexts. As usual, the 
labyrinth is shown to be duplicitous, and used by the man who attempts to get 
away with murder. Laszlo's forgery of  himself  as all-American citizen, 
moreover, hides an essential selfthat is, as the Federal Prosecutor, Burke 
(Frederic Forrest) has it; 'Pure evi1.' In his opening courtroom address, Burke 
states: 
'Mr Laszlo committed crimes so heinous that the mind boggles trying to 
comprehend them. We are not speaking here of  the banality of  evil, of  an 
anonymous bureaucrat sitting in an office giving orders, or a gendarme 
executing orders. We are speaking of  a man who committed these 
heinous crimes with his own hands. We are speaking of  evil incarnate.' 
For Burke, crimes committed by those in the system, or by extension, the 
bureaucratic system ofthe law itself, are not really crimes. It is only the 
inherently evil nature of  Mishka that makes him guilty. Thus the complicity of 
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is offered for our communal guilt is the labyrinthine, sadistic, Nazi pervert. In a 
perfect expression of  binary justice, the guilt of  otherness with which the Jews 
were lumbered by the Nazi's, here switches to the ex-Nazi. 
Were it not for the conflation of  Laszlo with Talbot, then, we would be looking 
at yet another plot of  the type we saw in the previous chapter, in which an 
essential, murderous, evil, self  was to be seen hiding beneath a performative 
masquerade. In fact, if  the film upheld Burke's (Federal) opinion as its dominant 
narrative voice, then the guilt of  everyone who participates in the same 
bureaucratic war machine would be, effectively, negated.  It would be as though 
it were saying that is not "we" who are to blame for upholding the law, that same 
law which caused the holocaust. Rather, it is the few bad apples who actually 
enjoy killing, these are the guilty ones. There is still evil, Burke's statement 
would suggest, and because of  this we know that we are not it. 
Alongside Laszlo, however, and ensuring that Burke's interpretation is not the 
dominant voice in the film, there is Talbot. Talbot also has a discontinuous 
history. In fact, he has a history as part of  the secret service which is continuous, 
but which, in contrast to the officially sanctioned view of  American history, 
appears duplicitous, labyrinthine, and dishonourable. In point of  fact, Talbot, 
symbol of  American law, and American history, is temporally the same 
labyrinthine character as Laszlo. The trial of  Laszlo, then, is also the trial of 
Talbot. The threat ofungrounding which the straight line of  time faces is not so 
much a threat in terms of  the disintegration of  its power, but rather, the discovery 
of  its own use, and disavowal, of  the labyrinth which lies beneath the fayade of 
history. 
Early on in the film, Sandy, one of  Ann's colleagues, tells her what the 'word' is 
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'Harry was in the O.S.S. during the war y'know, then the O.S.S. becomes 
the C.LA. then the C.LA. sets up its first little spy apparatus in Europe by 
putting a bunch of  Gestapo guys on the payro  11.  Word is, Harry used to 
sip bourbon with Klaus Barbie.' 
To which Ann replies: 
'Well, the word I heard was that he sipped bourbon with senators. He 
even sipped bourbon in The Whitehouse a couple oftimes. I never heard 
anything about Klaus Barbie.' 
The two stories concerning Talbot are telling. The 'word' given by Sandy is the 
story of  a discontinuous history, in which America shifts from being the enemy 
of  Nazism, to the ally of  ex-Nazis. This is due, we are told on numerous 
occasions throughout the film, to the need for allies against the new threat of  evil 
in the post-war world, the Communists. As the threat changed, the binary also 
shifted. From America, good, vs Nazism, bad, to America, good, vs 
Communism, bad. It  would not be too cynical to see this as a very little shift in 
allegiances. In fact, it is a continuous history of  sorts for the Americans, and the 
Nazi's, both of  whom retain a certain amount of  control of  western Europe after 
the war. What is important, however, is that whether this is much of  a political 
shift or not, the official smokescreen of  continuity remains in place. This is 
evidenced in the 'word' heard by Ann. Despite Talbot's chequered past - first in 
the O.S.S., fighting Nazism, and then in the C.LA using ex-Nazis to fight 
Communism - he has remained officially sanctioned through his links with the 
government. Here we see how the straight line of  his official American history is 
used to cover his labyrinthine shifts of  identity in relation to Europe. The global 
dominance of  American history, then, is seen to be based upon the maintenance 
of  the effacement of  its own duplicitousness, the realization of  which would 
threaten to unground its stability. 
In counterpoint to Laszlo, post-war cinema's forger, Talbot represents the 
'truthful man,4. Drawing on Nietzsche, Deleuze shows how the destiny of  the 267 
forger in post-war cinema is always shown to be based upon that of  the truthful 
man. The truthful man is he who establishes the normative standard of  the good. 
The truthful man in the end wants nothing other than to judge life; he 
holds up a superior value, the good, in the name of  which he will be able 
to judge, he is craving to judge, he sees in life an evil, a fault which is to 
atoned for, the moral origin of  the notion of  truth. 
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Yet the forger and the truthful man are inextricably linked, for how can the 
forger forge without a model upon which to create his forgery? Indeed, as this 
process is a double movement, how can the truthful man establish the good 
without an evil against which to oppose himself. As Deleuze has it: 
Behind the truthful man there is the forger ... and the one constantly 
refers back to the other. ... In short, the forger cannot be reduced to a 
simple copier, nor to a liar, because what is false is not simply a copy, 
but already the model. 
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The very idea of  a mode~ of  a normative measure of  the true, of  one official 
history, is but a fiction based upon the workings of  the labyrinth. In a rather 
circuitous process, a labyrinthine forgery of  time creates the illusory model of 
the straight line of  time. Using this model the truthful man establishes the 
legality of  history, and gives birth to the good. From the good then stems the 
notion that the labyrinth is the bad copy. It is for this reason that, as our analysis 
of  the forger in the previous chapter showed, he is forever unable to break free of 
the binary. His transgressive actions themselves only help to maintain the system 
which he hopes to unground. The truthful man, he of  the law, actually predicates 
his legitimacy upon a labyrinthine falsifying of  the past, but maintains his 
authority by disavowing this process. Laszlo and Talbot are effectively shown to 
be the same: the forger and the truthful man who constantly refer one 'back to 
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Admittedly, Laszlo's attempts to perform his identity differently in order to 
evade punishment for his war crimes illustrate the extreme dangers to which 
labyrinthine performativity can lead. How can we be sure of  anyone's guilt for 
their past actions, after all, if  they can willfully become-other? For this reason, 
illustrating the disguise of  the essential self  that Laszlo undertakes no longer 
seems to be quite such a reactionary move as it was seen to be in the previous 
chapter. Surely we should unmask such perpetrators, their disguises should be 
seen through? Whilst this is beyond question, what this film is trying to show us, 
rather like Liar does, is that the very law which sits in judgement upon such 
performativity is itself guilty of  the exact same crimes. It is for this reason that 
Talbot also has so much to lose in this case, for if  one forger is uncovered, so too 
is the truthful man, his ally. 
Laszlo's guilt is established in the film narrative in ways which are by now 
becoming easy to recognize. In particular, beneath all the masks the film goes to 
great lengths to establish the continuity of  his essential self This technique, 
however, is here also used by the film to foreground the artificially constructed 
nature of  US national identity. Since coming to America, Laszlo has built 
himself a cover in order to hide his past. He has adopted American values and 
become, as he says; 'A citizen, a good American'. He worked in a steel mill for 
thirty years. He has two children. His son, Karchi, (Michael Rooker) is a blue-
collar steel-worker like Laszlo himself Moreover, as a veteran of  the Vietnam 
war he has risked his life for his country. Ann for her part, is a lawyer, and, 
whilst she slowly sheds her political naIvety during the film, she is initially 
shown to be "in bed" with the law. Although having divorced Talbot's son, Dean, 
she has kept her married name. 
Laszlo has also made an exhibition of  himself on television, protesting against 
the visit ofthe Hungarian National Folk Dancers, a Communist organized 
dancing group. This action was, as Burke comments, perpetrated both to create 
an alibi as to why the Hungarian government might wish to dirty his name, and 
also to establish him as an enemy of  Communism; 'a good American' in the 269 
strictly oppositional sense. He has effectively created a new life for himself, he 
has become-other, but this is seen by the film to be but a smokescreen; 'the 
perfect camouflage' as Burke has it. This interpretation of  his actions is 
highlighted over the incident in which protestors attack his house and a picture 
of  Laszlo, defending his home with baseball bat in hand, is printed in the paper. 
Talbot congratulates Ann on this publicity saying: 
'You must be elated this morning! Old man in a [Chicago] Bears' cap, his 
arm round his grandson, being threatened by a screaming mob. The 
jury'lliove it.' 
Mikey's presence, pictured at Laszlo's side, along with the all-American ideal of 
the right to defend the family homestead (the legitimization of  violence against 
all evil doers) makes this an image that is the epitome of  American family 
values. In Laszlo's use of  his citizenship as a cover, becoming-other is figured as 
a charade which covers an essential self  in whom an originary evil exists. 
National identity, moreover, is here seen to be an image that can be abused by 
the cuckoo, Laszlo. His actions, consequently, force us to question just how 
authentic this national identity is in the first place. American history, the film 
suggests through this analogy, is constructed in a way similar to Laszlo's auto-
biographical identity. Behind the favade of  American values, after all, is the 
disguising ofa European led mass genocide, that of  the native Americans. By 
focusing on the essential self  and its European origins, the film questions 
whether it is ever possible to escape this heritage through labyrinthine 
performativity, or whether the present is ever anything but a continuation of  the 
murderous, exclusive past? 
There are several ways in which the film establishes the body as a continuous 
organism in which the truth of  identity is maintained. Most importantly, Laszlo's 
constant obsession with press-ups is used to provide a continuity between the 
murderous Mishka and the all-American Mike. From the torture ofMishka's 
victims, by press-ups over bayonet, to bedtime exercises with grandson Mikey, 
Laszlo's habit physically evidences the "real" man behind the imagery of  the all-270 
American mask. Again, in the courtroom, just prior to his heart attack, Laszlo 
protests against accusations of  barbarism, shouting: 'This man didn't do this. It's 
not me'. His body, however, as his heart gives out at this moment, gives the lie to 
his words. Behind all his protestations of  performative identity change, of; 'It's 
not me', his body tells another truth. Indeed, both Laszlo and Ann evidence their 
Hungarian heritage in mistakes, or slips, when speaking English. Here, once 
again, the organism betrays their essential otherness, their European origins, and 
foregrounds the disguise that is national identity. The labyrinthine, European 
roots of  American national identity are thus hinted at in order to draw attention 
to the historical construction of  an apparently continuous set of  American values. 
These are values, moreover, which are themselves based upon the genocidal 
extraction (like the holocaust, the ultimate marginalization of  the other) of  the 
native American. Laszlo and Talbot, as Europe and America, are conflated in 
order to show their complicity in the marginalization of  the other (at its extreme, 
mass genocide) upon which the law establishes its legitimacy. Moreover, it 
shows how this cover up is only made possible  through a strategic use of  the 
labyrinth to create a singular, continuous linear narrative of  the nation. 
Finally, the guilt of  Laszlo's originary self  is unmasked in the courtroom, in 
which all the witnesses are asked to identify not Laszlo, as he is now, but rather 
his picture from 1944. Whatever has happened to him since then, whatever 
becomings he has attempted (and in a sense, the film offers that he could have 
already served a life sentence, having worked for 30 years in a steel mill) it is his 
essential, European self  to which the guilt is attributed. In addition to this, when 
Ann finally realizes the truth it is through seeing an old picture ofTibor Zoltan's 
scarred face whilst on her visit to Hungary. His face having been corrected 
through plastic surgery, no one had previously been able to link Laszlo's 
blackmailer to his past as Mishka. Once Zoltan's essential self is uncovered by 
Ann, however, the body is, once again, seen to be something which cannot 
legitimately become-other. Rather, it can only be disguised in order to get away 
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The case ultimately hangs on whether or not Laszlo's Arrow Cross identity card 
is real, or a forgery which the Hungarian Communists were using to persecute 
him. As her star witness, Talbot provides Ann with an ex-KGB agent who has 
defected to the west. He describes the workings of  'Operation Harlequin', a 
policy pursued by the Communists, of  creating forged documents to sully the 
name of  those who had left Eastern Europe after the war. This witness ensures 
that it is the Communists who now appear labyrinthine, willing to falsify the past 
and create dishonourable personal histories for their enemies. Identity finally 
boils down to a question of  whether or not Laszlo's past has been falsified by 
himself, or by others. Who is the evil labyrinthine power? With Laszlo's guilt 
'not proven', it is the Communists who are finally found guilty, guilty of  hoisting 
a false, brightly coloured, harlequin's favade, a disguise, behind which to falsify 
identity. Once again, by making the powers of  the false a technique peculiar to 
the other, the American nation retains the illusion oflegitimacy for its own 
national narrative, and disavows the labyrinthine discontinuities which it 
contains. 
Costa-Gavras's film shows how, in the post-war years, America united with old 
enemies in Western Europe against Communism. In order to achieve this 
discontinuous shift it created a false, seemingly continuous history in which it 
was retroactively seen to be the singular, truthful power. The conflation of  Ann's 
two fathers makes this an international conspiracy of  the right-wing, patriarchal, 
bureaucratic, war-machine. With his guilt not proven, Laszlo joins the side of  the 
law once again, with his false past in Hungary, as policeman, apparently 
vindicated. Like Harry, his labyrinthine falsifying of  his identity now appears as 
a lawful straight line from which he has never deviated. In The Music Box, the 
masculine, linear history of  national tradition is shown to be the cause of  an evil 
in which we are all caught. As Jan Epstein has it of  the film's dominant symbol: 
At the heart ofCosta-Gavras' film is the powerful metaphor of  the folksy, 
charming old European music box churning out murderous and obscene 
images to the accompaniment of  tinkling music.
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This patriarchal use of  nation as a fayade beneath which to hide the guilt of 
exclusion is shown to be universaL Both Laszlo, in Hungary, and Talbot, in 
America are guilty of  upholding the same process. It is not by accident that when 
Ann visits Talbot in his office he also has a music box. The murderous past of 
both man and nation is thus shown to be hidden beneath a fayade of  history. This 
is Ann's discovery when she finds the pictures of  the murderous Mishka in the 
music box. Indeed, when Ann is given vital (although entirely uncorroborated) 
evidence by an unknown source in Hungary, it is yet another seemingly 
charming old man who delivers the documents to her. He states: 'There are some 
people here too. We believe your father innocent. This trial is bad for everybody, 
both here and there.' In this way the film shows that  not only is there a universal 
risk to the law, for, if  one labyrinthine forger is illuminated, so too are all 
truthful men, but so too is there a danger to the international patriarchal 
conspiracy which exists behind all national fayades. 
The maintenance of  the fayade of  history is further attributed to the two fathers 
when  Mikey's admits to having been told by his grandpa that the holocaust was; 
'all a big exaggeration ... all made up'. When Ann confronts Laszlo with this, 
however, he denies it, and Mikey, distressed, says that it was grandpa Talbot 
who said it. Talbot, however, also denies it. He goes so far as to say; 'Mikey and 
I never discuss politics'. Obviously, one of  them is lying. Moreover, if  it is 
Laszlo who is lying, which seems more likely, then so too is Mikey learning to 
lie in order to maintain a patriarchal fayade. In the scene in which Ann, returning 
from Hungary, finally confronts her father, this confusion over the two is 
deliberately left unresolved. Although our suspicions rest with Laszlo, the forger, 
we also here see Talbot, the truthful man, telling the press how the country 
should concentrate less on its grandfathers, and more on its grandsons. It  is the 
national heritage, and its continuation through male lineage which is 
foregrounded. Servant of  the law, Talbot is equally as adept at establishing a 
political smokescreen as Laszlo is, equally as good a liar. As he tells Ann, of  the 
Gestapo intelligence agents who he did sip bourbon with: 'None of  the men I 
knew were monsters. They were all salt of  the earth types, like your old man'. 
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Klaus Barbie, and provide him with a 'salt of  the earth' identity cover, so long as 
this enables him to maintain power. Legitimizing his actions, and perhaps also 
attempting to convince himself  through his own binary rhetoric, he argues that in 
the immediate post-war years the Communists were: 'Satan's army on earth'. For 
this reason, he says, they were; 'Right'to use the ex-Gestapo intelligence against 
this inherently evil, even satanic enemy. Thus the forger and the truthful man 
refer the one back to the other, through the truthful man's use of  the labyrinth, 
paradoxically, to establish his seemingly continuous authority. 
The final straw for Ann comes when Laszlo claims Mikey for himselfCHe's my 
boy, he's my son') and for his violent heritage. Shouting to Mikey, in front ofthe 
press cameras, to sit up in the saddle, 'Like a General', Laszlo expresses his wish 
to pass on his patriarchal, militaristic tradition to his grandson. The image of 
manhood into which he would mould Mikey is equated at this point with that of 
himself  - the uniformed Arrow Cross killer, captured committing murders during 
the war - in the photos which Ann finds in the music box. The binary workings 
of  the upholder of  the law are also evident at this point, in his reaction to her 
threat of  exposure. 'What did the Communists do to you?' he asks, shifting her to 
the side of  the marginalized other. Then, with; 'They are going to say that you 
are crazy' and; 'Something happened to your mind' he fmally exiles her as 
duplicitous, feeble minded woman, to the side of  his enemies. 
Sadly, and in fact, inevitably for the movement-image, when Ann exposes her 
two fathers to the world, she herself  only upholds the line oftime. As guilty 
parties, they have simply transgressed the law. Their labyrinthine crimes will 
now work to uphold the more general legitimacy of  the law which fmds them 
guilty. Far from everyone being implicated, the guilt will fall on the few who 
have seemingly deceived the righteous many. Moreover, pictured at the film's 
end, with her son, looking out to sea, in her opposition to the law of  her fathers, 
Ann herself  becomes marginalized to the position of  the labyrinthine other. As 
was the case with Possible Worlds, although supposedly a positive image, 
gazing out to sea, the woman is here again equated with the flux and becoming 274 
of  water, thus opposing her to the male form of  the land. Saving her son, and 
thereby ensuring that he does not continue the patriarchal smokescreen of  his 
grandfathers, creates a discontinuous line of  history for Mikey. Yet this is 
ultimately seen to be a women's time which stands in opposition to the male time 
of  continuous history. In spite of  all her efforts to the contrary, Ann has become 
the labyrinthine other which legitimizes the male law. 
The context into which the movement-images discussed in the previous two 
chapters emerged is that of  a post-war milieu conscious that any attempt to 
unground the law will inevitably result in a re-afftrming of  the legitimacy of  the 
law. As the time-image's recurrence constantly illustrates, the movement-image 
can never be ungrounded by the labyrinth, as it bases its own existence upon a 
reterritorialization of  its powers of  the false. Thus the time-image, the forger, and 
the movement-image, the truthful man, are caught up in a mutually re-enforcing 
process. When this binary process is played out solely within a movement-
image, moreover, its linear narrative inevitably ensures that any exposure of  the 
law's dishonesty will simply serve to maintain its position as law. Contemplating 
the notion of  getting away with murder is, in fact, the most legal of  all 
procedures. It is perfect practice for the next generation of  grandsons who will 
need to maintain the patriarchal smokescreen. It is this disavowal of  the 
labyrinth, after all, on which the straight line of  national history is established. 
The actions of  Shelby in Memento, can now be seen to represent, in microcosm, 
the same actions which create a national history. Like Shelby, America uses the 
repetition of  difference if  and when it suits it, whilst all the time maintaining the 
illusion that it has never truly departed from its identical (repetition of  the same) 
identity. Shelby'S split I is at once, Machiavellian politician, and the national 
populace, those complicit in the act of  their own self-fooling. 
Furthermore, if  we return to the quote from Rodowick of  chapter one, we can 
now begin to see why and how it is that; whilst 'the movement-image "evolves"; 
the time-image "recurs,,8. The straight line of  time of  the movement-image's 
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discontinuous history of  cinema of  the post-war time-images of  European 
cinema, by contrast, suggested the labyrinthine view of  history whose eternal 
recurrence threatened to unground the normative narrative of  the movement-
image. In much the same way as the movement-image establishes its global 
dominance against the time-image which it marginalizes as other (but which is 
actually the very plane of  consistency which it reterritorializes by constructing a 
plane of  transcendence) so too does the official American view of  history 
establish itself  through the othering of  a labyrinthine, discontinuous European 
past to which it is itself party. 
The maintenance of  America's national history is inextricably linked to the 
movement-image's plane of  transcendence. It is due to its binary logic that, in the 
post-war years, Europe comes to be represented as the falsifying site of  the 
labyrinth against which American linear history gains its legitimacy. It is for this 
reason that  Minghella's treatise on the dangers oflabyrinthine performativity, 
The Talented Mr Ripley works so well. Ripley travels, after all, through an 
American elsewhere, post-war Europe, a place well known in American cinema 
for its duplicitousness. What is perhaps even more interesting is the way in 
which European cinema begins to adopt the labyrinth somewhat self-
consciously. This is true not only in the time-images which emerged with the 
different European New Waves, but also in European movement-images. Emir 
Kusturica's dark, epic-burlesque, Underground (1995) for instance, whilst 
exploding the myth of  the nation aboveground, represents the underground 
pathways of  the European war machine as a labyrinth of  interweaving tunnels. A 
general tendency can also be seen, then, between an American cinema which 
establishes a single, national history through the exclusion of  the labyrinth as 
other, and a European art cinema which maintains the law in a more self-
reflexive way, by deliberately exposing the way in which history is built upon 
the labyrinth. 
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If  we analyse the different way in which the past is represented in Saving Private 
Ryan and Un Heros tres discret the general tendency evident in these two 
different representations of  post-war history should become apparent. On the one 
hand there is American cinema, which upholds the legitimacy of  its history by 
denying its complicity in the alien, labyrinthine events of  wartime Europe. Here 
Europe is figured as the labyrinthine other upon the reterritorialization of  which 
America's national history is established. On the other hand, there is European 
art cinema, which aimed to explore the process in which all of  Europe is 
complicit, that of  establishing and maintaining a historical continuity where all 
that really exists is a labyrinth. Here the concept ofthe nation is deliberately 
shown to rest on the maintenance of  an exclusive binary which determines 
national boundaries (us/them). This argument is not intended, however, to once 
again implicitly raise European art cinema over American cinema. It is not a re-
imposition of  the culture over commodity debate which perhaps structures 
Deleuze's texts. These generalized models, rather, will be explored in order to 
help us understand why different types of  images emerged after the war in 
America, than they did in Europe. Why do we still have Hitler and Hollywood? 
In Flashbacks in Cinema, Maureen Turim charts the evolution of  the flashback 
as it developed in both European and American cinemas. The representation of 
the past that is achieved in these different cinemas is broadly divided into two 
different systems. The American cinema's use of  flashback emerges around the 
time ofD. W. Griffith, and is a device which makes a subjective memory stand 
in for that ofa nation. It is the passing offofthe subjective flashback as 
representative of  supposedly objective, national truth. As she says: 
... flashbacks are central to Griffith's version of  history, saturated with 
emotional identification and symbolism. We can see his films as one of 
the formative stages of  the massive effort in American films to 
subjectivize history  .... The theme of  collective memory as determinant 
of  history and individuals as exemplars of  collective memories in their 
most personalized and subjective form is developed in Birth of  a Nation 277 
(1915) through the use of  one of  Griffith's melodramatic strategies, the 
interweaving of  personal tragedy and love stories with epic narratives of 
major historical events.
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As an example of  such a flashback in Birth of  a Nation, Turim describes the 
incident in which Elsie Stoneman (Lillian Gish) is amorously pursued by 
Yankee, Ben Cameron. Just when she seems about to succumb to his advances 
the intertitles declare: 'Bitter memories will not allow the Poor Bruised South to 
forget'. Soon after this the film cuts from Elsie's face, to a shot, with red filter, of 
her brother dying during the Civil War. This image, which we had previously 
seen as part of  the film's narrative development, was not one to which Elsie 
herself was privileged. What appears to be a personal recollection, then, due to 
the cut from her face to the image of  the dead, is in fact an image ofa 'collective' 
past through which the film attempts to 'subjectivize' history. It is, as Turim says, 
the conflation of  historical events with personal tragedies in order to raise an 
emotional response in the viewer. This is a process which, as we shall see in our 
analysis of  Saving Private Ryan, continues in 90s cinema. 
In contrast to this specific manipulation of  the past in American cinema, Turim 
charts the rather different way in which flashback developed in European art 
cinema of  the same period. Influenced by the philosophy of  Bergson, and its 
more popular expression, and critique, in Proust, French art cinema began to use 
the flashback in order to make a different point concerning the past. Rather than 
focusing on the collective past, through the subject, it attempted instead to 
explore the ambiguity of  the subjective experience of  the past. Turim argues that 
this concentration on the individual, subjective experience of  the past, in its own 
right, is also evident in the flashbacks used in early Swedish and German art 
cinemas. With the New Waves of  the post-war years, moreover, the European 
flashback began to represent subjective memory as a fragmented, patchwork 
puzzle of  the past. Turim's suggests that these cinemas force the spectator to 
become aware of, and, ultimately, to partake in, 'the formation of  the text'lO. By 
extension, it would then seem possible to argue, through its Brechtian focus on the individual's narrative, European art cinema questions our ability to 
objectively represent both national and historical events. 
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Put succinctly, the difference being drawn between what are primarily American 
movement-images and European time-images is as follows. In American cinema 
the flashback is used to represent a single national history, and to emotionally 
involve the audience in the playing out of  its epic destiny. In European art 
cinema, by contrast, there is a tendency to use flashback to illustrate the 
recognition that history is a labyrinth of  uncertain pasts. For this reason, the 
spectator confronts the realization that anyone, privileged, national past must be 
a fiction. Rather than emotionally involving the spectator, these films instead 
invite a more cerebral involvement in the construction of  a potentially 
ambiguous narrative. Again this foregrounds the artificially constructed and 
ultimately falsifying process in which we are all implicated when we construct a 
national history. This is not to oppose the American line to the European 
labyrinth, exactly, but rather, the American construction of  a linear history of  the 
victor at the expense of  the marginalized labyrinthine other (often figured as 
Europe itself) and the European exposure of  the way in which the line of  history 
is itself  only predicated upon the labyrinth which it both utilizes and 
reterritorializes. At this point, the terms "American" and "European" have 
effectively become conflated with "movement-image" and "time-image". The 
strategies that these types of  image offer for the creation of  national histories, 
however, is still illuminating. In fact, the question which this conflation raises is 
why these distinct types of  cinema came to typify their historical and 
geographical origins? 
The way in which history is represented in these two types of  cinema can be seen 
to mirror the way in which history has been experienced by the old and the new 
worlds. The European nations, with chequered pasts witnessing innumerable 
shifts of  power over the centuries, have discontinuous histories. Any semblance 
of  a continuous national history must, for this reason, be seen to exist as an 
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since its eradication of  its native population, has built a history which maintains 
its legitimacy by disavowing its labyrinthine, discontinuous shifts. In this sense, 
the links drawn between Europe and America by Costa-Gavras' film makes it 
appear as an allegory for the way in which American history establishes itself 
upon the denial of  its own act of  genocide when the land was initially settled by 
European settlers. 
American history is an immigrant history which, a little like the personal history 
of  all-American Mike Laszlo, has also utilized the labyrinth in order to falsify its 
various national heritages, its various 'Mishkas'. The paternal figure in America, 
after all, is not the national, father figure, but rather, "Uncle" Sam, the displaced 
patriarch who unites a diaspora of  nationalities orphaned from their original, 
national fathers. As Turim's work on flashbacks shows, American cinema unifies 
its diaspora through the use of  individuals as representative of  collective, 
national history. It creates what Canning calls a 'warrior theater,ll in which the 
lives ofa small group of  people, usually a small group of  white people, are used 
to represent the one, true, official view of  history. This fact is borne out by Jude 
Davies,12 discussion of  Falling Down (1992) and Groundhog Day, in which he 
shows how even very recent attempts by American films to deal with 
contemporary crises concerning family values, masculinity, post-cold war 
economic recession, and racial segregation, only manage to do so through a 
narrative which focuses on the heroic white male. Whilst documenting the crisis 
experienced by this racially dominant power, these narratives ultimately uphold 
the supremacy of  the white male and his official version of  national history. 
America cinema's development of  the movement-image was used to cover the 
labyrinth of  national pasts of  its immigrant diaspora with a particular singular 
history, that of  the white European colonizer. The linear narrative of  American 
cinema perpetrates the, to use Virilio's term, 'endo-colonialism,13 of  its national 
history. Its narrative, turned on its own people by the movement-image, denies 
all other alternatives to the official view of  the nation's history. The potential, 
myriad, labyrinthine histories of  its multi-cultural population are thus 
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This is in contrast to the European art cinema's concentration on the subjective 
nature of  memory, a focus which presupposes an acknowledgement of  the 
labyrinthine nature of  the past. Just as there are the many views of  the past of  the 
many individuals who experience it, so too are there as many national pasts that 
can be constructed. This is the case both within each nation, and also between 
nations whose identity is constantly being rethought around its borders. As 
Andrew Higson has noted, after all: 'national identity is by no means a fixed 
phenomenon, but constantly shifting, constantly in the process ofbecoming.'15 
Indeed, the struggle for a clear definition of  national boundaries indicates the 
role of  occupation, or indeed, colonialism, in the different conceptions of  history 
which characterize the two types of  cinema. 
It  is for this reason that WWII was an event that was instrumental in giving birth 
to the time-image. The national history that was written during the wartime 
occupation of  the many nations of  Fortress Europe was subsequently re-
examined in the post-war cinemas ofthese countries. If  this was too taboo a 
topic to immediately surface as a narrative concern, it was certainly one of  the 
reasons behind the emergence of  the time-image's fixation on the falsifying of 
time in the labyrinth. Alain Resnais' Hiroshima, Mon Amour (1959) one ofthe 
films on which Turim bases her argument,  provides ample evidence of  the use 
of  both narrative and montage in order to explore the labyrinthine nature of  the 
national past. Ifwe briefly consider Her (Emmanuele Riva) story, the flashback 
to post-war Nevers symbolically describes the cellar into which French national 
history banished any acknowledgement of  its discontinuous past, its past as 
collaborator, with the withdrawal of  the colonizing German army. Imprisoned 
there by her father, Her life demonstrates the European cinema's foregrounding 
of  the way in which national history both marginalizes the labyrinthine, 
duplicitous other, whilst itself creating a history that is discontinuous, although 
giving the illusion of  continuity. With liberation, Europe's post-war past had to 
be rethought, and for this to happen, the entire nation was required to use the 
powers of  the false. For a continuous, linear history of  the nation to be 
constructed, paradoxically, the labyrinth would have to be used. Coming to terms with this post-colonial realization has marked the way European art 
cinemas conceive of  the national past. 
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With this distinction in mind, the remainder of  this chapter will demonstrate how 
for American cinema - representative ofa nation whose colonial power, both 
internally and as global police force, still remains supreme - being the single, 
normative judge of  its own history remains paramount. For the European 
countries of  the post-war years, by contrast, the process of  having to, once more, 
re-write national identity with the departure of  a colonial army of  occupation, led 
to a greater meditation on the very process upon which it is established, the 
labyrinth of  time itself. In short, the America cinema's prioritizing ofthe 
movement-image ensures its tendency towards the singular history of  the plane 
of  transcendence. The European emergent time-image, in contrast, expresses its 
realization of  the labyrinth on which the line of  history is predicated. This 
difference will become more apparent through a comparison of  the different 
depictions ofthe wartime past seen in Saving Private Ryan and Un Heros tres 
discret. 
Saving Private Ryan follows the fortunes of  an eight man squad of  US troops 
from the Second Rangers, led by Captain John H. Miller (Tom Hanks). Initially 
we are immersed in the slaughter ofthe D-Day, as we follow their landing at 
Omaha Beach and the breaching of  the beachhead. From then on the story 
becomes a "Boy's Own" adventure through no-man's land. The squad is sent on a 
special mission, by none other than General George C. Marshall, the Chief of 
Staff  himself, to retrieve James Francis Ryan (Matt Damon) whose three 
brothers have all been recently killed in combat. When Ryan is fmally found, 
however, he refuses to be sent home to his mother, and decides instead to stay 
and help defend a tactically vital bridge. Although he survives, all but two of  the 
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As this plot synopsis suggests, this is, exactly as Turim describes the process 
when seen in Griffith's cinema, the story ofa nation's struggle told through the 
actions of  a few individuals. The film is, in fact, one huge flashback. It is 
recounted, we are initially led to believe, from the point of  view of  the elderly 
Ryan. The flashback begins, after all, with a very conventional close up on the 
aging Ryan's face, over which the sound of  the sea is heard, helping to situate us 
in the past to which we then cut. Ifwe watch closely, however, it becomes 
evident that this cannot be Ryan's memory that we are seeing, as he himself did 
not witness much ofthe narrative which we initially see. As a private in the 
101st Airborne division he parachuted into France, and consequently, did not 
witness the bloody landings with which the flashback begins. The heroic 
struggle which we see, then, this piece of  warrior theatre, is actually the passing 
off  of  an objective account of  the national past, through a narrative which 
initially suggests itself  to be a legitimate, veteran's account of  real events. Rather 
like Elsie Stoneman's supposed flashback in Birth of  a Nation, here again a 
collective memory is shown as though it were personal. It is also, again in the 
style of  Griffith's film, a nation's past told through the struggles of  a handful of 
white individuals. Once again we are seeing, as Turim says, 'the interweaving of 
personal tragedy' with an epic narrative of  'major historical events' 
Very much in American national cinema tradition, the film is also 'saturated with 
emotional identification and symbolism' in its attempt to 'subjectivize history'. 
Despite the horrific realism ofthe beach landing sequences, the film suffers from 
the incredibly thick slices of  ham and jack cheese which Steven Spielberg serves 
up at the film's beginning, and the second helping which he forces down the 
spectator's throat at the end. Once again, in the style of  Sunset Boulevard, the 
film's narrative is bookended by opening and closing images which take place in 
the present. This time the image is of  national significance, the US flag waving 
in the breeze, over a cemetery for US servicemen, in Normandy. This image is 
also accompanied by the soft, mournful tones of  trumpets, to whose beat the 
aged, wearisome, shuffling but proud feet of  Ryan march. The narrative, then, is 
blatantly linear, with an inevitable ending already inscribed in history, which is 
used to seemingly legitimize the fictional representation of  events that then 283 
follows. If  ever there was an origin to America's contemporary national history, 
this war, we are shown, is it. As the camera moves in on Ryan's face just prior to 
the flashback, we focus in on his blue eyes, shining, wet with tears. Although the 
colour blue and the salt water image functions primarily as a graphic match with 
which to transport us back in time to the coastal waters off  France in 1944, it 
also illustrates how the Aryan history which follows is that of  the American 
master race. 
The film also sets out to re-assure the nation that the family is its top priority. 
For this reason, we are shown, the Chief of  Staff  will personally take time out in 
the middle ofthe invasion of  Europe to see to it that mother Ryan's last boy will 
be returned to her alive. If  this costs another six lives, then so be it. In fact, as we 
see mother Ryan receiving the telegrams telling her that her other three sons are 
dead, her geographical position in the nation's heartland, Iowa, serves to conflate 
her identity with that of  the nation. Her house, amidst vast, crop-laden fields, 
suggests the bountiful, natural goodness of  the mother country in the service of 
which these men die. The national heritage which the dead fought for, moreover, 
is figured in Ryan's family who accompany him to the cemetery. Followed by 
his wife, son, and grandchildren, the family values which America holds so 
proud are shown to be built upon the sacrifices of  the soldiers who died during 
the war. Thus the national narrative is used, once again, to uphold patriarchal 
history. 
Throughout the film, Europe is shown as a deadly, duplicitous other world, the 
labyrinth. For America to gain entry it must, quite literally, be invaded, and this 
action itself  costs many lives. Moreover, on arrival, all sense of  order is 
immediately lost, as the American forces are scattered to the wind, without 
leadership or backup. Here identity also becomes confused. The initial search for 
Ryan, for instance, uncovers a man with the same name, but who is not the one 
true Ryan. This is a land, the film shows, in which the soldiers must struggle to 
maintain their own identities if  they are to save the true Ryan, and the one true 
America. This struggle over identity is demonstrated through Miller's (Cartesian) 284 
split personality, as evidenced by his battle traumatized body. Miller's right hand 
has developed an intermittently recurring shake. Behind the mask of  Captain 
which he wears in the war, we fmd out, exists a sensitive, High School teacher, 
an educated and cultured family man. His essential self shows through in the 
uncontrollable motor actions of  his hand, the fear and emotion which he hides in 
leadership being retained, we are thus reassured, in this land where all identities 
are uncertain. Becoming-other is just a temporary disguise beneath which he 
retains his essential American self 
In fact, when a command decision made by Miller leads to the death of  the 
squad's medic, Lieutenant Wade (Giovanni Ribisi) we see Miller break down 
and cry. As he battles his emotions he clenches and unclenches his hand, to try to 
stop it from shaking. In an impassioned speech to his men immediately after this 
revelation of  the continuous self he states: 
Back home I tell people what I do for a living, they think, well, now that 
figures. But over here, it's a big mystery. So I guess I've changed some. 
Sometimes I wonder ifI've changed so much my wife is even gonna 
recognize me whenever it is I get back to her. And how I'll ever be able 
to tell her about days like today  .... I just know that every man I kill, the 
further away from home I feel. 
Recognizing that he has changed since his arrival in Europe, Miller 
acknowledges the way in which identity can be different in different contexts. 
This acknowledgement, however, is immediately followed by a disavowal of  its 
legitimacy, ensuring that the wife (family) to which he hopes to return is the 
truly legitimate, essential identity. Becoming-other, performing your identity 
differently, is something the soldier does, but beneath this legitimized getting 
away with murder he struggles to retain his American innocence. As the story 
reaches its final destination, the bridge which they must hold, Miller again sums 
up the dangers of  becoming-other to which Europe has exposed them. He says: 
'Its like we've crossed some strange boundary here. The world has taken a turn 
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duplicitous, labyrinthine ways the American national narrative must negotiate if 
it is to survive. 
The battle-tom landscape through which they journey, moreover, literally depicts 
the 'any-spaces-whatever' of  Europe which Deleuze describes as characteristic of 
the post-war time-image. When reterritorialized in the narrative of  the 
movement-image, however, these spaces are seen to exist specifically to be 
mapped, taken, and fixed. Most obviously this is shown through the movement 
of  the men as they try to find their way across the country, to Ryan. The whole 
invasion, moreover, is a narrative of mapping. This becomes evident when 
Miller discusses military strategy with Captain Hamill (Ted Danson) of  the 
symbolically named, 'Pathfinders'. 
Hamill: You gotta take Caen so you can take St La. 
Miller:  You gotta take St La to take Boulogne. 
Hamill: Boulogne you got Cherbourg. 
Miller:  Cherbourg, you got Paris. 
Hamill: Paris, you got Berlin. 
The invasion is represented as the taking of  Europe's any-space-whatevers (the 
cities in ruin through which the time-image's inhabitants wandered aimlessly) 
and the re-imposition of  meaning upon them. Their physical mapping of  the 
spaces through which they pass re-imposes the sensory-motor continuity of  the 
war machine upon them. We are seeing the American national narrative being 
writ large upon Europe, reterritorializing its labyrinth of  space through the linear 
narrative of  military invasion (,Cherbourg, you got Paris', Paris, you got Berlin'). 
It  is for this reason that the bridge is deemed to be of  such strategic importance, 
for without it the whole invasion could fizzle out, and with it the linear trajectory 
of  the nation's history. The film's representation of  the invasion serves to 
reterritorialize the triplballed formula ofthe time-image, the everyday tourism of 
the 'stroll, the voyage and the continual return home,16. There is now a purpose 
and a direction to the lives of  the men who traverse Europe's any-space-whatevers. These men of  action are doers, not seers, imposing form upon the 
land. 
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This mapping, moreover, is a colonial action, a reclaiming of  the land with a 
specific purpose in mind. It is not coincidental that everytime they take a 
position, or breach a beachhead, the grizzly veteran Sergeant Mike Horrack 
(Tom Sizemore) is heard to say: 'We're in business'. The Americans invaded 
Europe in the war, we are told, in retrospect, not only to rid the world of  Nazism, 
and other such high-sounding ideals, but to impose its capitalist, free-market 
narrative upon the post-war world. 
Indeed, through the strategic use of  one particular character, the greenhorn 
Corporal, Timothy Upham (Jeremy Davies) we are shown the lessons which 
America is supposed to have learned during this war. Through Upham the film is 
held up as the story of  the nation's loss of  innocence in the foreign lands of 
Europe. Its military actions since the war are therefore justified in retrospect, as 
being due to lessons learned during the push on Berlin. 
Upham is initially shown to be a clumsy, type-writer toting, behind-the-lines 
administrator. He has never been in combat, not fired a rifle since basic training, 
and describes himself by saying: 'I make maps and I translate'. Yet into battle 
this innocent, well-mannered choreographer has to go, as retroactive 
representative of  so many essentially good Americans. He also stands in for the 
bureaucratic machine, that which, as Canning argues, is the guilty party in the 
process of  marginalization that caused the holocaust, but which is here (through 
its anthropomorphization in Upham) seen to be an essentially innocent entity. It 
is only through the corrupting influence of  wartime Europe, we are led to 
believe, that this machine becomes a killer. Our collective innocence is further 
illustrated through our association with Upham's gaze. At certain points, in fact, 
we witness action directly from his point of  view. The charge of  the machine-
gun post which leads to the loss of  Wade, for instance, is seen from a distance 287 
through his rifle scope. Gradually the greenhorn Upham is initiated into battle, 
and from his position as observer, he gradually becomes involved, as 
ammunition carrier, until he himself is finally inspired to kill. Thus the 
innocent's slide into the war is used to illustrate the moral rectitude of  the 
nation's struggle. 
His actions, moreover, are also used to represent the justification for post-war 
US foreign policy. The first lesson that America is seen to learn through Upham 
is that there is no point trying to help the indigenous population of  the land in 
which you are fighting. This will only lead to the death of  your men. This 
parable is demonstrated  over the French child who inadvertently causes the 
death of  Private Caparzo (Vin Diesel). It was Upham's mistake - when, acting as 
translator, he assured the French family that their children would be looked after 
if  they went with the troops - that led to this death. As Caparzo lies dead from a 
sniper's bullet, Miller says: 'That's why we can't take children.' The first lesson is 
that, as a military peace-keeping force, even the innocent populations who you 
are trying to help will only harm you. Do not get involved with them. This 
supports a policy ofnon-integration between the colonial army and the 
indigenous population, a policy set to maintain racial superiority. Hence this is 
not a film that is primarily about the liberation of  Europe, or its peoples, but 
rather, the dangers awaiting colonial soldiers in a foreign land. 
The second lesson learned through Upham is that of  the legitimacy of  the pre-
emptive strike. When the squad captures a German POW at the machine-gun 
post it is (partly at least) through Upham's intercession that Miller spares his life 
and frees him. When this same German soldier re-appears in the final battle, he 
kills at least one member of  the squad in hand-to-hand combat, before fatally 
wounding Miller. He then surrenders to Upham, who he believes to be either his 
friend, or at the very least, a coward who will not kill him in cold blood. Upham, 
however, does just this. The second lesson that we are taught through Upham's 
actions is that the mistreatment, torture, and even the murder of  a POW is 
justified, in order to save lives in the long run. In short, kill them first, before 288 
they kill you. The others that you may encounter in foreign lands, the Nazis in 
this case, are not to be trusted, as they are inherently duplicitous. As the German 
POW shows, whilst begging for his life he will readily declare, 'I like American' 
and, 'Fuck Hitler', but when his true colours are seen he is a brutal killer. 
Together the lessons which we experience along with Upham suggest that were 
it not for innocent America's encounter with duplicitous Nazis, these measures 
would not have been adopted. WWII here becomes an origin which legitimizes, 
in retrospect, the actions of  America since then, as though without their 
involvement in the labyrinthine lands of  Europe there they would have forever 
remained at horne, a peace-loving nation of  teachers and farmers. 
Finally, the film conflates its fmal scene with several important battles in 
American history, battles which were instrumental in the construction of  a 
national consciousness. The film's final sequences around the defense of  the 
bridge are perhaps more reminiscent of  an episode of  The A-Team than a war 
film, as we witness the horrendously outnumbered, rag-tag band of  troops fight 
tanks with bombs made from socks, before falling back in a last-ditch attempt to 
blow the bridge. The fmal point to which they return, they have named, 'The 
Alamo'. In this version of  the 1836 defense of  the Texas Mission, however, the 
Davy Crockett style squad of  Rangers ultimately wins out, and The Alamo does 
not fall. More to the point, the bridge, symbol of  the continuous sensory-motor 
mapping of  the US national narrative upon Europe, is saved. Spielberg's 
historical revisionist narrative rewrites an originary loss with a more recent 
victory which comes to take its place in retrospect. American history, with this 
false origin standing in for The Alamo, is now retroactively seen to be based 
upon the successful repelling of  the invasive outsider. The American national 
narrative thus rewrites its history upon the labyrinthine, any-space-whatevers of 
post-war Europe. 
As was the case with George Lucas' Star Wars (1977) the film's finale also 
replays the American war of  independence in miniature. This is enabled by the 
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of  a previously all-conquering, evil, military Empire. This also ensures that we 
are not shown images of  America's mighty war machine rolling through the 
streets of  Europe, a slight omission which attempts to disavow the nation's 
colonial ambitions. The last minute arrival of  the cavalry to save The Alamo, the 
US Airforce's P5I 'Tank Busters', thus appear not as a symbol of  US 
expansionism, but rather the heavenly sanctioned, 'Angels on our shoulders' 
which Miller dubs them. 
Ifthis all wasn't enough, the letter which the Chief of  Staff  reads at the 
beginning ofthe film, in his emotive argument for the retrieval of  Ryan, and 
which he is again heard piously quoting in his letter to the bereaved Mrs Ryan at 
the end, is from none other than "Honest" Abe Lincoln himself. Lincoln's letter, 
to the mother of  five brothers lost during the American Civil War, positions the 
film's WWlI context on a level of  national importance comparable with that of 
the war which unified the North and the South. Both wars become equated, 
through this voiceover, with the birth of  the nation. Lincoln's presence as divine 
logos, the word of  the nation's deceased father, also legitimizes America's post-
war colonial ambitions. His abolitionist stance gives credence to both the US 
expansionism which followed the war, and also the film's narrative, in which 
black servicemen are conspicuously absent, even as extras. The white narrative 
of  the nation's history is thus given a sense of  continuity, from the war of 
independence, through The Alamo, the civil war, and finally, to WWlI. The 
situating of  the war as the reason for, and supposed origin of, US post-war 
involvement in lands beyond its own borders, moreover, pushes the guilt for 
their expansionist militarism onto the duplicitous other of  Europe. The legitimate 
continuation of  this very history is ultimately provided in Miller's dying words to 
Ryan, that he has to: 'Earn this ... earn it.' The retrospectively situated origin 
must be lived up to in the present, we are told by our now deceased patriarch, 
Miller. The nationalism which the film advocates can only be earned in 
retrospect, through its repetition in the same way. This we see in the two 
generations of  Ryan's family who accompany him to the cemetery, the 
expression of  his commitment to maintain both the patriarchal order and 
American family values. 290 
Spielberg's movement-image is an endo-colonialist image. It  is specifically 
designed in order to reterritorialize desire in the service of  the nation and its 
continuous history. Fulfilling Massumi's words to the letter it illustrates the way 
in which: 
The plane of  transcendence, in order to accomplish its mission of 
containment, must swoop back down on bodies, dirty itself  with their 
decay and impermanence. It cannot do that by itself. Before a category 
will take, its code must be applied, the target body must be prepared, 
made receptive in overcoding. Openings must be cut into its perception, 
to provide entryways for generality; it must be coaxed into acquiescence 
or punished into docility, to give its habits of  thought and behavior in 
consonance with society's overall automatic desire for stable equilibrium; 
it must be kneaded into shape, to make it physically able to fulfil the 
productive, reproductive and destructive duties it will be assigned in the 
central molar domains of  Work, Family, War; its desire must be turned to 
1 
17  gory ... 
The movement-image's plane of  transcendence is itself part ofa much larger 
plane of  transcendence, that of  endo-colonialism. It is this reterritorializing 
narrative which overcodes the populace into a molar narrative of  'Work, Family' 
and 'War', and thus turns desire into glory. Saving Private Ryan's narrative 
illustrates the way in which the straight line of  national history is, and must 
continue to be, imposed upon the labyrinthine other, Europe. This seeming 
eradication of  the European labyrinth, through the imposition of  an American 
global order, moreover, works to disavow the film's own use of  the labyrinth in 
its revisionist falsifyings of  the past on which it bases its seemingly legitimate 
history. Due to the movement-image's reterritorializing powers, The Alamo is 
now seen to have never been lost. The truthful man of  history exists, once again, 
on the discontinuity of  the forger, ensuring that the nation's loss at The Alamo is 
never forgotten, by replaying it as contemporary, continuous, victory. 291 
The movement-image has thrived in America because it is the perfect tool for the 
representation of  the national history ofa globally dominant superpower, the 
maintenance of  whose power necessitates the continued illusion ofa singular, 
unchanging narrative of  victory. This illusion, however, can only exist through 
the use of  the labyrinth's historically falsifying powers to turn every initial loss 
into a gain. The bookended narrative of  the epic war film is the perfect 
expression of  the process of  disavowal through which American national history 
maintained its legitimizing image in spite of  its discontinuous heritage. Ulf 
Hedetoft's comment, that; "Hollywood' as a rule, produces national cinema,18 is 
thus supported by the creation of  the national narrative of  American history that 
we see in films like Saving Private Ryan. Despite the movement-image's 
globalizing, 'Hollywood' aesthetic, it is primarily the product of  the plane of 
transcendence which it inhabits, and for this reason, the medium best able to 
express American history. 
In fact, in American movement-images of  the war and immediate post-war years 
in general, there was a marked tendency to disavow the labyrinth, by 
representing it as an inherently evil, outside, force. This was done, at least in 
part, in order to encourage ex-servicemen to give up the murderous ways they 
had learned in Europe, and return to the family values fold. In her discussion of 
Frank Capra's perennial Christmas stocking-filler, It's a Wonderful Life (1946) 
for instance, Kaja Silverman describes the way in which the film: 'attempts to 
neutralize the historical trauma of  civilian reentry.,19 In his discussion of  the noir 
sequences of  the film, Frank Krutnik20 goes one further, describing the way in 
which the parallel universe of  'Pottersville' is used as negative other against 
which to posit the legitimacy of  a by-then long-departed American small-town 
life. Drawing on Dyer21, Krutnik shows how the seedy noir town in which 
George Bailey (Jimmy Stewart) symbolically loses all identity, expresses the 
loss of  the essential self  that occurs once the subject enters the labyrinth. Bailey's 
unlawful suicide, once again, illustrates the murder of  the self  which comes with 
performativity. Returning history to its rightful, small-town trajectory, 292 
marginalizes the labyrinth as defining other, and upholds the legitimacy of  the 
'dominant fiction,22 of  American history. 
Post-war film noir often contained an American labyrinth, then, but one whose 
purpose was to express the dangers of  straying from the straight and narrow. The 
narrative of  Edgar G. Ulmer's Detour (1945) for instance, only takes its 'detour' 
when Al Roberts (Tom Neal) morally bifurcates from the linear course that 
otherwise looked set to lead him to his wife-to-be in Los Angeles. Once he 
enters the labyrinth by taking on the identity of  a dead man, the film's conclusion 
becomes inevitable. Once again this conclusion is prompted by the film's use of 
a bookended flashback to frame the narrative. After playing out the past up until 
the point at which the film began, the fmal scene shows his inevitable capture by 
the Highway Patrol. Of  course, as Krutnik also points out, this was not a device 
which occurred simply because of  the war. It already existed, for instance, in the 
gangster films of  the 1930s. That said, there was often a conflation oflabyrinth, 
performativity, murder, and the European immigrant even in these earlier films. 
Howard Hawks' Italian-phobic, Scarface (1932) being the perfect example. In 
fact, the war remains a prime concern in American cinema, as the point at which 
dangerous outside values attempted to slip in under the guise of  returning 
servIcemen. 
Alan Parker's Angel Heart (1987) for instance, situates the war as the  primal 
scene for the cuckoo-performativity of  its protagonist, jazz singer, Johnny 
Favourite (Mickey Rourke). Having previously sold his soul to the devil, it is, 
significantly, in the body of  on-leave serviceman, Harry Angel, that the 
murderous Favourite chooses to hide out. Drafted before he can make good his 
escape, Favourite/Angel is wounded during the war, and returns to America with 
no memory of  his past. Thus the potentially positive Nietzschean forgetting of 
performativity is yet again figured as the masquerading of  identity of  one who 
attempts to get away with murder. In addition, and once again very much in the 
manner of  Birth of  a Nation, Favourite's occultism is also associated with the 
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parable which represents white American fears of  a labyrinthine other 
(conflating Europe, the occult, and racial difference) masquerading as a 
seemingly legitimate, self-employed, businessman. Ultimately, Favourite's 
inability to escape the devil (Robert de Niro) ensures that his labyrinthine 
identity leads him to hell, after his arrest (and subsequent execution) at the hands 
of  the police. Getting away with murder through the labyrinthine performance of 
the self  is, once again, marginalized as the action of  the evil other that simply 
serves to uphold the legitimacy ofthe law. In American cinema, American 
history is predicated upon the marginalizing of  the labyrinth in order to maintain 
the legitimacy of  the singular history of  the European colonizer, the very 
immigrant culture which, paradoxically, brought the labyrinth to America in the 
fIrst place. 
Nothing to Kill or Die for. 
In Un heros tres discret, by contrast, the use of  the labyrinth is foregrounded in 
order to highlight both the illusion that is linear history, and the disavowal of  its 
utilization of  the labyrinth. Again WwrI is the site of  contest over national 
history, this time in France. This is a fIlm which deals explicitly with the 
performance of  identity of  its protagonist, Albert Dehousse (Matthieu 
Kassowitz). Growing up in Lambersart, a small village in the north of  France, 
Dehousse initially believes his mother's story that his father died a war hero. At 
the age oftwelve, however, he is told by a childhood friend that his father was 
actually a drunk, who died ofliver cirrhosis. When the Germans occupy 
Lambersart in 1940, Dehousse is in danger of  being relocated to work in 
Germany. Saving him from this fate, his father-in-law, a member of  the 
Resistance, teaches him to be a salesman, and secures him a jo  b. With the 
liberation of  France, however, the naIve Dehousse, shocked at accusations of  his 
mother's collaboration, and of  his wife's family'S involvement in the Resistance, 
abandons Lambersart for Paris. There he reinvents himselfas a member of  the 
Resistance, and through bluff  and good fortune, rises to the rank of  Lieutenant-
Colonel. In the post-war years he is dispatched to occupied Germany as head of 294 
the military's 'Intelligence and Propaganda' section. He is charged with weeding 
out the Frenchmen who voluntarily departed for Germany, from those taken 
there by force. Finally, after taking the decision to shoot seven Frenchmen who, 
during the fmal stages of  the war, had volunteered for the German SS, he takes 
offhis mask, and voluntarily gives himself  to, 'the mercy ofthe law'. In order to 
avoid a scandal, he is given a token three year prison sentence for bigamy. 
The film shows all the studied self-reflexivity of  French art cinema. A mix of 
archive footage of  the war and fictional material, it establishes itself as false 
documentary, an effect compounded by its use of  fictional characters portraying 
eye-witnesses and archivists ofDehousse's supposed real life. In this respect it is 
a time-image which expresses only the possible truth of  the history it portrays. 
The musicians playing the soundtrack are also shown at several points during the 
film, whilst Dehousse's fantasy sequences of  himself (as a boy) flying, and his 
father's talking portrait, all further distance the viewer from any too real an 
attachment to the narrative. These Brechtian techniques are used to conflate the 
creation of  the fictional history that the film is undertaking with the fictional self 
Dehousse makes of  himself. The cinematic creation of  a seemingly legitimate 
national history that is perpetrated by films like Saving Private Ryan is here 
deliberately exposed as being a fictional process. 
Dehousse's many self-creations are by now all too obvious expressions ofthe 
labyrinthine powers of  the false. We see him learn to act a variety of  roles, 
including: writer, salesman, lover, dignified beggar, doorman, receptionist, 
resistance veteran, soldier, and husband. Most of  these, moreover, we see him 
being taught by a string of  patriarchs who initiate him into the way in which 
identity is a falsification of  the self His first lie, in fact, comes with his 
acknowledgement of  his mother's deceit concerning his father's death. Dehousse 
learns to lie in order to maintain the illusion of  his father's supposed heroism, the 
legitimacy of  which establishes both the patriarchal order and national history. 
Thus the myth of  the heroic nation/father is shown to be a fiction in which the 
whole population is complicit in maintaining. This is the case even though the 295 
"truth" which it hides is known by all, as Dehousse discovers when his friend 
reveals his father's true nature to him. Dehousse's behaviour from then on can be 
seen to be an attempt to become the image of  his father, the war hero. This 
image however, as we are shown in its sudden animated, drunken, 'Vive la 
France', covers a labyrinthine identity which is at odds with its illusory, proud, 
military heritage. 
Un heros tres discret is a film which directly acknowledges the nation's use of 
the labyrinth to uphold its patriarchal tradition. It is through the labyrinthine 
falsifying of  the past, we are shown, that the legitimacy of  the resistance 
movement comes to create an illusion of  continuity which ensures that the 
collaborations of  the wartime years appear a temporary aberration from an 
otherwise continuous history. This is the case even though the identities ofthose 
working for the resistance during the war were, of  necessity, labyrinthine. 
Captain Dionnet (Albert Dupontel) for instance, who teaches Dehousse the 
dignity and bearing of  the soldier, admits to having had at least six identities to 
enable him to move between the occupied north and the south during the war. 
Rather like Talbot in The Music Box, the labyrinthine techniques which the 
resistance fighters developed during the war are used, in the post-war years, 
whilst at the same time being disavowed. In this way, the resistance comes to 
represent national continuity, whilst the collaborator is seen as the dissembler. 
The film's focus on this fictionalizing of  national history is due to the recent 
acknowledgement of  the revisionist binary that was created in the immediate 
post-war years in order to mask national, collective, culpability. As Chris Darke 
describes the film: 
... it is .. a troubling parable of  the still-unresolved French guilt about its 
wartime and immediate post-war record, a guilt that came into sharp 
focus around the time of  former president Fran90is Mitterrand's death. 
The myth that France was neatly and comfortably divided into two camps 
during and after the German occupation - on the one hand those who 296 
supported Marshal Petain's collaborationist Vichy government, and on 
the other those who resisted the Nazis and their Vichy puppets - has been 
steadily undermined. The result has been an uncomfortable, ongoing 
reckoning with both the national mythology ofthe Resistance and the 
history of  France's deeply ingrained anti-semitism.
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It  is the creation of  these two camps which Dehousse is given the task of 
achieving, through his ability to judge who is a collaborator, and who a 
legitimate, press-ganged, Frenchman. The irony of  the film's "set a thief  to catch 
a thief"  plot is again deliberate, as it expresses the way in which the labyrinthine 
dissembler of  the wartime Resistance later becomes the judge who creates the 
binary of  historical legitimacy, in retrospect. In effect, by becoming the judge, 
and maintainer of  the law, France's labyrinthine national identity is disavowed, 
through the use of  this labyrinth to recreate a straight line. The punishment of  the 
collaborator turns the war years into a temporary blip in national history, 
throughout which the Resistance is seen to have retained France's true national 
identity. The fact that this was itself achieved through the cultivation of  multiple, 
labyrinthine identities is thus sutured over by the nation's maintenance of  a 
seemingly continuous history. Here again we see the truthful man and the forger 
as one in the same character. Dehousse, again like Talbot in The Music Box, 
although appearing to be the law, the truthful man, is in fact the labyrinth, the 
forger. This ambiguity surrounding the identity of  the man responsible for the 
separation of  the "innocent" from the "guilty", of  de Gaulle from Petain, of  true-
French from pro-German, illustrates how arbitrary the creation of  national 
boundaries are through the binary process of  exclusion. 
One question, however, remains to be answered. Exactly why is this depiction of 
national history so different from that found in American cinema? The answer 
lies in the film's subtext of  colonialism. As we saw in our discussion of  Saving 
Private Ryan, the singular image of  history created by American national cinema 
is both colonizing and endo-colonizing. It  is the strong, unchallenged image of 
national superiority of  a nation at the height of  its power. Un heros tres discret, by contrast, is the exploration of  national history in a country which is re-
assessing its status after the loss of  its previous colonial power. 
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The one person who suspects Dehousse's charade to be a fake is Captain Boutin 
(Yves Verhoeven). In fact, if  this were simply an oppositional role in relation to 
the forger, Boutin could be seen to be the truthful man. Boutin's attempts to 
expose the forger Dehousse, after all, illustrate his commitment to a continuous, 
legitimate national history. Symbolically, however, Boutin does not succeed in 
unmasking Dehousse. In fact, in an amusing direct address to the camera, the 
character states: 
'I had to earn all I got, including the women. Its unfair. I shall die in 
Indo-China, in '53. In the Col-de-Nuages ambush. I was never lucky.' 
As Boutin represents the legitimate heritage of  French national identity, the site 
of  his death is telling. He falls in the former French colony oflndo-China, now 
Vietnam. The reason for this European film's meta-fictional emphasis on the 
labyrinthine falsifying that enables the creation of  a singular national history, as 
opposed to the singular history of  American cinema, is here shown to be France's 
loss of  colonial power. With the gradual loss of  the colonies, of  national 
strength, went also the legitimate, national history of  the victor. 
It is for this reason also that lean-Louis Trintignant is so prominent in the film, 
playing the role of  the present-day, elderly Dehousse. Famous for many film 
roles in the past, the one which is surely being referenced here is his portrayal of 
Marcello Clerici in Bernardo Bertolucci's, II Conformista (1969). As Bertolucci's 
film's representation ofthe conformist dissembler shows, it is the realization of 
the loss of  national identity which enables representations of  the labyrinth to 
emerge. Unlike America, and American cinema, whose economic and military 
superpower status remains globally unchallenged (singular acts of  terrorism 
notwithstanding) the European art cinemas of  the post-war years, by contrast, 
slowly began to face their culpability in the use of  the labyrinth in order to 298 
maintain their national identity. It is perhaps for this reason as much as anything 
else, that the time-image first emerged in European (and indeed Japanese) art 
cinemas. It was the losers who were forced to face their new status as 
labyrinthine other to the new colonial superpower, America. 
Trintignant's presence in Audiard's film also expresses the same movement to re-
align national identity with a singular past that we see in II Conformista. It is the 
conservative becoming-reactive of  the fascist in all of  us that is represented by 
Clerici after all, that same day-to-day fascism of  the binary which creates the 
need for mass slaughters on the scale of  the holocaust. The collective guilt of  the 
nation in the maintenance of  its national past at the expense of  an excluded 
scapegoat (in this case the Petain regime and all associated collaborators) is 
deliberately foregrounded by the film. It  is for this reason that when Dehousse 
confesses his crime of  national hero-impersonator there is a consensus decision 
to whitewash his guilt. To acknowledge his individual culpability in the 
fictionalizing of  the past, after all, would be to also acknowledge the gullibility, 
and more importantly, culpability of  everyone else concerned. This would in turn 
cast a shadow of  doubt over the legitimacy of  the Resistance. As there is a 
collective getting away with murder involved in the creation of  a national 
history, the executions of  those arbitrarily excluded scapegoats upon which its 
legitimacy is established must be upheld if  the truly labyrinthine aspect of 
national identity is to remain hidden. 
The national disavowal ofDehousse's crime is the perfect expression of  the 
collective complicity in which we are all involved. This is the same process 
which also ensures our complicity in the massacre of  the Jews, yet another guilt 
which we disavow through the creation of  a scapegoat and the re-establishing of 
the binary. Trintignant's final speech illustrates the way in which this very 
process is established upon the disavowal of  the labyrinth when he says: 
,  ... and we should keep inventing. And when death comes we'll cheat it. 
We'll say it's the wrong time, the wrong guy ... You know what? We'll 299 
direct him to some vile bastard instead. And that's that. In the end only 
human beings will be left, real human beings. Only good guys. Our kind 
of  people.' 
Performativity is here seen to be the force which creates the binaries of  go  0 d/bad 
and us/them, or as he has it, 'good guys', or 'real human beings' vs 'vile bastards'. 
Falsifying the past also provides immortality to those on the right side of  the 
law, whose ability to cheat death is provided by their national history. Sadly, 
however, at the last, Audiard's film advocates this type of  performativity in the 
service of  the nation. In fact, the sympathy which we feel for Dehousse 
throughout furthers the film's conservative message. Audiard himself also draws 
a distinction between the collective everybody and the marginalized scapegoat 
evildoer when he says ofDehousse: 
'I don't judge him in the film because, like a lot of  my generation, I can 
identify with him. I wouldn't, however, like to see myself  in the character 
of  a real bastard; a torturer or a collaborator in the deportation ofthe 
Jews. This is something unpardonable. But I would not necessarily have 
been a hero, no, I could have been a dirty little dissembler.' 
In this way, rather then Dehousse standing in as representative of  the collective 
guilt of  all humanity in the politics of  exclusion, his naIvety and understandable 
cowardice during wartime are shown to be collective offences which are 
extremely minor. They stand in contrast to those of  the 'real bastard', the 
inherent, other, the evildoer, the essential Nazi. Whilst Audiard's film certainly 
foregrounds the use and disavowal of  the labyrinth in the maintenance of 
national history, and our collective culpability in its maintenance, it is ultimately 
unable to critique it. It betrays the same binary reasoning that informs the law. In 
this respect, it may be that it is a very heavily reterritorialized time-image, or 
perhaps even a movement-image. 
In fact, there are a number of  other ways in which the film's conservatism is 
evident. In spite of  its art cinema self-consciousness this is a film which 300 
subjectivizes history, very much in the style of  American cinema. It  tells the 
story of  a national past through the eyes of  a subject with whom we come to 
identify. Although this process itself becomes the meta-fictional topic of  the 
film's narrative in the way that Turim describes, in a sense it also drives the 
film's narrative. This is also true of  the noir bookending flashback technique 
with which the film opens and closes. Here again, although it attempts to 
deconstruct this very technique - Trintignant's first words, 'Let me tell you a 
story', foregrounding the fictionalizing of  the past that will follow - it still 
utilizes this technique to good effect. Indeed, within the narrative itself, the 
essential self  remains the test of  the protagonist's true identity. It  is the lack ofa 
convincing scar (from a bullet in the lung) which eventually gives Dehousse 
away to both Boutin and his wife. Moreover, it is immediately after the 
execution of  the seven pro-German SS that Dehousse gives himself up. Yet 
again the character who initially appears to be getting away with the murder of 
his essential self  is fmally returned to the right side of  the law. Finally, the crime 
for which he is  incarcerated, bigamy, is offered as an almost laughable offence, 
for which his three years inside are a token sentence. The collection of  wives, 
after all, maintains the very same practice ofpatriarchal ownership which we 
saw in the conclusion to chapter four. Labyrinthine performativity is again 
reterritorialized in the film's moral message. It  may expose the labyrinth, upon 
the disavowal of  which the straight line ofnational history is established, but it 
does so with a knowing wink. Our complicity in the maintenance of  the binary is 
shown to be entirely innocent. 
In contrast to American cinema's need to unify a diasporic culture under the 
generalizing banner of  one white history, such European art cinema instead 
illustrates the labyrinth of  histories which exist on a continent where national 
borders have historically been a matter of  much contest. Moreover, at a time of 
supposed European Union, previous national identities (established upon the 
difference between nations) are now in need of  re-definition. The notion of  a 
national identity, for this reason, begins to appear suspect. Recent European art 
films like Underground and Un heros tres discret evidence Europe's new self-
consciousness concerning the labyrinthine shifts which it must make if  its 301 
identity is to be established in relation to a collective future that lies beyond the 
traditional concept of  the nation. 
Thus we see how, in the post-war world, the realization of  our own culpability in 
the binary which caused the holocaust was immediately reterritorialized. In order 
to consolidate its power, the narrative of  the colonial victor made the labyrinth 
other, and conflated it with an evil inherent to Nazism. This was done in order to 
maintain the dominance of  the law exercised by the allied powers. In this way, 
similar past crimes committed by the victors were eradicated from history, in 
order that they should appear to maintain a continuous position on the side of  the 
good. This disavowal of  a labyrinthine, discontinuous, national history through 
the imposition of  a linear smokescreen is exactly that which is critiqued in The 
Music Box, through the conflation of  MishkaiMike Laszlo, with Harry Talbot. 
As forger and truthful man are co-dependent for their existence, so too are the 
labyrinth and the straight line oftime. America's history, moreover, is also 
shown by this film to be based upon the marginalization of  the European 
labyrinthine powers of  both self- and national-creation. These are the very 
powers which were used in order to clear and settle the land in the first place. 
Furthermore, this is the same logic which posits the normative existence of  the 
American movement-image over the marginalized other of  the European time-
image. In order to maintain its narrative of  colonial victor, American cinema 
developed the movement-image. This was a process which continued unchecked 
after the war, in order to perpetuate the illusion of  America's continued moral 
legitimacy, despite its strategic shifts of  allegiance. Europe saw the birth of  the 
time-image, by contrast, due to its labyrinthine past as perpetually contested site 
of  shifting national identities. For the nations forced to rethink their immediate, 
occupied past, the acknowledgement of  their national, historical, labyrinthine 
nature was too obvious a process to be completely disavowed. It  was for this 
reason that the crisis of  truth that took place amongst Europe's any-spaces-
whatever created the time-image. This difference between the two continents is 
seen in the contrasts between the linear history of  the victor portrayed in the 302 
American movement-image, Saving Private Ryan, and the French 
acknowledgement of  its labyrinthine national pasts in Un heros tres discret. 
Sadly, however, neither procedure for the establishing of  national history is able 
to escape the reterritorializing forces ofthe binary. The reason for this is simple. 
We desire the becoming-reactive of  its forces. The European time-image, 
consequently, was unable to unground cinema. 
It  is the utilization and disavowal of  its labyrinthine techniques, after all, which 
enable the movement-image to exist in the first place. This is the lesson of Un 
heros tres discret, a potential time-image, which is in actual fact, a movement-
image which uses and disavows the plane of  consistency upon the dismantled 
bones of  which it constructs its plane of  transcendence. It  is for this reason, 
moreover, that the 90s has seen so many movement-images which self-
consciously play with time, but which, ultimately, disavow this manipulation of 
the labyrinth, reterritorializing it as other in order to uphold their linear, 
normative narrative legitimacy. It  is in this way, we have seen, that the 
movement-image continues to get away with murder. 303 
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Conclusion: On Problems encountered. 
Several difficulties have arisen during this work. The somewhat general 
conclusions to which we are drawn in part two, in the final chapter in particular, 
are at least partly due to the methodological framework we have applied to the 
films studied. Deleuze's philosophical approach lends itself very easily to the 
study of  apparently universal concepts, such as "gender", "sexuality", "time", 
"history" and "nation". These do not always, however, fit specific 
representations ofthese concepts as they are to be found in different national, or 
indeed, popular cinemas. Rather, and perhaps a little like psychoanalysis in this 
respect, Deleuze's ideas need to be examined in more specific contexts ifless 
sweeping conclusions are to be garnered than those offered here. In short, by 
focusing on such universalizing concepts in their abstracted "western" forms, 
this study has reached conclusions which are perhaps a little too generalized to 
be applied to any specific context other than that of  De  leuze, and its own 
devising. 
Deleuze's cinema texts, despite the sections in Cinema 2 pertaining to modem 
political cinemas, manifest a specific understanding of  exactly what constitutes 
cinema worthy of  study. Deleuze's intention, especially in Cinema 2, appears to 
be the perpetuation ofa Hollywood (movement-image) vs European art cinema 
(time-image) binary. For this reason, his texts are symptomatic of  the time in 
which they emerged. In 1992, Richard Dyer and Ginette Vincendeau commented 
on the state of  development of  Anglo-American film studies, stating: 
Part of  the existing map of  cinema is coloured in quite clearly: there is 
America, which is Hollywood, which is popular entertainment, and there 
is Europe, which is art.
l 
Whilst it is not possible to directly map this distinction onto Deleuze's work-
after all, Cinema 1 discusses the growth of  the European movement-image in 306 
several national cinemas, and Cinema 2, the development of  American 
independent cinema - in general, the tendency which Dyer and Vincendeau 
identify in Anglo-American film studies is also true of  De  leuze's cinema texts of 
the mid 80s. 
Deleuze's texts appear to chart the post-war resistance of  European art cinema to 
the colonialism of  the Hollywood movement-image. In point of  fact, however, 
they are an expression of  difference from Hollywood which Deleuze himself 
creates, but which he gives the impression of  having discovered. Essentially, the 
cinema texts offer a third way of  categorizing art cinema's resistance of  the 
Hollywood aesthetic. In addition to David Bordwell's, 'Art Cinema as Mode of 
Film Practice,2 (1979), and Steve Neale's 'Art Cinema as Institution,3 (1981), 
with Deleuze's work we have a definition of  art cinema as a category based 
around the use of  different temporal narratives to create a different type of 
subject. Perhaps the cinema texts could be subtitled, 'Art Cinema as a Temporal 
Narrative' (198311985). This particular image ofa unified ungrounding force 
within European cinema, however, is only evident if  we look through Deleuze's 
philosophical filter. This is a filter, moreover, which not only helps perpetuate 
the HollywoodlEuropean art cinema distinction, but which also ensures the 
continuation of  the assumption that Hollywood cinema is the structuring norm 
from which all other cinemas derive their existence. 
The extremely general conclusions which we reached in chapter six are a 
product of  this tacitly assumed binary. Due to its structuring rationale, the 
distinction between the European temporal labyrinth (as seen in the time-image) 
and the American straight line oftime (movement-image) emerged as a 
seemingly inevitable conclusion. To the scholar of  the cinema/s of  anyone 
specific European nation (or indeed, of  American cinemas) this conclusion must 
seem extremely universalizing. In our defence it is worth stating that, attempting 
to tie Deleuze's categories to a specific historical context inevitably led the work 
back to the few, brief, passing references he makes, in Cinema 2, to the effect of 
WWII on the emergence of  the time-image in Europe. Such ambiguous contexts 307 
as "Europe" and "WWII" themselves suggest the need for a sizable study 
dedicated to exploring the validity of  De  leuze's distinctions in such vast 
contexts. There is much more to be said of  European cinema, after all, than is to 
be found in its internationally accepted art cinema forms. The many popular 
European cinemas which Deleuze's work fails to address would certainly 
necessitate a rethinking of  his categories, if  not his entire argument. The very 
general tendencies which we have alluded to in chapter six, then, should perhaps 
be seen as illustrative of  one of  the drawbacks of  De  leuze's work. This is, 
explicitly, its lack of  detailed context specificity, such as that provided by the 
study of  one nation, and its different cinemas. 
In addition to this it is worth noting that, with the growth of  studies of  popular 
cinemas, it is now no longer possible to assert, as Deleuze did (or to assume, as 
we have) that the Hollywood action-image is the movement-image's most 
dominant manifestation. In fact, the global dominance of  Hollywood's action-
image form is itself a questionable phenomena, depending upon the part of  the 
world studied. Bollywood cinema, for instance, whilst it does not follow the 
same SAS' pattern evident in the Hollywood action-image
4 
- the movement from 
situation (S) to changed situation (S') through the action (A) of  a character - is 
still the dominant movement-image form in many parts of  Asia. This fact in 
itself is enough to question, if  not unground, Deleuze's implicit binary. Even in 
Europe, the art cinema model of  the time-image cannot simply be equated with 
the national cinema of  any country. The number of  different popular movement-
images which exist in Europe alone illustrate just how universalizing the 
conclusions of  this thesis would be, ifuniversally applied. 
This is not meant, however, as a dismissal of  De  leuze's work. The movement-
Itime-image distinction offered by Deleuze is undoubtedly a unique way of 
classifying different cinemas. The way in which it has enabled Laura Marks to 
discuss multi-cultural, and diasporic cinemas, for instance, is exemplary. Yet it 
has been a constant struggle to keep this work from simply maintaining the 
hierarchy that is implicit in Deleuze's cinema texts. It is all to easy, after all, to 308 
use Deleuze's work in order to venerate the time-image over the movement-
image. It  was partly in order to avoid this moral snobbery that, in part two, the 
focus shifted to the movement-image. This was done specifically in order to 
draw out just why, if  it is so morally inferior to the time-image, the movement-
image is so widespread. As we have attempted to show, the reason for this is not 
simply a lack of  education, or "taste", on the part of  the viewer, but rather, our 
human desire for reterritorialization, and molar order. That this is the same 
process that perpetuates colonialism and acts of  mass genocide is perhaps the 
reason why the time-image must ultimately seem so ineffective to this study. 
However, as Marks' work shows, through its focus on the transgressions of 
dominant colonial fictions made available to the viewer through multi-cultural 
time-images, a different approach than ours can offer much more optimistic 
conclusions. Deleuze's binary is itself not wholly to blame for the pessimism of 
our conclusions, then, but rather the combination of  it and the mainstream 
American and European movement-images we have explored. 
Pursuing this work, we have found that De1euze's philosophical approach is a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand it provides a unique and fascinating tool 
for the study of  cinema. On the other, its Hollywood/European art cinema 
framework can presuppose the drawing of  extremely general distinctions 
between national cinemas which are infinitely more complex than the cinema 
texts suppose. We offer this work, then, with the proviso that the conclusions 
which we have drawn be understood as limited to certain types of  cinema. The 
reasons why they should not be universally applied will be made clear before we 
finish, in order to highlight some of  the dangers inherent in such a move. 
The histories of  cinema which Deleuze's texts create, even though they follow, 
as we have shown, an epistemic model, still represent a specifically western 
view of  cinema's development. For this reason, to impose the conclusions that 
this study draws on other, world cinemas, would be little short of  cultural 
imperialism. This is the case, we shall now briefly show, whether they be art 
cinema or popular cinemas. 309 
Studies of  popular cinemas world-wide illustrate just how the different aesthetic 
and cultural traditions on which these cinemas can be shown to draw - once they 
are viewed in specific national and cultural contexts - problematize the subject 
Deleuze uncovers in both the Hollywood movement-, and the European time-
image. Moreover, recent studies of  different art cinemas have also begun to 
question certain of  the assumptions that structure Deleuze's work. Within the 
internationally accepted art cinema movement in which Deleuze discovers the 
time-image, we also find evidence of  the dangers inherent in universally 
applying western frameworks within non-western contexts. Darius Cooper's 
recent book (2000) on the films ofSatyajit RayS (the internationally accepted 
Indian - or rather, Bengali - art cinema auteur) for instance, re-appraises the way 
in which certain critics have, in the past, applied western theories of  subjectivity 
to Ray's characters. This is most obvious in Robin Wood's liberal humanist 
appraisal of  Ray, in his book, The Apu Trilog/ (1972). In this earlier work, 
Cooper shows, Wood betrays his ignorance of  aesthetic forms specific to India. 
Unmasking the Aristotelian bias of  Wood's decision to approach Ray's films 
through their characters, and his psychoanalytically informed study of  their 
psyches', Cooper's work thus critiques the tendency to universalize, and, 
effectively, to naturalize, through a westernized interpretation, the poorly 
understood other. 
Wood, Cooper shows, is not the only critic guilty of  this universalizing 
application of  western theories of  the subject onto characters who exist in a 
different national and cultural aesthetic. He is also critical of  Ben Nyce's7 
conception ofthe character of  Apu, in Apur Sansar (1959). The passage which 
Cooper quotes from Nyce is meant as a description of  the transformations of 
Apu when his character is read as allegorically representative of  the Hindu God, 
Krishna. In fact, the concluding section of  the passage describes perfectly the 
becoming-other of  the Deleuzian subject. 310 
He is the same Apu throughout the trilogy, and yet he is in the process of 
becoming different from his prior selves - or, more accurately, of 
becoming more and more himself
8 
Cooper states, however, that this interpretation is 'completely erroneous,9. As he 
goes on to demonstrate, there is a becoming-other evident in Apu, but it should 
not be understood in the way Nyce suggests. Instead, it can be more fully 
understood as part of  the Classical Indian aesthetic form of  the rasa (roughly 
speaking, the blending offlavours/moods). Ray's character, Apu, whilst 
developing through the course of  The Apu Trilogy actually remains constant to 
himself  throughout. He displays, Cooper demonstrates, the 'constancy of 
character'  10 typical ofthe rasa form. His "becoming-other" (if  we persist in 
understanding this term in the fashion prescribed by a western metaphysics like 
that of  Deleuze  ) is figured, rather, through his contrast with other characters. In 
this way, Cooper explains, does the rasa aesthetic develop its characters. Thus, 
whilst Apu can be seen to manifest the same becoming-other as Deleuze 
discovered in the subject of  the time-image (especially if  we go looking for this 
interpretation of  his character) when seen in a different light - when viewed, for 
instance, as part of  a distinctly Indian aesthetic - the way in which his becoming-
other is made manifest is seen to be extremely different. Here we see how a 
character who could be classified as a subject typical of  the time-image, can 
instead be seen to exist in a form whose aesthetic characteristics problematize 
this western definition of  character. 
Ray, however, is in no way typical of  popular Indian cinema After al~ his work 
is received with little enthusiasm by mainstream audiences throughout India's 
different States. In Indian cinema's popular forms, different manifestations of 
the subject of  the movement-image also arise. Once again, this is due to the 
specific aesthetic concerns of  these cinemas. Bombay cinema, for instance, as 
Rosie Thomas cautioned in the same year that saw the publication of  Cinema 2, 
must not be seen as an industry that produces bad copies of  mainstream western 
cinemas like Hollywood. Whilst they may borrow elements from western 
cinemas, through an aesthetic 'Indianisation'll these borrowed elements become 311 
part of  films which are culturally specific entities unto themselves. As Thomas' 
work illustrates, the Hollywood action-image's movement from situation (S) to 
changed situation (S') through the action (A) of  the character, is not retained by 
the Hindi cinema aesthetic, even in cases when a  Hollywood narrative is 
transplanted into a Hindi film. In fact, Hindi cinema displays distinctly different 
priorities to those of  west  em cinema. 
What seems to emerge in Hindi cinema is an emphasis on emotion and 
spectacle rather than on tight narrative, on how things will happen rather 
than what will happen next, on a succession of  modes rather than linear 
denouement ...  12 
This ensures that the agency of  the character in the development ofa 
recognizable linear narrative takes second place to the creation of  spectacles 
through which the changing situation is seen to develop. It is a matter of  how, 
not why, the situation changes from S to Sf. For this reason, the subject of  the 
movement-image that we find in Sherlock Jr.  is not quite the same subject that 
we find in Hindi cinema. Its sensory-motor continuity remains, but its actions are 
not given the same primacy in the linking together of  situations as is the case in 
the Hollywood model. In films like Naseeb (1981, Destiny) Thomas shows, the 
role of  fate, or destiny, plays a much stronger role than in the Hollywood action-
image, the representative of  the American ideology of  per  formative self-creation. 
In a film in which; 'Order, or equilibrium is presented as a state in which humans 
live in harmony with fate', and in which; 'Disruption of  this order is the result of 
selfish greed,13, the subject's ability to perform their identity in such a way as to 
change the situation in which they find themselves (from S to Sf) is contrary to 
necessity. Deleuze's distinctions simply do not apply to this aesthetic context. 
In fact, it becomes extremely difficult to sustain Deleuze's exclusive categories 
of  movement- and time-image in relation to the non-Aristotelian aesthetic of  the 
rasa employed by Hindi cinema. Here, the succession of  events that take place 
across a series of  unified spaces in the movement-image becomes, instead, the 
'succession of  modes of  affect (rasa), by means of  highly stylised devices.'14 312 
The narrative's progression through a series of  discontinuous spectacles 
problematizes the broad distinction which Deleuze draws between movement-
and time-images. Neither category seems entirely adequate to describe the Hindi 
cinema narrative, which rejects the 'unities of  time and place,15 of  the 
Aristotelian (movement-image) aesthetic on the one hand, but which does not 
quite slip into the convoluted passage through time of  the time-image on the 
other. Deleuze's binary categories must, for this reason alone, be applied with 
great caution to texts whose logic is not the same as that which structures 
Deleuze's image of  thought. 
Perhaps a little like a Proppian analysis of  narrative, a semiological critique of 
shot structures, or a psychoanalytically defined subject, Deleuze's work should 
be understood as offering one more way of  regarding cinema. His methodology 
is not a film studies panacea, it is an epistemology. Indeed, it is one of  many. 
Consequently, it must be utilized with great care, and, for the reasons we have 
alluded to above, more than a few caveats. Whilst we began this work with a 
criticism of  film studies' retreat into the nation (and whilst we still maintain that 
the very concept of  the nation is itself  an arbitrary framework of  reasoning from 
within which to view films) the recourse to a specific context, as we have briefly 
seen with some different Indian cinemas, illuminates the difficulties which face 
any attempt to utilize Deleuze's concepts universally. Although there are, 
admittedly, almost as many complementary difficulties involved in any recourse 
to causal aesthetic origins in national and cultural texts and contexts (especially 
the dangers of  essentialism and racist exclusion which they bring to the multi-
cultural histories which nearly all "nations" enjoy) the questions which the 
contrasting conclusions ask of  De  leuze cannot simply be ignored. 
The somewhat unresolved endings of  both chapters five and six of  this thesis 
also suggest other limitations inherent to the Deleuzian study of  cinema. These 
are, in part at least, created by this work's inevitable fmitude. As it drew towards 
its conclusion we realized with desperate frustration the new territories opening 
up before us which we no longer had the words, or the time, left to map. Some of 313 
the questions which remain include: How do our conclusions concerning film 
noirs like Memento, The Talented Mr Ripley, and Liar fare, when examined in 
relation to the contextual framework oftheir genre's conventions and history? 
Would such an approach strengthen or diminish the validity of  the conclusions 
drawn so far? Moreover, how would a study of  the effect of  American film noir 
on the French New Wave influence what we have said about Un heros tres 
discret? Furthermore, how would such a generic/national cinema context further 
problematize the distinctions between the two types of  cinema that we have 
drawn, and indeed, Deleuze's movement-/time-image binary? 
This is, of  course, in addition to the necessarily over-simplistic Europe/America 
distinction of  chapter six, which cannot help but be problematized by any study 
that concentrates on the specifics of  the regional cinemas that exist within these 
continental contexts. What are we to make, for instance, of  the conclusions we 
have drawn concerning the narrative representations of  performative subjectivity 
in relation to the political and institutional contexts in which these films 
emerged? Although we touched on this question in chapter four, through an 
analysis of  the urban, national, and global economical contests that produced 
Sliding Doors and Lola Rennt, much work still remains to be done in this 
respect. Finally, as we noted in the preface, the focus on character subjectivity 
has led to a marked absence of  any critical appreciation of  the role of  mise-en-
scene, lighting, soundtrack, music, subtitles (and so on) in the films we have 
studied. Anyone of  these factors could problematize the conclusions we have 
drawn. 
The above notwithstanding, it may be that, as the notion of  the nation becomes 
increasingly more problematic - due to the growth of  globally determined 
networks like the two-tier global economy, a European superstate, or indeed, 
terrorism that is not (contrary to current military maneuvers) nation specific -
Deleuze's universalizing framework can still offer new ways ofthinking about 
cinema. Marks' work, once more, expresses exactly how a Deleuzian focus on 
concepts like memory and the senses, when used in relation to contexts that 314 
transgress that of  the nation, can help to locate general trends that are prevalent 
within multi-cultural and diasporic cinemas. In this way, its potentially 
universalizing stance can be used in an extremely positive fashion. For this 
reason at least, it is hoped that the initial conclusions that this work offers -
concerning the narrative expression of  our western view oftime in the 
movement-image - may also be usefuL 
Despite the above reservations, there is much ofpositive worth to be gained 
from a study of  De  leuze. Perhaps as a contrast to Marks' focus on multi-cultural 
time-images, this work can be seen as an uncovering of  some of  the generalizing 
binary reterritorializations behind certain western movement-images. After all, 
as the global dominance of  the colonizing (and increasingly, the endo-
colonizing) western image of  thought attempts to grow stronger throughout the 
globe, might realizing its tyrannical, linear narrative temporality not be one of 
the first steps towards ungrounding its reterritorializing power? If  so, we must 
also be wary of  simply perpetuating the same colonization through our choice of 
methodological filter with which to view different cinemas. For these reasons we 
must always keep one eye on the way in which we are utilizing Deleuze's 
exclusive image of  thought. 315 
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All  About Eve 
Country: US 
Year: 1950 
Running Time: 138 min. 
Director: Joseph L. Mankiewicz 
Producerls: Darryl F. Zanuck 
Script: Joseph L. Mankiewicz 
Angel Heart 
Country: US 
Year: 1987 
Running Time: 113 min. 
Director: Alan Parker 
Producerls: Alan Marshall 
Script: Alan Parker 
Annee derniere it Marienbad, L' 
Country: FrlIt 
Year: 1961 
Running Time: 94 min. 
Director: Alain Resnais 
Producerls: Pierre Courau, Raymond Froment 
Script: Alain Robbe-Grillet 
Apur Sansar 
Country: India 
Year: 1959 
Running Time: 106 min. 
Director: Satyajit Ray 
Producerls: Satyajit Ray 
Script: Satyajit Ray 
316 Big Heat,  The 
Country: US 
Year: 1953 
Running Time: 90 min. 
Director: Fritz Lang 
Producerls: Robert Arthur 
Script: Sydney Boehm 
Birth of  a Nation 
Country: US 
Year: 1915 
Length: 13 058 ft. 
Director: D. W. Griffith 
Producerls: D. W. Griffith, Harry E. Aitkin 
Script: D. W. Griffith, Frank E. Woods 
Ciline et Julie vont en bateau 
Country: France 
Year: 1974 
Running Time: 192 min. 
Director: Jacques Rivette 
Producerls: Barbet Schroeder 
Script: Juliet Berto, Dominique Labourier, Bulle Ogier, Marie-France Pisier, 
Jacques Rivette 
Conformista, II 
Country: ItlFr/WGer 
Year: 1969 
Running Time: 108 min. 
Director: Bernardo Bertolucci 
Producerls: Maurizio Lodi-Fe 
Script: Bernardo Bertolucci 
317 Deep Cover 
Country: US 
Year: 1992 
Running Time: 112 min. 
Director: Bill Duke 
Producerls: Pierre David 
Script: Michael Tolkin, Henry Bean 
Detour 
Country: US 
Year: 1945 
Running Time: 68 min. 
Director: Edgar G. Ulmer 
Producerls: Leon Fromkess 
Script: Martin Goldsmith 
Double Vie de  Veronique,  La 
Country: Poland 
Year: 1991 
Running Time: 98 min. 
Director: Krzysztof Kieslowski 
Producerls: Leonardo De La Fuente 
Script: Krzysztof Kieslowski, Krzysztof Piesiewicz 
8Y2 
Country: Italy 
Year: 1963 
Running Time: 13 8 min. 
Director: Federico Fellini 
Producerls: Angelo Rizzoli 
Script: Federico Fellini 
Epouse-moi 
Country: France 
318 Year: 2000 
Running Time: 90 min. 
Director: Harriet Marin 
Producerls: Jean-Claude Fleury 
Script: Harriet Marin, Laurent Couchan 
Flirt 
Country: US/GB/Jap 
Year: 1995 
Running Time: 84 min. 
Director: Hal Hartley 
Producerls: Ted Hope 
Script: Hal Hartley 
Goodfellas 
Country: US 
Year: 1990 
Running Time: 145 min. 
Director: Martin Scorcese 
Producerls: Irwin Winkler 
Script: Nicholas Pileggi, Martin Scorcese 
Heros tres discret,  Un 
Country: France 
Year: 1995 
Running Time: 106 min. 
Director: Jacques Audiard 
Producerls: Patrick Godeau 
Script: Alain Le Henry, Jacques Audiard 
Hiroshima, Mon Amour 
Country: France 
Year: 1959 
Running Time: 91 min. 
319 Director: Alain Resnais 
Script: Marguerite Duras 
It's a Wonderful Life 
Country: US 
Year: 1946 
Running Time: 129 min. 
Director: Frank Capra 
Producerls: Frank Capra 
Script: Frances Goodrich 
Je t'aime, je t'aime 
Country: France 
Year: 1967 
Running Time: 94 min. 
Director: Alain Resnais 
Producerls: Mag Bodard 
Script: Jacques Sternberg 
Jetee,  La 
Country: France 
Year: 1962 
Running Time: 29 min. 
Director: Chris Marker 
Script: Chris Marker 
Liar 
Country: US 
Year: 1997 
Running Time: 102 min. 
Director: Josh and Jonas Pate 
Producerls: Peter Glatzer 
Script: Jonas Pate, Josh Pate 
320 Living in Oblivion 
Country: US 
Year: 1995 
Running Time: 90 min. 
Director: Tom de Cillio 
Producerls: Michael Griffiths, Marcus Viscidi 
Script: Tom DiCillo 
Lola Rennt 
Country: Germany 
Year: 1998 
Running Time: 80 min. 
Director: Tomas Tykwer 
Producerls: Stefan Arndt 
Script: Tomas Tykwer 
Lost Highway 
Country: US 
Year: 1996 
Running Time: 134 min. 
Director: David Lynch 
Producerls: Deepak Nayar, Tom Sternberg, Mary Sweeney 
Script: David Lynch, Barry Gifford 
Mamie 
Country: US 
Year: 1964 
Running Time: 130 min. 
Director: Alfred Hitchcock 
Producerls: Alfred Hitchcock 
Script: Jay Presson Allen 
Memento 
Country: US 
321 Year: 2000 
Running Time: 109 min. 
Director: Christopher Nolan 
Producerls: Suzanne Todd, Jennifer Todd 
Script: Christopher Nolan 
Mulholland Drive 
Country: US 
Year: 2002 
Running Time: 146 min. 
Director: David Lynch 
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Producerls: Mary Sweeney, Alain Sarde, Neal Edelstein, Michael Polaire, Tony 
Krantz, and Pierre Edelman, 
Script: David Lynch 
The Music Box 
Country: US 
Year: 1989 
Running Time: 126 min. 
Director: Costa-Gavras 
Producerls: Irwin Winkler 
Script: Joe Eszterhas 
Possible Worlds 
Country: Canada 
Year: 2001 
Running Time: 93 min. 
Director: Robert Lepage 
Producerls: Sandra Cunningham 
Script: Robert Lepage, John Mighton 
Pretty Woman 
Country: US 
Year: 1990 Running Time: 119 min. 
Director: Garry Marshall 
Producerls: Arnon Milchan, Steven Reuther 
Script: J. F. Lawton 
Roma Citta Aperta 
Country: Italy 
Year: 1945 
Running Time: 101 min. 
Director: Roberto Rosselini 
Script: Sergio Amidei, Federico Fellini, Roberto Rossellini 
Romy and Michele IS High School Reunion 
Country: US 
Year: 1997 
Running Time: 91 min. 
Director: David Mirkin 
Producerls: Laurence Mark 
Script: Robin Schiff 
Saving Private Ryan 
Country: US 
Year: 1998 
Running Time: 170 min. 
Director: Steven Spielberg 
Producerls: Steven Spielberg, Ian Bruce, Mark Gordon, Gary Levinsohn 
Script: Robert Rodat 
Scarface 
Country: us 
Year: 1932 
Running Time: 90 min. 
Director: Howard Hawks 
Producerls: Howard Hawks 
323 Script: Ben Hecht, Seton 1. Miller, John Lee Marvin, W. R. Burnett 
Sherlock Jr. 
Country: US 
Year: 1924 
Length: 4 065 ft. 
Director: Buster Keaton 
Producerls: Joseph M. Schenck 
Script: Jean Havez, Joseph Mitchell, Clyde Bruckmann 
Shoah 
Country: France 
Year: 1985 
Running Time: 566 min. 
Director: Claude Lanzmann 
Short Cuts 
Country: US 
Year: 1993 
Running Time: 188 min. 
Director: Robert Altman 
Producerls: Cary Brokaw 
Script: Robert Altman, Frank Barhydt 
Sixth Sense,  The 
Country: US 
Year: 1999 
Running Time: 107 min. 
Director: M. Night Shyamalan 
Producerls: Frank Marshall, Kathleen Kennedy, Barry Mendel 
Script: M. Night Shyamalan 
Sliding Doors 
Country: US/GB 
324 Year: 1997 
Running Time: 99 min. 
Director: Peter Howitt 
Producerls: Sydney Pollack, Philippa Braithwaite, William Horberg 
Script: Peter Howitt 
Star Wars 
Country: US 
Year: 1977 
Running Time: 121 min. 
Director: George Lucas 
Producerls: Gary Kurtz 
Script: George Lucas 
Sunset Boulevard 
Country: US 
Year: 1950 
Running Time: 111 min. 
Director: Billy Wilder 
Producerls: Charles Brackett 
Script: Charles Brackett, Billy Wilder, D. M. Marshman Jr. 
Talented Mr Ripley, The 
Country: US 
Year: 1999 
Running Time: 139 min. 
Director: Anthony Minghella 
Producerls: William Horberg, Tom Sternberg 
Script: Anthony Minghella 
Todo Sabre Mi Madre 
Country: SplFr 
Year: 1999 
Running Time: 101 min. 
325 Director: Pedro Almod6var 
Producerls: Augustin Almod6var 
Script: Pedro Almod6var 
Underground 
Country: Fr/GerlHun 
Year: 1995 
Running Time: 192 min. 
Director: Emir Kusturica 
Producerls: Pierre Spengler 
Script: Dusan Kovacevic, Emir Kusturica 
Vertigo 
Country: US 
Year: 1958 
Running Time: 128 min. 
Director: Alfred Hitchcock 
Producerls: Alfred Hitchcock 
Script: Alec Coppel, Samuel Taylor 
Winterschlafer 
Country: GerIFr 
Year: 1997 
Running Time: 124 min. 
Director: Tomas Tykwer 
Producerls: Stefan Arndt 
Script: Tomas Tykwer, Anne-Franc;oise Pyszora 
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